For 15 years, a newspaper publisher enjoyed a substantial
monopoly of the mass dissemination of local and national news and
advertising in its community, and 99% coverage of the community's
families. After the establishment of a competing radio station, the
publisher refused to accept local advertising from those who
advertised over the radio station. The purpose of the publisher was
to destroy the broadcasting company.
Held: the publisher was engaged in an attempt to
monopolize interstate commerce, in violation of § 2 of the Sherman
Antitrust Act, and was properly enjoined under § 4 from continuing
the attempt. Pp.
342 U. S.
144-157.
1. The conduct of the publisher was an attempt to monopolize
interstate commerce. Pp.
342 U. S.
149-152.
(a) The distribution within the community of the news and
advertising transmitted there in interstate commerce for the sole
purpose of immediate and profitable reproduction and distribution
to the reading public is an inseparable part of the flow of the
interstate commerce involved. P.
342 U. S.
152.
(b) Without the protection of competition at the outlets of the
flow of interstate commerce, the protection of its earlier stages
is of little worth. P.
342 U. S.
152.
2. The publisher's attempt to regain its monopoly of interstate
commerce by forcing advertisers to boycott a competing radio
station violated § 2 of the Sherman Act. Pp.
342 U. S.
152-155.
(a) In order to establish this violation of § 2, it was not
necessary to show that the publisher's attempt to monopolize was
successful. Pp.
342 U. S.
153-154.
(b) A lone newspaper, already enjoying a substantial monopoly in
its area, violates the "attempt to monopolize" clause of § 2 when
it uses its monopoly to destroy threatened competition. P.
342 U. S.
154.
(c) The right claimed by the publisher as a private business
concern to select its customers and to refuse to accept
advertisements from whomever it pleases is neither absolute nor
exempt from regulation. Its exercise as a purposeful means of
monopolizing interstate commerce is prohibited by the Sherman Act.
P.
342 U. S.
155.
Page 342 U. S. 144
3. The injunction against the newspaper publisher's continuing
to attempt to monopolize interstate commerce does not violate the
First Amendment's guaranty of freedom of the press. Pp.
342 U. S.
155-156.
4. There is no obvious error in the form or substance of the
decree of the District Court, and, in the circumstances of the
case, this Court relies upon that court's retention of jurisdiction
over the cause for whatever modification the decree may need in the
light of the entire proceedings and of subsequent events. Pp.
342 U. S.
156-157.
92 F.
Supp. 794, affirmed.
In a civil action brought by the United States under the Sherman
Act, the District Court enjoined appellants from violation of the
Act.
92 F. Supp.
794. A direct appeal to this Court was taken under the
Expediting Act.
Affirmed, p.
342 U. S.
157.
MR. JUSTICE BURTON delivered the opinion of the Court.
The principal question here is whether a newspaper publisher's
conduct constituted an attempt to monopolize interstate commerce,
justifying the injunction issued against it under §§ 2 and 4 of the
Sherman Antitrust Act. [
Footnote
1] For the reasons hereafter stated, we hold that the
injunction was justified.
Page 342 U. S. 145
This is a civil action, instituted by the United States in the
District Court for the Northern District of Ohio, against The
Lorain Journal Company, an Ohio corporation, publishing, daily
except Sunday, in the City of Lorain, Ohio, a newspaper here called
the Journal. The complaint alleged that the corporation, together
with four of its officials, was engaging in a combination and
conspiracy in restraint of interstate commerce in violation of § 1
of the Sherman Antitrust Act, and in a combination and conspiracy
to monopolize such commerce in violation of § 2 of the Act, as well
as attempting to monopolize such commerce in violation of § 2.
[
Footnote 2] The District Court
declined to issue a temporary injunction but, after trial, found
that the parties were engaging in an attempt to monopolize as
charged. Confining itself to that issue, the court enjoined them
from continuing the attempt.
92 F. Supp.
794. They appealed to this Court under the Expediting Act of
1903, 32 Stat. 823, as amended, 62 Stat. 989, 15 U.S.C. (Supp. IV)
§ 29, and the issues before us are those arising from that finding
and the terms of the injunction.
