1. Title II of the Housing and Rent Act of 1947, enacted after
the effective date of the Presidential Proclamation terminating
hostilities on December 31, 1946, and limiting the rent which may
be charged for certain housing accommodations in "defense rental
areas," is a valid exercise of the war power of Congress.
Hamilton v. Kentucky Distilleries Co., 251 U.
S. 146;
Ruppert v. Caffey, 251 U.
S. 264;
Stewart v.
Kahn, 11 Wall. 493. Pp.
333 U. S.
141-146.
2. The constitutionality of action taken by Congress does not
depend on recitals of the power which it undertakes to exercise,
and the legislative history shows that Congress was invoking its
war power to cope with a current condition of which the war was a
direct and immediate cause. P.
333 U. S.
144.
Page 333 U. S. 139
3. The Act prescribes adequate standards for the guidance of
administrative action and does not unconstitutionally delegate
legislative power. Pp.
333 U. S.
144-145.
4. By its exemption of certain classes of housing
accommodations, the Act does not violate the Fifth Amendment. P.
333 U. S.
145.
5. The fact that the property regulated suffers a decrease in
value is no more fatal to the exercise of the war power than it is
where the police power is invoked to the same end. P.
333 U. S.
146.
74 F. Supp. 546, reversed.
The Housing Expediter sued to enjoin violations of Title II of
the Housing and Rent Act of 1947. The District Court denied a
permanent injunction on the ground that the Act was
unconstitutional. 74 F. Supp. 546. On direct appeal to this Court,
reversed, p.
333 U. S.
146.
MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS delivered the opinion of the Court.
The case is here on a direct appeal, Act of August 24, 1937, 50
Stat. 752, 28 U.S.C. § 349a, from a judgment of the District Court
holding unconstitutional Title II of the Housing and Rent Act of
1947. 61 Stat. 193, 196.
The Act became effective on July l, 1947, and, the following
day, the appellee demanded of its tenants increases of 40% and 60%
for rental accommodations in the Cleveland Defense Rental Area, an
admitted violation of the Act and regulations adopted pursuant
thereto. [
Footnote 1]
Page 333 U. S. 140
Appellant thereupon instituted this proceeding under § 206(b) of
the Act [
Footnote 2] to enjoin
the violations. A preliminary injunction issued. After a hearing,
it was dissolved, and a permanent injunction denied.
The District Court was of the view that the authority of
Congress to regulate rents by virtue of the war power (
see
Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U. S. 503)
ended with the Presidential Proclamation terminating hostilities on
December 31, 1946, [
Footnote 3]
since that proclamation inaugurated "peace in fact," though it did
not mark termination of the war. It also concluded that, even if
the war power continues, Congress did not act under it, because it
did not say so, and only if Congress says so, or enacts provisions
so implying, can it be held that Congress intended to exercise such
power. That Congress did not
Page 333 U. S. 141
so intend, said the District Court, follows from the provision
that the Housing Expediter can end controls in any area without
regard to the official termination of the war, [
Footnote 4] and from the fact that the preceding
federal rent control laws (which were concededly exercises of the
war power) were neither amended nor extended. The District Court
expressed the further view that rent control is not within the war
power, because "the emergency created by housing shortage came into
existence long before the war." It held that the Act "lacks in
uniformity of application and distinctly constitutes a delegation
of legislative power not within the grant of Congress" because of
the authorization to the Housing Expediter to lift controls in any
area before the Act's expiration. It also held that the Act in
effect provides "low rentals for certain groups without taking the
property or compensating the owner in any way."
See 74 F.
Supp. 546.
We conclude, in the first place, that the war power sustains
this legislation. The Court said in
Hamilton v. Kentucky
Distilleries Co., 251 U. S. 146,
251 U. S. 161,
that the war power includes the power "to remedy the evils which
have arisen from its rise and progress," and continues for the
duration of that emergency. Whatever may be the consequences when
war is officially terminated, [
Footnote 5] the war power does not necessarily end with
the cessation of hostilities. We recently held that it is adequate
to support the preservation of rights created by wartime
legislation,
Fleming v. Mohawk Wrecking
&
Page 333 U. S. 142
Lumber Co., 331 U. S. 111. But
it has a broader sweep. In
Hamilton v. Kentucky Distilleries
Co., supra, and
Ruppert v. Caffey, 251 U.
