1. A collective bargaining agreement whereby an employer, in
determining relative seniority of employment among its employees,
gives them credit for pre-employment military service, as well as
the credit for post-employment military service required by the
Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, is valid -- although it
works to the disadvantage of other employees, including those who
were employed prior to their military service. Pp.
345 U. S.
331-336.
2. By accepting such a provision in a collective bargaining
agreement, a union does not exceed its authority as a certified
collective bargaining representative under the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended. Pp.
345 U. S.
336-343.
195 F.2d 170 reversed.
The District Court dismissed a class suit for a declaratory
judgment and injunctive relief brought by an employee to invalidate
a seniority clause in a collective bargaining agreement between his
union and his employer. The Court of Appeals reversed. 195 F.2d
170. This Court granted certiorari. 344 U.S. 814.
Reversed and
remanded, p.
345 U. S.
343.
Page 345 U. S. 331
MR. JUSTICE BURTON delivered the opinion of the Court.
In these cases we sustain the validity of collective bargaining
agreements whereby an employer, in determining relative seniority
of employment among its employees, gives them credit for
pre-employment military service, as well as the credit required by
statute for post-employment military service. [
Footnote 1]
These proceedings were begun in the United States District Court
for the Western District of Kentucky by respondent Huffman, acting
individually and on behalf of a class of about 275 fellow employees
of the Ford Motor Company, petitioner in Case No.193 (here called
Ford). His complaint is that his position, and that of each member
of his class, has been lowered on the seniority roster at Ford's
Louisville works because of certain provisions in collective
bargaining agreements between Ford and the International Union,
United Automobile, Aircraft and Agricultural Implement Workers of
America, CIO, petitioner in Case No.194 (here called
International). He contends that those provisions have
Page 345 U. S. 332
violated his rights, and those of each member of his class,
under the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, as amended.
[
Footnote 2] He contends that
also that International's acceptance of those provisions exceeded
its authority as a collective bargaining representative under the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended. [
Footnote 3] He asks, accordingly, that the provisions
be declared invalid insofar as they prejudice the seniority rights
of members of his class, and that appropriate injunctive relief be
granted against Ford and International. After answer, both sides
asked for summary judgment. [
Footnote 4]
The District Court dismissed the action without opinion, but
said in its order that it was
"of the opinion that the collective bargaining agreement
expresses an honest desire for the protection of the interests of
all members of the union, and is not a device of hostility to
veterans. The Court finds that said collective bargaining
agreement
Page 345 U. S. 333
sets up a seniority system which the Court deems not to be
arbitrary, discriminatory, or in any respect unlawful."
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed, one judge
dissenting. 195 F.2d 170. Ford and International filed separate
petitions for certiorari seeking to review the same decision of the
Court of Appeals. We granted both because of the widespread use of
contractual provisions comparable to those before us, and because
of the general importance of the issue in relation to collective
bargaining. 344 U.S. 814.
The pleadings state that Huffman entered the employ of Ford
September 23, 1943, was inducted into military service November 18,
1944, was discharged July 1, 1946, and, within 30 days, was
reemployed by Ford with seniority dating from September 23, 1943,
as provided by statute. [
Footnote
5] It does not appear whether the other members of his class
are veterans but, like him, all have seniority computed from their
respective dates of employment by Ford.
The pleadings allege further that Huffman and the members of his
class all have been laid off or furloughed from their respective
employments at times and for
Page 345 U. S. 334
periods when they would not have been so laid off or furloughed
except for the provisions complained of in the collective
bargaining agreements. Those provisions state, in substance, that,
after July 30, 1946, in determining the order of retention of
employees, all veterans in the employ of Ford
"shall receive seniority credit for their period of service,
subsequent to June 21, 1941, in the land or naval forces or
Merchant Marine of the United States or its allies, upon completion
of their probationary period"
of six months. [
Footnote
6]
The effect of these provisions is that, whereas Huffman's
seniority, and that of the members of his class, is computed
Page 345 U. S. 335
from their respective dates of employment by Ford and they have
been credited with their subsequent military service, if any, yet
in some instances they are now surpassed in seniority by employees
who entered the employ of Ford after they did, but who are credited
with certain military service which they rendered before their
employment by Ford. [
Footnote
7]
Page 345 U. S. 336
Respondent contended in the Court of Appeals that allowance of
credit for pre-employment military service was invalid because it
went beyond the credit prescribed by the Selective Training and
Service Act of 1940. That argument was rejected unanimously. 195
F.2d 170, 173. It has not been pressed here. There is nothing in
that statute which prohibits allowing such a credit if the employer
and employees agree to do so. The statutory rights of returning
veterans are subject to changes in the conditions of their
employment which have occurred in regular course during their
absence in military service where the changes are not hostile
devices discriminating against veterans.