Page 342 U. S. 146
The appellant corporation, here called the publisher, has
published the Journal in the City of Lorain since before 1932. In
that year, it, with others, purchased the Times-Herald, which was
the only competing daily paper published in that city. Later,
without success, it sought a license to establish and operate a
radio broadcasting station in Lorain.
92 F.
Supp. 794, 796,
and see Lorain Journal Co. v. Federal
Communications Comm'n, 86 U.S.App.D.C. 102, 180 F.2d 28.
The court below describes the position of the Journal, since
1933, as
"a commanding and an overpowering one. It has a daily
circulation in Lorain of over 13,000 copies, and it reaches
ninety-nine percent of the families in the city."
92 F. Supp. at 796. Lorain is an industrial city on Lake Erie
with a population of about 52,000 occupying 11,325 dwelling units.
The Sunday News, appearing only on Sundays, is the only other
newspaper published there [
Footnote
3]
While but 165 out of the Journal's daily circulation of over
20,000 copies are sent out of Ohio, it publishes not only Lorain
news but substantial quantities of state, national, and
international news. It pays substantial sums for such news and for
feature material shipped to it from various parts of the United
States and the rest of the world. It carries a substantial quantity
of national advertising
Page 342 U. S. 147
sent to it from throughout the United States. Shipments and
payments incidental to the above matters, as well as the
publisher's purchases of paper and ink, involve many transactions
in interstate or foreign commerce.
From 1933 to 1948, the publisher enjoyed a substantial monopoly
in Lorain of the mass dissemination of news and advertising, both
of a local and national character. However, in 1948, the
Elyria-Lorain Broadcasting Company, a corporation independent of
the publisher, was licensed by the Federal Communications
Commission to establish and operate in Elyria, Ohio, eight miles
south of Lorain, a radio station whose call letters, WEOL, stand
for Elyria, Oberlin, and Lorain. [
Footnote 4] Since then, it has operated its principal
studio in Elyria, and a branch studio in Lorain. Lorain has about
twice the population of Elyria, and is by far the largest community
in the station's immediate area. Oberlin is much smaller than
Elyria, and eight miles south of it.
While the station is not affiliated with a national network, it
disseminates both intrastate and interstate news and advertising.
About 65% of its program consists of music broadcast from
electrical transcriptions. These are shipped and leased to the
station by out-of-state suppliers. Most of them are copyrighted,
and the station pays royalties to the out-of-state holders of the
copyrights.
Page 342 U. S. 148
From 10 to 12% of the station's program consists of news,
worldwide in coverage, gathered by United Press Associations. The
news is received from outside of Ohio and relayed to Elyria through
Columbus or Cleveland. From April, 1949, to March, 1950, the
station broadcast over 100 sponsored sports events originating in
various states.
Substantially all of the station's income is derived from its
broadcasts of advertisements of goods or services. About 16% of its
income comes from national advertising under contracts with
advertisers outside of Ohio. This produces a continuous flow of
copy, payments, and materials moving across state lines. [
Footnote 5]
The court below found that appellants knew that a substantial
number of Journal advertisers wished to use the facilities of the
radio station as well. For some of them, it found that advertising
in the Journal was essential for the promotion of their sales in
Lorain County. It found that, at all times since WEOL commenced
broadcasting, appellants had executed a plan conceived to eliminate
the threat of competition from the station. Under this plan, the
publisher refused to accept local advertisements in the Journal
from any Lorain County advertiser who advertised or who appellants
believed to be about to advertise over WEOL. The court found
expressly that the
Page 342 U. S. 149
purpose and intent of this procedure was to destroy the
broadcasting company.
The court characterized all this as "bold, relentless, and
predatory commercial behavior." 92 F. Supp. at 796. To carry out
appellants' plan, the publisher monitored WEOL programs to
determine the identity of the station's local Lorain advertisers.
