After one of the respondents had been convicted and the others
acquitted of substantive offenses under what is now 18 U.S.C. § 242
--
i.e., beating or aiding and abetting the beating of
certain suspects until they confessed to a theft -- they were
convicted in the Federal District Court for a violation of what is
now 18 U.S. C. § 241. The indictment arose out of the same facts,
and alleged that, "acting under the laws of . . . Florida,"
they
"conspired to injure the free exercise and enjoyment of the
rights and privileges secured to him and protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment."
The Court of Appeals reversed their conviction on this
conspiracy indictment.
Held: the judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.
P.
341 U. S.
82.
(a) MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER, joined by THE CHIEF JUSTICE, MR.
JUSTICE JACKSON and MR. JUSTICE MINTON, was of the opinion that §
241 only covers conduct which interferes with rights arising from
the substantive powers of the Federal Government, and that
including an allegation that the defendants acted under color of
state law in an indictment under § 241 does not extend the
protection of the section to rights which the Federal Constitution
merely guarantees against abridgment by the States. Pp.
341 U. S.
71-82.
(b) MR. JUSTICE BLACK concurred in the result on the ground that
trial under this conspiracy indictment was barred by the principle
of
res judicata. Pp.
341 U. S.
86-86.
179 F.2d 644 affirmed.
MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, joined by MR. JUSTICE REED, MR. JUSTICE
BURTON, and MR. JUSTICE CLARK, dissented. P.
341 U. S.
87.
A conviction of respondents for violation of what is now 18
U.S.C. § 241 was reversed by the Court of Appeals. 179 F.2d 644.
This Court granted certiorari. 340 U.S. 849.
Affirmed, p.
341 U. S.
82.
Page 341 U. S. 71
MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER announced the judgment of the Court and
an opinion in which THE CHIEF JUSTICE, MR. JUSTICE JACKSON and MR.
JUSTICE MINTON joined.
In 1947, a Florida corporation employed a detective agency to
investigate thefts of its property. The inquiry was conducted by
one Williams, the head of the agency, and among the participants
were two of his employees and a member of the Miami police force
detailed to assist in the investigation. Certain of the company's
employees fell under suspicion, and Williams and his collaborators,
without arresting the suspects, took them one by one to a shack on
the company's premises. There, the investigators subjected them to
the familiar "third-degree" which, after blows, kicks, threats, and
prolonged exposure to a brilliant light, yielded "confessions."
Williams and the other three were thereupon indicted for
violation of §§ 19 and 20 of the Criminal Code of the United
States. 18 U.S.C. (1946 ed.) §§ 51 and 52, now 18 U.S.C. (1950 ed.)
§§ 241 and 242. Williams was convicted under § 20, the indictment
alleging that he
"willfully, under color of the laws, statutes, ordinances,
regulations and customs of the Florida . . . subjected . . . an
inhabitant of the Florida to deprivation of the rights, privileges
and immunities secured to him and protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment. . . ."
This conviction is reviewed in No. 365,
post, p.
341 U. S. 97, also
decided this day. The other defendants were acquitted of the
charges under § 20, and, as to all defendants, a
Page 341 U. S. 72
mistrial was declared under § 19. This outcome of the indictment
under §§ 19 and 20 was followed by a new indictment against the
four defendants under § 19. The indictment alleged that, "acting
under the laws of the Florida," the defendants
"conspired to injure . . . a citizen of the United States and of
the Florida, in the free exercise and enjoyment of the rights and
privileges secured to him and protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment. . . ."
This time all the defendants were convicted, but, on appeal, the
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed. It held that, in
the conspiracy provision of § 19
"the Congress had in mind the federal rights and privileges
which appertain to citizens as such and not the general rights
extended to all persons by the clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment."
179 F.2d 644, 648. In the alternative, the court concluded that
a broader construction of § 19 would render it void for
indefiniteness, and that there was error in the judge's charge, as
well as in the exclusion of evidence of the prior acquittal of
three of the defendants. Together with Nos. 134 and 365 of this
Term, the other two cases growing out of the same affair, we
brought the case here because important questions in the
administration of civil rights legislation are raised. 340 U.S.
849.
The alternative grounds for the decision of the Court of Appeals
need not be considered, for we agree that § 241 (to use the current
designation for what was § 19 of the Criminal Code) does not reach
the conduct laid as an offense in the prosecution here. This is not
because we deny the power of Congress to enforce by appropriate
criminal sanction every right guaranteed by the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment; nor is it because we fully accept the
course of reasoning of the court below. We base our decision on the
history of § 241, its text and context, the statutory framework in
which it stands, its practical and judicial application
controlling
Page 341 U. S. 73
elements in construing a federal criminal provision that affects
the wise adjustment between State responsibility and national
control of essentially local affairs. The elements all converge in
one direction. They lead us to hold that § 241 only covers conduct
which interferes with rights arising from the substantive powers of
the Federal Government.
What is now known as § 241 originated as § 6 of the Act of May
31, 1870, 16 Stat. 140. That statute was entitled "An Act to
enforce the Right of Citizens of the United States to vote in the
several States of this Union, and for other Purposes." In
furtherance of its chief end of assuring the right of Negroes to
vote, it provided in §§ 2 and 3 that it should be a misdemeanor for
any "person or officer" wrongfully to fail in a duty imposed on him
by State law to perform or permit performance of acts necessary to
registering or voting. In § 4, interference with elections by
private persons was made a similar offense. In the course of
passage through Congress, several sections were added which had a
larger purpose. One of them, § 17, was derived from the Civil
Rights Act of 1866, 14 Stat. 27, and was designed to "secure to all
persons the equal protection of the laws." [
Footnote 1] It imposed imprisonment up to one year and
a fine up to one thousand dollars on
"any person who, under color of any law, statute, ordinance,
regulation, or custom, shall subject, or cause to be subjected, any
inhabitant of any State or Territory to the deprivation of any
right secured or protected by the last preceding section of this
act, or to different punishment, pains, or penalties on account of
such person being an alien, or by reason of his color or race, than
is prescribed for the punishment of citizens. . . ."
16 Stat. 140, 144.
Page 341 U. S. 74
Through successive revisions, it has become § 242, the
application of which to the facts before us is considered in No.
365,
post, p.
341 U. S. 97.
Another of the broader provisions is the section which is our
immediate concern. This was its original form:
"SEC. 6.