Aeronautical Indus.
Dist. Lodge v. Campbell, 337 U. S. 521,
and see Trailmobile Co. v. Whirls, 331 U. S.
40;
Fishgold v. Sullivan Drydock & Repair
Corp., 328 U. S. 275.
See also Oakley v. Louisville & N. R. Co.,
338 U. S. 278, as
to a veteran's seniority status more than one year after his
reemployment.
On the other hand, the second objection raised by respondent was
sustained by a majority of the members of the Court of Appeals.
This objection was that the authority of International, as a
certified bargaining representative, was limited by statute and was
exceeded when International agreed to the provisions that are
before us.
The authority of every bargaining representative under the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, is stated in broad
terms:
"SEC. 7. Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to
form, join, or assist labor organizations,
Page 345 U. S. 337
to bargain collectively through representatives of their own
choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the
purpose of
collective bargaining or other mutual aid or
protection. . . ."
"SEC. 9. (a) Representatives designated or selected for the
purposes of collective bargaining by the majority of the employees
in a unit appropriate for such purposes, shall be the exclusive
representatives of all the employees in such unit for the purposes
of
collective bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages,
hours of employment, or other conditions of employment. . .
."
(Emphasis supplied.) 61 Stat. 140, 143, 29 U.S.C.(Supp. V) §§
157, 159(a).
In the absence of limiting factors, the above purposes,
including "mutual aid or protection" and "other conditions of
employment," are broad enough to cover terms of seniority. The
National Labor Relations Act, as passed in 1935 and as amended in
1947, exemplifies the faith of Congress in free collective
bargaining between employers and their employees when conducted by
freely and fairly chosen representatives of appropriate units of
employees. That the authority of bargaining representatives,
however, is not absolute is recognized in
Steele v. Louisville
& N. R. Co., 323 U. S. 192,
323 U. S.
198-199, in connection with comparable provisions of the
Railway Labor Act. Their statutory obligation to represent all
members of an appropriate unit requires them to make an honest
effort to serve the interests of all of those members, without
hostility to any.
Id. at
323 U. S. 198,
323 U. S.
202-204;
Tunstall v. Brotherhood of Locomotive
Firemen, 323 U. S. 210,
323 U. S. 211;
Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Howard, 343 U.
S. 768.
Any authority to negotiate derives its principal strength from a
delegation to the negotiators of a discretion
Page 345 U. S. 338
to make such concessions and accept such advantages as, in the
light of all relevant considerations, they believe will best serve
the interests of the parties represented. A major responsibility of
negotiators is to weigh the relative advantages and disadvantages
of differing proposals. A bargaining representative, under the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, often is a labor
organization, but it is not essential that it be such. The
employees represented often are members of the labor organization
which represents them at the bargaining table, but it is not
essential that they be such. The bargaining representative, whoever
it may be, is responsible to, and owes complete loyalty to, the
interests of all whom it represents. In the instant controversy,
International represented, with certain exceptions not material
here, all employees at the Louisville works, including both the
veterans with, and those without, prior employment by Ford, as well
as the employees having no military service. Inevitably differences
arise in the manner and degree to which the terms of any negotiated
agreement affect individual employees and classes of employees. The
mere existence of such differences does not make them invalid. The
complete satisfaction of all who are represented is hardly to be
expected. A wide range of reasonableness must be allowed a
statutory bargaining representative in serving the unit it
represents, subject always to complete good faith and honesty of
purpose in the exercise of its discretion.
