1. Without being advised of his right to counsel or being
offered counsel at any time between arrest and conviction, a
17-year-old youth charged in a Pennsylvania state court under four
indictments with four separate burglaries, for which he could have
been given maximum sentences aggregating 80 years, pleaded guilty
and was sentenced to from five to ten years on each indictment, the
sentences to run consecutively. The record showed no attempt on the
part of the court to make him understand the consequences of his
plea.
Held: he was denied due process of law contrary to the
Fourteenth Amendment. Pp.
335 U. S.
438-442.
2. The due process clause of the Fifth or the Fourteenth
Amendment requires counsel for all persons charged with serious
crimes, when necessary for their adequate defense, in order that
such persons may be advised how to conduct their trials. P.
335 U. S.
441.
3. The record before this Court adequately raised the federal
constitutional question as to denial of the right to counsel. Pp.
335 U. S.
438-439.
4. Since it appears that in Pennsylvania habeas corpus is
available to an accused whose constitutional right to counsel has
been denied, and since the state does not suggest that it bars a
remedy by habeas corpus in the circumstances of this case because
no appeal was taken from the original conviction, this Court
decides this case on its merits. P.
335 U. S.
440.
161 Pa.Super. 58, 53 A.2d 984, reversed.
Without a hearing, a Pennsylvania court of common pleas
dismissed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus to
Page 335 U. S. 438
review petitioner's conviction, on his pleas of guilty, for four
separate burglaries. The Superior Court of Pennsylvania affirmed.
161 Pa.Super. 58, 53 A.2d 894. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
denied a petition for allowance of an appeal. 161 Pa.Super. xxv, 53
A.2d 894. This Court granted certiorari. 334 U.S. 836.
Reversed, p.
335 U. S.
442.
MR. JUSTICE REED delivered the opinion of the Court.
Petitioner is held by the Pennsylvania in the Western State
Penitentiary on sentences totalling a minimum of twenty and a
maximum of forty years pronounced pursuant to his pleas of guilty
to four indictments charging burglary. We granted certiorari, 334
U.S. 836, to review a denial by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
of his petition to appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court
which affirmed a dismissal of a petition for habeas corpus in the
Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County. Petitioner claimed in
the state courts, and now claims here, that he was denied counsel
in the proceedings leading to his convictions in violation of his
right to counsel under the due process of law clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
From the pleadings and decisions of the Pennsylvania courts,
certified to us as the record in the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,
and without reliance upon any additional allegations in the
petition for certiorari, the facts and allegations as to denial of
constitutional rights may be summarized as follows: on October 27,
1938, petitioner Uveges, a youth seventeen years of age, was faced
with
Page 335 U. S. 439
four district attorney's indictments charging four separate
burglaries. Upon his plea of guilty to these indictments, Uveges
was sentenced in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County to
from five to ten years on each indictment, the sentences to run
consecutively. In his petition to the same court for a writ of
habeas corpus in 1946, petitioner alleged that he was not informed
of his right to counsel, nor was counsel offered him at any time
during the period between arrest and conviction. He also alleged
that,
"frightened by threats of dire consequences if he dared to stand
trial, relator pleaded guilty under the direction of an assistant
district attorney, with the understanding that a sentence to
Huntington Reformatory would be imposed."
We disregard this last allegation because it was not presented
to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in the petition for allowance
of appeal. A rule to show cause why the writ should not issue was
granted. The answer denied that petitioner was entitled to counsel,
but did not deny the allegation of threats by the assistant
district attorney. The Court of Common Pleas, without a hearing,
entered an order dismissing the petition and denying the writ. The
Superior Court of Pennsylvania affirmed, 161 Pa.Super. 58, 53 A.2d
894, noting that Uveges had been arrested once before for burglary
and confined in a reformatory for ten months. The state Supreme
Court, on September 29, 1947, denied a petition for allowance of
appeal which repeated the allegations of youth and denial of the
right to counsel. 53 A.2d 894. We think this record adequately
raised the federal constitutional question as to denial of counsel.
Pennsylvania makes no contrary contention. [
Footnote 1] We granted the
Page 335 U. S. 440
motion to proceed
in forma pauperis and the petition
for a writ of certiorari, 334 U.S. 836, in order to examine the
important constitutional question presented by petitioner's claim
of right to counsel. [
Footnote
2]
Since our understanding is that, in Pennsylvania, habeas corpus
is available to an accused whose constitutional right to counsel
has been denied, [
Footnote 3]
and since respondent does not suggest that the state bars a remedy
by habeas corpus in the circumstances of this case because no
appeal was taken from the original conviction, we proceed to the
merits of this controversy.
