In a civil action brought by the United States against
appellant, a domestic corporation, to enjoin alleged violations of
the Sherman Act, the complaint charged that appellant had combined
and conspired with a British corporation and a French corporation,
in each of which it had a financial interest, to restrain
interstate and foreign commerce in the manufacture and sale of
antifriction bearings. The District Court found that, under
agreements between them the corporations had allocated trade
territories among themselves; fixed prices on products of one sold
in the territory of the others; cooperated to protect each other's
markets and to eliminate outside competition, and participated in
cartels to restrict imports to, and exports from, the United
States. The court concluded that appellant had violated the Sherman
Act as charged, and entered a comprehensive decree designed to bar
future violations.
Held:
1. The District Court's material findings of fact are not
"clearly erroneous," and are accepted here. Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.,
52(a). Pp.
341 U. S.
596-597.
2. The opinion of the District Court sufficiently complies with
the requirements of Rule 52(a) relative to findings of fact and
conclusions of law. P. 597,
n
7.
3. Agreements between legally separate persons and companies to
suppress competition among themselves cannot be justified by
characterizing the project as a "joint venture." Pp.
341 U. S.
597-598.
(a) Agreements providing for an aggregation of trade restraints
such as those existing in this case are prohibited by the Act,
whether or not incidental to a "joint venture." P.
341 U. S.
598.
(b) Common ownership or control of the contracting corporations
does not liberate them from the impact of the antitrust laws. P.
341 U. S.
598.
4. Nor can the restraints be justified as reasonable steps taken
to implement a valid trademark licensing system, since the
trademark provisions of the agreements were secondary to the
central purpose of allocating trade territory, and since the
agreements provided
Page 341 U. S. 594
for control of the manufacture and sale of antifriction
bearings, whether carrying the trademark or not. Pp.
341 U. S.
598-599.
(a) A trademark cannot lawfully be used as a device for
violating the Sherman Act, and its use therefor is penalized by the
Trade Mark Act of 1946. P.
341 U. S. 599.
5. The suggestion that what appellant has done is reasonable in
view of current foreign trade conditions, and that therefore the
Sherman Act should not he enforced in this case, is rejected. P.
341 U. S.
599.
6. The decree of the District Court properly enjoined
continuation or repetition of the conduct which it found to be
illegal. P.
341 U. S.
600.
7. The relief which a district court may grant in a Sherman Act
ease need not be confined to the narrow limits of the proven
violation. P.
341 U. S.
600.
8. The District Court should not have ordered appellant to
divest itself of its stockholdings and all other financial
interests in the British and French corporations, and the decree is
modified so as to eliminate provisions directed to that end. Pp.
341 U. S.
600-601.
83 F.
Supp. 284 modified and affirmed.
In a civil action brought by the United States against
appellant, to restrain alleged violations of the Sherman Act, the
District Court found that appellant had violated the Act, and a
decree of injunction was entered.
83 F.
Supp. 284. On direct appeal to this Court, the decree is
modified and, as modified, affirmed, p.
341 U. S.
601.
MR. JUSTICE BLACK delivered the opinion of the Court.
The United States brought this civil action to prevent and
restrain violations of the Sherman Act [
Footnote 1] by appellant,
Page 341 U. S. 595
Timken Roller Bearing Co., an Ohio corporation. The complaint
charged that appellant, in violation of §§ 1 and 3 of the Act,
[
Footnote 2] combined,
conspired and acted with British Timken, Ltd. (British Timken) and
Societe Anonyme Francaise Timken (French Timken) to restrain
interstate and foreign commerce by eliminating competition in the
manufacture and sale of antifriction bearings in the markets of the
world. After a trial of more than a month, the District Court made
detailed findings of fact which may be summarized as follows:
As early as 1909, appellant and British Timken's predecessor had
made comprehensive agreements providing for a territorial division
of the world markets for antifriction bearings. These arrangements
were somewhat modified and extended in 1920, 1924, and 1925. Again
in 1927, the agreements were substantially renewed in connection
with a transaction by which appellant and one Dewar, an English
businessman, cooperated in purchasing all the stock of British
Timken. Later, some British Timken stock was sold to the public,
with the result that appellant now holds about 30% of the
outstanding shares, while Dewar owns about 24%. [
Footnote 3] In 1928, appellant and Dewar
organized French Timken, and, since that date, have together owned
all the stock in the French company. Beginning in that year,
appellant, British Timken and French Timken have continuously kept
operative "business agreements" regulating the manufacture and sale
of antifriction bearings by the three companies and providing for
the use by the British and French corporations of the trademark
"Timken." [
Footnote 4] Under
these agreements,
Page 341 U. S. 596
the contracting parties have(1) allocated trade territories
among themselves; (2) fixed prices on products of one sold in the
territory of the others; (3) cooperated to protect each other's
markets and to eliminate outside competition, and (4) participated
in cartels to restrict imports to, and exports from, the United
States.
