Respondent commenceed in a Federal District Court a suit in
equity seeking two kinds of specific relief: (1) a declaratory
judgment that its carriage of motion picture film and newsreels
between points in Utah constitutes interstate commerce, and (2) an
injunction against the State Commission's interfering with such
transportation over routes authorized by the Interstate Commerce
Commission. Respondent offered no evidence of any past, pending, or
threatened action by the State Commission touching its business in
any respect. The District Court, in dismissing the complaint after
trial, made a general finding that no such interference had been
made or threatened, and this finding was not reversed or mentioned
by the Court of Appeals.
Held: the suit cannot be entertained as one for
injunction, and should not be continued as one for a declaratory
judgment . Pp.
344 U. S.
239-249.
1. There can be no injunction on constitutional grounds in this
case. It is wanting in equity, because there is no proof of any
threatened or probable act of the defendants which might cause the
irreparable injury essential to equitable relief by injunction. Pp.
344 U. S.
240-241.
2. Declaratory relief is not appropriate under the circumstances
of this case. Pp.
344 U. S.
241-249.
(a) The Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201, is an
enabling Act which confers a discretion on the courts, rather than
an absolute right upon the litigant. P.
344 U. S.
241.
(b) The remedy afforded by the Act is available only in cases of
actual controversy which admit of an immediate and definite
determination of the legal rights of the parties. Pp.
344 U. S.
242-243.
(c) The propriety of declaratory relief in a particular case
depends upon a circumspect sense of its fitness, informed by the
teachings and experience concerning the functions and extent of
federal judicial power. Pp.
344 U. S.
243-244.
(d) Discretionary use of the Declaratory Judgment Act does not
permit the grant of declaratory relief to respondent merely to
Page 344 U. S. 238
hold it in readiness for use should the State Commission at any
future time attempt to apply to respondent any part of a
complicated regulatory statute. P.
344 U. S.
245.
(e) The declaratory judgment procedure will not be used to
preempt and prejudge issues that are committed for initial decision
to an administrative body or special tribunal, any more than it
will be used as a substitute for statutory methods of review. P.
344 U. S.
246-247.
(f) As here invoked, the declaratory judgment proceeding is
inappropriate because, in addition to foreclosing an administrative
body, it is incompatible with a proper federal-state relationship.
P.
344 U. S.
247.
(g) Where the complaint in an action for declaratory judgment
seeks, in essence, to assert a defense to an impending or
threatened state court action, it is the character of the
threatened action, and not of the defense, which determines whether
there is federal question jurisdiction in the District Court. P.
344 U. S.
248.
(h) Federal courts will not seize litigations from state courts
merely because one, normally a defendant, goes to federal court to
begin his federal law defense before the state court begins the
case under state law. P.
344 U. S.
248.
195 F.2d 252, reversed.
Respondent's suit in equity for a declaratory judgment and
injunction against petitioners was dismissed by the District Court.
The Court of Appeals reversed. 195 F.2d 252. This Court granted
certiorari. 343 U.S. 975.
Reversed with directions that the
action be dismissed, p.
344 U. S.
249.
Page 344 U. S. 239
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON delivered the opinion of the Court.
As this suit in equity was commenced in United States District
Court it sought two kinds of specific relief: (1) a declaratory
judgment that complainant's carriage of motion picture film and
newsreels between points in Utah constitutes interstate commerce;
(2) that the Public Service Commission of Utah and its members be
forever enjoined from interfering with such transportation over
routes authorized by the Interstate Commerce Commission.
The complaint alleged a course of importing, processing, and
transporting picture film and newsreels to support the contention
that carriage between points in Utah was so integrated with their
interstate movement that the whole constituted interstate commerce.
It averred that the Commission and its members
"threatened to and are attempting to stop and prevent plaintiff
from transporting motion picture film and newsreel between points
and places within the Utah, and they are thereby interfering with
the conduct of interstate commerce by the plaintiff and imposing an
undue burden upon interstate commerce,"
and that, unless the defendants are enjoined they will "block,
harass and prevent plaintiff in the transportation of said motion
picture film and newsreels in Utah."
The Commission and its members answered that respondent's
transportation between points in Utah was nothing more than
intrastate commerce. They specifically denied attempting,
threatening, or intending to interfere with or burden interstate
commerce.
