On the day before the effective date of the Labor Management
Relations Act, 1947, amending the National Labor Relations Act, a
union ordered its members, who were working on a dwelling
renovation project, to strike. They did so, and the strike
continued after the effective date of the amendment. One of the
objects was to force the owner of the dwelling to cancel a contract
for the installation of wall and floor coverings by a merchant
using nonunion workmen in their installation. The National Labor
Relations Board found that the union and its agent (petitioners
here) had engaged in an unfair labor practice within the meaning of
§ 8(b)(4)(A) of the Act and ordered them to cease and desist.
Held: its finding and order are sustained. Pp.
341 U. S.
708-715.
1. On the record in this case, the actions complained of had
sufficient effect on interstate commerce to sustain the Board's
jurisdiction. P.
341 U. S.
712.
2. Section 8(c) is not applicable. Pp.
341 U. S.
712-713.
3. It is enough that one of the objects of the action complained
of was to force the owner of the dwelling to cancel the merchant's
contract, and it does not immunize such action from § 8(b)(4)(A) to
show that another object was to enforce a rule of the union that
its members should not work on a project on which nonunion men were
employed. P.
341 U. S.
713.
4. It is immaterial that the strike had its origin before the
effective date of the amended Act, since it was prolonged after the
effective date, for the same objective. Pp.
341 U. S.
713-714.
5. The case has not been rendered moot by the completion of the
renovation project. P.
341 U. S.
715.
181 F.2d 126, affirmed.
The National Labor Relations Board found that petitioners had
committed an unfair labor practice within the meaning of §
8(b)(4)(A) of the National Labor Relations
Page 341 U. S. 708
Act, as amended by the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, and
ordered them to cease and desist. 80 N.L.R.B. 533. The Court of
Appeals ordered enforcement. 181 F.2d 126. This Court granted
certiorari. 340 U.S. 902.
Affirmed, p.
341 U. S.
715.
MR. JUSTICE BURTON delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is a companion case to No. 393,
Labor Board v. Denver
Building and Construction Trades Council (the
Denver
case),
ante, p.
341 U. S. 675, and
No. 108,
International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers v.
Labor Board (the
Greenwich case),
ante, p.
341 U. S. 694.
The principal question is whether, under the following
circumstances, a union engaged in an unfair labor practice within
the meaning of § 8(b)(4)(A) of the National Labor Relations Act, 49
Stat. 449, 29 U.S.C. § 151, as amended by the Labor Management
Relations Act, 1947. [
Footnote
1] On the day before the effective date of that amendment, the
union ordered its members, who were working on a dwelling
renovation project, to engage in a strike where an object thereof
was to force the owner of the dwelling to cancel a contract for the
installation of wall and floor coverings, and then for several
days, on and
Page 341 U. S. 709
after the effective date of the amendment, the strike was
continued under the same conditions which created it and for the
same objective. For the reasons hereafter stated, we hold that an
unfair labor practice was engaged in on and after the effective
date of the amendment.
For some years before March, 1947, Ira A. Watson Company, a
Rhode Island corporation (here called Watson's), operated a general
retail store in Chattanooga, Tennessee, including a department for
the sale and installation of wall and floor coverings. Since that
time, Watson's has operated a specialty store devoted to those
activities. At about the same time, Local 74, United Brotherhood of
Carpenters and Joiners of America, A.F. of L. (here called the
union), and its business agent, Jack Henderson (respectively the
petitioners in the instant case), asked Watson's to enter into a
closed-shop agreement with the union recognizing it as the
bargaining agent of Watson's installation employees. None of its
employees were members of the union, and Watson's declined to enter
the agreement. Thereupon, from the latter part of March until about
August 28, 1947, petitioners maintained a picket in front of
Watson's store carrying a placard. This announced, over the name of
the union, that Watson's was "unfair to organized labor," or,
later, "This store employs non-union labor." Watson's sometimes
sold wall or floor coverings without installing them, and, at other
times, it insisted upon installing such coverings as a condition of
their sale. When the installations were made by Watson's, the work
was done by nonunion men.
August 7, 1947, George D. Stanley, who owned a dwelling near
Chattanooga, contracted with D. F. Parker to improve and renovate
it. Parker was to furnish and supervise the workmen and select the
materials. Stanley was to pay the wages of the workmen, the cost of
the materials, and a ten percent commission to Parker on both.