Those using the station's facilities had their contracts with the
publisher terminated, and were able to renew them only after
ceasing to advertise through WEOL. The program was effective.
Numerous Lorain County merchants testified that, as a result of the
publisher's policy, they either ceased or abandoned their plans to
advertise over WEOL.
"Having the plan and desire to injure the radio station, no more
effective and more direct device to impede the operations and to
restrain the commerce of WEOL could be found by the Journal than to
cut off its bloodstream of existence -- the advertising revenues
which control its life or demise."
"
* * * *"
". . . the very existence of WEOL is imperiled by this attack
upon one of its principal sources of business and income."
Id. 92 F. Supp. at 798, 799.
The principal provisions of the injunction issued by the
District Court are not set forth in the published report of the
case below, but are printed in an Appendix,
infra, pp.
342 U. S.
157-159. Sections IV and V B of the decree, relating to
notices, are stayed pending final disposition of this appeal.
1.
The conduct complained of was an attempt to monopolize
interstate commerce. It consisted of the publisher's practice
of refusing to accept local Lorain advertising from parties using
WEOL for local advertising. Because of the Journal's complete daily
newspaper monopoly of local advertising in Lorain and its
practically
Page 342 U. S. 150
indispensable coverage of 99% of the Lorain families, this
practice forced numerous advertisers to refrain from using WEOL for
local advertising. That result not only reduced the number of
customers available to WEOL in the field of local Lorain
advertising and strengthened the Journal's monopoly in that field,
but, more significantly, tended to destroy and eliminate WEOL
altogether. Attainment of that sought-for elimination would
automatically restore to the publisher of the Journal its
substantial monopoly in Lorain of the mass dissemination of all
news and advertising, interstate and national, as well as local. It
would deprive not merely Lorain, but Elyria and all surrounding
communities, of their only nearby radio station.
There is a suggestion that the out-of-state distribution of some
copies of the Journal, coupled with the considerable interstate
commerce engaged in by its publisher in the purchase of its
operating supplies, provided, in any event, a sufficient basis for
classifying the publisher's entire operation as one in interstate
commerce. It is pointed out also that the Journal's daily
publication of local news and advertising was so inseparably
integrated with its publication of interstate news and national
advertising that any coercion used by it in securing local
advertising inevitably operated to strengthen its entire operation,
including its monopoly of interstate news and national
advertising.
It is not necessary, however, to rely on the above suggestions.
The findings go further. They expressly and unequivocally state
that the publisher's conduct was aimed at a larger target -- the
complete destruction and elimination of WEOL. The court found that
the publisher, before 1948, enjoyed a substantial monopoly in
Lorain of the mass dissemination not only of local news and
advertising, but of news of out-of-state events transmitted to
Lorain for immediate dissemination, and of
Page 342 U. S. 151
advertising of out-of-state products for sale in Lorain. WEOL
offered competition by radio in all these fields, so that the
publisher's attempt to destroy WEOL was in fact an attempt to end
the invasion by radio of the Lorain newspaper's monopoly of
interstate as well as local commerce. [
Footnote 6]
There can be little doubt today that the immediate dissemination
of news gathered from throughout the nation or the world by
agencies specially organized for that purpose is a part of
interstate commerce.
Associated Press v. United States,
326 U. S. 1,
326 U. S. 14;
Associated Press v. Labor Board, 301 U.
S. 103. The same is true of national advertising
originating throughout the nation and offering products for sale on
a national scale. The local dissemination of such news and
advertising requires continuous interstate transmission of
materials and payments, to say nothing of the interstate commerce
involved in the sale and delivery of products sold. The decision in
Blumenstock Bros. v. Curtis Pub. Co., 252 U.
S. 436, related to the making of contracts for
advertising, rather than to the preparation and dissemination of
advertising. Moreover, the view there stated, that the making of
contracts by parties outside of a state for the insertion of
advertising material in periodicals of nationwide circulation did
not amount to interstate commerce, rested expressly
Page 342 U. S. 152
on a line of cases holding
"that policies of insurance are not articles of commerce, and
that the making of such contracts is a mere incident of commercial
intercourse."