The District Court, after trial, sustained the contention of the
Commission and dismissed the complaint. The Court of Appeals
considered only "whether the intrastate transportations are
nonetheless integral parts of interstate
Page 344 U. S. 240
transportations." [
Footnote
1] It held the evidence to warrant an affirmative answer,
reversed the judgment of the District Court, and ordered further
proceedings in conformity with that view. We granted certiorari,
[
Footnote 2] requesting counsel
to discuss whether a single judge could hear and determine the case
in view of 28 U.S.C. § 2281. That section provides that an
injunction restraining enforcement of a state statute or the order
of an administrative body thereunder "shall not be granted" upon
the ground of unconstitutionality unless the application is heard
and determined by a district court of three judges, as provided in
28 U.S.C. § 2284.
The respondent, which was plaintiff, contends that a three-judge
court was not required, because the suit does not question
constitutionality of any Utah statute nor the validity of any order
of the State Commission. It says also that no injunction has been
granted, or even urged, "outside of the naked recitation in the
prayer of the complaint." It offered no evidence whatever of any
past, pending, or threatened action by the Utah Commission touching
its business in any respect. The pleadings made that a clear-cut
issue, which seems to have been completely ignored thereafter. The
only issues defined on pretrial hearing was whether, as matter of
fact and of law, the within-state transportation constituted
interstate commerce. The trial court, however, made a general
finding that no such interference had been made or threatened,
which was not reversed or mentioned by the Court of Appeals.
For more reasons than one, it is clear that this proceeding
cannot result in an injunction on constitutional grounds. In
addition to defects that will appear in our discussion of
declaratory relief, it is wanting in equity
Page 344 U. S. 241
because there is no proof of any threatened or probable act of
the defendants which might cause the irreparable injury essential
to equitable relief by injunction.
The respondent appears to have abandoned the suit as one for
injunction, but seeks to support it as one for declaratory
judgment, hoping thereby to avoid both the three-judge court
requirement and the necessity for proof of threatened injury.
Whether declaratory relief is appropriate under the circumstances
of this case apparently was not considered by either of the courts
below. But that inquiry is one which every grant of this remedy
must survive.
The Declaratory Judgment Act of 1934, now 28 U.S.C. § 2201,
styled "creation of a remedy," provides that, in a case of actual
controversy, a competent court may "declare the rights and other
legal relations" of a party "whether or not further relief is or
could be sought." This is an enabling Act, which confers a
discretion on the courts, rather than an absolute right upon the
litigant.
Previous to its enactment, there were responsible expressions of
doubt that constitutional limitations on federal judicial power
would permit any federal declaratory judgment procedure.
Cf.
Liberty Warehouse Co. v. Grannis, 273 U. S.
70;
Willing v. Chicago Auditorium Assn.,
277 U. S. 274;
Arizona v. California, 283 U. S. 423;
Piedmont & N. R. Co. v. United States, 280 U.
S. 469. Finally, as the practice extended in the states,
we reviewed a declaratory judgment rendered by a state court and
held that a controversy which would be justiciable in this Court if
presented in a suit for injunction is not the less so because the
relief was declaratory.
Nashville, C. & St.L. R. Co. v.
Wallace, 288 U. S. 249.
Encouraged by this and guided by the experience of the thirty-four
states that had enacted such laws, the Senate Judiciary Committee
recommended an adaptation of the principle to federal practice. Its
enabling clause was narrower
Page 344 U. S. 242
than that of the Uniform Act adopted in 1921 by the
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, which gave comprehensive power
to declare rights, status, and other legal relations. The Federal
Act omits status and limits the declaration to cases of actual
controversy. [
Footnote 3]
This Act was adjudged constitutional only by interpreting it to
confine the declaratory remedy within conventional "case or
controversy" limits. In
Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley
Authority, 297 U. S. 288,
297 U. S. 325,
the Court said,
"The Act of June 14, 1934, providing for declaratory judgments,
does not attempt to change the essential requisites for the
exercise of judicial power,"
which still was to be tested by such established principles as
that "The judicial power does not extend to . . . abstract
questions," and that "Claims based merely upon
assumed
potential invasions' of rights are not enough to warrant judicial
intervention."
In
Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.
