Petitioner was convicted under § 145 of the Internal Revenue
Code of willful attempts to evade his income taxes for 1946 through
1949. In addition to the net worth method of proof considered in
Holland v. United State, ante, p.
348 U. S. 121, the
Government relied on an extrajudicial written net worth statement
signed by petitioner and delivered to government agents, plus
independent evidence of petitioner's expenditures, savings, and
investments. Petitioner contended (a) that his extrajudicial
statement was not sufficiently corroborated by other evidence, and
(b) that it should not have been admitted in evidence, because it
was procured pursuant to an understanding with a government agent
that the case would be closed and petitioner granted immunity. At a
pretrial hearing, the trial judge denied a motion to suppress this
statement as evidence. At the trial, he refused to hold a hearing
outside the presence of the jury to determine preliminarily the
admissibility of the statement, and he submitted the issue to the
jury with instructions that they should reject the statement and
all evidence obtained through it, if "trickery, fraud or deceit"
were practiced on petitioner or his accountant.
Held: the conviction is affirmed. Pp.
348 U. S.
149-159.
1. The issue of fraud or deceit on the part of the government
agent was properly submitted to the jury, and the jury, in arriving
at its general verdict, could have found from the conflicting
evidence that no fraudulent inducements had been offered petitioner
or his accountant. Pp.
348 U. S.
150-151.
2. Denial of a
voir dire during the trial, on the issue
of fraud or deceit on the part of the government agent, did not
deprive petitioner of any substantial right. The trial judge had
already held a hearing on this issue in passing on the pretrial
motion to suppress evidence, the only evidence offered in seeking a
voir dire during the trial was that which had been heard
in the pretrial hearing, and that evidence was narrated again to
judge and jury after the
voir dire had been denied. P.
348 U. S.
151.
3. There was sufficient independent evidence to corroborate
petitioner's extrajudicial admission that he did not have
sufficient assets
Page 348 U. S. 148
at the beginning of the computation period to account for the
increases in net worth attributed to him. Pp.
348 U. S.
151-159.
(a) The requirement of corroboration of extrajudicial
confessions is applicable to the crime of tax evasion. Pp.
348 U. S.
153-154.
(b) The rule requiring corroboration of extrajudicial
confessions is applicable to the statement involved in this case,
which, though not a confession admitting all of the elements of the
offense, was made after the fact to an official charged with
investigating the possibility of wrongdoing, and which embraced an
element vital to the Government's case. Pp.
348 U. S.
154-156.
(c) Corroboration is necessary for all elements of the offense
established by admissions alone, but it is sufficient if the
corroboration merely fortifies the truth of the admission, without
independently establishing the crime charged. P.
348 U. S.
156.
(d) All elements of the offense must be established by
independent evidence or corroborated admissions, but one available
mode of corroboration is for the independent evidence to bolster
the confession itself, and thereby prove the offense through the
statements of the accused. P.
348 U. S.
156.
(e) The Government may provide the necessary corroboration by
introducing substantial evidence, apart from the taxpayer's
admissions, tending to show that he willfully understated his
taxable income. P.
348 U. S.
157.
(f) This may be accomplished by substantiating the opening net
worth computation directly, since that figure, together with the
remainder of the net worth computation, amply establishes a
consistent understatement by petitioner of his taxable income; and
from this the jury could infer willfulness. P.
348 U. S.
157.
(g) In this case, petitioner's tax returns adequately
corroborated his extrajudicial statements as to his financial
history, and the two together corroborated the Government's
computation of his net worth. Pp.
348 U. S.
157-158.
(h) Petitioner's extrajudicial statements were further
corroborated by independent evidence showing substantial
expenditures, savings, and investments during the period involved.
Pp.
348 U. S.
158-159.
210 F.2d 496 affirmed.
Page 348 U. S. 149
MR. JUSTICE CLARK delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is the third of the net worth cases, and the first dealing
with the Government's use of extrajudicial statements made by the
accused. Petitioner and his wife were jointly tried on five counts
charging them with willful attempts to evade and defeat their
income taxes for the years 1946 through 1950. A motion for
acquittal was granted as to the wife on all five counts, and as to
petitioner on the fifth count (for the year 1950). The jury found
petitioner guilty on the first four counts, and the conviction was
affirmed by the Court of Appeals. 210 F.2d 496. We granted
certiorari in order to pass on the issues raised by the
prosecution's use of defendant's extrajudicial statements. 347 U.S.