And be it further enacted, That if two or more
persons shall band or conspire together, or go in disguise upon the
public highway, or upon the premises of another, with intent to
violate any provision of this act, or to injure, oppress, threaten,
or intimidate any citizen with intent to prevent or hinder his free
exercise and enjoyment of any right or privilege granted or secured
to him by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or because
of his having exercised the same, such persons shall be held guilty
of felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be fined or
imprisoned, or both at the discretion of the court -- the fine not
to exceed five thousand dollars, and the imprisonment not to exceed
ten years -- and shall, moreover, be thereafter ineligible to, and
disabled from holding, any office or place of honor, profit, or
trust created by the Constitution or laws of the United
States."
16 Stat. 140, 141.
The dominant conditions of the Reconstruction Period were not
conducive to the enactment of carefully considered and coherent
legislation. Strong post-war feeling caused inadequate
deliberation, and led to loose and careless phrasing of laws
relating to the new political issues. The sections before us are no
exception. Although enacted together, they were proposed by
different sponsors, and hastily adopted. They received little
attention in debate. While the discussion of the bill as a whole
fills about 100 pages of the Congressional Globe, only two or three
related to § 6, and these are in good part
Page 341 U. S. 75
a record of complaint that the section was inadequately
considered or understood. [
Footnote
2]
Nevertheless, some conclusions are warranted. The first is that
interference with civil rights by State officers was dealt with
fully by § 17 of the Act. Three years before its enactment,
Congress had passed the first general conspiracy statute. Act of
March 2, 1867, § 30, 14 Stat. 484, R.S. § 5440, now 18 U.S.C. (1950
ed.) § 371. This provision, in conjunction with § 17, reached
conspiracies under color of State law to deprive persons of rights
guaranteed
Page 341 U. S. 76
by the Fourteenth Amendment. No other provision of the Act of
1870 was necessary for that purpose.
The second conclusion is that, if language is to carry any
meaning at all, it must be clear that the principal purpose of § 6,
unlike § 17, was to reach private action, rather than officers of a
State acting under its authority. Men who "go in disguise upon the
public highway, or upon the premises of another" are not likely to
be acting in official capacities. The history of the times -- the
lawless activities of private bands, of which the Klan was the most
conspicuous -- explains why Congress dealt with both State
disregard of the new constitutional prohibitions and private
lawlessness. [
Footnote 3] The
sponsor of § 6 in the Senate made explicit that the purpose of his
amendment was to control private conduct. [
Footnote 4]
Page 341 U. S. 77
These two conclusions strongly suggest a third: that the rights
which § 6 protects are those which Congress can beyond doubt
constitutionally secure against interference by private
individuals. Decisions of this Court have established that this
category includes rights which arise from the relationship of the
individual and the Federal Government. The right of citizens to
vote in congressional elections, for instance, may obviously be
protected by Congress from individual as well as from State
interference.
Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.
S. 651. On the other hand, we have consistently held
that the category of rights which Congress may constitutionally
protect from interference by private persons excludes those rights
which the Constitution merely guarantees from interference by a
State. Thus, we held that an individual's interest in receiving a
fair trial in State courts cannot be constitutionally vindicated by
federal prosecution of private persons.
United States v.
Powell, 212 U.S. 564;
accord, Hodges v. United
States, 203 U. S. 1;
United
Page 341 U. S. 78
States v. Wheeler, 254 U. S. 281. The
distinction which these decisions draw between rights that flow
from the substantive powers of the Federal Government and may
clearly be protected from private interference, and interests which
the Constitution only guarantees from interference by States, is a
familiar one in American law.
See, e.g., Strauder v. West
Virginia, 100 U. S. 303,
100 U. S.
310.
To construe § 6 so as to protect interests not arising from the
relationship of the individual with the Federal Government, but
only guaranteed by the Constitution from interference by the
States, would make its scope duplicate the coverage of § 17 and the
general conspiracy clause. That this is not, in fact, what Congress
desired is confirmed by further examination of the text of the
statute. Full allowance for hasty draftsmanship cannot obscure
clear indications from the text that the category of interests
protected by § 6 does not include the rights against State action
secured by § 17.
Thus, when Congress wished to protect from State action
interests guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, it described them
in § 17 as rights "secured or protected" by the Constitution. But,
in § 6, the narrower phrase "granted or secured" is used to define
the interests protected from interference by individuals. When
Congress wanted to reach action by State officers, the explicit
reference in § 17 to "color" of State law demonstrates that
Congress knew how to make this purpose known. Similarly, reference
in §§ 2 and 3 to "persons or officers" indicates that Congress was
able explicitly to draft a section applicable to persons acting in
private and official capacities alike. In contrast, § 6 was made
applicable simply to "persons." Nothing in its terms indicates that
color of State law was to be relevant to prosecution under it.
[
Footnote 5]
Page 341 U. S. 79
To find this significance in the text of the Act of 1870 is not
to give undue weight to differences in phraseology appearing in the
statute. For the text of these sections has been considered by
Congress not once, but five times. Some minor changes of
phraseology were made in the course of the successive revisions.
But neither the Revised Statutes of 1874-1878, nor the Criminal
Code of 1909, nor the 1926 codification in the United States Code,
nor the 1948 revision of the Criminal Code indicates, either in
text or revisor's commentary, any change in substance. The
continuity of meaning is indicated in the
341 U.S.
70app|>Appendix to this opinion.
In three of the revisions, furthermore, Congress had before it a
consistent course of decisions of this Court indicating that § 6 --
now § 241 -- was, in practice, interpreted only to protect rights
arising from the existence and powers of the Federal Government.
The pattern was established by
United States v.
Cruikshank, 92 U. S. 542. The
defendants were indicted for conspiring to deprive some Negro
citizens of rights secured by the Constitution. This Court affirmed
the decision of the Circuit Court arresting judgment entered on a
verdict of guilty. It found that counts alleging interference with
rights secured by the First, Second, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth
Amendments were objectionable, because the rights asserted were not
"granted or secured by the Constitution or laws of the United
States" within the meaning of the statute. 92 U.S. at
92 U. S. 551.
The pattern set by this case has never been departed from.
Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U. S. 651, was
the first of seven decisions in which the Court held or assumed
that the
Page 341 U. S. 80
right to vote in federal elections was protected by this
legislation because it was a right "granted or secured" by the
Constitution or laws of the United States.