S. 227, Mr. Chief Justice Hughes used the whole
catalogue of familiar phrases to define and delimit the measure of
this new remedy. If its metes and bounds are not clearly marked, it
is because his available verbal markers are themselves elastic,
inconstant, and imprecise. It applies, he points out, only to
"cases and controversies in the constitutional sense" of a nature
"consonant with the exercise of the judicial function" and
"appropriate for judicial determination." Each must present a
"justiciable controversy," as distinguished from
"a difference or dispute of a hypothetical or abstract
character. . . . The controversy must be definite and concrete,
touching the legal relations of parties having adverse legal
interests. . . . It must be a real and substantial controversy
admitting of specific relief through a decree of a conclusive
character, as distinguished from an opinion advising what the
law
Page 344 U. S. 243
would be upon a hypothetical state of facts."
The relief is available only for a "concrete case admitting of
an immediate and definite determination of the legal rights of the
parties."
Other sources have stated relevant limitations. The Senate
Judiciary Committee report regarded the 1,200 American decisions
theretofore rendered on the subject as establishing that "the issue
must be real, the question practical and not academic, and the
decision must finally settle and determine the controversy."
[
Footnote 4] Indeed, the
Uniform Act, unlike the Federal Act, expressly declares the
discretion of the Court to refuse a decree that would not
"terminate the uncertainty or controversy giving rise to the
proceeding." In recommending Rule 57 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure in order to provide procedures for the declaratory
decree, the Committee noted,
"A declaration may not be rendered if a special statutory
proceeding has been provided for the adjudication of some special
type of case. . . . [
Footnote
5]"
But when all of the axioms have been exhausted and all words of
definition have been spent, the propriety of declaratory relief in
a particular case will depend upon a circumspect sense of its
fitness, informed by the teachings and experience concerning the
functions and extent of federal judicial power. While the courts
should not be reluctant or niggardly in granting this relief in the
cases for which it was designed, they must be alert to avoid
imposition upon their jurisdiction through obtaining futile or
premature interventions, especially in the field of public law. A
maximum of caution is necessary in the type of litigation that we
have here, where a ruling is sought that would reach far beyond the
particular case. Such differences
Page 344 U. S. 244
of opinion or conflicts of interest must be "ripe for
determination" as controversies over legal rights. The disagreement
must not be nebulous or contingent, but must have taken on fixed
and final shape, so that a court can see what legal issues it is
deciding, what effect its decision will have on the adversaries,
and some useful purpose to be achieved in deciding them.
The complainant in this case does not request an adjudication
that it has a right to do, or to have, anything in particular. It
does not ask a judgment that the Commission is without power to
enter any specific order or take any concrete regulatory step. It
seeks simply to establish that, as presently conducted,
respondent's carriage of goods between points within as well as
without Utah is all interstate commerce. One naturally asks, so
what? To that ultimate question no answer is sought.
A multitude of rights and immunities may be predicated upon the
premise that a business consists of interstate commerce. What are
the specific ones in controversy? The record is silent, and counsel
little more articulate. We may surmise that the purpose to be
served by a declaratory judgment is ultimately the same as
respondent's explanation of the purposes of the injunction it
originally asked, which is
"to
guard against the possibility that said Commission
would attempt to prevent respondent from operating under its
certificate from the Interstate Commerce Commission."
(Emphasis supplied.)
In this connection,
Wycoff Co. v. Public Service
Commission, ___ Utah ___,
227 P.2d 323
(1951), is brought to our attention. From this, it appears that
respondent and its predecessors in interest long made it a practice
to obtain from the Utah Commission certificates to authorize this
carriage of film commodities between points in Utah. But the
Supreme Court of Utah, in the cited case, sustained the Commission
in denying such an application
Page 344 U. S. 245
upon a finding that the field already was adequately served. We
are also told that the Commission filed a petition in a Utah state
court to a enjoin respondent from operating between a few specified
locations within the State, but that process was never served, and
nothing in the record tells us what has happened to this action. We
may conjecture that respondent fears some form of administrative or
judicial action to prohibit its service on routes wholly within the
State without the Commission's leave. What respondent asks is that
it win any such case before it is commenced. Even if respondent is
engaged solely in interstate commerce, we cannot say that there is
nothing whatever that the State may require.
Eichholz v. Public
Service Commission, 306 U. S. 268,
306 U. S.
273.
A declaratory judgment may be the basis of further relief
necessary or proper against the adverse party, 28 U.S.C. § 2202.
The carrier's idea seems to be that it can now establish the major
premise of an exemption not as an incident of any present
declaration of any specific right or immunity, but to hold in
readiness for use should the Commission at any future time attempt
to apply any part of a complicated regulatory statute to it. If
there is any more definite or contemporaneous purpose to this case,
neither this record nor the briefs make it clear to us. We think
this, for several reasons, exceeds any permissible discretionary
use of the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act.