S. 264, prohibition laws which were enacted after the
Armistice in World War I were sustained as exercises of the war
power because they conserved manpower and increased efficiency of
production in the critical days during the period of
demobilization, and helped to husband the supply of grains and
cereals depleted by the war effort. Those cases followed the
reasoning of
Stewart v.
Kahn, 11 Wall. 493, which held that Congress had
the power to toll the statute of limitations of the States during
the period when the process of their courts was not available to
litigants due to the conditions obtaining in the Civil War.
The constitutional validity of the present legislation follows
a fortiori from those cases. The legislative history of
the present Act makes abundantly clear that there has not yet been
eliminated the deficit in housing which in considerable measure was
caused by the heavy demobilization of veterans and by the cessation
or reduction in residential construction during the period of
hostilities due to the allocation of building materials to military
projects. [
Footnote 6] Since
the war
Page 333 U. S. 143
effort contributed heavily to that deficit, Congress has the
power, even after the cessation of hostilities, to act to control
the forces that a short supply of the needed article created. If
that were not true, the Necessary and Proper Clause, Art. I, § 8,
cl. 18, would be drastically limited in its application to the
several war powers. The Court has declined to follow that course in
the past.
Hamilton v. Kentucky Distilleries Co., supra,
pp.
251 U. S. 155,
251 U. S. 156;
Ruppert v. Caffey, supra, pp.
251 U. S. 299,
251 U. S. 300.
We decline to take it today. The result would be paralyzing. It
would render Congress powerless to remedy conditions the creation
of which necessarily followed from the mobilization of men and
materials for successful prosecution of the war. So to read the
Constitution would be to make it self-defeating.
We recognize the force of the argument that the effects of war
under modern conditions may be felt in the economy
Page 333 U. S. 144
for years and years, and that, if the war power can be used in
days of peace to treat all the wounds which war inflicts on our
society, it may not only swallow up all other powers of Congress,
but largely obliterate the Ninth and the Tenth Amendments as well.
There are no such implications in today's decision. We deal here
with the consequences of a housing deficit greatly intensified
during the period of hostilities by the war effort. Any power, of
course, can be abused. But we cannot assume that Congress is not
alert to its constitutional responsibilities. And the question
whether the war power has been properly employed in cases such as
this is open to judicial inquiry.
Hamilton v. Kentucky
Distilleries Co., supra; Ruppert v. Caffey, supra.
The question of the constitutionality of action taken by
Congress does not depend on recitals of the power which it
undertakes to exercise. Here, it is plain from the legislative
history that Congress was invoking its war power to cope with a
current condition of which the war was a direct and immediate
cause. [
Footnote 7] Its
judgment on that score is entitled to the respect granted like
legislation enacted pursuant to the police power.
See Block v.
Hirsh, 256 U. S. 135;
Marcus Brown Co. v. Feldman, 256 U.
S. 170;
Chastleton Corp. v. Sinclair,
264 U. S. 543.
Under the present Act, the Housing Expediter is authorized to
remove the rent controls in any defense rental area if, in his
judgment, the need no longer exists by reason of new construction
or satisfaction of demand in other ways. [
Footnote 8] The powers thus delegated are far less
extensive than those sustained in
Bowles v. Willingham,
supra, pp.
321 U. S.
512-515. Nor is there here a grant of unbridled
administrative
Page 333 U. S. 145
discretion. The standards prescribed pass muster under our
decisions.
See Bowles v. Willingham, supra, pp.
321 U. S.
514-516, and cases cited.