Page 341 U. S. 710
Parker was a member of the union, and he hired union members to
do the carpentry work. If the wall and floor coverings desired by
Stanley had been available in Chattanooga elsewhere than at
Watson's, Parker would have purchased them from such source, and
would have employed union men to install them. However, neither
Parker nor Stanley could find such coverings in Chattanooga except
at Watson's, and Watson's insisted on installing them as a
condition of their sale. Although knowing that Watson's would use
nonunion men to make the installations, Stanley, with Parker's
implied consent, contracted with Watson's for the purchase and
installation of the coverings. Watson's began its installation
Sunday, August 17, when there were no other workmen present. Monday
and Tuesday, apparently with Parker's approval, the installation
continued during regular working hours. Wednesday, two of the union
carpenters stopped work for half an hour because of the presence on
the job of the nonunion installation workers. Parker, however,
induced the carpenters to resume work. This situation came to the
attention of the union, and, on Thursday, August 21, Henderson came
to the project and told the four union carpenters who were working
there that they could not continue to work with nonunion men or
where nonunion men were employed. At that hour, none of Watson's
men was present, but the installation of coverings contracted for
by Stanley with Watson's had not been completed. The union men
finished their day's work but, in compliance with the instructions
thus issued by petitioners, did not return on the following days.
Watson's men returned, and completed their work by August 28, and
the entire renovation was finished by the end of August. The
unfinished carpentry work was done by two of the four union men who
had been on the job and who returned without the knowledge or
Page 341 U. S. 711
consent of petitioners. On August 22, 1947, § 8(b)(4)(A) took
effect. [
Footnote 2]
Watson's promptly filed a charge with the National Labor
Relations Board based upon the continuance of the above strike by
petitioners on and after August 22. The Regional Director issued a
complaint charging the union and Henderson with engaging in an
unfair labor practice as defined in § 8(b)(4)(A). [
Footnote 3] Pursuant to § 10(
l),
[
Footnote 4] the Regional
Director petitioned the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Tennessee for injunctive relief. This relief
was denied on the ground that the conduct complained of took place
before August 22 and was at that time lawful.
Styles v. Local
74, United Brotherhood of Carpenters, 74 F. Supp.
499.
After hearings before an examiner, the Board, with one member
dissenting, affirmed the rulings of its examiner, attached his
intermediate report to its decision, 80 N.L.R.B. 533, 540, and
adopted his findings, conclusions, and recommendations with
additions and modifications. It ordered the union and Henderson
to
"Cease and desist from engaging in or inducing the members of
Local 74 to engage in a strike or a concerted refusal in the course
of their employment to perform services for any employer where an
object thereof is to require any employer or other person to cease
doing business with Ira A. Watson, doing business as Watson's
Specialty Store."
Id. at 539.
The dissent was on the ground that the effect of the actions
complained of upon interstate commerce was so
Page 341 U. S. 712
remote and insubstantial and the controversy was so local in
character that it was undesirable for the Board to exercise federal
power in relation to it.
Id. at 540. On a review under §
10(e), [
Footnote 5] the Court
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit ordered enforcement of the order.
181 F.2d 126. We granted certiorari. 340 U.S. 902.
See Labor
Board v. Denver Building and Construction Trades Council,
ante, p.
341 U. S. 682,
341 U. S.
683.
1. Petitioners contest the jurisdiction of the Board on the
ground of the insufficiency of the effect of the actions complained
of upon interstate commerce. We conclude that the findings in the
intermediate report, adopted by the Board and accepted by the court
below, are sufficient to sustain the Board's jurisdiction.
Denver case,
ante at p.
341 U. S.
683-687. From March to September, 1947, Watson's
purchased about $93,000 worth of goods. Thirty-three percent was
shipped to it in interstate business. Thirty percent more had been
manufactured outside of Tennessee. Watson's sales and installation
jobs came to about $100,000, of which eight percent represented
sales and installations outside of the State. The Board also
referred to the fact that Watson's operated a system of 26 or 27
retail stores in seven different states, of which the Chattanooga
store apparently was an integral part.
2. The complaint was not against the picketing at Watson's store
from March to August 28, 1947.
See Labor Board v. International
Rice Milling Co., ante, p.
341 U. S. 665. The
complaint was directed against petitioners' extension of their
activities to the Stanley project by there ordering a strike, or
concerted cessation of work, on the part of Stanley's union
carpenters [
Footnote 6] with an
object of forcing Stanley to cancel his installation contract with
Watson's.
Page 341 U. S. 713
Section 8(c) [
Footnote 7] is
not applicable. This strike was ordered by Henderson in person. The
union and he both engaged in and ordered the strike. The
carpenters, as individual employees, are not charged with an unfair
labor practice. The charge is confined to the actions of the labor
organization and its agent in engaging in, ordering, and continuing
a strike for a proscribed object after Congress had made such
conduct an unfair labor practice.
3. As determined in the
Denver case, it is enough that
one of the objects of the action complained of was to force Stanley
to cancel Watson's contract. It does not immunize such action from
§ 8(b)(4)(A) to show that it also had as an object the enforcement
of a rule of the union that its members should not work on a
project on which nonunion men were employed. [
Footnote 8] The statute did not require the
individual carpenters to remain on this job. It did, however, make
it an unfair labor practice for the union or its agent to engage in
a strike, as they did here, when an object of doing so was to force
the project owner to cancel his installation contract with
Watson's.