Compromises on a temporary basis, with a view to long range
advantages, are natural incidents of negotiation. Differences in
wages, hours and conditions of employment reflect countless
variables. Seniority rules governing promotions, transfers, layoffs
and similar matters may, in the first instance, revolve around
length of competent service. Variations acceptable in the
discretion of bargaining representatives, however, may well include
differences
Page 345 U. S. 339
based upon such matters as the unit within which seniority is to
be computed, the privileges to which it shall relate, the nature of
the work, the time at which it is done, the fitness, ability or age
of the employees, their family responsibilities, injuries received
in course of service, and time or labor devoted to related public
service, whether civil or military, voluntary or involuntary.
See, e.g., Hartley v. Brotherhood of Clerks, 283 Mich.
201, 277 N.W. 885,
and see also Williamson & Harris,
Trends in Collective Bargaining (1945) 100-103.
The National Labor Relations Act, as amended, gives a bargaining
representative not only wide responsibility, but authority to meet
that responsibility. We have held that a collective bargaining
representative is within its authority when, in the general
interest of those it represents, it agrees to allow union chairmen
certain advantages in the retention of their employment, even to
the prejudice of veterans otherwise entitled to greater seniority.
Aeronautical Indus. Dist. Lodge v. Campbell, supra, at
337 U. S.
526-529.
The public policy and fairness inherent in crediting employees
with time spent in military service in time of war or national
emergency is so clear that Congress, in the Selective Training and
Service Act of 1940, required some credit to be given for it in
computing seniority both in governmental and in private employment.
See note 5
supra. Congress there prescribed that employees who left
their private civilian employment to enter military service should
receive seniority credit for such military service, provided their
prior civilian employment, however brief, was
bona fide
and not on a temporary basis. There is little that justifies giving
such a substantial benefit to a veteran with brief prior civilian
employment that does not equally justify giving it to a veteran who
was inducted into military service before having a chance to enter
any civilian employment, or to a veteran who never worked
Page 345 U. S. 340
for the particular employer who hired him after his return from
military service. The respective values of all such veterans, as
employees, are substantially the same. From the point of view of
public policy and industrial stability, there is much to be said,
especially in time of war or emergency, for allowing credit for all
military service. Any other course adopts the doubtful policy of
favoring those who stay out of military service over those who
enter it.
The above considerations took concrete form in the Veterans'
Preference Act of 1944, which added the requirement that credit for
military service be given by every civilian federal agency, whether
the military service preceded or followed civilian employment.
[
Footnote 8] Apparently
recognizing the countless variations in conditions affecting
private employment, Congress, however, did not make credit for such
pre-employment military service compulsory in private civilian
employment. A little later, the Administrator of the Retraining and
Reemployment Administration of the United States Department of
Labor assembled a representative committee to recommend principles
to serve as guides to private employers in their employment of
veterans and others. [
Footnote
9] Among 15 principles
Page 345 U. S. 341
developed by that committee, and "wholeheartedly" endorsed by
the Secretary of Labor, in 1946, were the following:
"8. All veterans having reemployment rights under Federal
statutes should be accorded these statutory rights
as a
minimum."
"
* * * *"
"13. Newly hired veterans who qualified for employment should be
allowed seniority credit at least for purposes of job retention,
equal to time spent in the armed services plus time spent in
recuperation from service-connected injuries or disabilities either
through hospitalization or vocational training. [
Footnote 10]"
The provisions before us reflect such a policy. [
Footnote 11] It
Page 345 U. S. 342
is not necessary to define here the limits to which a collective
bargaining representative may go in accepting proposals to promote
the long range social or economic welfare of those it represents.
Nothing in the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, so limits
the vision and action of a bargaining representative that it must
disregard public policy and national security. Nor does anything in
that Act compel a bargaining representative to limit seniority
clauses solely to the relative lengths of employment of the
respective employees.
Aeronautical Indus. Dist. Lodge v.
Campbell, supra, at
337 U. S. 526,
337 U. S.
528-529, note 5. For examples of negotiated provisions
protecting veterans from loss of seniority upon their return to
private civilian employment, recognized by the National War Labor
Board as coming within the proper scope of collective bargaining,
in 1945,
see In re American Can Co., 27 War Lab.Rep. 634,
28 War Lab.Rep. 764, and
In re Firestone Tire & Rubber
Co., 24 War Lab.Rep. 322, 28 War Lab.Rep. 483.