1010.
The Government's theory was that the increases in the net worth
of petitioner and his wife exceeded their reported income for each
of the prosecution years, and that these increments represented
taxable income. The evidence tended to show that petitioner and his
wife were persons of moderate means prior to 1945, and that, toward
the end of that year, petitioner acquired a racing news service. In
the four succeeding years, the prosecution years here in issue,
petitioner and his wife acquired a large amount of visible wealth
in the form of bank accounts, real estate, securities, and other
assets. The evidence, taken as a whole, tended to prove that
petitioner and his wife had understated their income for the
four-year period of by over $190,000.
The issues in this case stem from a statement signed by the
petitioner and delivered to the Government agents
Page 348 U. S. 150
along with a check, the latter supposedly representing the
amount of tax he thought due and owing. [
Footnote 1] The statement, a five-page document,
included tables on petitioner's securities, prior tax returns,
living expenses, and a listing of petitioner's assets for each of
the years 1945 through 1949, showing changes in his net worth over
the prosecution period. While each of the pages was headed by the
names of petitioner and his wife, the statement was signed only by
the petitioner. His signature appeared after a clause describing
the listing of assets as "my true net worth for the period covered
herein."
Admissibility of the Statement.
Petitioner contends that his net worth statement should not have
been admitted in evidence, because it was procured pursuant to an
understanding between petitioner and a Government agent that the
case would be closed and the petitioner granted immunity.
See
Ziang Sung Wan v. United States, 266 U. S.
1,
266 U. S. 14;
Bram v. United States, 168 U. S. 532,
168 U. S.
542-543;
Wilson v. United States, 162 U.
S. 613,
162 U. S.
622-623;
Sparf and Hansen v. United States,
156 U. S. 51,
156 U. S. 55.
Petitioner's accountant, who carried on negotiations with this
Government agent, testified that the agent had promised to close
the case if the net worth statement and a check to cover the tax
deficiency were forthcoming, and that he, the accountant, would
never have submitted the statement had he not believed that the
case would be closed on this basis. The Government agent testified
that he was aware of no such understanding, and that he had made no
promises to close the case. After a pretrial hearing on
petitioner's motion to suppress evidence, the trial judge refused
to suppress the net worth statement.
Page 348 U. S. 151
During the course of the trial, he refused to hold a hearing
outside the presence of the jury to determine preliminary the
statement's admissibility. He submitted the issue to the jury with
the instruction that they were to reject the statement, and all
evidence obtained through it, if "trickery, fraud or deceit" were
practiced on petitioner or his accountant.
The issue of fraud or deceit on the part of the Government agent
was properly submitted to the jury, and the jury, in arriving at
its general verdict, could have found from the conflicting evidence
that no fraudulent inducement had been offered petitioner or his
accountant. Petitioner cannot complain that he was denied a
voir dire, cf. United States v. Carignan, 342 U. S.
36, since the trial judge had already held a hearing on
this issue in passing on the pretrial motion to suppress evidence.
Moreover, the only evidence offered by petitioner in seeking this
hearing during the trial was the testimony of petitioner's
accountant, evidence which had been heard in the pretrial hearing
and was narrated again to judge and jury after the
voir
dire had been denied. Under these circumstances, it cannot be
said that the refusal to hold a preliminary hearing deprived
petitioner of any substantial right.
Corroboration of Petitioner's Statement.
Petitioner's second major objection is that his net worth
statement, as it related to his opening net worth, was not
corroborated -- or was insufficiently corroborated -- by
independent evidence. Petitioner's statement listed his opening net
worth as follows:
Bank account . . . . . $ 1,079.60
Residence. . . . . . . 12,000.00
Automobile . . . . . . 2,000.00
----------
Total assets . . . . . $15,079.60
Page 348 U. S. 152
The Government agents credited petitioner with a higher opening
net worth:
Cash in banks. . . . . $ 8,058.58
Drug store partnership 5,618.39
Real estate. . . . . . 18,600.00
Furniture. . . . . . . 2,000.00
Automobile . . . . . . 2,000.00
----------
Total. . . . . . . . . $36,276.97
In determining these opening net worth figures, the Government
agents relied in part on figures furnished by petitioner in his net
worth statement and in other of his extrajudicial admissions -- for
the autos, the furniture, and one parcel of real estate. Any
variation in these figures would not materially affect the result.