Objection is made that the Act, by its exemption of certain
classes of housing accommodations, [
Footnote 9] violates the Fifth Amendment. A similar
argument was rejected under the Fourteenth Amendment when New York
made like exemptions under the rent control statute which was here
for review in
Marcus Brown Co. v. Feldman, supra, pp. 195
[argument of counsel -- omitted],
256 U. S.
198-199. Certainly Congress is not under greater
limitations. It need not control all rents or none. It can select
those areas or those classes of property where the need seems the
greatest.
See Barclay & Co. v. Edwards, 267 U.
S. 442,
267 U. S. 450.
This alone is adequate answer to the objection, equally applicable
to the original Act sustained in
Bowles v. Willingham,
supra, that the present Act lacks uniformity in
application.
Page 333 U. S. 146
The fact that the property regulated suffers a decrease in value
is no more fatal to the exercise of the war power (
Bowles v.
Willingham, supra, pp.
321 U. S. 517,
321 U. S. 518)
than it is where the police power is invoked to the same end.
See Block v. Hirsh, supra.
Reversed.
MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER concurs in this opinion because it
decides no more than was decided in
Hamilton v. Kentucky
Distilleries Co., 251 U. S. 146, and
Jacob Ruppert v. Caffey, 251 U. S. 264, and
merely applies those decisions to the situation now before the
Court.
[
Footnote 1]
Section 204(b) of the Act provides that
"no person shall demand, accept, or receive any rent for the use
or occupancy of any controlled housing accommodations greater than
the maximum rent established under the authority of the Emergency
Price Control Act of 1942, as amended, and in effect with respect
thereto on June 30, 1947."
Controlled Housing Rent Regulation, 12 Fed.Reg. 4331, contains
similar provisions. §§ 2(a), 4(a). Provisions of this statute and
regulation, not here material, allow adjustment of maximum rentals
when necessary to correct inequities and permit a 15% increase if
negotiated between landlord and tenant and incorporated in a lease
of a designated term.
[
Footnote 2]
Section 206(a) makes it unlawful
"to offer, solicit, demand, accept, or receive any rent for the
use or occupancy of any controlled housing accommodations in excess
of the maximum rent prescribed under section 204."
Section 206(b) authorized the Housing Expediter to apply to any
federal, state, or territorial court of competent jurisdiction for
an order enjoining "any act or practice which constitutes or will
constitute a violation of subsection (a) of this section."
[
Footnote 3]
Proclamation 2714, 12 Fed.Reg. 1. That proclamation recognized
that "a state of war still exists." On July 25, 1947, on approving
S.J.Res. 123 terminating certain war statutes, the President issued
a statement in which he declared that
"[t]he emergencies declared by the President on September 8,
1939, and May 27, 1941, and the state of war continue to exist,
however, and it is not possible at this time to provide for
terminating all war and emergency powers."
[
Footnote 4]
Section 204(c) provides:
"The Housing Expediter is hereby authorized and directed to
remove any or all maximum rents before this title ceases to be in
effect, in any defense rental area, if in his judgment the need for
continuing maximum rents in such area no longer exists due to
sufficient construction of new housing accommodations or when the
demand for rental housing accommodations has been otherwise
reasonably met."
[
Footnote 5]
See Commercial Trust Co. v. Miller, 262 U. S.
51,
262 U. S.
57.
[
Footnote 6]
See H.R.Rep. No. 317, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., pp. 1, 2,
3, 10-11.
The Report states, p. 2:
"There are several factors, in addition to the normal increase
in population, which have contributed to the existing housing
shortage. These include demobilization of a large number of
veterans, shifts in population, less intensive use of housing
accommodations, amount of new housing construction, trend away from
construction of rental units, and change from tenant to owner
occupancy."
As to the effect of demobilization of veterans, the Report
states, p. 2:
"Heavy demobilization of members of our armed forces,
particularly in late 1945 and the first half of 1946, made
effective an important demand for housing accommodations. In 1945,
an estimated 6,279,000 veterans of World War II were returned to
civilian life, in 1946, the number so returned was 5,659,000, and
in 1947 to February 28, an additional 212,000 veterans were
demobilized. Statistics are not available as to the number of new
family units created by returning veterans, but undoubtedly the
figure is substantial, and, in many cases, creation of new family
units was delayed until these veterans were returned to civilian
life. The importance and delayed impact of the 11,938,000 veterans
returned to civilian life in 1945 and 1946 on an already acute
housing shortage is readily apparent."