On these findings, the District Court concluded that appellant
had violated the Sherman Act as charged, and entered a
comprehensive decree designed to bar future violations.
83 F.
Supp. 284. The case is before us on appellant's direct appeal
under 15 U.S.C. § 29.
Although appellant has indiscriminately challenged the District
Court's judgment and decree in over 200 separate assignments of
error, the real grounds relied on for reversal are only a few in
number. [
Footnote 5] In the
first place, appellant contends that most of the District Court's
material findings of fact are without evidential support, that they
"ignore or fail properly to evaluate" evidence supporting
appellant's position, and that it was error for the court to refuse
to make additional findings. For the most part, this shotgun
approach is actually only a dispute as to the proper inferences to
be drawn from the evidence in the record; [
Footnote 6] in effect, it is an invitation for
Page 341 U. S. 597
us to try the case
de novo. This Court must decline
such an invitation, just as it does when the Government makes the
same request.
United States v. Yellow Cab Co.,
338 U. S. 338. In
the present case, the trial judge, after a patient hearing,
carefully analyzed the evidence in an opinion prepared with obvious
care. [
Footnote 7] Appellant's
lengthy brief has failed to establish that there was error in
making any crucial, or even important, ultimate or subsidiary
finding. Since we cannot say the findings are "clearly erroneous,"
we accept them. Fed.Rules Civ.Proc., 52(a).
Appellant next contends that the restraints of trade so clearly
revealed by the District Court's findings can be justified as
"reasonable," and therefore not in violation of the Sherman Act,
because they are "ancillary" to allegedly "legal main
transactions," namely, (1) a "joint venture" between appellant and
Dewar, and (2) an exercise of appellant's right to license the
trademark "Timken."
We cannot accept the "joint venture" contention. That the trade
restraints were merely incidental to an otherwise legitimate "joint
venture" is, to say the least, doubtful. The District Court found
that the dominant purpose of the restrictive agreements into which
appellant, British Timken and French Timken entered was to avoid
all competition either among themselves or with
Page 341 U. S. 598
others. Regardless of this, however, appellant's argument must
be rejected. Our prior decisions plainly establish that agreements
providing for an aggregation of trade restraints such as those
existing in this case are illegal under the Act.
Kiefer-Stewart
Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, 340 U.
S. 211,
340 U. S. 213;
United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.
S. 150,
310 U. S.
223-224 and note 59;
United States v. National Lead
Co., 63 F. Supp.
513,
aff'd, 332 U. S. 332 U.S.
319;
United States v. American Tobacco, 221 U.
S. 106,
221 U. S.
180-184;
Associated Press v. United States,
326 U. S. 1,
326 U. S. 15.
See also United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148
F.2d 416, 439-445. The fact that there is common ownership or
control of the contracting corporations does not liberate them from
the impact of the antitrust laws.
E.g., Kiefer-Stewart Co. v.
Seagram & Sons, supra, at
340 U. S. 215.
Nor do we find any support in reason or authority for the
proposition that agreements between legally separate persons and
companies to suppress competition among themselves and others can
be justified by labeling the project a "joint venture." Perhaps
every agreement and combination to restrain trade could be so
labeled.