Some members of the Court think that, where serious offenses are
charged, failure of a court to offer counsel in state criminal
trials deprives an accused of rights under the Fourteenth
Amendment. They are convinced that
Page 335 U. S. 441
the services of counsel to protect the accused are guaranteed by
the Constitution in every such instance.
See Bute v.
Illinois, 333 U. S. 640,
dissent,
333 U. S.
677-679. Only when the accused refuses counsel with an
understanding of his rights can the court dispense with counsel.
[
Footnote 4] Others of us think
that, when a crime subject to capital punishment is not involved,
each case depends on its own facts.
See Betts v. Brady,
316 U. S. 455,
316 U. S. 462.
Where the gravity of the crime and other factors -- such as the age
and education of the defendant, [
Footnote 5] the conduct of the court or the prosecuting
officials, [
Footnote 6] and the
complicated nature of the offense charged and the possible defenses
thereto [
Footnote 7] -- render
criminal proceedings without counsel so apt to result in injustice
as to be fundamentally unfair, the latter group held that the
accused must have legal assistance under the Amendment whether he
pleads guilty or elects to stand trial, whether he requests counsel
or not. Only a waiver of counsel, understandingly made, justifies
trial without counsel.
The philosophy behind both of these views is that the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment or the Fifth Amendment
requires counsel for all persons charged with serious crimes, when
necessary for their adequate defense, in order that such persons
may be advised how to conduct their trial. The application of the
rule varies as indicated in the preceding paragraph.
Under either view of the requirements of due process, the facts
in this case required the presence of counsel at
Page 335 U. S. 442
petitioner's trial. He should not have been permitted to plead
guilty without an offer of the advice of counsel in his situation.
If the circumstances alleged in his petition are true, the accused
was entitled to an adviser to help him handle his problems.
Petitioner was young and inexperienced in the intricacies of
criminal procedure when he pleaded guilty to crimes which carried a
maximum sentence of eighty years. [
Footnote 8] There is an undenied allegation that he was
never advised of his right to counsel. The record shows no attempt
on the part of the court to make him understand the consequences of
his plea. Whatever our decision might have been if the trial court
had informed him of his rights and conscientiously had undertaken
to perform the functions ordinarily entrusted to counsel, we
conclude that the opportunity to have counsel in this case was a
necessary element of a fair hearing.
Reversed.
[
Footnote 1]
Excerpts from the brief of the Commonwealth show its acceptance
of the actual issue:
"3. The basic question of this case is whether the petitioner
was denied due process of law by reason of the fact that the
Pennsylvania did not appoint Counsel to represent him in the
proceedings leading to his imprisonment. It is the contention of
the respondent that the federal Constitution did not require that
the state appoint Counsel to represent this accused, since"
"(A) The requirement of the 6th Amendment to the Federal
Constitution that the accused be represented by counsel in all
criminal cases does not apply to the states, and"
"(B) It is only in a capital case or under other special
circumstances not here present that a state is required by the 14th
Amendment to the Federal Constitution to appoint counsel to
represent the accused."
"The vital question to be decided, and, in our view, of the case
the only significant question, is whether the accused, under such
facts as are properly before this Court, must be represented by
counsel in order that the process leading to his confinement may be
deemed due process."
[
Footnote 2]
Petitioner, in his petition for certiorari, bases his claim for
review in part on procedural irregularities allegedly in violation
of state statutes, such as the failure of the district attorney
personally to sign the indictments. Since these allegations, even
if true, present no federal question, we have not considered
them.
[
Footnote 3]
See Commonwealth ex rel. McGlinn v. Smith, 344 Pa. 41,
47, 48, 24 A.2d 1;
Commonwealth ex rel. Penland v. Ashe,
341 Pa. 337, 341, 342, 19 A.2d 464.
[
Footnote 4]
See Rice v. Olson, 324 U. S. 786,
324 U. S.
788-789;
Walker v. Johnston, 312 U.
S. 275,
312 U. S. 286;
Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U. S. 458,
304 U. S.
468.
[
Footnote 5]
See e.g., Wade v. Mayo, 334 U.
S. 672,
334 U. S.
683-684;
DeMeerleer v. Michigan, 329 U.
