Petitioner, a member of Jehovah's Witnesses, was denied
classification as a conscientious objector under § 6(j) of the
Universal Military Training and Service Act. He appealed. After the
usual investigation, the Department of Justice admitted his
sincerity, but recommended to the Appeal Board that classification
as a conscientious objector be denied on the ground that he was not
entitled to exemption because he had indicated his willingness to
fight in defense of "his ministry, Kingdom Interests, and . . . his
fellow brethren." The Appeal Board denied petitioner classification
as a conscientious objector, and he was convicted of failing to
submit to induction under § 12(a) of the Act.
Held: the recommendation of the Department of Justice
was based on an error of law, and the conviction is reversed. Pp.
348 U. S.
386-392.
(a) In view of petitioner's emphasis throughout his selective
service form that the weapons of his warfare were spiritual, not
carnal, his willingness to use force in defense of Kingdom
Interests and brethren is not sufficiently inconsistent with his
claim to justify the conclusion that he fell short of being a
conscientious objector to "participation in war in any form" within
the meaning of § 6(j). Pp.
348 U. S. 389-390.
(b) By relating a registrant's conscientious objection to his
religious training and belief, Congress has made the beliefs of his
religious sect relevant, but it was erroneous as a matter of law to
deny a member of Jehovah's Witnesses exemption as a conscientious
objector merely because members of that sect are ready to engage in
a "theocratic war," if Jehovah so commands, and willing to fight at
Armageddon with spiritual, not carnal, weapons. Pp.
348 U. S.
390-391.
(c) When Congress referred to participation in war in any form,
it had in mind actual military conflicts between nations of the
earth in our time. P.
348 U. S.
391.
(d) If a registrant has the requisite conscientious objection,
on religious grounds, to participation in war in any form, he does
not forfeit his rights under § 6(j) because his other beliefs may
extend beyond the exemption granted by Congress. P.
348 U. S.
391.
Page 348 U. S. 386
(e) The Department of Justice's error of law in its report to
the Appeal Board must vitiate the entire proceedings, since it is
not clear that the Board relied on some legitimate ground in
denying petitioner's classification as a conscientious objector.
Pp.
348 U. S.
391-392.
213 F.2d 911 reversed.
Petitioner was convicted of failing to submit to induction into
the armed forces in violation of § 12(a) of the Universal Military
Training and Service Act. The Court of Appeals affirmed. 213 F.2d
911. This Court granted certiorari. 348 U.S. 812.
Reversed, p.
348 U. S.
392.
MR. JUSTICE CLARK delivered the opinion of the Court.
Petitioner was born in 1927, and was brought up as a Jehovah's
Witness by his parents, both of whom were of that faith. He has
been identified with the sect since he was 6 years old, "was
immersed and became a consecrated servant of Jehovah" at 15, and
was ordained when 17 years old. He registered with his local Board
in 1948, and, although he worked 44 hours a week for the Railway
Express Company, he was first classified as a minister. In 1950,
however, petitioner was reclassified for general service, and,
shortly thereafter, he filed his conscientious objector claim.
In the special form, petitioner included this statement:
"The nature of my claim is that: I am already in the Army of
Christ Jesus serving as a soldier of Jehovah's appointed Commander
Jesus Christ. (2 Tim. 2:3 & 4). Inasmuch as the war weapons
of
Page 348 U. S. 387
the soldier of Jesus Christ are not carnal, I am not authorized
by his Commander to engage in carnal warfare of this world. (2
Corinthians 10:3 & 4, Ephesians 6:11-18) Furthermore, being
enlisted in the army of Jesus Christ, I cannot desert the forces of
Jehovah to assume the obligations of a soldier in any army of this
world without being guilty of desertion and suffering the
punishment meted out to deserters by Almighty God. . . ."
In answer to the question, "Under what circumstances, if any, do
you believe in the use of force," he wrote:
"Only in the interests of defending Kingdom Interests, our
preaching work, our meetings, our fellow brethren and sisters, and
our property against attack. I (as well as all Jehovah's Witnesses)
defend those when they are attacked, and are forced to protect such
interests, and scripturally so. Because, in doing so, we do not arm
ourselves or carry carnal weapons in anticipation of or in
preparation for trouble or to meet threats. In doing so, I try to
ward off blows and attacks only in defense. I do not use weapons of
warfare in defense of myself or the Kingdom interests. I do not
retreat when attacked in my home or at meeting places, but will
retreat on public or other property and shake the dust off my feet;
so not giving what is holy to dogs and not throwing my pearls
before swine. (Matthew 10:14 & 7:6) So I retreat when I can do
so and avoid a fight or trouble. Also following the admonition at
Acts 24:16; which states, 'In this respect, indeed, I am exercising
myself continually to have a consciousness of committing no offense
against God and man.'"