Guinn v. United
States, 238 U. S. 347;
United States v. Mosley, 238 U. S. 383, and
United States v. Saylor, 322 U. S. 385,
held that interference by private persons with the right to vote in
general elections for members of Congress is an offense under §
241; in
United States v. Classic, 313 U.
S. 299, the statute was found applicable to the
Louisiana system of primary elections for Congress. [
Footnote 6]
In
United States v. Waddell, 112 U. S.
76, interference with the right to establish a claim
under the Homestead Acts brought the offender within § 241. The
right did not pertain to United States citizenship; but, since it
was "wholly dependent upon the act of Congress," obstructing its
exercise came "within the purview of the statute and of the
constitutional power of Congress to make such statute." 112 U.S. at
112 U. S. 79-80.
Similarly, the Court has held that assault upon a citizen in the
custody of a United States marshal is a violation of the statute,
Logan v. United States, 144 U. S. 263. And
so, a citizen may not be denied the right to inform on violation of
federal laws.
In re Quarles, 158 U.
S. 532;
Motes v. United States, 178 U.
S. 458.
Contrariwise, we have held that conspiracies to force citizens
to give up their jobs or compel them to move out of a State are not
within the terms of the statute.
Hodges v. United States,
203 U. S. 1;
United States v. Wheeler, 254 U.
S. 281. And, in
United States v. Powell, 212
U.S. 564, we held that participants in a mob which seized a
Page 341 U. S. 81
Negro from the custody of the local sheriff and lynched him were
not indictable under § 241. [
Footnote 7]
In none of these decisions was the precise issue before us
decided, for in none was it alleged that the defendants acted under
color of State law. But the validity of a conviction under § 241
depends on the scope of that section, which cannot be expanded by
the draftsman of an indictment. The uses to which a statute has
been put are strong evidence of the ends it was intended to serve.
In this instance, the decisions buttress what common sense and a
spontaneous reading of the statute independently make clear, and
give added significance to repeated reenactment without substantial
change. [
Footnote 8] All the
evidence points to the same conclusion: that § 241 applies only to
interference
Page 341 U. S. 82
with rights which arise from the relation of the victim and the
Federal Government, and not to interference by State officers with
rights which the Federal Government merely guarantees from
abridgment by the States.
To reject this evidence and hold the indictment valid under §
241 not only involves a new, distorting construction of an old
statute. It also makes for redundancy and confusion, and raises
some needless constitutional problems. For if we assume that a
conspiracy such as that described here is under color of State law,
it can be reached under § 242 and the general conspiracy statute.
Indeed, the defendants before us were indicted and tried for
violation of § 242; the conviction of one of them under that
section is before us in No. 365. Unlike § 242, the section now
before us is not qualified by the requirement that the defendants
have acted "willfully," and the very specialized content attributed
to that word was found essential to sustaining § 242 in
Screws
v. United States, 325 U. S. 91. Nor
does the defined crime have as an ingredient that the conspiracy be
under color of State law. Criminal statutes should be given the
meaning their language most obviously invites. Their scope should
not be extended to conduct not clearly within their terms.
We therefore hold that including an allegation that the
defendants acted under color of State law in an indictment under §
241 does not extend the protection of the section to rights which
the Federal Constitution merely guarantees against abridgment by
the States. Since, under this interpretation of the statute, the
indictment must fall, the judgment of the court below is
Affirmed.
[For opinion of MR. JUSTICE BLACK, concurring in the result,
see post, p.
341 U. S.
85.]
[For dissenting opinion of MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, joined by MR.
JUSTICE REED, MR. JUSTICE BURTON, and MR. JUSTICE CLARK,
see
post, p.
341 U. S.
87.]
Page 341 U. S. 83
[
Footnote 1]
See the remarks of Senator Stewart at the time he
proposed the amendment, Cong.Globe, 41st Cong., 2d Sess., 3480
(1870).
[
Footnote 2]
Sections 2, 3, and 4 appeared in the bill as it was first
introduced into the Senate. Cong.Globe, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 3480
(1870). Section 17 was proposed by Senator Stewart at the outset of
the debate.
Ibid. Section 6 was subsequently proposed by
Senator Pool.
Id. 3612.
The debate of the Senate, which considered the Act as in
Committee of the Whole, is found between pp. 3479 and 3808 of the
Congressional Globe. Illustrative of the discussion of the
consideration given the Act are these remarks of Senator
Casserly:
"One of the worst provisions of the bill, as it passed this body
and as it went to the committee of conference, was a provision
which escaped escaped the notice of nearly everyone of the minority
of this body, and I verily believe of a very considerable portion
of the majority of the Senators in this body. I refer to those
provisions which were taken out of a bill for the enforcement of
the fourteenth amendment."
"Now, is it a fit thing that legislation of that importance
should go through the American Congress unknown to those members
who had taken the greatest interest in informing themselves, as
well as to that large body of other members whose right it was to
know upon what they were voting? . . . I shall not undertake to
show how far the course of the majority, in forcing the Senate bill
through to a final vote at a midnight session of unusual duration,
without the least public demand or exigency for such a proceeding,
contributed to such a result; how far it contributed to the making,
to the enacting into a law of provisions which were not supposed or
understood by a considerable portion of the body to be in the bill
that was before it."
Id. 3759.
See also the remarks of Senators
Thurman and Stewart,
id. 3672, 3808. The House devoted
very little attention to the Act.
See id. 1812, 3503,
3853, 3871.
[
Footnote 3]
The depth of feeling which the lawlessness of the period evoked
is reflected in the letter of Chief Justice Thomas Ruffin to his
son, July 8, 1869.
See 4 Hamilton, The Papers of Thomas
Ruffin, 225.
[
Footnote 4]
In introducing the provisions, Senator Pool said,
"There are, Mr. President, various ways in which the right
secured by the fifteenth amendment may be abridged by citizens in a
State. If a State should undertake by positive enactment, as I have
said, to abridge the right of suffrage, the courts of the country
would prevent it, and I find that, in section two of the bill which
has been proposed as a substitute by the Judiciary Committee of the
Senate provision is made for cases where officers charged with
registration or officers charged with the assessment of taxes and
with making the proper entries in connection therewith, shall
refuse the right to register or to pay taxes to a citizen. . . .