S. 663,
329 U. S.
664-665;
Betts v. Brady, supra, at
316 U. S. 472;
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U. S. 45,
287 U. S. 51-52,
287 U. S.
71.
[
Footnote 6]
See e.g., Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.
S. 736,
334 U. S.
739-741;
DeMeerleer v. Michigan, supra, at
329 U. S. 665;
Smith v. O'Grady, 312 U. S. 329,
312 U. S.
332-333.
[
Footnote 7]
See e.g., Rice v. Olson, 324 U.
S. 786,
324 U. S.
789-791.
[
Footnote 8]
Purdon's Pa.Stat.Ann., tit. 18, § 4901.
MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER, with whom MR. JUSTICE JACKSON and MR.
JUSTICE BURTON concur, dissenting.
Exercise of this Court's jurisdiction is peculiarly for this
Court's own determination, and is neither to be conceded nor
withheld by counsel's admission. In fact, however, Pennsylvania
does not admit that the adjudication by the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania is reviewable here. It urges that, "under such facts
as are properly before this Court," petitioner's claim must fail.
The circumstances under which this Court is reversing the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania show such disregard for the distribution of
judicial power between this Court and the highest courts of the
States, that I am constrained to dissent.
As the caption announces, this case was brought here by a writ
of certiorari directed to the Supreme Court of
Page 335 U. S. 443
Pennsylvania. We issued the writ solely on the basis of
allegations in the petition for certiorari. In sum, these were the
allegations: (1) petitioner was held for two weeks without being
able to consult friends or relatives; (2) because of his youth, his
ignorance, and the complexity of the charges against him,
petitioner was incapable of meeting them intelligently without
assistance of counsel; (3) his request for legal aid to determine
his plea was met with a threat of a severe sentence if the
Commonwealth were put to the expense of a trial; (4) he was
promised by the District Attorney a short sentence at a reformatory
for a plea of guilty; (5) he was not informed of the consequences
of a plea of guilty, was unaware of its effect, and intended to
plead guilty only to one of several indictments.
On these allegations, without more, we granted the petition for
certiorari on June 7, 1948. The record before the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania, on the basis of which that Court denied the petition
for an appeal to review the order of the Superior Court affirming
the refusal of the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County to
issue a writ of habeas corpus, was not before us when we granted
certiorari. Not until September 8, 1948, was that record sent here
by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania; it was lodged here on
September 20, 1948. It now appears that the allegations on which
this Court issued its writ to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court were
not before that Court in the paper it requires to be filed to
determine whether under Pennsylvania law an appeal should be
entertained. More particularly, the five allegations summarized
above had not been before the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania when it
denied an appeal. Apart from two claims involving matters of local
procedure, the only ground on which appeal was sought from the
Pennsylvania Superior Court was the bare claim that petitioner was
denied assistance of counsel, unsupported
Page 335 U. S. 444
by those considerations of unfairness which under our rulings,
make such denial a denial of the due process guaranteed by the
Fourteenth Amendment.
Having granted a review of the action of the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court on the basis of allegations not before that Court,
this Court now holds that the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has
flouted the Constitution of the United States. It does so despite
the fact that, at the bar of this Court, the representative of
Pennsylvania unreservedly admitted that the writ of habeas corpus
would not have been dismissed by the courts of Pennsylvania if the
allegations that were made here had been made there. We are
reviewing what the Pennsylvania Supreme Court did. The only matter
before that court was a petition for an allowance of an appeal from
the order of the Superior Court of Pennsylvania. The only matter
properly before us is disallowance of that appeal. If the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania was, as a matter of State law, authorized to
disallow the appeal because the claim was not formulated with
adequate particularity, a federal question is wanting and our writ,
being without proper foundation, should be dismissed. The fact
that, on adequate allegations in a new proceeding before an
appropriate Pennsylvania court, the claim may be successfully
sustained gives this Court no warrant for assuming that the proper
allegations were before the Pennsylvania Supreme Court so as to
transmute its denial of an appeal into the denial of a properly
presented federal claim.
This Court now makes such an assumption. If we are to decide a
case, however grave the issue, only on what appears according to
the record, there is no basis for finding that the Supreme Court
had before it anything but the petition for allowance of an appeal.