Id. at
252 U. S. 443.
See Paul v.
Virginia, 8 Wall. 168, and
New York Life Ins.
Co. v. Deer Lodge County, 231 U. S. 495.
That line of cases no longer stands in the way.
United States
v. South-Eastern Underwriters Assn., 322 U.
S. 533.
See also North American Co. v. Securities
& Exchange Comm'n, 327 U. S. 686;
Indiana Farmer's Guide Pub. Co. v. Prairie Farmer Pub.
Co., 293 U. S. 268.
The distribution within Lorain of the news and advertisements
transmitted to Lorain in interstate commerce for the sole purpose
of immediate and profitable reproduction and distribution to the
reading public is an inseparable part of the flow of the interstate
commerce involved.
See Binderup v. Pathe Exchange,
263 U. S. 291,
263 U. S. 309;
Stafford v. Wallace, 258 U. S. 495,
258 U. S. 516;
Illinois Central R. Co. v. De Fuentes, 236 U.
S. 157,
236 U. S. 163;
Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.
S. 375,
196 U. S. 398.
Unless protected by law, the consuming public is at the mercy of
restraints and monopolizations of interstate commerce at whatever
points they occur. Without the protection of competition at the
outlets of the flow of interstate commerce, the protection of its
earlier stages is of little worth.
2.
The publisher's attempt to regain its monopoly of
interstate commerce by forcing advertisers to boycott a competing
radio station violated § 2. The findings and opinion of the
trial court describe the conduct of the publisher upon which the
Government relies. The surrounding circumstances are important. The
most illuminating of these is the substantial monopoly which was
enjoyed in Lorain by the publisher from 1933 to 1948, together with
a 99% coverage of Lorain families. Those factors made the Journal
an indispensable medium of advertising for many Lorain concerns.
Accordingly, its
Page 342 U. S. 153
publisher's refusals to print Lorain advertising for those using
WEOL for like advertising often amounted to an effective
prohibition of the use of WEOL for that purpose. Numerous Lorain
advertisers wished to supplement their local newspaper advertising
with local radio advertising, but could not afford to discontinue
their newspaper advertising in order to use the radio.
WEOL's greatest potential source of income was local Lorain
advertising. Loss of that was a major threat to its existence. The
court below found unequivocally that appellants' conduct amounted
to an attempt by the publisher to destroy WEOL and, at the same
time, to regain the publisher's pre-1948 substantial monopoly over
the mass dissemination of all news and advertising.
To establish this violation of § 2 as charged, it was not
necessary to show that success rewarded appellants' attempt to
monopolize. The injunctive relief under § 4 sought to forestall
that success. While appellants' attempt to monopolize did succeed
insofar as it deprived WEOL of income, WEOL has not yet been
eliminated. The injunction may save it.
"[W]hen that intent [to monopolize] and the consequent dangerous
probability exist, this statute [the Sherman Act], like many
others, and like the common law in some cases, directs itself
against that dangerous probability, as well as against the
completed result."
Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.
S. 375,
196 U. S. 396.
See also American Tobacco Co. v. United States,
328 U. S. 781;
United States v. Aluminum Co., 148 F.2d 416, 431.
"[T]he 2d section [of the Sherman Act] seeks, if possible, to
make the prohibitions of the act all the more complete and perfect
by embracing all attempts to reach the end prohibited by the 1st
section, that is, restraints of trade, by any attempt to
monopolize, or monopolization thereof, even although the acts by
which such results are attempted
Page 342 U. S. 154
to be brought about or are brought about be not embraced within
the general enumeration of the 1st section."
Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U. S.
1,
221 U. S. 61.
[
Footnote 7]
Assuming the interstate character of the commerce involved, it
seems clear that, if all the newspapers in a city, in order to
monopolize the dissemination of news and advertising by eliminating
a competing radio station, conspired to accept no advertisements
from anyone who advertised over that station, they would violate §§
1 and 2 of the Sherman Act.
Cf. Fashion Originators' Guild v.