See
also Bureau of National Affairs, Inc., Collective Bargaining
Contracts (1941), 369
et seq.
The provisions before us are within reasonable bounds of
relevancy. They extended but slightly, during a period of war and
emergency, the acceptance of credits for military service under
circumstances where comparable credit already was required, by
statute, in favor of all who had been regularly employed by Ford
before entering military service. These provisions conform to the
recommendation of responsible Government officials and round out a
statutory requirement which, unless so rounded out, produces
discriminations of its own. A failure to adopt these provisions
might have resulted in
Page 345 U. S. 343
more friction among employees represented by International than
did their adoption.
The several briefs of
amici curiae, filed here by
consent of all parties, demonstrate the widespread acceptance and
relevance of the type of provisions before us.
We hold that International, as a collective bargaining
representative, had authority to accept these provisions.
Accordingly, we find no ground sufficient to establish the
invalidity of the provisions before us or to sustain an injunction
against either petitioner.
In accord: Haynes v. United Chemical
Workers, 190 Tenn. 165,
228
S.W.2d 101.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals which reversed that of the
District Court therefore is reversed. The judgment of the District
Court is affirmed, and the cause is remanded to it.
Reversed and remanded.
[
Footnote 1]
Where the context permits, "military service" in this opinion
includes service in the land or naval forces or Merchant Marine of
the United States or its allies.
[
Footnote 2]
54 Stat. 890, 56 Stat. 724, 58 Stat. 798, 60 Stat. 341, 50
U.S.C.App. § 308.
[
Footnote 3]
49 Stat. 452, 61 Stat. 140, 65 Stat. 601, 29 U.S.C. (Supp.V) §§
157-159.
[
Footnote 4]
In No.194, International also questions the jurisdiction of the
District Court. International recognizes that one issue in the case
is whether it engaged in an unfair labor practice when it agreed to
the allowance of credit for pre-employment military service in
computations of employment seniority. It then argues that the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, 61 Stat. 146, 29 U.S.C.
(Supp. V) § 160(a), vests the initial jurisdiction over such an
issue exclusively in the National Labor Relations Board. This
question was not argued in the Court of Appeals nor mentioned in
its opinion and, in view of our position on the merits, it is not
discussed here. Our decision interprets the statutory authority of
a collective bargaining representative to have such breadth that it
removes all ground for a substantial charge that International, by
exceeding its authority, committed an unfair labor practice. As to
a somewhat comparable question considered in connection with the
Railway Labor Act,
see Tunstall v. Brotherhood of Locomotive
Firemen, 323 U. S. 210;
Steele v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 323 U.
S. 192,
323 U. S.
204-207.
[
Footnote 5]
"SEC. 8. . . ."
"(b) In the case of any such person who, in order to perform
such training and service, has left or leaves a position, other
than a temporary position, in the employ of any employer and who
(1) receives such certificate (of satisfactory completion of his
period of training and service), (2) is still qualified to perform
the duties of such position, and (3) makes application for
reemployment within ninety days after he is relieved from such
training and service"
"(B) if such position was in the employ of a private employer,
such employer shall restore such person to such position or to a
position of like seniority, status, and pay unless the employer's
circumstances have so changed as to make it impossible or
unreasonable to do so. . . ."
54 Stat. 890, 58 Stat. 798, 50 U.S.C.App. § 308(b)(B).
[
Footnote 6]
Article VIII of a supplementary agreement between Ford and
International, dated July 30, 1946, contained the following:
"Section 13 -- . . ."
"(c)
Any veteran of World War II who was not employed by any
person or company at the time of his entry into the service of the
land or naval forces or the Merchant Marine and who is a
citizen of the United States and served with the allies and who has
been honorably discharged from such training and service and
who is hired by the company after he is relieved from training
and service in the land or naval forces or after completion of
service in the Merchant Marine
shall, upon having been employed
for six (6) months and not before, receive seniority credit for the
period of such service subsequent to June 21, 1941, provided:
"
"(1) Such veteran must apply for employment within ninety (90)
days from the time he is relieved from such training or service in
the land or naval forces or the time of his completion of such
service in the Merchant Marine, and must obtain such employment
within twelve (12) months from the time he is relieved from such
training and service in the land or naval forces or the time of his
completion of such service in the Merchant Marine."