In the first place, this dispute has not matured to a point
where we can see what, if any, concrete controversy will develop.
It is much like asking a declaration that the State has no power to
enact legislation that may be under consideration, but has not yet
shaped up into an enactment. If there is any risk of suffering
penalty, liability, or prosecution which a declaration would avoid,
it is not pointed out to us. If and when the State Commission takes
some action that raises an issue of its power,
Page 344 U. S. 246
some further declaration would be necessary to any complete
relief. The proposed decree cannot end the controversy.
Nor is it apparent that the present proceeding would serve a
useful purpose if, at some future date, the State undertakes
regulation of respondent. After a sifting of evidence and a finding
of facts as they are today, there is no assurance that changes of
significance may not take place before the State decides to move.
Of course, the remedy is not to be withheld because it necessitates
weighing conflicting evidence or deciding issues of fact as well as
law. That is the province of courts.
Aetna Life Insurance Co.
v. Haworth, supra, at
300 U. S. 242,
and see Perkins v. Elg,
307 U. S. 325;
Currin v. Wallace, 306 U. S. 1. But
when the request is not for ultimate determination of rights, but
for preliminary findings and conclusions intended to fortify the
litigant against future regulation, it would be a rare case in
which the relief should be granted.
Cf. Coffman v. Breeze
Corporations, Inc., 323 U. S. 316.
Even when there is no incipient federal-state conflict, the
declaratory judgment procedure will not be used to preempt and
prejudice issues that are committed for initial decision to an
administrative body or special tribunal, any more than it will be
used as a substitute for statutory methods of review. It would not
be tolerable, for example, that declaratory judgments establish
that an enterprise is not in interstate commerce in order to
forestall proceedings by the National Labor Relations Board, the
Interstate Commerce Commission, or many agencies that are
authorized to try and decide such an issue in the first instance.
Cf. Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U. S.
41;
Eccles v. Peoples Bank, 333 U.
S. 426.
See Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.
S. 549. Responsibility for effective functioning of the
administrative process can
Page 344 U. S. 247
not be thus transferred from the bodies in which Congress has
placed it to the courts.
But, as the declaratory proceeding is here invoked, it is even
less appropriate because, in addition to foreclosing an
administrative body, it is incompatible with a proper federal-state
relationship. The carrier, being in some disagreement with the
State Commission, rushed into federal court to get a declaration
which either is intended in ways not disclosed to tie the
Commission's hands before it can act or it has no purpose at
all.
Declaratory proceedings in the federal courts against state
officials must be decided with regard for the implications of our
federal system. State administrative bodies have the initial right
to reduce the general policies of state regulatory statutes into
concrete orders and the primary right to take evidence and make
findings of fact. It is the state courts which have the first and
the last word as to the meaning of state statutes and whether a
particular order is within the legislative terms of reference so as
to make it the action of the State. We have disapproved
anticipatory declarations as to state regulatory statutes even
where the case originated in and was entertained by courts of the
State affected.
Alabama State Federation of Labor v.
McAdory, 325 U. S. 450.
Anticipatory judgment by a federal court to frustrate action by a
state agency is even less tolerable to our federalism. Is the
declaration contemplated here to be
res judicata, so that
the Commission cannot hear evidence and decide any matter for
itself? If so, the federal court has virtually lifted the case out
of the State Commission before it could be heard. If not, the
federal judgment serves no useful purpose as a final determination
of rights.
The procedures of review usually afford ample protection to a
carrier whose federal rights are actually invaded, and there are
remedies for threatened irreparable injuries. State courts are
bound equally with the federal courts by
Page 344 U. S. 248
the Federal Constitution and laws. Ultimate recourse may be had
to this Court by certiorari if a state court has allegedly denied a
federal right.
In this case, as in many actions for declaratory judgment, the
realistic position of the parties is reversed. [
Footnote 6] The plaintiff is seeking to establish
a defense against a cause of action which the declaratory defendant
may assert in the Utah courts. Respondent here has sought to ward
off possible action of the petitioners by seeking a declaratory
judgment to the effect that he will have a good defense when and if
that cause of action is asserted. Where the complaint in an action
for declaratory judgment seeks, in essence, to assert a defense to
an impending or threatened state court action, it is the character
of the threatened action, and not of the defense, which will
determine whether there is federal question jurisdiction in the
District Court. If the cause of action which the declaratory
defendant threatens to assert does not itself involve a claim under
federal law, it is doubtful if a federal court may entertain an
action for a declaratory judgment establishing a defense to that
claim. This is dubious. even though the declaratory complaint sets
forth a claim of federal right, if that right is in reality in the
nature of a defense to a threatened cause of action. Federal courts
will not seize litigations from state courts merely because one
normally a defendant goes to federal court to begin his federal law
defense before the state court begins the case under state law.