Federal Trade Comm'n, 312 U. S. 457,
312 U. S. 465;
Binderup v. Pathe Exchange, 263 U.
S. 291;
Federal Trade Comm'n v. Beech-Nut Packing
Co., 257 U. S. 441;
Loewe v.Lawlor, 208 U. S. 274;
William Goldman Theaters v. Loew's, Inc., 150 F.2d 738. It
is consistent with that result to hold here that a single
newspaper, already enjoying a substantial monopoly in its area,
violates the "attempt to monopolize" clause of § 2 when it uses its
monopoly to destroy threatened competition. [
Footnote 8]
Page 342 U. S. 155
The publisher claims a right as a private business concern to
select its customers and to refuse to accept advertisement from
whomever it pleases. We do not dispute that general right.
"But the word 'right' is one of the most deceptive of pitfalls;
it is so easy to slip from a qualified meaning in the premise to an
unqualified one in the conclusion. Most rights are qualified."
American Bank & Trust Co. v. Federal Reserve Bank,
256 U. S. 350,
256 U. S. 358.
The right claimed by the publisher is neither absolute nor exempt
from regulation. Its exercise a a purposeful means of monopolizing
interstate commerce is prohibited by the Sherman Act. The operator
of the radio station, equally with the publisher of the newspaper,
is entitled to the protection of that Act.
"
In the absence of any purpose to create or maintain a
monopoly, the act does not restrict the long recognized right
of trader or manufacturer engaged in an entirely private business,
freely to exercise his own independent discretion as to parties
with whom he will deal."
(Emphasis supplied.)
United States v. Colgate &
Co., 250 U. S. 300,
250 U. S. 307.
See Associated Press v. United States, 326 U. S.
1,
326 U. S. 15;
United States v. Bausch & Lomb Co., 321 U.
S. 707,
321 U. S.
721-723.
3.
The injunction does not violate any guaranteed freedom of
the press. The publisher suggests that the injunction amounts
to a prior restraint upon what it may publish. We find in it no
restriction upon any guaranteed freedom of the press. The
injunction applies to a publisher
Page 342 U. S. 156
what the law applies to others. The publisher may not accept or
deny advertisements in an "attempt to monopolize . . . any part of
the trade or commerce among the several States. . . ." 15 U.S.C. §
2;
Associated Press v. United States, supra, at
326 U. S. 6-7,
326 U. S. 20;
Indiana Farmer's Guide Pub. Co. v. Prairie Farmer Pub.
Co., 293 U. S. 268.
See also Oklahoma Press Pub. Co. v. Walling, 327 U.
S. 186,
327 U. S. 192;
Mabee v. White Plains Pub. Co., 327 U.
S. 178,
327 U. S. 184;
Associated Press v. Labor Board, 301 U.
S. 103. Injunctive relief under § 4 of the Sherman Act
is as appropriate a means of enforcing the Act against newspapers
as it is against others.
4.
The decree is reasonably consistent with the requirements
of the case and remains within the control of the court below.
[
Footnote 9] We have considered
the objections made to the form and substance of the decree and do
not find obvious error. It is suggested, for example, that the
decree covers a broader scope of activities than is required by the
evidence, and requires unnecessary supervision of future conduct of
the publisher, that notice of its terms must be published at least
once a week for 25 weeks, and that the publisher, for five years,
must maintain records relating to the subject of the judgment, and
keep them accessible for governmental inspection.
While the decree should anticipate probabilities of the future,
it is equally important that it do not impose unnecessary
restrictions and that the procedure prescribed for supervision,
giving notice, keeping records, and making inspections be not
unduly burdensome.
In the instant case, the printed record contains neither the
entire testimony nor all the exhibits which were before the court
below. It omits also material mentioned during the trial as having
been considered by the court
Page 342 U. S. 157
when denying the Government's motion for a temporary injunction.
Under the circumstances, we are content to rely upon the trial
court's retention of jurisdiction over the cause for whatever
modification the decree may require in the light of the entire
proceedings and of subsequent events.
See Associated Press v.