"(2) Such veteran shall not have previously exercised his right
in any plant of this or any other company."
"(3) A veteran so employed shall submit his service discharge
papers to the company at the end of aforesaid probationary period
of employment and the company shall place thereon in permanent form
a statement showing that the veteran has exercised this right, such
statement to be signed by representatives of the company and the
Union, and a copy thereof placed in the employee's record and a
copy furnished to the Union."
"(d) It is further understood and agreed that, regardless of any
of the foregoing,
all veterans in the [employ] of the company
at the time the Contract is thus amended shall receive seniority
credit for their period of service, subsequent to June 21, 1941 in
the land or naval forces or Merchant Marine of the United States or
its allies, upon completion of their probationary period."
(Emphasis supplied.)
The above provisions were continued in effect, in substantially
identical form, in an agreement of August 21, 1947. An agreement of
September 28, 1949, provided:
"(c) Any employee who, prior to the effective date of this
Agreement, has received the seniority credit provided for in
Article VIII, Section 13(c) or (d) of and the Union dated August
21, 1947, or the Agreement between the Company the comparable
provision in the Supplementary Agreement between the Company and
the Union dated July 30, 1946, shall continue to receive such
seniority credit."
[
Footnote 7]
On Huffman's return to Ford in July, 1946, his employment
seniority, including his military service, dated from September 23,
1943. It totaled about 33 months, including about 14 months of
pre-service company employment and 19 of post-employment military
service. An example of a veteran who, due to the agreements before
us, outranks Huffman in employment seniority is one who entered
military service July 1, 1943, without any prior employment, served
honorably until discharged March 1, 1945, and, thereafter, has been
employed continuously by Ford, including six months of satisfactory
probationary employment. His seniority dates from July 1, 1943. By
July 1, 1946, it totaled 36 months, including 20 months of
pre-employment military service, and 16 of post-service company
employment. However, except for the collective bargaining
agreements, Huffman would then have outranked such a veteran by
about 17 months, although Huffman's military service totaled one
month less, his employment by Ford two months less, and his
combined military service and company employment three months less
than that of such a veteran.
[
Footnote 8]
"SEC. 12. In any reduction in personnel in any civilian service
of any Federal agency, competing employees shall be released in
accordance with Civil Service Commission regulations which shall
give due effect to tenure of employment, military preference,
length of service, and efficiency ratings:
Provided, That
the length of time spent in active service in the armed forces of
the United States of each such employee shall be credited in
computing length of total service. . . ."
58 Stat. 390, 5 U.S.C. § 861.
[
Footnote 9]
This "Committee of Nine" consisted of representatives from the
Business Advisory Council to the Secretary of Commerce, National
Association of Manufacturers, U.S. Chamber of Commerce, American
Federation of Labor, Congress of Industrial Organizations, Railway
Labor Executives' Association, American Legion, Disabled American
Veterans and Veterans of Foreign Wars.
[
Footnote 10]
Reemployment of Veterans Under Collective Bargaining, United
States Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, October,
1947, Statement of Employment Principles dated October 7, 1946,
App. D, pp. 46-48,
and see Bulletin of Retraining and
Reemployment Administration, United States Department of Labor,
October 10, 1946, p. 5; Harbison, Seniority Problems During
Demobilization and Reconversion, Industrial Relations Section,
Department of Economics and Social Institutions, Princeton
University (1944) 12-14.
[
Footnote 11]
Collective Bargaining Provisions-Seniority, Bull. No. 908-11,
United States Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics
(1949), quotes many seniority clauses as examples of those then in
use and including many factors other than length of employment.
Among those quoted is the following:
"61.
Veteran Not Previously Employed Given Seniority Credit
for Time Spent in Armed Forces"
"Any veteran of World War II who has been discharged, other than
dishonorably, from the armed forces of the United States and who
immediately prior to his acceptance in the armed forces was not
previously employed by [name of company] and who is employed by
[name of company] within twelve (12) months after his discharge,
provided it is his first place of employment after his discharge,
shall take his place on the seniority list after completing the
sixty (60) day trial period. His seniority shall be computed from
the day of his acceptance into the armed forces. However, no
veteran covered by this section shall have seniority prior to
December 7, 1941."
P. 13.