Upon a denial of this claim by the local Board, petitioner
appealed, and his file was referred to the Department of Justice.
It appears that the report of the Federal Bureau
Page 348 U. S. 388
of Investigation contained nothing unfavorable to petitioner's
claim, and the hearing officer concluded that petitioner should be
classified as a conscientious objector. In advising the Department
of Justice, the hearing officer wrote that he "was convinced that
[petitioner] has sincere objections to military service by reason
of his religious training and beliefs." The Department of Justice,
although admitting that the investigation was favorable to
petitioner, recommended to the Appeal Board that petitioner's claim
be denied on the ground that
"While the registrant may be sincere in the beliefs he has
expressed, he has, however, failed to establish that he is opposed
to war in any form. As indicated by the statements on his SSS Form
No. 150, registrant will fight under some circumstances, namely in
defense of his ministry, Kingdom Interests, and in defense of his
fellow brethren. He is therefore not entitled to exemption within
the meaning of the Act."
The Appeal Board retained petitioner in his I-A classification,
and thereafter, when duly ordered to report, he refused to submit
to induction. This prosecution followed, and the Seventh Circuit
affirmed petitioner's conviction. 213 F.2d 911. We granted
certiorari, 348 U.S. 812.
In this case, unlike
Witmer, ante, p.
348 U. S. 375, it
is admitted that petitioner is sincere; we are therefore relieved
of the task of searching the record for basis in fact to support a
finding of insincerity. The only question presented in this case is
one of law -- do the beliefs which petitioner says he holds amount
to the conscientious opposition to "participation in war in any
form" demanded by Congress as a prerequisite to the conscientious
objector deferment?
Page 348 U. S. 389
Stated in the light of the background, the question at issue is
whether a registrant under the Universal Military Training and
Service Act, who is admittedly a sincere Jehovah's Witness and
conscientious objector to participation in war, but who believes in
the use of force in defending "his ministry, "Kingdom Interests,"
and . . . his fellow brethren," is entitled to exemption under §
6(j) of the Act from service in the armed forces. The Government
insists that petitioner's statements reveal qualified and varied
objection to war -- and that
"petitioner's willingness to fight in defense of Kingdom
interests, particularly when those words are considered in the
light of the teachings of his sect, . . ."
is clearly not opposition to war in any form.
The Government does not contend that the petitioner's belief in
the use of force in self-defense, as well as the defense of his
home, family and associates, is so inconsistent with his claim of
conscientious objection as to serve as a basis for a denial of his
claim.
* The question
here narrows to whether the willingness to use of force in defense
of Kingdom interests and brethren is sufficiently inconsistent with
petitioner's claim as to justify the conclusion that he fell short
of being a conscientious objector. Throughout his selective service
form, petitioner emphasized that the weapons of his warfare were
spiritual, not carnal. He asserted that he was a soldier in the
Army of Jesus Christ and that "the war weapons of the soldier of
Jesus Christ are not carnal." With reference to the defense of his
ministry, his brethren, and Kingdom interests, he asserted that "we
do not arm ourselves or carry carnal weapons. . . . I do not use
weapons of warfare in defense . . . of Kingdom interests. . . ." In
letters to
Page 348 U. S. 390
the local Board, he reiterated these beliefs. On their face,
these statements make it clear that petitioner's defense of
"Kingdom Interests" has neither the bark nor the bite of war as we
unfortunately know it today. It is difficult for us to believe that
the Congress had in mind this type of activity when it said the
thrust of conscientious objection must go to "participation in war
in any form."
But the Government urges that these statements of petitioner
must be taken in the light of the teachings of Jehovah's Witnesses.
While each case must of necessity be based on the particular
beliefs of the individual registrant, it is true that the Congress,
by relating the registrant's conscientious objection to his
religious training and belief, has made the belief of his sect
relevant. Moreover, the petitioner does parenthetically say that
his belief in the use of force was "as well . . . [the belief of]
all Jehovah's Witnesses." On the other hand, though the Government
has appended to its brief a copy of the Watchtower magazine of
February 1, 1951, we do not find any such literature in the record.
It is not at all clear that we may consider such material outside
the record to support an Appeal Board decision,
cf. Cox v.