But, sir, individuals may prevent the exercise of the right of
suffrage; individuals may prevent the enjoyment of other rights
which are conferred upon the citizen by the fourteenth amendment,
as well as trespass upon the right conferred by the fifteenth. Not
only citizens, but organizations of citizens, conspiracies, may be
and are, as we are told, in some of the States formed for that
purpose."
Id. 3611.
The only other pertinent remarks of the Senator are these:
"I believe that the United States has the right, and that it is
an incumbent duty upon it, to go into the States to enforce the
rights of the citizens against all who attempt to infringe upon
those rights when they are recognized and secured by the
Constitution of the country. . . ."
"Mr. President, the liberty of a citizen of the United States,
the prerogatives, the rights, and the immunities of American
citizenship, should not be and cannot be safely left to the mere
caprice of States either in the passage of laws or in the
withholding of that protection which any emergency may require. If
a State, by omission, neglects to give to every citizen within its
borders a free, fair, and full exercise and enjoyment of his
rights, it is the duty of the United States Government to go into
the State and, by its strong arm, to see that he does have the full
and free enjoyment of those rights."
Id. 3613.
In both these passages, the Senator states clearly that his
proposals are intended to be applicable to private persons. In
neither does he indicate distinctly the nature of the rights which
§ 6 is to protect. The phrase "rights which are conferred upon the
citizen by the fourteenth amendment" does not necessarily refer to
interests guaranteed by the Amendment against State action. It may
be relevant only to the new federal rights created by the Amendment
through conferring citizenship on persons not previously entitled
to it.
[
Footnote 5]
The position of § 6 in the statute, as well as its phraseology,
indicates that it was not intended to be a companion to § 17, and
to punish conspiracies wherever that section prohibited the
substantive offense. It is likewise clear that § 6 was not intended
to apply the provisions of § 17 to private persons in the sense
that § 4 supplements §§ 2 and 3. The location of § 6 in the statute
to the contrary confirms that its purpose and coverage are distinct
from the other provisions of the law.
[
Footnote 6]
The two other decisions involving elections found the
indictments wanting because what was charged was not deemed to
constitute an effective interference with the exercise of a voter's
federal franchise.
United States v. Gardwell, 243 U.
S. 476;
United States v. Bathgate, 246 U.
S. 220.
[
Footnote 7]
Baldwin v. Franks, 120 U. S. 678,
held that a conspiracy to drive aliens from their homes is not an
offense under the statute, since it is expressly limited to
interference with citizens. In three other decisions of this Court,
the section was involved, but no question pertinent to the issues
now before us was decided.
United States v. Mason,
213 U. S. 115;
O'Sullivan v. Felix, 233 U. S. 318;
Pennsylvania System Federation v. Pennsylvania R. Co.,
267 U. S. 203.
[
Footnote 8]
It is worth noting that count 1 of the indictment in
Screws
v. United States, 325 U. S. 91, laid
a charge under § 51 (now § 241) similar to the indictment now here
for review. There was a demurrer to that indictment on the ground
that § 51 did not afford a legal basis for such a charge. The
argument advanced by the Government to support count 1 was
substantially the argument the Government now makes in this case.
The demurrer was sustained, and the Government did not challenge
the District Court's interpretation of § 51, although the Criminal
Appeals Act of 1907, 34 Stat. 1246, 18 U.S.C. (1946 ed.) § 682, now
18 U.S.C. (1950 ed.) § 3731, enabled the Government to secure
review of that construction here.
In a few early cases, this section was applied in lower courts
to rights not arising from the relation of the victim to the
Federal Government.
See United States v. Hall, 26 Fed.Cas.
79;
United States v. Mall, 26 Fed.Cas. 1147;
Ex parte
Riggins, 134 F. 404. Since in none of these decisions was it
alleged that the defendants acted under color of State law, each is
plainly inconsistent with subsequent decisions of this Court. They
also run counter even to the arguments adduced in support of the
conviction here.
|
341 U.S.
70app|
APPENDIX TO OPINION OF FRANKFURTER, J.
Criminal Civil Rights Legislation: Comparative
Table
of Successive Phraseology
bwm:
(Material deleted by next subsequent revision shown in brackets.
Material added or substituted in revision shown in italics.)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Act of April 9, 1866, 14 Stat. 27 Act of May 31, 1870, 16 Stat.
Revised Statutes of 1874-1878 Criminal Code of 1909, 35 Stat.
United States Code, 1926 Codifica- Title 18, United States Code,
as
141, 144 1092 tion, 44 Stat. 462, now 1946 ed. revised in
1948
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
SEC. 6.
And be it further enac- SEC. 5508. If two or
more per- SEC.19. If two or more persons Section 51. Conspiracy to
§ 241. Conspiracy against
ted, That if two or more persons sons conspire to
injure, oppress, conspire to injure, oppress, injure persons in
exercise of rights of citizens
[shall band or] conspire [toge- threaten, or intimidate any
citi- threaten, or intimidate any citi- civil rights. -- If two or
more
ther], or go in disguise upon the zen in the free exercise or
enjoy- zen in the free exercise or enjoy- persons conspire to
injure, If two or more persons conspire
[public] highway, or upon the ment of any right or privilege
ment of any right or privilege oppress, threaten, or intimidate to
injure, oppress, threaten, or
premises of another, with intent secured to him by the
Constitution secured to him by the Constitution any citizen in the
free exercise intimidate any citizen in the free
to [violate any provision of this or laws of the United States,
or or laws of the United States, or or enjoyment of any right or
pri- exercise or enjoyment of any right
act, or to] injure, oppress, because of his having so exercised
because of his having so exercised vilege secured to him by the
Con- or privilege secured to him by the
threaten, or intimidate any cit- the same; or if two or more
per- the same, or if two or more per- stitution or laws of the
United Constitution or laws of the United
izen with intent to prevent or sons go in disguise on the high-
sons go in disguise on the high- States, or because of his having
States, or because of his having
hinder his free exercise and en- way, or on the premises of ano-
way, or on the premises of an- so exercised the same, or if two so
exercised the same; or
joyment of any right or privilege ther, with intent to prevent
or other, with intent to prevent or or more persons go in disguise
on
[granted or] secured to him by the hinder his free exercise or
enjoy- hinder his free exercise or enjoy- the highway, or on the
premises of If two or more persons go in
Constitution or laws of the United ment of any right or
privilege so ment of any right or privilege so another, with intent
to prevent or disguise on the highway, or on the
States, or because of his having secured, they shall be fined
not secured, they shall be fined not hinder his free exercise or
enjoy- premises of another, with intent
exercised the same, such persons more than five thousand dollars
more than five thousand dollars ment of any right or privilege so
to prevent or hinder his free
[shall be held guilty of felony,
and imprisoned not
more than ten and imprisoned not more than ten secured, they shall
be fined not exercise or enjoyment of any right
and, on conviction thereof,] shall years, and shall, moreover,
be years, and shall, moreover, be more than $5,000 and imprisoned
or privilege so secured --
be fined or imprisoned, [or both thereafter ineligible to any
thereafter ineligible to any not more than ten years, [and
at the discretion of the court,] office, or place of honor,
profit, office, or place of honor, profit, shall, moreover, be
thereafter They shall be fined not more
-- the fine not to exceed five or trust created by the Consti-
or trust created by the Consti- ineligible to any office, or place
than $5,000 or imprisoned not more
thousand dollars, and the impri- tution or laws of the United
tution or laws of the United of honor, profit, or trust created
than ten years, or both.