Nor can the restraints of trade be justified as reasonable steps
taken to implement a valid trademark licensing system, even if we
assume with appellant that it is the owner of the trademark
"Timken" in the trade areas allocated to the British and French
corporations. Appellant's premise that the trade restraints are
only incidental to the trademark contracts is refuted by the
District Court's finding that the "trade mark provisions [in the
agreements] were subsidiary and secondary to the central purpose of
allocating trade territories." Furthermore, while a trademark
merely affords protection to a name, the agreements in the present
case went far beyond protection of the name "Timken," and provided
for control of the manufacture and sale of antifriction
bearings
Page 341 U. S. 599
whether carrying the mark or not. A trademark cannot be legally
used as a device for Sherman Act violation. Indeed, the Trade Mark
Act of 1946 itself penalizes use of a mark "to violate the
antitrust laws of the United States." [
Footnote 8]
We also reject the suggestion that the Sherman Act should not be
enforced in this case because what appellant has done is reasonable
in view of current foreign trade conditions. The argument in this
regard seems to be that tariffs, quota restrictions, and the like
are now such that the export and import of antifriction bearings
can no longer be expected, as a practical matter; that appellant
cannot successfully sell its American-made goods abroad, and that
the only way it can profit from business in England, France, and
other countries is through the ownership of stock in companies
organized and manufacturing there. This position ignores the fact
that the provisions in the Sherman Act against restraints of
foreign trade are based on the assumption, and reflect the policy,
that export and import trade in commodities is both possible and
desirable. Those provisions of the Act are wholly inconsistent with
appellant's argument that American business must be left free to
participate in international cartels, that free foreign commerce in
goods must be sacrificed in order to foster export of American
dollars for investment in foreign factories which sell abroad.
Acceptance of appellant's view would make the Sherman Act a dead
letter insofar as it prohibits contracts and conspiracies in
restraint of foreign trade. If such a drastic change is to be made
in the statute, Congress is the one to do it.
Page 341 U. S. 600
Finally, appellant attacks the District Court's decree as being
too broad in scope. The decree enjoins continuation or repetition
of the conduct found illegal. This is clearly correct.
Ethyl
Gasoline Corp. v. United States, 309 U.
S. 436,
309 U. S. 461. It
also contains certain other restraining provisions which were
within the court's discretion because "relief, to be effective,
must go beyond the narrow limits of the proven violation."
United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 340 U. S.
76,
340 U. S. 90.
The most vigorous objection, however, is made to those portions of
the decree relating to divestiture of appellant's stockholdings and
other financial interests in British and French Timken.
MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, MR. JUSTICE MINTON, and I believe that the
decree properly ordered divestiture. Our views on this point are as
follows: appellant's interests in the British and French companies
were obtained as part of a plan to promote the illegal trade
restraints. If not severed, the intercompany relationships will
provide in the future, as they have in the past, the temptation and
means to engage in the prohibited conduct. These considerations
alone should be enough to support the divestiture order.
United
States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.
S. 131,
334 U. S.
152-153;
United States v. National Lead Co.,
332 U. S. 319,
332 U. S. 363.
But there are other considerations as well. The decree should not
be overturned unless we can say that the District Court abused its
discretion. Absent divestiture, it is difficult to see where other
parts of the decree forbidding trade restraints would add much to
what the Sherman Act by itself already prohibits. [
Footnote 9] And obviously the most
effective
Page 341 U. S. 601
way to suppress further Sherman Act violations is to end the
intercorporate relationship which has been the core of the
conspiracy. For these reasons, MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, MR. JUSTICE
MINTON, and I cannot say that the District Court abused its
discretion in ordering divestiture. [
Footnote 10]
Nevertheless, a majority of this Court, for reasons set forth in
other opinions filed in this case, believe that divestiture should
not have been ordered by the District Court. Therefore, it becomes
necessary to strike from the decree §§ VIII, IVB, and the phrase
"or B" in § IVC. As so modified, the judgment of the District Court
is affirmed.
It is so ordered.
MR. JUSTICE BURTON and MR. JUSTICE CLARK took no part in the
consideration or decision of this case.
[
Footnote 1]
26 Stat. 209, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-4.
[
Footnote 2]
These sections declare illegal all contracts, combinations or
conspiracies in restraint of trade or commerce among the states and
territories or with foreign nations.
[
Footnote 3]
[
Footnote 4]
The most recent of these agreements, which was to have governed
the conduct of the parties until 1965, is dated November 28,
1938.
[
Footnote 5]
Appellant originally attacked the decision below in 206
assignments of error, including 69 alleged errors in the District
Court's findings of fact, 26 in its conclusions of law, and 62
based on the court's refusal to make new and additional findings.
(Later, appellant abandoned 5 of the assignments.) These
assignments are unduly repetitious, some are frivolous, and the
excessive number obscures the actual grounds on which appellant
relies for reversal. As the Government pointed out in its motion to
dismiss the appeal, our prior cases justify dismissal in such
situations.