Tennessee v. Union and Planters' Bank, 152 U.
S. 454;
The Fair v. Kohler Die and Specialty
Co., 228 U. S. 22;
Taylor v. Anderson, 234 U. S. 74.
Since this case should be dismissed in any event, it is not
necessary to determine whether, on this record, the
Page 344 U. S. 249
alleged controversy over an action that may be begun in state
court would be maintainable under the head of federal question
jurisdiction. But we advert to doubts upon that subject to indicate
the injury that would be necessary if the case clearly rested
merely on threatened suit in state court, as, for all we can learn,
it may.
We conclude that this suit cannot be entertained as one for
injunction, and should not be continued as one for a declaratory
judgment. The judgment below should be reversed and modified to
direct that the action be dismissed.
Reversed and so ordered.
[
Footnote 1]
195 F.2d 252, 254.
[
Footnote 2]
343 U.S. 975.
[
Footnote 3]
See 28 U.S.C. § 2201.
[
Footnote 4]
S.Rep.No.7005, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., May 10, 1934; Borchard,
Declaratory Judgments (2d ed.1941), 1043, 1048.
[
Footnote 5]
Borchard,
op. cit., 1042.
[
Footnote 6]
See Developments -- Declaratory Judgments, 62
Harv.L.Rev. 787, 802.
MR. JUSTICE REED, concurring.
The record, although uncertain and unsatisfactory, convinces me
that a suit was filed in the state court by the Public Service
Commission of Utah. This state suit evidently sought to prevent
respondent from transporting motion picture film and newsreels
between points and places within the Utah. This is the portion of
transportation between out-of-state points and motion picture
exhibitors within Utah that raises the question as to the authority
of respondent to operate under the Interstate Commerce Commission
certificate. The films are unloaded at Salt Lake City, where they
are prepared for exhibition and stored by the owners until ordered
out to the exhibition points. They are then again loaded on
respondent's trucks and delivered to the exhibitors. If this final
part of the transportation continues the interstate commerce,
respondent would be free to operate without further authority from
the Utah Commission. If it is intrastate commerce, respondent would
need further authority from Utah. It was apparently to determine
this question that the Utah Commission filed its suit in the state
court. No process was
Page 344 U. S. 250
served. Thereafter. respondent instituted this proceeding for a
declaratory judgment.
The authority for this litigation is the Declaratory Judgment
Act of 1934, 28 U.S.C. § 2201. This provides for a judgment
declaring "the rights and other legal relations of any interested
parties" in cases "of actual controversy."
The Act was intended by Congress as a means for parties in such
controversies as that between this interstate carrier and the Utah
Commission to settle their legal responsibilities and powers
without the necessity and risk of violation of the rights of one by
the other. The controversy here is clear and definite. A decision
would settle the issue that creates the uncertainty as to the
parties' rights.
See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth,
300 U. S. 227. The
Act intended operations to be conducted in the light of knowledge,
rather than the darkness of ignorance. S.Rep. No. 1005, 73d Cong.,
2d Sess.
However, it was recognized that the Declaratory Judgment Act
introduced a new method for determining rights into the body of
existing law. Therefore, the language of the Act was deliberately
cast in terms of permissive, rather than mandatory, authority to
the courts to take cognizance of petitions seeking this new relief.
[
Footnote 2/1] This enables federal
courts to appraise the threatened injuries to complainant, the
necessity and danger of his acting at his peril though incurring
heavy damages, the adequacy of state or other remedies,
particularly in controversies with administrative bodies. But even
in respect to controversies with administrative bodies, the
Declaratory Judgment Act exists as an instrument to protect the
citizen against the dangers and damages that may result
Page 344 U. S. 251
from his erroneous belief as to his rights under state or
federal law.
Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Huffman,
319 U. S. 293,
319 U. S. 300.
Cf. Spector Motor Co. v. McLaughlin, 323 U.
S. 101,
323 U. S. 105;
Spector Motor Co. v. O'Connor, 340 U.