sonment not to exceed ten years, States.[1] States. by the
Constitution or laws of the
-- and shall, moreover, be there- United States].
after ineligible to, and disabled
from holding, any office or place
of honor, profit, or trust created
by the Constitution or laws of the
United States.[1]
SEC. 2.
And be it further en- SEC. 17. And be it
further en- SEC. 5510.
Every person who, SEC. 20.
Whoever, under color § 52. Depriving citizens of § 242.
Deprivation of rights
acted,
That any person who, under acted, That any
person who, under under color of any law, statute, of any law,
statute, ordinance, civil rights under color of State under color
of law.
color of any law, statute, ordi- color of any law, statute,
ordi- ordinance, regulation, or custom, regulation, or custom,
willfully laws. -- Whoever, under color of
nance, regulation, or custom, nance, regulation, or custom,
subjects, or causes to be sub- subjects, or causes to be subjec-
any law, statute, ordinance, regu- Whoever, under color of any
shall subject, or cause to be [shall] subject, or cause to be
jected, any inhabitant of any ted, any inhabitant of any State,
lation, or custom, willfully sub- law, statute, ordinance,
regula-
subjected, any inhabitant of any subjected, any inhabitant of
any State or Territory to the depri- Territory,
or
District to the jects, [or causes to be subject- tion, or
custom, willfully sub-
State or Territory to the depri- State or Territory to the
depri- vation of any rights,
privileges, deprivation of
any rights, privi- ed,] any inhabitant of any State, jects any
inhabitant of any State,
vation of any right secured or vation of any right secured or or
immunities, secured or pro- leges, or immunities secured
or Territory, or District to the de- Territory, or District to
the
protected by this act, or to dif- protected by
the last
preceding tected by the Constitution and protected by the
Constitution and privation of any rights, privi- deprivation of any
rights, privi-
ferent punishment, pains, or pe- section
of this act, or to
dif- laws of the United States, or to laws of the United
States, or to leges, or immunities secured or leges, or immunities
secured or
nalties on account of such person ferent punishment, pains, or
different punishments, pains, or different punishments, pains, or
protected by the Constitution and protected by the Constitution
or
[having at any time been held in penalties on account of such
per- penalties, on account of such penalties, on account of such
in- laws of the United States, or to laws of the United States, or
to
a condition of slavery or invol- son
being an alien, or
by reason
inhabitant being an alien, or by habitant being
an alien, or by different punish- ments, pains, or different
punishments, pains, or
untary servitude, except as a of his color or race, than is
reason of his color or race, than reason of his color, or race,
than penalties, on account of such penalties, on account of
such
punishment for crime whereof the prescribed for the punishment
of
are prescribed for the punishment are prescribed for
the punishment inhabitant being an alien, or by inhabitant being an
alien, or by
party shall have been duly con-
citizens, shall be
deemed guilty of citizens, shall be punished by of citizens, shall
be
fined not reason of his color, or race, than reason of
his color, or race, than
victed, or] by reason of his color of a misdemeanor, and, on
conv- a fine of not
more than one more than one thousand
dollars, or are prescribed for the punishment are prescribed for
the punishment
or race, than is prescribed for iction, shall be punished by
fine thousand dollars, or by impri-
imprisoned not more
than one year, of citizens, shall be fined not of citizens, shall
be fined not
the punishment of white persons, not exceeding one thousand dol-
sonment not
more than one year, or both. more than $1,000,
or imprisoned more than $1,000 or imprisoned not
shall be deemed guilty of a mis- lars, or imprisonment not
exceed- or by both. not more than one year, or both. more than one
year, or both.
demeanor, and, on conviction, ing one year, or both, [in the
shall be punished by fine not ex- discretion of the
court].[2]
ceeding one thousand dollars, or
imprisonment not exceeding one
year, or both, in the discretion
of the court.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
ewm:
[1] Because of the rearrangement and simplification of the
clauses of §. 6 in the Revision of 1874-1878, certain changes
cannot conveniently be shown by brackets and italics. They are
immaterial.
[2] The rights referred to in the preceding section are "to make
and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to
the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the
security of person and property as is enjoyed by white citizens
[and to] be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes,
licenses, and exactions of every kind, and none other." § 16, 16
Stat. 144.
[Page 84 intentionally left blank]
Page 341 U. S. 85
MR. JUSTICE BLACK, concurring.
This is one of three prosecutions of respondents Williams, Ford,
Bombaci, and Perry arising out of their alleged conduct in brutally
coercing confessions from certain persons suspected of theft. The
first prosecution was under an indictment charging respondents and
two other defendants not now before us with violation of the
substantive offense and conspiracy sections of the Civil Rights
Act. 18 U.S.C. (1946 ed.) §§ 51, 52 now 18 U.S.C. §§ 241, 242. That
trial resulted in conviction of respondent Williams and acquittal
of the other five on the substantive counts; a mistrial was
declared as to all defendants on the conspiracy counts. [
Footnote 2/1] Shortly thereafter, two new
indictments were returned: one again charged the six defendants
with the same conspiracy; the other charged four of them with
having committed perjury during their first trial. [
Footnote 2/2] On the second trial for conspiracy,
all were convicted, and it is these convictions of respondents that
we review in the present case.