The effect of the war upon the construction of new dwelling
units is shown by the following table:
Total non-farm dwelling units constructed
1937. . . . . . . . 336,000 1943. . . . . . . . 350,000
1938. . . . . . . . 406,000 1944. . . . . . . . 169,000
1939. . . . . . . . 515,000 1945. . . . . . . . 247,000
1940. . . . . . . . 603,000 1946. . . . . . . . 776,200
1941. . . . . . . . 715,000 1947 (11 months). . 799,000
1942. . . . . . . . 497,000
The figures for the years 1937-1945 inclusive are taken from
H.R.Rep. No. 317,
supra, p. 3. Those for 1946 and 1947 are
taken from U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Construction, Dec.1947,
p. 4.
[
Footnote 7]
See H.R.Rep. No. 317,
supra, note 6 and statement of Representative
Wolcott, Chairman of the House Committee on Banking and Currency
which reported the rent bill, 93 Cong.Rec. 4395.
[
Footnote 8]
See note 4
supra.
[
Footnote 9]
Sec. 202(c) provides:
"The term 'controlled housing accommodations' means housing
accommodations in any defense rental area, except that it does not
include -- (1) those housing accommodations, in any establishment
which is commonly known as a hotel in the community in which it is
located, which are occupied by persons who are provided customary
hotel services such as maid service, furnishing and laundering of
linen, telephone and secretarial or desk service, use and upkeep of
furniture and fixtures, and bellboy service; or (2) any motor
court, or any part thereof; or any tourist home serving transient
guests exclusively, or any part thereof; or (3) any housing
accommodations (A) the construction of which was completed on or
after February 1, 1947, or which are additional housing
accommodations created by conversion on or after February 1, 1947,
except that contracts for the rental of housing accommodations to
veterans of World War II and their immediate families, the
construction of which was assisted by allocations or priorities
under Public Law 388, Seventy-ninth Congress, approved May 22,
1946, shall remain in full force and effect, or (B) which at no
time during the period February 1, 1945, to January 31, 1947, both
dates inclusive, were rented (other than to members of the
immediate family of the occupant) as housing accommodations."
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON, concurring.
I agree with the result in this case, but the arguments that
have been addressed to us lead me to utter more explicit misgivings
about war powers than the Court has done. The Government asserts no
constitutional basis for this legislation other than this vague,
undefined and undefinable "war power."
No one will question that this power is the most dangerous one
to free government in the whole catalogue of powers. It usually is
invoked in haste and excitement, when calm legislative
consideration of constitutional limitation is difficult. It is
executed in a time of patriotic fervor that makes moderation
unpopular. And, worst of all, it is interpreted by judges under the
influence of the same passions and pressures. Always, as in this
case, the Government urges hasty decision to forestall some
emergency or serve some purpose, and pleads that paralysis will
result if its claims to power are denied or their confirmation
delayed.
Particularly when the war power is invoked to do things to the
liberties of people, or to their property or economy that only
indirectly affect conduct of the war, and do not
Page 333 U. S. 147
relate to the management of the war itself, the constitutional
basis should be scrutinized with care.
I think we can hardly deny that the war power is as valid a
ground for federal rent control now as it has been at any time. We
still are technically in a state of war. I would not be willing to
hold that war powers may be indefinitely prolonged merely by
keeping legally alive a state of war that had, in fact, ended. I
cannot accept the argument that war powers last as long as the
effects and consequences of war, for, if so, they are permanent --
as permanent as the war debts. But I find no reason to conclude
that we could find fairly that the present state of war is merely
technical. We have armies abroad exercising our war power, and have
made no peace terms with our allies, not to mention our principal
enemies. I think the conclusion that the war power has been
applicable during the lifetime of this legislation is
unavoidable.