S. 602,
340 U. S. 605.
It is a matter of discretion with federal courts.
The use of this new method of settlement was illustrated a few
years ago in an important case dealing with the jurisdiction of the
National Railroad Adjustment Board. [
Footnote 2/2] That case involved a disagreement between
two divisions of the National Railroad Adjustment Board as to which
division had jurisdiction of disputes involving yardmasters. We
held that the settlement of such a jurisdictional dispute
concerning an administrative agency was a proper subject for a
declaratory judgment where the controversy resulted in a complete
stalemate. Here, the record does not show any unusual danger of
loss or damage to respondent, a suit had already been filed, and
the record shows no reason why its result would not settle this
controversy. Because of these circumstances, I concur with the
reversal of the judgment.
[
Footnote 2/1]
H.R.Rep.No.1264, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., p. 2; Borchard,
Declaratory Judgments (2d ed.1941), 312;
Brillhart v. Excess
Insurance Co., 316 U. S. 491,
316 U. S.
494.
[
Footnote 2/2]
Order of Conductors v. Swan, 329 U.
S. 520.
MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, dissenting.
Respondents hold a certificate of public convenience and
necessity from the Interstate Commerce Commission for the
transportation of motion picture films and news reels from Salt
Lake City, Utah, to points in Utah, Idaho, and Montana. Their
transportation to Utah points is interstate commerce according to
the Court of Appeals, and with that conclusion I agree, since the
movement in Utah is part of a continuing interstate stream. The
threat of interference with that interstate activity by the Utah
Public Service Commission is clear and immediate.
First .
The Utah Commission brought suit to enjoin those interstate
activities, and that suit is now pending
Page 344 U. S. 252
in the Utah court.
Second. The Commission's answer in
the District Court denied that it was interfering with interstate
commerce not because it did not intend to prevent respondent from
operating, but on the ground that the operations were deemed to be
intrastate commerce, and therefore subject to its regulation.
Similarly, the District Court's finding that there was no
interference with interstate commerce was based on an acceptance of
the Commission's contentions as to the nature of respondent's
business.
Third. In their brief here, petitioners assert
that the Utah Commission "will prevent the respondent from
conducting" this business "unless and until he is authorized to do
so by appropriate administrative order" of the Utah Commission,
since, in the Commission's view, the transportation is in
intrastate commerce.
That, for me, is threat enough. Moreover, Utah is not attempting
to regulate a phase of interstate business that is within the reach
of a State's police power. She is endeavoring to make respondent
obtain a permit to do an interstate business for which the
respondent already holds a federal permit, under threat that,
unless he obtains a Utah permit, Utah will stop him from conducting
the interstate business. That is an attempt to regulate in a field
preempted by the Congress under the Motor Carrier Act, 49 U.S.C. §
301
et seq. That kind of regulation is precluded by our
decision in
Buck v. Kuykendall, 267 U.
S. 307.
Thus, the controversy is definite and concrete, and involves
legal interests of adverse parties. The test laid down for
declaratory judgments by
Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth,
300 U. S. 227, is
thus satisfied. I have said enough to show that the judges who
heard this case below knew that they were dealing with a live,
active contest that threatened serious consequences to respondent,
not
Page 344 U. S. 253
with a hypothetical question that might have practical
repercussions only in the remote future.
The fact that the Utah court can adjudicate the controversy in
the pending state case is no reason why the federal court should
stay its hand. There is no federal policy indicating that this is a
field in which federal courts should be reluctant to intervene.
That was the case in
Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v.
Huffman, 319 U. S. 293,
where we held that declaratory relief that a state tax was
unconstitutional should be denied by the federal court. The basis
of our ruling was that, since Congress had prohibited the federal
courts from enjoining state taxes where an adequate remedy was
available in the state courts (
cf. Hillsborough v.
Cromwell, 326 U. S. 620,
326 U. S.
623), declaratory relief should also be withheld.
Congress here has given no indication that the integrity of permits
granted interstate carriers by the Interstate Commerce Commission
should be protected in the state, rather than in the federal,
courts. All the presumptions are contrary. The basis of the
jurisdiction of the District Court created by Congress is clear.
The case "arises under the Constitution" and "laws" of the United
States. 28 U.S.C. § 1331. It is proper that the federal court,
absent such special circumstances as the
Huffman case
presented, exercise that jurisdiction and protect the federal
right.
The failure to do it here relegates the declaratory judgment to
a low estate.