I am convinced from the records before us that the principle of
res judicata should have barred the Government from trying
respondents on this second indictment for conspiracy. In the first
trial, the judge instructed the jury to convict on the substantive
counts all defendants who either committed that crime or aided,
abetted, assisted, counseled, encouraged, commanded, induced,
procured or incited any other person to do so. Acquittal of
Page 341 U. S. 86
the five defendants was, therefore, a final determination that
they had done none of these things, or, in effect, that they had
nothing to do with the commission of the substantive offense
itself. The principle of
res judicata, of course,
precludes a relitigation of the same factual issues in any
subsequent trial.
Sealfon v. United States, 332 U.
S. 575. This being true, the broad scope of the facts
found adversely to the Government in the first trial barred a
conviction of the five defendants upon the second trial, because
there is no evidence that they conspired except insofar as the
unlawful agreement can be inferred from their having participated
in some way in the substantive crime. Consequently, the conspiracy
convictions cannot stand as to respondents Ford, Bombaci, and
Perry, these three being among those previously found not guilty of
the substantive charge.
Nor should the conspiracy conviction of respondent Williams
stand under these circumstances. The indictment did not allege, and
there was no evidence to suggest, that he conspired with anyone
other than the five named defendants. As a result, when the
Government was precluded by
res judicata from proving the
guilt of any of Williams' alleged co-conspirators, the basis of the
conspiracy charged as to Williams was necessarily removed, since
one person obviously cannot conspire with himself.
Cf. Morrison
v. California, 291 U. S. 82,
291 U. S. 93;
Feder v. United States, 257 F. 694;
see also the
cases collected in 72 A.L.R. 1180, 1186-1187; 97 A.L.R. 1312, 1313,
1316-1317.
Because, for the foregoing reasons, I believe the conspiracy
convictions of respondents must fail, I find it unnecessary to
determine whether 18 U.S.C. (1946 ed.) § 51, now 18 U.S.C. (1946
ed., Supp. III) § 241, as applied, is too vague and uncertain in
scope to be consistent with the Fifth Amendment.
Page 341 U. S. 87
[
Footnote 2/1]
Williams' conviction on the substantive counts is reviewed in
Williams v. United States, 341 U. S.
97, decided today.
[
Footnote 2/2]
The indictment charging respondents Williams, Ford, and Bombaci
(and one defendant not before us in the present case) with perjury
is reviewed today in
United States v. Williams,
341 U. S. 58.
Respondents have claimed that, because of the pending perjury
charges, the defendants refrained from testifying in the present
trial for conspiracy.
MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, with whom MR. JUSTICE REED, MR. JUSTICE
BURTON, and MR. JUSTICE CLARK concur, dissenting.
Sections 19 and 20 of the Criminal Code, now 18 U.S.C. §§ 241,
242, are companion sections designed for the protection of great
rights won after the Nation's most critical internal conflict.
Section 19 covers conspiracies; § 20, substantive offenses. Section
19 protects the "citizen;" § 20 the "inhabitant." The sanction of §
19 extends to "any right or privilege secured" to the citizen "by
the Constitution or laws of the United States;" the sanction of §
20 to "any rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected
by the Constitution and laws of the United States." [
Footnote 3/1]
Mr. Justice Rutledge, in
Screws v. United States,
325 U. S. 91,
325 U. S. 119,
wrote that, in spite of the difference in wording
Page 341 U. S. 88
of §§ 19 and 20, there are
"no differences in the basic rights guarded. Each protects in a
different way the rights and privileges secured to individuals by
the Constitution."
One would indeed have to strain hard at words to find any
difference of substance between "any right or privilege secured" by
the Constitution or laws of the United States (§ 19) and "any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the
Constitution and laws of the United States" (§ 20). If § 20
embraces a broader range of rights than § 19, it must be because it
includes "immunities" as well as "rights" and "privileges," and
"protects" them as well as "secures" them. When no major difference
between §§ 19 and 20 is apparent from the words themselves, it is
strange to hear it said that, though § 20 extends to rights
guaranteed against state action by the Fourteenth Amendment, § 19
is limited to rights which the Federal Government can secure
against invasion by private persons. The division of powers between
State and Nation is so inherent in our republican form of
government and so well established throughout our history that, if
Congress had desired to draw a distinction along that line, it is
hard to imagine that it would not have made its purpose clear in
the language used. [
Footnote
3/2]
It is true that §§ 19 and 20 have different origins. Section 20
came into the law as § 2 of the Act of April 7, 1866, 14 Stat. 27,
while § 19 first appeared as § 6 of the
Page 341 U. S. 89
Act of May 31, 1870, 16 Stat. 141. We reviewed the history of §
20 in
Screws v. United States, 325 U. S.
91,
325 U. S.
98-100. The legislative history makes plain that § 20
was an antidiscrimination measure designed to protect Negroes in
their newly won rights. It was enacted before the Fourteenth
Amendment became effective. But, after that date, it was reenacted
as § 17 of the Act of May 31, 1870, 16 Stat. 144, and in 1874, the
prohibition against "the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities, secured or protected by the Constitution and laws of
the United States" was introduced. R.S. § 5510. From this history
there can be no doubt, as we stated in
Screws v. United States,
supra, at
325 U. S. 100,
that § 20 is "one of the sanctions to the great rights which the
Fourteenth Amendment was designed to secure." If that be true -- if
"rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the
Constitution and laws of the United States," as used in § 20, are
not restricted to rights which the Federal Government can secure
against interference by private persons -- it is difficult to
understand why "any right or privilege secured to him by the
Constitution or laws of the United States," as used in § 19, is so
restricted.
It is true that a part of the purpose of § 19 (which, as I have
said, originated as § 6 of the Act of May 31, 1870, 16 Stat. 141)
was to give sanction to the right to vote which was guaranteed by
the Fifteenth Amendment, recently adopted. That is made plain from
the congressional debates. Cong.Globe, Pt. 4, 41st Cong., 2d Sess.,
pp. 3607
et seq. Yet the rights which § 19 protected were
not confined to voting rights, and one who reads the legislative
history finds no trace of a suggestion that the
Page 341 U. S. 90
broadening of the language of § 19 to include "any right or
privilege secured" by the Constitution or laws of the United States
was aimed only at those rights "secured" by the Federal Government
against invasion by private persons.
The distinction now urged has not been noticed by students of
the period. Thus, Flack, in Adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment
(1908) p. 223, wrote,
"The bill as passed by the Houses was signed by the President
May 31, 1870, and so became a law, and was, therefore, the first
law for the enforcement of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments."