This is so even if we assume, although nothing in the record
affords
Page 335 U. S. 445
us the right to do so, [
Footnote
2/1] that the records in the lower courts of Pennsylvania were
filed in its Supreme Court before it disallowed an appeal.
Appellants often do not raise all that they urged in a lower court,
and they sometimes raise an issue for the first time in the
appellate court. In any event, the petition here was to review the
adjudication of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, and our writ ran
to that court. This is not a case where our writ turns out to be
formally misdirected due to the fact that the record to be sent up
was lodged, according to local procedure, in one court rather than
another. In such a case, what
Page 335 U. S. 446
is reviewed here, despite the misdirection, is the same record
that was before the State court which is to be reviewed. The writ
runs to the other court only to get the record here. This case
presents quite a different situation. We cannot review the judgment
of the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County, or that of the
Superior Court of Pennsylvania, because neither is a final judgment
under Pennsylvania law if either involved a federal constitutional
issue. For our purpose of "finality," such an issue must go to the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, because that court has obligatory
jurisdiction to review it. Pa.Stat.Ann., tit. 17, § 190;
Commonwealth v. Caulfield, 211 Pa. 644, 61 A. 243;
see
Commonwealth v. Gardner, 297 Pa. 498, 500, 147 A. 527. In
bringing here for review the action of that Court, we must be
governed by what was before that Court, and cannot rely on what was
not before it.
Unless we are to assume that the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
flagrantly violated its duty under Pennsylvania law to grant an
appeal where a violation of a right secured by the Constitution of
the United States is properly raised, we must attribute to that
court a nonconstitutional ground in denying an appeal if it may
reasonably be so attributed. If that Court had said explicitly that
it requires a more particularized statement for the claim that the
petitioner did not plead guilty with full understanding of what he
was doing and that the failure to assign him counsel in no wise
handicapped him in pleading to the indictments, this Court hardly
would find that the Constitution of the United States precludes
such a State requirement of particularity in an effort to set aside
a sentence eight years after it was imposed. If such a
determination by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania explicitly made
would not raise a federal question, it does not raise a federal
question if, on the record, we have a right to infer that such was
the implicit ruling of the Pennsylvania
Page 335 U. S. 447
Court. That Court may dispose of cases summarily as does this
Court. The record here plainly calls for the inference that the
claims now made were not adequately presented in the paper upon
which the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania acted. A comparison between
the statements which the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania had before
it when it denied the appeal, and the allegations made in the
petition before this Court on the basis of which we issued the writ
of certiorari, affords compelling reason for attributing the
disallowance of the appeal by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court to its
finding that a claim of lack of due process raised after eight
years was made without sufficient particularity to call for a trial
on the merits. A tabular view of the claims made in the four courts
before which they were pressed clearly establishes not only that
what was before the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania was very
different from what was urged here, but also different from what
was urged before the lower Pennsylvania courts. [
Footnote 2/2] A finding that a State court
disregarded the Constitution of the United States should not be
like a game of blindman's buff.
Since the action of the State court may fairly be sustained on
the State ground of failure adequately to present the
constitutional claim sought to be raised, we must so interpret it.
Klinger v.
Missouri, 13 Wall. 257,
80 U. S. 263;
Lynch v. New York ex rel. Pierson, 293 U. S.
52,
293 U. S. 54;
Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. Oklahoma, 303 U.
S. 206,
303 U. S. 212.
Our reviewing power is, of course, not to be withheld by
excogitating some fanciful or recondite doctrine of local law for a
State court decision. Here, the State ground is fairly obvious. To
reject it is to reach out for a federal issue. The Pennsylvania
courts are fully aware of the circumstances under which indigent
defendants
Page 335 U. S. 449
are entitled to the assistance of counsel.
See, e.g.,
Commonwealth ex rel. McGlinn v. Smith, 344 Pa. 41, 24 A.2d 1.
Only by assuming that the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania was
heedless of its duty under the Constitution can we assume that it
denied an appeal in this case because of such heedlessness, rather
than because it enforced allowable requirements by Pennsylvania for
asserting a constitutional claim.
Such reasoning is not what is invidiously called legalistic. Law
is essentially legalistic in the sense that observance of well
recognized procedure is, on balance, socially desirable. In the
wellbeing of a federalism like ours, observance of what on casual
view may appear as a sterile technicality is important whenever
this Court is brought in potential conflict with State courts.