[
Footnote 2] But petitioner
further complains that the Government did not corroborate the
negative implications of his net worth statement, that he did not
have at the end of 1945 any substantial assets -- for example, cash
on hand -- which were not reflected in his or the Government's net
worth computation. The question presented, therefore, is whether
there is sufficient independent evidence to corroborate
petitioner's extrajudicial admission that he did not have
sufficient assets at the starting point to account for the
increases in net worth attributed to him in the prosecution
years.
The general rule that an accused may not be convicted on his own
uncorroborated confession has previously been recognized by this
Court,
Warszower v. United States, 312 U.
S. 342;
Isaacs v. United States, 159 U.
S. 487;
cf. Miles v. United States,
103 U. S. 304,
103 U. S.
311-312, and has been consistently applied in the lower
federal courts and
Page 348 U. S. 153
in the overwhelming majority of state courts,
Forte v.
United States, 68 App.D.C. 111, 94 F.2d 236, 127 A.L.R. 1130;
7 Wigmore, Evidence, §§ 2070-2072. Its purpose is to prevent
"errors in convictions based upon untrue confessions alone,"
Warszower v. United States, supra, at
312 U. S. 347;
its foundation lies in a long history of judicial experience with
confessions, and in the realization that sound law enforcement
requires police investigations which extend beyond the words of the
accused. Confessions may be unreliable because they are coerced or
induced, and although separate doctrines exclude involuntary
confessions from consideration by the jury,
Bram v. United
States, supra; Wilson v. United States, supra, further caution
is warranted because the accused may be unable to establish the
involuntary nature of his statements. Moreover, though a statement
may not be "involuntary" within the meaning of this exclusionary
rule, still its reliability may be suspect if it is extracted from
one who is under the pressure of a police investigation -- whose
words may reflect the strain and confusion attending his
predicament, rather than a clear reflection of his past. Finally,
the experience of the courts, the police, and the medical
profession recounts a number of false confessions voluntarily made,
Note, 28 Ind.L.J. 374. These are the considerations which justify a
restriction on the power of the jury to convict, for this
experience with confessions is not shared by the average juror.
Nevertheless, because this rule does infringe on the province of
the primary finder of facts, its application should be scrutinized,
lest the restrictions it imposes surpass the dangers which gave
rise to them.
The first issue is whether the requirement of corroboration may
properly be applied to the crime of tax evasion. The corroboration
rule, at its inception, served an extremely limited function. In
order to convict of serious crimes of violence, then capital
offenses, independent proof was required that someone had indeed
inflicted the
Page 348 U. S. 154
violence, the so-called
corpus delicti. Once the
existence of the crime was established, however, the guilt of the
accused could be based on his own otherwise uncorroborated
confession. But, in a crime such as tax evasion, there is no
tangible injury which can be isolated as a
corpus delicti.
As to this crime, it cannot be shown that the crime has been
committed without identifying the accused. Thus, we are faced with
the choice either of applying the corroboration rule to this
offense and according the accused even greater protection than the
rule affords to a defendant in a homicide prosecution,
Evans v.
United States, 122 F.2d 461;
Murray v. United States,
53 App.D.C. 119, 288 F. 1008, or of finding the rule wholly
inapplicable because of the nature of the offense, stripping the
accused of this guarantee altogether. We choose to apply the rule,
with its broader guarantee, to crimes in which there is no tangible
corpus delicti, where the corroborative evidence must
implicate the accused in order to show that a crime has been
committed.
See, e.g., Tabor v. United States, 152 F.2d
254;
United States v. Kertess,139 F.2d 923;
Ercoli v.
United States, 76 U.S.App.D.C. 360, 131 F.2d 354;
Pines v.
United States, 123 F.2d 825;
Forte v. United States,
68 App.D.C. 111, 94 F.2d 236;
Tingle v. United States, 38
F.2d 573;
Wynkoop v. United States, 22 F.2d 799;
Daeche v. United States, 250 F. 566.
The next problem presented is whether the statement here
involved -- the opening net worth -- must be corroborated. Although
this statement was part of a document which may have admitted an
understatement of taxable income, one of the elements of the crime
of tax evasion, still it is clear that the statement is not a
confession admitting to all the elements of the offense. There is
some uncertainty in the lower court opinions as to whether the
corroboration requirement applies to mere admissions,
see
United States v. Kertess, supra, 139 F.2d at 929;
Ercoli
v. United
Page 348 U. S. 155
States, supra, 131 F.2d at 356.
But see Warszower
v. United States, supra, at
312 U. S. 347.
We hold the rule applicable to such statements, at least where, as
in this case, the admission is made after the fact to an official
charged with investigating the possibility of wrongdoing, and the
statement embraces an element vital to the Government's case.
[
Footnote 3]
Cf. Gulotta v.
United States, 113 F.2d 683, assimilating admissions to
confessions but failing to distinguish between admissions before
and after the fact as required by the
Warszower case.
Accord, Duncan v. United States, 68 F.2d 136;
Gordnier
v. United States, 261 F. 910.
The negative implications of petitioner's opening net worth
admission formed the cornerstone of the Government's theory of
guilt. Without proof that assets on hand at the beginning of the
prosecution period did not account for the alleged net worth
increases, the Government could not succeed.
Holland v. United
States, ante, p.
348 U. S. 75. An
admission which assumes this importance in the presentation of the
prosecution's case should not go uncorroborated, and this is true
whether we consider the statement an admission of one of the formal
"elements" of the crime or of a fact subsidiary to the proof of
these "elements." It is the practical relation of the statement to
the Government's case which is crucial, not its theoretical
relation to the definition of the offense.
Although we are unable to hold on this record that petitioner's
statement was inadmissible, the evidence is sufficient to cast
doubt on the accuracy of his admissions. The unreliability of the
statement is illustrated by the great variance between its net
worth calculation and the Government's computation, although
petitioner's consistent
Page 348 U. S. 156
erring in his own favor made it not unreasonable for the
Government to hold him to his word where it was to the Government's
advantage. On the whole, the statement is one which should be
carefully scrutinized in the light of the available independent
evidence.
There has been considerable debate concerning the quantum of
corroboration necessary to substantiate the existence of the crime
charged. It is agreed that the corroborative evidence does not have
to prove the offense beyond a reasonable doubt, or even by a
preponderance, as long as there is substantial independent evidence
that the offense has been committed, and the evidence as a whole
proves beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant is guilty.
Gregg v. United States, 113 F.2d 687;
Jordan v. United
States, 60 F.2d 4;
Forte v. United States, supra; Daeche
v. United States, supra. But cf. United States v.
Fenwick, 177 F.2d 488. In addition to differing views on the
substantiality of specific independent evidence, the debate has
centered largely about two questions: (1) whether corroboration is
necessary for all elements of the offense established by admissions
alone,
compare Ercoli v. United States, supra, and
Pines v. United States, supra, with Wynkoop v. United States,
supra, and Pearlman v. United States, 10 F.2d 460, and (2)
whether it is sufficient if the corroboration merely fortifies the
truth of the confession, without independently establishing the
crime charged,
compare Pearlman v. United States, supra, and
Daeche v. United States, supra, with Pines v. United States, supra,
and Forte v. United States, supra. We answer both in the
affirmative. All elements of the offense must be established by
independent evidence or corroborated admissions, but one available
mode of corroboration is for the independent evidence to bolster
the confession itself, and thereby prove the offense "through" the
statements of the accused.
Cf. Parker v. State, 228 Ind.
1, 88 N.E.2d 556, 89 N.E.2d 442.
Page 348 U. S. 157
Under the above standard, the Government may provide the
necessary corroboration by introducing substantial evidence, apart
from petitioner's admissions, tending to show that petitioner
willfully understated his taxable income. This may be accomplished
by substantiating the opening net worth directly, since that
figure, taken together with the remainder of the net worth
computation, amply establishes a consistent understatement by
petitioner of his taxable income, and from this the jury could
infer willfulness. Two significant items of evidence tend to show
that petitioner owned no assets at the starting point in excess of
those attributed to him in the Government's statement. First, a
Government official testified that petitioner had filed no income
tax returns in the years 1936 through 1939, nontaxable returns for
1940 and 1942, a nonassessable return for 1943, a refundable return
for 1944, and a taxable return for 1941. Second, the testimony of a
Government agent, touching upon the economic activities of the
petitioner in the years immediately preceding the prosecution
period, disclosed that, prior to 1941, petitioner had been employed
as a manager of a racing news service; that, from 1941 to 1945, he
worked in a package store for $40 a week; and that, for a short
time during this latter period, his wife worked as a hairdresser.
The agent's testimony, however, was based solely on the
extrajudicial statements of the petitioner, and, under the standard
we have adopted, these admissions must be corroborated by
substantial independent evidence. [
Footnote 4] The
Page 348 U. S. 158
tax returns adequately corroborate petitioner's statements as to
his financial history, and we hold that the two together
corroborate the opening net worth. The jury could find from this
evidence that petitioner's resources prior to the prosecution years
were such that he could not have amassed a greater store of wealth
than the amount credited to him in the Government's net worth
statement. This proof is buttressed somewhat by independent
evidence that petitioner had bought a modest home in 1943 for
$9,600, paying less than one-third in cash and the balance in
installments, and by the fact that petitioner's wife, who held the
bulk of the family's assets in her name, was a housewife through
almost all of the pre-prosecution years with no significant
independent sources of income.
But substantiating the opening net worth is just one method of
corroborating these extrajudicial statements. Petitioner's
admissions may also be corroborated by an entirely different line
of proof -- by independent evidence concerning petitioner's conduct
during the prosecution period, which tends to establish the crime
of tax evasion without resort to the net worth computations. The
Government's evidence showed that, coincident with petitioner's
opening of the racing news service, in which he kept no records,
petitioner and his wife opened 9 new bank accounts, making their
over-all total 14 accounts in 12 banks; that the money in these
accounts, which amounted to only $8,000 at the beginning of the
prosecution period, varied between $42,000 and $80,000 during the
prosecution years; that brokerage accounts, opened by petitioner
and his wife in 1947 and 1948 respectively, were worth $9,000 in
1947 and over $41,000 in 1948 and 1949; that petitioner and his
wife made new investments in realty during the prosecution period,
about $2,000 in 1946, over $14,000 in 1948, and $35,000 in 1949;
that other substantial expenditures were made during the
Page 348 U. S. 159
prosecution years, $3,750 in U.S. Savings Bonds in 1946, a total
investment of $4,768 in new cars in 1947 and 1948, and a $37,000
annuity payment and $3,750 mink coat in 1949. During these same
years, petitioner's declared income exceeded his living expenses by
less than $3,000. These substantial expenditures, savings and
investments might not, of themselves, suffice to support a
conviction of tax evasion without evidence of a starting point
indicating a lack of funds from which these payments might have
come. But this conduct does corroborate the net worth statement by
tending to show that the petitioner was understating his
income during the prosecution years. We cannot say that there is so
little relation between expenditures and income that the
Government's proof of expenditures far in excess of reported
income, coupled with proof of a business producing unrecorded
amounts of income, fails to corroborate the charge that
petitioner's earnings during the prosecution years exceeded his
declared income.
We hold that, under either of these two lines of proof,
sufficient corroboration was shown to permit the case to go to the
jury. The circumstances leading up to petitioner's statement, and
the failure of the facts shown therein to mesh with the other
evidence adduced by the Government, imposed on the trial judge and
the reviewing courts a duty of careful scrutiny. Nevertheless, the
independent evidence was strong enough, we believe, to overcome
these indicia of unreliability, and we accordingly
Affirm.
[
Footnote 1]
Although there had previously been discussion of a civil fraud
penalty, this check was apparently meant to cover only the tax
liability proper.
[
Footnote 2]
The Government also relied on petitioner's admissions in
establishing his living expenses during the prosecution years. But
these do not bear on opening net worth, and are therefore not
fairly within the question presented. Moreover, the variation
possible in these figures is too slight to affect the result in any
significant respect.
[
Footnote 3]
Admissions given under special circumstances, providing grounds
for a strong inference of reliability, may not have to be
corroborated.
Cf. Miles v. United States, supra; State v.
Saltzman, 241 Iowa 1373,
44 N.W.2d 24.
[
Footnote 4]
They were made to officials after the offense had been
committed. It may be questioned, though, whether these admissions
were as basic to the Government's case as the statements concerning
opening net worth, and whether they should therefore be exempted
from the requirement of corroboration. But where a fact is
sufficiently important that the Government adduces extrajudicial
statements of the accused bearing on its existence, and then relies
on its existence to sustain the defendant's conviction, there is
need for corroboration.
Cf. United States v. Kertess,
supra, 139 F.2d at 930.