United States, supra, at
326 U. S. 22-23;
United States v. Bausch & Lomb Co., supra, at
321 U. S.
727-729.
The judgment accordingly is
Affirmed.
MR. JUSTICE CLARK and MR. JUSTICE MINTON took no part in the
consideration or decision of this case.
[
Footnote 1]
"SEC. 2. Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to
monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or
persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the
several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of
a misdemeanor. . . ."
"SEC. 4. The several district courts of the United States are
hereby invested with jurisdiction to prevent and restrain
violations of this act, and it shall be the duty of the several
district attorneys of the United States, in their respective
districts, under the direction of the Attorney General, to
institute proceedings in equity to prevent and restrain such
violations. . . ."
26 Stat. 209, 36 Stat. 1167, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2 and 4.
[
Footnote 2]
The individual defendants named in the complaint were Samuel A.
Horvitz, vice-president, secretary, and a director of the
corporation; Isadore Horvitz, president, treasurer and a director;
D. P. Self, business manager, and Frank Maloy, editor. Each
participated in the conduct alleged to constitute the attempt to
monopolize. Maloy has died pending the appeal.
[
Footnote 3]
The Sunday News has a weekly circulation of about 3,000 copies,
largely in Lorain. The Chronicle-Telegram is a newspaper published
daily, except Sunday, eight miles away in Elyria. It has a daily
circulation in that city of about 9,000, but none in Lorain. The
Cleveland Plain Dealer, News, and Press are metropolitan newspapers
published daily, except Sunday, in Cleveland, 28 miles east of
Lorain. They have a combined daily circulation in Lorain of about
6,000. The Cleveland Sunday Plain Dealer has a Sunday circulation
in Lorain of about 11,000. The Cleveland papers carry no Lorain
advertising and little Lorain news. No reference has been made in
the record or in the argument here to competition from any radio
station other than WEOL.
[
Footnote 4]
The license also covers WEOL-FM, but the two stations are here
treated as one. WEOL operates on a frequency of 930 kilocycles and
WEOL-FM of 107.6 megacycles. The station outlines its primary
listening or market area on the basis of a half millivolt daytime
pattern and a two millivolt nighttime pattern. Its day pattern
reaches an area containing all or part of 20 counties and an
estimated population of over 2,250,000. Its night pattern reaches
an area containing parts of nine of these counties and an estimated
population of about 450,000. Lorain County, which includes the
communities of Lorain, Elyria, and Oberlin, contains about 120,000
people, 52,000 of whom live in the City of Lorain.
[
Footnote 5]
Other findings show that the station broadcasts advertisements
of goods and services on behalf of suppliers outside of Ohio. These
sometimes result in interstate orders and shipments. Orders
received by its local advertisers are sometimes filled by
out-of-state suppliers. The station's broadcasts inevitably reach
across state lines. They are heard with some regularity by many
people in southern Michigan. The application which led to WEOL's
license was considered by the Federal Communications Commission in
conjunction with an application for another license, sought by a
Michigan station, involving possible conflicts between its coverage
and that of WEOL.
[
Footnote 6]
The reference in § 2 to an attempt to monopolize "any part of
the trade or commerce among the several States" relates not merely
to interstate commerce within any geographical part of the United
States, but also to any appreciable part of such interstate
commerce.
"The provisions of sections 1 and 2 have both a geographical and
distributive significance, and apply to any part of the United
States. as distinguished from the whole and to any part of the
classes of things forming a part of interstate commerce."
Indiana Farmer's Guide Pub. Co. v. Prairie Farmer Pub.
Co., 293 U. S. 268,
293 U. S. 279.
See also United States v. Griffith, 334 U.
S. 100,
334 U. S. 106;
United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.
S. 218,
332 U. S. 225;
Montague & Co. v. Lowry, 193 U. S.
38.