Especially is it important as to those vast reaches of the criminal
law which are exclusively within State domain, and which are
therefore not subject to the supervision which this Court may
exercise over the lower federal courts. Of course, this Court has
the duty of alertness in safeguarding rights guaranteed by the
Constitution of the United States against infringement by the
States even in their difficult task of repressing crime and dealing
with transgressors. At best, however, intervention by this Court in
the criminal process of States is delicate business. It should not
be indulged in unless no reasonable doubt is left that a State
denies, or has refused to exercise, means of correcting a claimed
infraction of the United States Constitution.
Intervention by this Court in the administration of the criminal
justice of a State has all the disadvantages of interference from
without. Whatever short-cut to relief may be had in a particular
case, it is calculated to beget misunderstanding and friction, and,
to that extent, detracts from those imponderables which are the
ultimate reliance of a civilized system of law. After all, this is
the Nation's
Page 335 U. S. 450
ultimate judicial tribunal, not a super legal aid bureau. If the
same relief, although by a more tedious process, is available
through a State's self-corrective process, it enlists the
understanding and support of the community. Considerations rooted
in psychological and sociological reason underlie the duty of
abstention by this Court from upsetting convictions by State courts
or their refusal to grant writs of habeas corpus to those under
State sentences where State action may fairly be attributed to a
rule of local procedure, and is not exclusively founded on denial
of a federal claim. When a State court explicitly rests its
decision on a State ground, it is easy sailing. But even when a
State court summarily disposes of a case without spelling out its
ground, led to do so, as is this Court in many cases, by the burden
of its docket, it is our duty not to attribute to the State court
flouting of the United States Constitution, but to infer regard for
its own law if to that law may reasonably be attributed a finding
of inadequacy in the mode of presenting the constitutional claim
for which relief is here sought on the merits.
I would dismiss the writ, leaving petitioner to pursue in
Pennsylvania the claim he makes here.
[
Footnote 2/1]
The relevant docket entries of the three Pennsylvania courts
which considered this case strongly indicate that all papers other
than the petition for allowance of an appeal were in the Court of
Common Pleas for Allegheny County when the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court was determining the allowance of an appeal. The "Docket
Entries" in the Superior Court of Pennsylvania record that, on July
29, 1947, twelve days after that court affirmed the order of the
Court of Common Pleas, the Record of the Court of Common Pleas
which had been filed in the Superior Court was remitted to the
Court of Common Pleas. The latter court's "Appearance Docket Entry"
shows that it was received on the same day. Twenty-four days later,
on August 22, 1947, the petitioner filed in the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania his petition for allowance of appeal from the judgment
of the Superior Court. The Docket Entries in the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania do not show that the Record which previously had been
sent back to the Court of Common Pleas by the Superior Court had
been filed in that Court.
After this Court issued its writ on June 7, 1948, petitioner's
attorney filed a "Praecipe" with the Clerk of the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania requesting that the papers that now make up the record
in this Court be certified to this Court. Although this was done
under the Clerk's signature with a statement that
"the foregoing Record . . . is a true and faithful copy of the
Record and Proceedings of THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA . . .
in a certain suit therein pending . . . ,"
that Record shows that the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, after
our writ of certiorari had been directed to it, had to issue its
supplemental certiorari to the Court of Common Pleas to obtain the
Record.
[
Footnote 2/2]
bwm:
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
I II III IV
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Court of Common pleas Superior Court of Supreme Court of
Supreme Court of the United States
of Allegheny County Pennsylvania Pennsylvania
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Petition for writ of Court's opinion Petition for allowance
Petition for writ of certiorari
habeas corpus of appeal
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1. Bare denial of right 1. Same. 1. Same. 1. Failure to assign
counsel resulted in
to counsel. unfair trial; disabled him from making
intelligent plea and led to overreaching
by D.A.
2. Signature lacking on 2. Same. 2. Here denied he signed 2.
Signature not on indictment.
indictment as waiver a waiver.
of grand jury pres-
entation. Claims
waiver not read to
him.
3. Right of 17-year-old 3. Apparently no such 3. No such claim.
3. Same as No. 3, Column I.
boy to disaffirm plea claim.
of guilt. Also claim
of threats and promise
of shorter sentence.
4. Claims to have enter- 4. Same. 4. Same.
ed plea of guilty
to only one of nine
indictments.
5. Held incommunicado for two weeks.
6. Refusal of request for consultation with
counsel followed by threats.
7. Witnesses not sworn.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
ewm: