1. An agreement among competitors in interstate commerce to fix
maximum resale prices of their products violates the Sherman Act.
P.
340 U. S.
213.
2. Under the Sherman Act, a combination formed for the purpose
and with the effect of raising, depressing, fixing, pegging, or
stabilizing the price of a commodity in interstate or foreign
commerce is illegal
per se. P.
340 U. S.
213.
3. The evidence in this case was sufficient to support a finding
by the jury that respondents had conspired to fix maximum resale
prices. Pp.
340 U. S.
213-214.
4. In an action under the Sherman Act for treble damages,
brought by a complainant injured by a conspiracy of sellers of
liquor in interstate commerce to fix maximum resale prices, it is
no defense that the complainant had conspired with others to fix
minimum prices for liquor in violation of the antitrust laws. P.
340 U. S.
214.
5. The fact that corporations are under common ownership and
control does not relieve them from liability under the antitrust
laws, especially where they hold themselves out as competitors. P.
340 U. S.
215.
6. Since the District Court's instructions to the jury submitted
to them only the cause of action under the Sherman Act, it did not
err in refusing a more formal withdrawal of an issue concerning a
violation of the Clayton Act, which had been charged in the
complaint but which was not proved. P.
340 U. S.
215.
182 F.2d 228, reversed.
In an action under the Sherman Act for treble damages, the jury
returned a verdict for petitioner, and damages were awarded. The
Court of Appeals reversed. 182 F.2d 228. This Court granted
certiorari. 340 U.S. 863.
Reversed, p.
340 U. S.
215.
Page 340 U. S. 212
MR. JUSTICE BLACK delivered the opinion of the Court.
The petitioner, Kiefer-Stewart Company, is an Indiana drug
concern which does a wholesale liquor business. Respondents,
Seagram and Calvert corporations, are affiliated companies that
sell liquor in interstate commerce to Indiana wholesalers.
Petitioner brought this action in a federal district court for
treble damages under the Sherman Act. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 15. The
complaint charged that respondents had agreed or conspired to sell
liquor only to those Indiana wholesalers who would resell at prices
fixed by Seagram and Calvert, and that this agreement deprived
petitioner of a continuing supply of liquor, to its great damage.
* On the trial,
evidence was introduced tending to show that respondents had fixed
maximum prices above which the wholesalers could not resell. The
jury returned a verdict for petitioner, and damages were awarded.
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed. 182 F.2d
228. It held that an agreement among respondents to fix maximum
resale prices did not violate the Sherman Act, because such prices
promoted, rather than restrained, competition. It also held the
evidence insufficient to show that respondents had acted in
concert. Doubt as to the correctness
Page 340 U. S. 213
of the decision on questions important in antitrust litigation
prompted us to grant certiorari. 340 U.S. 863.
The Court of Appeals erred in holding that an agreement among
competitors to fix maximum resale prices of their products does not
violate the Sherman Act. For such agreements, no less than those to
fix minimum prices, cripple the freedom of traders, and thereby
restrain their ability to sell in accordance with their own
judgment. We reaffirm what we said in
United States v.
Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U. S. 150,
310 U. S.
223:
"Under the Sherman Act, a combination formed for the purpose and
with the effect of raising, depressing, fixing, pegging, or
stabilizing the price of a commodity in interstate or foreign
commerce is illegal
per se."
The Court of Appeals also erred in holding the evidence
insufficient to support a finding by the jury that respondents had
conspired to fix maximum resale prices. The jury was authorized by
the evidence to accept the following as facts: Seagram refused to
sell to petitioner and others unless the purchasers agreed to the
maximum resale price fixed by Seagram. Calvert was at first willing
to sell without this restrictive condition, and arrangements were
made for petitioner to buy large quantities of Calvert liquor.
Petitioner subsequently was informed by Calvert, however, that the
arrangements would not be carried out because Calvert had "to go
along with Seagram." Moreover, about this time, conferences were
held by officials of the respondents concerning sales of liquor to
petitioner. Thereafter, on identical terms as to the fixing of
retail prices, both Seagram and Calvert resumed sales to other
Indiana wholesalers who agreed to abide by such conditions, but no
shipments have been made to petitioner.
The foregoing is sufficient to justify the challenged jury
finding that respondents had a unity of purpose or a common design
and understanding when they forbade
Page 340 U. S. 214
their purchasers to exceed the fixed ceilings. Thus, there is
support for the conclusion that a conspiracy existed,
American
Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.
S. 781,
328 U. S.
809-810, even though, as respondents point out, there is
other testimony in the record indicating that the price policies of
Seagram and Calvert were arrived at independently.
Respondents also seek to support the judgment of reversal on
other grounds not passed on by the Court of Appeals, but which have
been argued here both orally and in the briefs. These grounds raise
only issues of law not calling for examination or appraisal of
evidence, and we will consider them. Respondents introduced
evidence in the District Court designed to show that petitioner had
agreed with other Indiana wholesalers to set minimum prices for the
sale of liquor in violation of the antitrust laws. It is now
contended that the trial court erred in charging the jury that
petitioner's part in such a conspiracy, even if proved, was no
defense to the present cause of action. We hold that the
instruction was correct. Seagram and Calvert. acting individually.
perhaps might have refused to deal with petitioner or with any or
all of the Indiana wholesalers. But the Sherman Act makes it an
offense for respondents to agree among themselves to stop selling
to particular customers. If petitioner and others were guilty of
infractions of the antitrust laws, they could be held responsible
in appropriate proceedings brought against them by the Government
or by injured private persons. The alleged illegal conduct of
petitioner, however, could not legalize the unlawful combination by
respondents nor immunize them against liability to those they
injured.
Cf. Fashion Originators' Guild v. Federal Trade
Comm'n, 312 U. S. 457,
668;
Mandeville Island Farms v. American Crystal Sugar
Co., 334 U. S. 219,
334 U. S.
242-243.
Page 340 U. S. 215
Respondents next suggest that their status as "mere
instrumentalities of a single manufacturing-merchandising unit"
makes it impossible for them to have conspired in a manner
forbidden by the Sherman Act. But this suggestion runs counter to
our past decisions that common ownership and control does not
liberate corporations from the impact of the antitrust laws.
E.g. United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.
S. 218. The rule is especially applicable where, as
here, respondents hold themselves out as competitors.
It is also claimed that the District Court improperly refused to
withdraw from the jury an issue as to respondents' violation of the
Clayton Act which had been charged in the complaint but which was
not proved. A fair reading of the instructions to the jury,
however, reveals that the trial court submitted to them only the
cause of action under the Sherman Act. We are convinced from this
record that a more formal withdrawal of the Clayton Act issue would
have served solely to confuse.
Other contentions of error in the admission of evidence and in
the charge to the jury are so devoid of merit that it is
unnecessary to discuss them.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and that of
the District Court is affirmed.
It is so ordered.
* Petitioner also charged a violation of the Clayton Act, 15
U.S.C. § 18, but this theory has been abandoned, and is not
important here.
See p.
340 U. S. 215
infra.