See Local 167 v. United States, 291 U.
S. 293,
291 U. S. 296;
Phillips & Colby Construction Co. v. Seymour,
91 U. S. 646,
91 U. S. 648.
We do not take that action, however, since appellant, in its brief
opposing the Government's motion, has sufficiently spelled out the
few real objections it raises here.
[
Footnote 6]
This is well illustrated by the following portion of the
"Summary of Argument" which appears in the appellant's brief:
"The evidence relied upon by the district court as demonstrating
conduct of an intentional restraint of trade by the three Timken
companies from 1928 on is just as reconcilable with the conduct of
a legal joint adventure as with the conduct of a combination for
the purpose of suppressing competition and controlling world trade
in tapered roller bearings, and therefore the district court's
decision to the contrary is clearly erroneous."
Brief for Appellant, pp. 78-79.
[
Footnote 7]
Appellant claims the District Court's findings of fact and
conclusions of law failed to comply with Rule 52(a) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. We think that the opinion below meets all
the requirements of the Rule.
[
Footnote 8]
60 Stat. 427, 439, § 33(b)(7), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051, 1115(b)(7).
The reason for the penalty provision was that "trademarks have been
misused. . . . have been used in connection with cartel
agreements." 92 Cong.Rec. 7872.
[
Footnote 9]
We would reject the argument that divestiture is unwise in light
of current foreign trade conditions for substantially the same
reasons we rejected it in connection with appellant's contention
that there was no violation of the Sherman Act.
[
Footnote 10]
Dewar died while this appeal was pending. Were it not for the
present litigation, appellant, under the contracts between it and
Dewar, would be entitled to purchase Dewar's interest in British
Timken (which would give appellant a 54% stock interest in that
corporation); appellant also has a right of first refusal as to
Dewar's 50% stock interest in French Timken (which, if exercised,
would give appellant 100% ownership of that company). Appellant
moved in the District Court to reopen the record to admit evidence
of these changed circumstances caused by Dewar's death and for a
reconsideration of the divestiture provisions of the decree. The
District Court denied the motion. MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, MR. JUSTICE
MINTON, and I would hold that this ruling was within its
discretion.
MR. JUSTICE REED, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE joins,
concurring.
It seems to me there can be no valid objection to that part of
the opinion which approves the finding of the District Court that
the Timken Roller Bearing Company has violated §§ 1 and 3 of the
Sherman Act. It may seem
Page 341 U. S. 602
strange to have a conspiracy for the division of territory for
marketing between one corporation and another in which it has a
large or even a major interest, but any other conclusion would open
wide the doors for violation of the Sherman Act at home and in
foreign fields. My disagreement with the opinion is based on the
suggested requirement that American Timken divest itself of all
interest in British Timken and French Timken as required by
paragraph VIII of the decree set out below. [
Footnote 2/1] My reasons for this disagreement
follow.
There are no specific statutory provisions authorizing courts to
employ the harsh remedy of divestiture in civil proceedings to
restrain violations of the Sherman Act. Fines and imprisonment may
follow criminal convictions, 15 U.S.C. § 1, and divestiture of
property has been used
Page 341 U. S. 603
in decrees, not as punishment, but to assure effective
enforcement of the laws against restraint of trade. [
Footnote 2/2]
Since divestiture is a remedy to restore competition, and not to
punish those who restrain trade, it is not to be used
indiscriminately, without regard to the type of violation or
whether other effective methods, less harsh, are available. That
judicial restraint should follow such lines is exemplified by our
recent rulings in
United States v. National Lead Co.,
332 U. S. 319, pp.
332 U. S.
348-353, where we approved divestiture of some
properties belonging to the conspirators and denied it as to
others. While the decree here does not call for confiscation, it
does call for divestiture. I think that requirement is unnecessary.
[
Footnote 2/3]
In this case, the prohibited plan grew out of the effort to
implement a patent monopoly. The difficulties of cultivating a
foreign market for our manufactured goods obviously entered into
creation of the British and French companies so as to enjoy a right
of distribution into areas where otherwise restrictions, because of
tariffs, quotas, and exchange, might be expected. We fail to see
such propensity toward restraint of trade as is evidenced in the
Crescent case.