United States, 332 U. S. 442,
332 U. S.
453-455 (1947), but we need not decide that here,
because, in any event, there is no substance to the Government's
contention. Granting that these articles picture Jehovah's
Witnesses as anti-pacifists, extolling the ancient wars of the
Israelites and ready to engage in a "theocratic war" if Jehovah so
commands them, and granting that the Jehovah's Witnesses will fight
at Armageddon, we do not feel this is enough. The test is not
whether the registrant is opposed to all war, but whether he is
opposed, on religious grounds, to participation in war. As to
theocratic war, petitioner's willingness to fight on the orders of
Jehovah is tempered by the fact that, so far as we know, their
history records
Page 348 U. S. 391
no such command since Biblical times and their theology does not
appear to contemplate one in the future. And although the Jehovah's
Witnesses may fight in the Armageddon, we are not able to stretch
our imagination to the point of believing that the yardstick of the
Congress includes within its measure such spiritual wars between
the powers of good and evil where the Jehovah's Witnesses, if they
participate, will do so without carnal weapons.
We believe that Congress had in mind real shooting wars when it
referred to participation in war in any form -- actual military
conflicts between nations of the earth in our time -- wars with
bombs and bullets, tanks, planes, and rockets. We believe the
reasoning of the Government in denying petitioner's claim is so far
removed from any possible congressional intent that it is erroneous
as a matter of law.
The Court of Appeals also rested its decision on the conclusion
that petitioner's objection to participation in war was only a
facet of his real objection to all government authority. We
believe, however, that, if the requisite objection to participation
in war exists, it makes no difference that a registrant also
claims, on religious grounds, other exemptions which are not
covered by the Act. Once he comes within § 6(j), he does not
forfeit its coverage because of his other beliefs which may extend
beyond the exemption granted by Congress.
The Government also contends, apparently for the first time,
that petitioner objects to "participation in war in any form," if
in fact he does, not from a feeling that it is wrong to participate
in war, but because such participation will require time which
petitioner feels should be devoted to his religious activities. In
its memorandum indicating its lack of opposition to certiorari, the
Government gave no hint that it considered such an issue in the
case, and it is unnecessary for us to consider it here. The
report
Page 348 U. S. 392
of the Department of Justice to the Appeal Board clearly bases
its recommendation on petitioner's willingness to "fight under some
circumstances, namely in defense of his ministry, Kingdom
Interests, and in defense of his fellow brethren," and we feel that
this error of law by the Department, to which the Appeal Board
might naturally look for guidance on such questions, must vitiate
the entire proceedings, at least where it is not clear that the
Board relied on some legitimate ground. Here, where it is
impossible to determine on exactly which grounds the Appeal Board
decided, the integrity of the Selective Service System demands at
least that the Government not recommend illegal grounds. There is
an impressive body of lower court cases taking this position, and
we believe that they state the correct rule.
Cf. United States
ex rel. Levy v. Cain, 149 F.2d 338, 342 (1945);
United
States v. Balogh, 157 F.2d 939, 943-944 (1946),
judgment
vacated on other grounds, 329 U.S. 692;
United States v.
Everngam, 102 F.
Supp. 128 (1951).
The decision below is therefore
Reversed.
* In
United States v. Taffs, in which we denied
certiorari 347 U.S. 928, the Government admitted as much in its
petition. Its admission here does not extend to the category
"brethren," which was not used in
Taffs.
MR. JUSTICE REED, dissenting.
It is not important to the United State military strength that a
few people eligible for military service are excused from combat
and noncombatant duties as conscientious objectors. It is important
to other American citizens that many without such scruples against
war must serve while the few continue their assigned tasks with no
exposure to danger greater than that of other civilians.
Many, by reason of religious training or moral conviction, may
be opposed to certain wars declared by the Nation. But they must
serve because they do not meet the test of the statute,
"conscientiously opposed to participation in war in any form." The
Court assumes that
Page 348 U. S. 393
Sicurella's conscience permits him to participate in theocratic
wars -- that is, those approved by Jehovah, such as the blood and
flesh wars of the Israelites. Sicurella testified he would use
force in defense of "Kingdom Interests." Those words also seem to
me to include theocratic wars. Under the assumption of the Court
and petitioner's statements, he is not covered by the statutory
exemption. His position is inconsistent with his claimed opposition
to war. I would require him to serve in the military service.
MR. JUSTICE MINTON, dissenting.
The findings and classification made by the Selective Service
Board and the Appeal Board are final. 50 U.S.C.App. (1952 ed.) §
460(b)(3). This Court does not sit as a court of review. It is not
our province to substitute our judgment of the facts for that of
the Board, or to correct the Board's errors of law unless they are
so wanton, arbitrary and capricious as to destroy the jurisdiction
of the Board.