[
Footnote 7]
"Section 2 is not restricted to conspiracies or combinations to
monopolize, but also makes it a crime for any person to monopolize
or to attempt to monopolize any part of interstate or foreign trade
or commerce. . . . It is indeed 'unreasonable,
per se, to
foreclose competitors from any substantial market.' . . . The
anti-trust laws are as much violated by the prevention of
competition as by its destruction. . . . It follows
a
fortiori that the use of monopoly power, however lawfully
acquired, to foreclose competition, to gain a competitive
advantage, or to destroy a competitor, is unlawful."
United States v. Griffith, 334 U.
S. 100,
334 U. S.
106-107.
[
Footnote 8]
Appellants have sought to justify their conduct on the ground
that it was part of the publisher's program for the protection of
the Lorain market from outside competition. The publisher claimed
to have refused advertising from Elyria or other out-of-town
advertisers for the reason that such advertisers might compete with
Lorain concerns. The publisher then classified WEOL as the
publisher's own competitor from Elyria, and asked its Lorain
advertisers to refuse to employ WEOL as an advertising medium in
competition with the Journal. We find no principle of law which
required Lorain advertisers thus to boycott an Elyria advertising
medium merely because the publisher of a Lorain advertising medium
had chosen to boycott some Elyria advertisers who might compete for
business in the Lorain market. Nor do we find any principle of law
which permitted this publisher to dictate to prospective
advertisers that they might advertise either by newspaper or by
radio, but that they might not use both facilities.
[
Footnote 9]
A substantial part of the decree is printed in the Appendix,
infra pp.
342 U. S.
157-159.
|3420143app|
APPENDIX
FINAL JUDGMENT -- . . .
* * * *
III
Defendant The Lorain Journal Company is enjoined and restrained
from:
A. Refusing to accept for publication or refusing to publish any
advertisement or advertisements or discriminating as to price,
space, arrangement, location, commencement or period of insertion
or any other terms or conditions of publication of advertisement or
advertisements where the reason for such refusal or discrimination
is, in whole or in part, express or implied, that the person, firm
or corporation submitting the advertisement or advertisements has
advertised, advertises, has proposed or proposes to advertise in or
through any other advertising medium.
B. Accepting for publication or publishing any advertisement or
making or adhering to any contract for the publication of
advertisements on or accompanied by any
Page 342 U. S. 158
condition, agreement or understanding, express or implied:
"1. That the advertiser shall not use the advertising medium of
any person, firm or corporation other than defendant The Lorain
Journal Company;"
"2. That the advertiser use only the advertising medium of
defendant The Lorain Journal Company;"
C. Cancelling, terminating, refusing to renew or in any manner
impairing any contract, agreement or understanding, involving the
publication of advertisements, between the defendants, or any of
them, and any person, firm or corporation for the reason, in whole
or in part, that such person, firm or corporation advertised,
advertises or proposes to advertise in or through any advertising
medium other than the newspaper published by the corporate
defendant.
IV
Commencing fifteen (15) days after the entry of this judgment
and at least once a week for a period of twenty-five weeks
thereafter, the corporate defendant shall insert in the newspaper
published by it a notice which shall fairly and fully apprise the
readers thereof of the substantive terms of this judgment and which
notice shall be placed in a conspicuous location.
V
Defendant The Lorain Journal Company and the individual
defendants are ordered and directed to:
A. Maintain for a period of five (5) years from the date of this
judgment all books and records, which shall include all
correspondence, memoranda, reports and other writings, relating to
the subject matter of this judgment;
B. Advise in writing within ten (10) days from the date of this
judgment any officers, agents, employees, and
Page 342 U. S. 159
any other persons acting for, through or under defendants or any
of them of the terms of this judgment and that each and every such
person is subject to the provisions of this judgment. The
defendants shall make readily available to such persons a copy of
this judgment, and shall inform them of such availability.
VII
Jurisdiction of this cause is retained for the purpose of
enabling any of the parties to this judgment to apply to the Court
at any time for such further orders and directions as may be
necessary or appropriate in relation to the construction of, or
carrying out of this judgment, for the amendment or modification of
any of the provisions thereof, or the enforcement of compliance
therewith and for the punishment of violations thereof.