And see Mr. Justice Roberts in
Hague v. CIO,
307 U. S. 496,
307 U. S. 510.
If the drastic restriction now proposed for § 19 had been part of
the architectural scheme for the Act of May 31, 1870, it is
difficult to imagine that some trace of the purpose would not have
been left in the legislative history. What we find points indeed
the other way. Senator Pool of North Carolina, who introduced the
section from which § 19 evolved, indicated that it was his purpose
to extend the protection of the new provision to the Fourteenth as
well as to the Fifteenth Amendment. [
Footnote 3/3] It has, indeed,
Page 341 U. S. 91
long been assumed that § 19 had a coverage broad enough to
include all constitutional rights. Thus, in
United States v.
Mosley, 238 U. S. 383,
238 U. S. 387,
Mr. Justice Holmes
Page 341 U. S. 92
observed that § 19 "dealt with Federal rights, and with all
Federal rights."
There is no decision, prior to that of the Court of Appeals in
this case, which is opposed to that view. Fourteenth Amendment
rights have sometimes been asserted under § 19 and denied by the
Court. That was true in
United States v. Cruikshank,
92 U. S. 542. But
the denial had nothing to do with the issues in the present case.
The Fourteenth Amendment protects the individual against state
action, not against wrongs done by individuals.
See Civil
Rights Cases, 109 U. S. 3;
Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U. S. 1. The
Cruikshank case, like others, [
Footnote 3/4] involved wrongful action by individuals
who did not act for a state nor under color of state authority. As
the Court in the
Cruikshank case said,
"The fourteenth amendment prohibits a State from denying to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws;
but this provision does not, any more than the one which precedes
it . . . add anything to the rights which one citizen has under the
Constitution against another."
92 U.S. at pp.
92 U. S.
554-555. There is implicit in this holding, as Mr.
Justice Rutledge observed in the
Screws case,
supra, at
325 U. S. 125,
note 22, that wrongful action by state officials would bring the
case within § 19. For the Court in the
Cruikshank case
stated,
"The only obligation resting upon the United States is to see
that the States do not deny the right. This the amendment
guarantees, but no more. The power of the national government is
limited to the enforcement of this guaranty."
Section 19 has, in fact, been applied to the protection of
rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.
See United States v.
Hall, 26 Fed.Cas. 79;
United States v. Mall, 26
Page 341 U. S. 93
Fed.Cas. 1147;
Ex parte Riggins, 134 F. 404,
writ
dism'd, 199 U. S. 547.
Those attempts which failed did so not because § 19 was construed
to have too narrow a scope, but because the action complained of
was individual action, not state action.
See, e.g., United
States v. Powell, 151 F. 648,
aff'd, 212 U.S. 564;
Powe v. United States, 109 F.2d 147.
While it is true, as Mr. Justice Rutledge stated in the
Screws case, that there is no difference between §§ 19 and
20 so far as the "basic rights guarded" are concerned, the coverage
of the two sections is not coterminous. The difference is not
merely in the fact that § 19 covers conspiracies and § 20
substantive offenses. Section 20 extends only to those who act
"under color" of law, while § 19 reaches "two or more persons" who
conspire to injure any citizen in the enjoyment of any right or
privilege secured to him by the Constitution, etc. The reach of §
20 over deprivations of rights protected from invasion by private
persons is therefore in this one respect less than that of § 19.
But that is no comfort to respondents in the present case. It
certainly cannot be doubted that state officers, or those acting
under color of state law, who conspire to wring confessions from an
accused by force and violence are included in "two or more persons"
within the meaning of § 19. As we hold in No. 365,
Williams v.
United States, post, p.
341 U. S. 97,
decided this day, such an act deprives the accused of the kind of
trial which the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees. He is therefore
denied the enjoyment of that right within the meaning of § 19.
In
Screws v. United States, supra, we relieved § 20 of
the risk of unconstitutionality by reason of vagueness. We held
that
"a requirement of a specific intent to deprive a person of a
federal right made definite by decision or other rule of law saves
the Act from any charge of unconstitutionality on the grounds of
vagueness."
325 U.S. at
Page 341 U. S. 94
103. The same analysis does like service here, as evidenced both
by the construction of § 19 and the charge to the jury in this
case.
A conspiracy, by definition, is a criminal agreement for a
specific venture. It is "a partnership in crime."
United States
v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U. S. 150,
310 U. S. 253.
As stated by Mr. Justice Holmes in
Frohwerk v. United
States, 249 U. S. 204,
249 U. S. 209,
an "intent to accomplish an object cannot be alleged more clearly
than by stating that parties conspired to accomplish it." The trial
court in its charge to the jury followed the ruling in the
Screws case, and gave precise application to this concept
in avoidance of any claim of unconstitutionality of § 19 on the
grounds of vagueness. The court, after explaining to the jury what
rights, enumerated in the indictment, were guaranteed under the
Fourteenth Amendment, gave numerous charges on the element of
intent. The following is typical:
"In order to convict under this indictment, it is necessary for
the jury to find that the defendants had in mind the specific
purpose of depriving the complaining witnesses of those rights
guaranteed them under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution
of the United States, which are enumerated in the indictment, while
acting under color of the laws of the Florida."
"The proof, if any, of a general intent to do the complaining
witnesses a wrong is not sufficient, but a specific intent to
deprive them of a Constitutional right, as the object of the
conspiracy, if any, is a burden the law casts upon the Government.
In considering whether the defendants had such specific intent, you
may take into consideration all the circumstances of the case in
the light of the evidence as it has been developed. "
Page 341 U. S. 95
In view of the nature of the conspiracy and charge to the jury
in the instant case, it would be incongruous to strike § 19 down on
the grounds of vagueness and yet sustain § 20 as we did in the
Screws case.
The defense of
res judicata is based on the acquittal
of five of the respondents for violation of § 20 -- the substantive
offense. It is argued that there is no evidence that the five
conspired except insofar as the unlawful agreement can be inferred
from their having participated in some way in the substantive
crime. It is further argued that acquittal on the substantive
counts was a determination that the five had nothing to do with the
commission of the substantive offense. The conclusion therefore is
that their conviction of the conspiracy entailed a relitigation, in
violation of the principles of
Sealfon v. United States,
332 U. S. 575, of
the factual issues involved in the prior trial.