4. Even assuming that, if petitioners had engaged in such a
strike or had induced the union carpenters to take part in it on
and after August 22, 1947, it would have been an unfair labor
practice under the new amendment,
Page 341 U. S. 714
petitioners contend that their actions all took place before
August 22, and that they did nothing on or after that date which is
proscribed by § 8(b)(4)(A). [
Footnote 9] The answer turns on what actually took place
on and after August 22. As to that, the Board concluded:
"Nor is it material . . . that the labor dispute had its origin
before the effective date of the amended Act, for we are convinced
that it was continued and prolonged after the effective date by the
very same factors which originally created it and for the same
original objective, which, as found above, Section 8(b)(4)(A)
declares unlawful. Thus, at material times both before and after
the effective date of the amendments . . . , (2) the Respondents'
[here, petitioners'] strike order, which admittedly was never
rescinded, was outstanding, and effectively prevented the
carpenters from officially working on the job as long as Watson's
men were also working. . . ."
80 N.L.R.B. at 537-538. [
Footnote 10]
We agree with the court below in sustaining that conclusion.
[
Footnote 11]
Page 341 U. S. 715
5. We have considered the remaining questions raised by
petitioners based on constitutional or other grounds, and have
resolved them in favor of sustaining the Board and the court below.
This case has not been rendered moot by the completion of the
renovation project. The complaint was against petitioners' use of
secondary pressure upon Watson's in a manner proscribed by the
statute. The use of such pressure on this renovation project was
merely a sample of what might be repeated elsewhere if not
prohibited. The underlying dispute between petitioners and Watson's
has not been shown to have been resolved.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals accordingly is
Affirmed.
MR. JUSTICE REED, MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS and MR. JUSTICE JACKSON
are of the opinion that the judgment should be reversed.
[
Footnote 1]
61 Stat. 140-141, 29 U.S.C. (Supp. III) § 158(b)(4)(A). For
text,
see Labor Board v. Denver Building and Construction
Trades Council, ante, p. 675,
note 1
[
Footnote 2]
The Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, was enacted into law
June 23, 1947, but Title I, containing § 8(b)(4)(A), took effect 60
days later. 61 Stat. 152, 162, 29 U.S.C. (Supp. III), note
following § 151.
[
Footnote 3]
The complaint originally also charged violations of §
8(b)(1)(A), but the Board dismissed those allegations, and they are
not before us.
[
Footnote 4]
61 Stat. 149-150, 29 U.S.C. (Supp. III) § 160(
l). For
text,
see Labor Board v. Denver Building and Construction
Trades Council, ante, p. 675,
note 10
[
Footnote 5]
61 Stat. 147-148, 29 U.S.C. (Supp. III) § 160(e).
[
Footnote 6]
The examiner expressed doubt as to whether the carpenters were
employees of Parker or of Stanley, but decided to assume that they
were employees of Stanley. 80 N.L.R.B. at 544, n. 12.
[
Footnote 7]
61 Stat. 142, 29 U.S.C. (Supp. III) § 158(c). For text,
see the
Denver case,
ante, p.
341 U. S. 690,
note 20.
[
Footnote 8]
The examiner found that Henderson testified credibly that this
rule applied whether or not the nonunion men were physically
present at the moment. It was enough that nonunion men were
employed on the project. Henderson therefore applied the rule here
because, although Watson's men were absent from the project on
August 21, 1947, Watson's installation contract was not yet
complete, and it was clear that its completion would mean the
return of nonunion men to the project. Henderson testified also
that the rule applied even to the employment of nonunion labor
which did not come under the jurisdiction of Local 74. 80 N.L.R.B.
at 546, 553, n. 33.
[
Footnote 9]
In the proceedings for an injunction under § 10(
l), the
District Court so held. Its decision, however, was based upon the
affidavits before it, rather than upon the record before the Board,
and its conclusion did not bind the Board in the proceeding on the
merits.
74 F. Supp.
499,
and see Labor Board v. Denver Building and
Construction Trades Council, ante, pp.
341 U. S.
681-683.
[
Footnote 10]
Petitioners gain nothing from, § 102:
"No provision of this title [which includes § 8(b)(4)(A)] shall
be deemed to make an unfair labor practice any act which was
performed prior to the date of the enactment of this Act [June 23,
1947] which did not constitute an unfair labor practice prior
thereto. . . ."
61 Stat. 152, 29 U.S.C. (Supp. III), note following § 158.
[
Footnote 11]
For a comparable result relating to a labor dispute which
commenced before the taking effect of the National Labor Relations
Act of 1935,
see Jeffery-De Witt Insulator Co. v. Labor
Board, 91 F.2d 134.