What we have is an American corporation, dominant in the field
of tapered roller bearings, producing between 70 and 80 percent of
the American output. In 1947, its gross sales were over
$77,000,000. This is a distinctive type of bearing, competing
successfully for adoption by industry with other antifriction
bearings. Timken produces
Page 341 U. S. 604
about 25% of all United States antifriction bearings. As there
were no findings of facts tending to show violation of the Sherman
Act otherwise than through formal agreements for partition of
territory, we assume appellant's conduct was otherwise lawful.
In such circumstances, there was, of course, no occasion for the
lower court to order any splitting up of a consolidated entity.
Cf. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U. S.
1;
United States v. American Tobacco Co.,
221 U. S. 106. There
has been no effort to create numerous smaller companies out of
Timken so that there will be no dominant individual in the tapered
roller bearing field. The American company had had a normal growth
and development. Its relations with English and French Timken were
close, and American Timken had stock and contracts for further
stock in both foreign companies of value in the development of its
foreign business. Such business arrangements should not be
destroyed unless necessary to do away with the prohibited evil.
An injunction was entered by the District Court to prohibit the
continuation of the objectionable contracts. Violation of that
injunction would threaten the appellant and its officers with civil
and criminal contempt.
United States v. Goldman,
277 U. S. 229, and
Hill v. Weiner, 300 U. S. 105. The
paucity of cases dealing with contempt of Sherman Act injunctions
is, I think, an indication of how carefully the decrees are obeyed.
The injunction is a far stronger sanction against further violation
than the Sherman Act alone. Once in possession of facts showing
violation, the Government would obtain a quick and summary
punishment of the violator. Furthermore, this case remains on the
docket for the purpose of "enforcement of compliance" and
"punishment of violations." This provision should leave power in
the court to enforce divestiture, if the injunction alone fails.
Prompt and full compliance with the decree should be
anticipated.
Page 341 U. S. 605
This Court is hesitant, always, to interfere with the scope of
the trial court's decree. [
Footnote
2/4] However, in this case, it seems appropriate to indicate my
disapproval of the requirement of divestiture and to suggest a
direction to the District Court that provisions leading to that
result be eliminated from the decree. Such remand would also give
opportunity for reconsideration of the changes necessary in the
decree because of the remand and the death of Mr. Dewar.
In my view, such an order should be entered.
[
Footnote 2/1]
"VIII. A. Within two years from the date of this judgment,
defendant shall divest itself of all stock holdings and other
financial interests, direct or indirect, in British Timken and
French Timken. Within one year from the date of this judgment,
defendant shall present to the Court for its approval a plan for
such divestiture."
"B. Defendant is hereby enjoined and restrained, from the date
of this judgment, from: "
"1. Acquiring, directly or indirectly, any ownership interest in
(by purchase or acquisition of assets or securities, or through the
exercise of any option, or otherwise), or any control over, British
Timken or French Timken, or any subsidiary, successor or assign
thereof;"
"2. Exercising any influence or control over the production,
sales or other business policies of British Timken or French
Timken, or any subsidiary, successor, assign, agent, sales
representative, or distributor thereof;"
"3. Causing, authorizing or knowingly permitting any officer,
director, or employee of defendant or its subsidiaries to serve as
an officer, director, or employee of British Timken or French
Timken or of any subsidiary, successor, assign, agent, sales
representative, or distributor thereof."
[
Footnote 2/2]
United States v. Crescent Amusement Co., 323 U.
S. 173,
323 U. S. 189;
United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.
S. 131,
334 U. S. 166
(Third);
85 F. Supp.
881, 895,
aff'd sub nom. United States v. Loew's,
Inc., 339 U.S. 974;
United States v. Aluminum Co. of
America, 91 F. Supp.
333, 392 (Aluminum Limited) at 418-419.
[
Footnote 2/3]
Cf. Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.
S. 386,
323 U. S. 413
et seq.
[
Footnote 2/4]
See United States v. United States Gypsum Co.,
340 U. S. 76,
340 U. S.
89.
MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER, dissenting.
The force of the reasoning against divestiture in this case
fortifies the doubts which I felt about the Government's position
at the close of argument, and persuades me to associate myself, in
substance, with the dissenting views expressed by MR. JUSTICE
JACKSON. Even "cartel" is not a talismanic word, so as to displace
the rule of reason by which breaches of the Sherman Law are
determined. Nor is "division of territory" so self-operating a
category of Sherman Law violations as to dispense with analysis of
the practical consequences of what, on paper, is a geographic
division of territory.