The argument, however, is too facile for the facts.
First. The substantive crime was one of aiding and
abetting. That offense has "a broader application" than conspiracy.
"It makes a defendant a principal when he consciously shares in any
criminal act whether or not there is a conspiracy."
Nye &
Nissen v. United States, 336 U. S. 613,
336 U. S. 620.
Respondents may have conspired to do the act without actually
aiding in its commission. In other words, the crimes are
different.
Second. In the
Sealfon case, the jury's
acquittal of the first offense necessarily constituted a rejection
of the only evidence presented at the second trial and upon which
conviction of the record offense depended. That was not true here.
The acquittals on the substantive charges by no means established
that the jury rejected all the evidence against the defendants. For
example, the acquittals of the substantive offense may have been on
the ground that the evidence showed no giving of actual aid to
Williams when he obtained the confessions by force and
violence.
Page 341 U. S. 96
The evidence, though insufficient to show that the five
participated in the execution of the project, could nonetheless
make overwhelmingly clear that they were members of the conspiracy
that conceived it.
The links that tied respondents to the conspiracy are therefore
not necessarily those that the jury rejected in the earlier trial.
Accordingly, the rule of
Sealfon v. United States, supra,
has no application.
[
Footnote 3/1]
Section 19 of the Criminal Code, 18 U.S.C. (1946 ed.) § 51,
provided:
"If two or more persons conspire to injure, oppress, threaten,
or intimidate any citizen in the free exercise or enjoyment of any
right or privilege secured to him by the Constitution or laws of
the United States, or because of his having so exercised the same,
or if two or more persons go in disguise on the highway, or on the
premises of another, with intent to prevent or hinder his free
exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege so secured, they
shall be fined not more than $5,000 and imprisoned not more than
ten years, and shall, moreover, be thereafter ineligible to any
office, or place of honor, profit, or trust created by the
Constitution or laws of the United States."
Section 20 of the Criminal Code, 18 U.S.C. (1946 ed.) § 52,
provided:
"Whoever, under color of any law, statute, ordinance,
regulation, or custom, willfully subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any inhabitant of any State, Territory, or District to
the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured or
protected by the Constitution and laws of the United States, or to
different punishments, pains, or penalties, on account of such
inhabitant being an alien, or by reason of his color, or race, than
are prescribed for the punishment of citizens, shall be fined not
more than $1,000, or imprisoned not more than one year, or
both."
[
Footnote 3/2]
The suggestion that the general conspiracy statute, § 30 of the
Act of March 2, 1867, 14 Stat. 484, enacted three years before §
19, was adequate to reach conspiracies under color of state law to
deprive persons of Fourteenth Amendment right, and that therefore
the inclusion of such rights in § 19 was not necessary, bears
little weight. The general conspiracy statute, as originally
enacted, carried a penalty of not less than $1,000 and not more
than $10,000 and imprisonment not exceeding 2 years. Section 19
has, from the beginning, carried a more severe penalty -- not more
than $5,000 and imprisonment not to exceed 10 years. Moreover, §
19, at the time of its enactment, carried a further penalty: the
persons convicted were disabled from holding "any office or place
of honor, profit, or trust created by the Constitution or laws of
the United States." Act of May 31, 1870, § 6, 16 Stat. 141. The
penalty of the general conspiracy statute has only recently been
increased.
See 18 U.S.C. (1946 ed., Supp. III) § 371,
reviser's note.
[
Footnote 3/3]
After discussing the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth
Amendments, he said,
"I believe that we have a perfect right under the Constitution
of the United States, not only under these three amendments, but
under the general scope and features and spirit of the Constitution
itself, to go into any of these States for the purpose of
protecting and securing liberty. I admit that, when you go there
for the purpose of restraining liberty, you can go only under
delegated powers in express terms; but to go into the States for
the purpose of securing and protecting the liberty of the citizen
and the rights and immunities of American citizenship is in
accordance with the spirit and whole object of the formation of the
Union and the national Government."
"There are, Mr. President, various ways in which the right
secured by the fifteenth amendment may be abridged by citizens in a
State. . . . I believe the language of the Senate bill is
sufficiently large and comprehensive to embrace any other class of
officers that might be charged with any act that was necessary to
enable a citizen to perform any prerequisite to voting. But, sir,
individuals may prevent the exercise of the right of suffrage;
individuals may prevent the enjoyment of other rights which are
conferred upon the citizen by the Fourteenth Amendment, as well as
trespass upon the right conferred by the Fifteenth. Not only
citizens, but organizations of citizens, conspiracies, may be and
are, as we are told, in some of the States formed for that purpose.
I see in the fourth section of the Senate bill a provision for
cases where citizens by threats, intimidation, bribery, or
otherwise prevent, delay, or hinder the exercise of this right; but
there is nothing here that strikes at organizations of individuals
at conspiracies for that purpose. . . ."
"
* * * *"
"That the United States Government has the right to go into the
States and enforce the Fourteenth and the Fifteenth Amendments is,
in my judgment, perfectly clear, by appropriate legislation that
shall bear upon individuals. I cannot see that it would be possible
for appropriate legislation to be resorted to except as applicable
to individuals who violate or attempt to violate these provisions.
Certainly we cannot legislate here against States. As I said a few
moments ago, it is upon individuals that we must press our
legislation. It matters not whether those individuals be officers
or whether they are acting upon their own responsibility; whether
they are acting singly or in organizations. If there is to be
appropriate legislation at all, it must be that which applies to
individuals. . . ."
"
* * * *"
"Mr. President, the liberty of a citizen of the United States,
the prerogatives, the rights, and immunities of American
citizenship, should not be and cannot be safely left to the mere
caprice of States either in the passage of laws or in the
withholding of that protection which any emergency may require. If
a State, by omission, neglects to give to every citizen within its
borders a free, fair, and full exercise and enjoyment of his
rights, it is the duty of the United States Government to go into
the State, and, by its strong arm, to see that he does have the
full and free enjoyment of those rights."
Cong.Globe, 41st Cong., 2d Sess., pp. 3611, 3613.
[
Footnote 3/4]
See Hodges v. United States, 203 U. S.
1,
203 U. S. 14;
United States v. Powell, 151 F. 648,
aff'd, 212
U.S. 5643;
United States v. Wheeler, 254 U.
S. 281,
254 U. S.
298.