This Court said in
Estep v. United States, 327 U.
S. 114 at
327 U. S.
122-123:
"The provision making the decisions of the local boards 'final'
means to us that Congress chose not to give administrative action
under this Act the customary scope of judicial review which obtains
under other statutes. It means that the courts are not to weigh the
evidence to determine whether the classification made by the local
boards was justified. The decisions of the local boards made in
conformity with the regulations are final
even though they may
be erroneous. The question of jurisdiction of the local board
is reached only if there is no basis in fact for the classification
which it gave the registrant."
(Emphasis added.)
Page 348 U. S. 394
In that case, Estep had claimed that his classification was made
arbitrarily and capriciously. This is always a question of
jurisdiction. Was the Board acting in wanton disregard of its legal
boundaries? If it was not, but made what we might consider an
honest mistake in judgment, this Court should not intervene.
In the instant case, the Court does not say that the Board acted
capriciously and arbitrarily, or that the judgment of the Board was
not an allowable judgment of reasonable men. The Court states that
a mistake in advice was made by the Department of Justice to the
Appeal Board.
"The report of the Department of Justice . . . clearly bases its
recommendation on petitioner's willingness to 'fight under some
circumstances, namely in defense of his ministry, Kingdom
Interests, and in defense of his fellow brethren,' and we feel that
this error of law by the Department, to which the Appeal Board
might naturally look for guidance on such questions, must vitiate
the entire proceedings. . . ."
It will be noted that the Court says there was error of law not
by the Appeal Board, but by the Department of Justice, whose
recommendation is purely advisory, and not binding upon the Appeal
Board. 50 U.S.C.App. (1952 ed.) § 456(j). The Court concludes that
the Department of Justice committed an error of law by recommending
to the Appeal Board that the petitioner be denied conscientious
objector classification because of petitioner's willingness to
"fight under some circumstances, namely in defense of his ministry,
Kingdom Interests, and in defense of his fellow brethren." The
record in this case clearly establishes that this was the position
and attitude of the petitioner as a faithful Jehovah's Witness.
Petitioner
Page 348 U. S. 395
says he is opposed to fighting a secular war, but is not opposed
to fighting a religious war where the interests of his sect are
involved. This does not meet the test of the statute, 50 U.S.C.App.
(1952 ed.) § 456(j), which provides:
"Nothing contained in this title [sections 451-454 and 455-471
of this Appendix] shall be construed to require any person to be
subject to combatant training and service in the armed forces of
the United States who, by reason of religious training and belief,
is conscientiously opposed to participation in war in any
form."
The petitioner is not opposed to "participation in war in any
form." That is the congressional test. On the contrary, he reserves
the right to choose the wars in which he will fight. The petitioner
refused even to be inducted for any kind of limited service,
combatant or otherwise.
The Court's opinion gives the impression that the petitioner and
his sect would not use force. In petitioner's own statement to the
Board, he contradicts such a position. SSS Form No. 150, filled out
by the petitioner and submitted to the Board, contains the
following question and answer:
"5. Under what circumstances, if any, do you believe in the use
of force?"
"Only in the interests of defending Kingdom Interests, our
preaching work, our meetings, our fellow brethren and sisters and
our property against attack. I (as well as all Jehovah's Witnesses)
defend those when they are attacked and are forced to protect such
interests, and scripturally so. Because, in doing so, we do not arm
ourselves or carry carnal weapons in anticipation of or in
preparation for trouble or to meet threats. "
Page 348 U. S. 396
This answer clearly shows that the petitioner and his sect will
fight for Kingdom interests, whatever that is, preaching work,
their meetings, their fellow brethren and sisters, and their
property. They do not, they say, carry carnal weapons in
anticipation of attack, but they will use them in case of attack.
This evidence clearly supports the District Court's finding of
guilt, and the conclusion of the Selective Service Board based on
such evidence was an allowable one.
I think the Department of Justice might very well have believed
petitioner did not meet the test laid down by Congress. By
accepting the Department's recommendation, the Board might have
been mistaken, but it was an honest mistake. There is not the
slightest intimation of arbitrary or capricious conduct on the part
of the Board.
Because we do not sit to review errors of fact or law unless the
latter be so arbitrary and capricious as to destroy the Board's
jurisdiction, and because I think the decision of the Appeal Board,
even if the Board accepted and relied upon the recommendation of
the Department of Justice, was an honest opinion, and therefore an
allowable judgment not arbitrarily and capriciously made, I would
affirm.