While
American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co.,
213 U. S. 347,
presented a wholly different set of facts from those before us, the
decision in that case does point to the fact that the circumstances
of foreign trade may alter the incidence of what in the setting of
domestic commerce would be a clear case of unreasonable restraint
of trade.
Of course, it is not for this Court to formulate economic policy
as to foreign commerce. But the conditions controlling foreign
commerce may be relevant here. When, as a matter of cold fact, the
legal, financial, and governmental policies deny opportunities for
exportation from
Page 341 U. S. 606
this country and importation into it, arrangements that afford
such opportunities to American enterprise may not fall under the
ban of a fair construction of the Sherman Law because comparable
arrangements regarding domestic commerce come within its
condemnation.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON, dissenting.
I doubt that it should be regarded as an unreasonable restraint
of trade for an American industrial concern to organize foreign
subsidiaries, each limited to serving a particular market area. If
so, it seems to preclude the only practical means of reaching
foreign markets by many American industries.
The fundamental issue here concerns a severely technical
application to foreign commerce of the concept of conspiracy. It is
admitted that, if Timken had, within its own corporate
organization, set up separate departments to operate plants in
France and Great Britain as well as in the United States, "that
would not be a conspiracy. You must have two entities to have a
conspiracy." [
Footnote 3/1] Thus,
although a single American producer, of course, would not compete
with itself, either abroad or at home, and could determine prices
and allot territories with the same effect as here, that would not
be a violation of the Act, because a corporation cannot conspire
with itself. Government counsel answered affirmatively the question
of the Chief Justice: "Your theory is that, if you have a separate
corporation, that makes the difference?" [
Footnote 3/2] Thus, the Court applies the well
established conspiracy doctrine that what it would not be illegal
for Timken to do alone may be illegal as a conspiracy when done by
two legally separate persons. The doctrine now applied to foreign
commerce is that foreign subsidiaries organized by an
Page 341 U. S. 607
American corporation are "separate persons," and any arrangement
between them and the parent corporation to do that which is legal
for the parent alone is an unlawful conspiracy. I think that result
places too much weight on labels.
But, if we apply the most strict conspiracy doctrine, we still
have the question whether the arrangement is an unreasonable
restraint of trade or a method and means of carrying on competition
in trade. Timken did not sit down with competitors and divide an
existing market between them. It has at all times, in all places,
had powerful rivals. It was not effectively meeting their
competition in foreign markets, and so it joined others in creating
a British subsidiary to go after business best reachable through
such a concern, and a French one to exploit French markets. Of
course, in doing so, it allotted appropriate territory to each, and
none was to enter into competition with the other or with the
parent. Since many foreign governments prohibit or handicap
American corporations from owning plants, entering into contracts,
or engaging in business directly, this seems the only practical way
of waging competition in those areas.
The philosophy of the Government, adopted by the Court, is that
Timken's conduct is conspiracy to restrain trade solely because the
venture made use of subsidiaries. It is forbidden thus to deal with
and utilize subsidiaries to exploit foreign territories, because
"parent and subsidiary corporations must accept the consequences of
maintaining separate corporate entities," [
Footnote 3/3] and that consequence is conspiracy to
restrain trade. But not all agreements are conspiracies, and not
all restraints of trade are unlawful. In a world of tariffs, trade
barriers, empire or domestic preferences, and various forms of
parochialism from which we are by no means free, I think a rule
that it
Page 341 U. S. 608
is restraint of trade to enter a foreign market through a
separate subsidiary of limited scope is virtually to foreclose
foreign commerce of many kinds. It is one thing for competitors or
a parent and its subsidiaries to divide the United States domestic
market which is an economic and legal unit; it is another for an
industry to recognize that foreign markets consist of many legal
and economic units, and to go after each through separate means. I
think this decision will restrain more trade than it will make
free.
[
Footnote 3/1]
Argument of government counsel reported 19 L.W. 3291
et
seq.
[
Footnote 3/2]
See 341
U.S. 593fn3/1|>note 1,
supra.
[
Footnote 3/3]
See 341
U.S. 593fn3/1|>note 1,
supra.