In a suit on a contract in a Federal District Court, each party
moved for a directed verdict. One party's motion was granted and
judgment was entered for him. The other party failed to move, as
authorized by Rule 50(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
to have the judgment set aside and judgment entered in accordance
with his own motion for a directed verdict. The Circuit Court of
Appeals reversed and remanded with directions to enter judgment for
the loser below.
Held:
1. The Circuit Court of Appeals erred in directing entry of such
a judgment.
Cone v. West Virginia Paper Co., 330 U.
S. 212. Pp.
332 U. S.
572-574.
2. Since the question whether the District Court should have
directed a verdict for petitioner depended upon a number of
factors, including an interpretation of the law of the state where
the contract was made, a proper interpretation of the pleadings, a
determination whether a disputed deposition was admitted in
evidence in whole or in part, and the effect of that evidence if
admitted, the case should be remanded to the District Court for a
new trial. P.
332 U. S.
574.
160 F.2d 800, affirmed in part and reversed in part.
The District Court directed a verdict and entered judgment for
petitioner. The Circuit Court of Appeals reversed. 160 F.2d 800.
This Court granted certiorari. 332 U.S. 756.
Affirmed in part
and reversed in part, p.
332 U. S.
574.
Page 332 U. S. 572
MR. JUSTICE BLACK delivered the opinion of the Court.
The petitioner, Globe Liquor Company, Inc., brought this act on
in Federal District Court against respondents, Frank and Dorothea
San Roman, doing business under the name of International
Industries. The complaint claimed damages for an alleged breach of
warranty in the sale of certain liquors. An answer was filed;
issues were appropriately joined. After all the evidence had been
introduced, each party requested a directed verdict. The
petitioner's motion was granted, verdict was returned in its favor,
and judgment was accordingly entered. The respondents then moved
for a new trial on the ground, among others, that there were many
contested issues of fact which should have been submitted to the
jury. They did not move for judgment under Rule 50(b) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides in part:
"Within 10 days after the reception of a verdict, a party who
has moved for a directed verdict may move to have the verdict and
any judgment entered thereon set aside and to have judgment entered
in accordance with his motion for a directed verdict. . . . A
motion for a new trial may be joined with this motion, or a new
trial may be prayed for, in the alternative. If a verdict was
returned, the court may allow the judgment to stand or may reopen
the judgment and either order a new trial or direct the entry of
judgment as if the requested verdict had been directed."
On appeal, the Circuit Court of Appeals not only set aside the
judgment in favor of the petitioner, but also remanded the case to
the District Court with directions to enter judgment for the
respondent. 160 F.2d 800. We granted certiorari, 332 U.S. 756, to
consider the apparent inconsistency between this latter action of
the Circuit Court of Appeals and our holding in
Cone v. West
Virginia Pulp and Paper Co., 330 U. S. 212.
In the
Cone case, we held that the Circuit Court of
Appeals was without power to order the entry of final judgment
Page 332 U. S. 573
for the loser of a jury verdict in the District Court where he
had failed to follow his motion for directed verdict with a timely
motion for judgment as required by Rule 50(b). We pointed out in
the
Cone case that Rule 50(b) vested district judges with
a discretion, under the circumstances outlined in the rule, to
choose between two alternatives: (1) reopening the judgment and
granting a new trial, and (2) ordering the entry of judgment as if
the losing party's request for directed verdict had been granted by
the trial judge.
It is urged that the reasons which supported the
Cone
decision are not relevant here, because, unlike the
Cone
case, the jury in this case returned its verdict under specific
directions of the trial judge. However significant this variance
between the two cases might be for some purposes, it is of no
importance here. By its terms, the rule applies equally to cases
where the verdict returned by the jury was not directed, as in the
Cone case, or was directed, as in this case.
Furthermore, the very circumstances which arose in this case
emphasize the importance of having the District Court first pass
upon whether its error should result in a new trial or in a
judgment finally ending the controversy. For there is here a
dispute between the parties whether all or certain parts of a
deposition containing important evidence were properly introduced
in the trial court. Both parties took the position in the Circuit
Court of Appeals that some, though different portions of the
deposition, were properly presented in evidence. The Circuit Court
of Appeals decided the case on the assumption that no part of the
deposition was ever admitted as evidence. In this Court,
respondents argue that no part of the deposition was ever read to
the jury, and therefore no part of it can be considered as
introduced in evidence. Whether this deposition or any part of it
was properly before the court, and, even if it were
Page 332 U. S. 574
not before the court, whether the ends of justice required that
a new trial be granted in order that the evidence it contained
might properly be offered, were questions which the petitioner was
entitled under Rule 50(b) to have passed upon in the first instance
by the trial court. What we said in the
Cone case is
peculiarly appropriate here:
"Determination of whether a new trial should be granted or a
judgment entered under Rule 50(b) calls for the judgment in the
first instance of the judge who saw and heard the witnesses and has
the feel of the case which no appellate printed transcript can
impart."
It was error, therefore, for the Circuit Court of Appeals to
direct the District Court to enter judgment for the
respondents.
Petitioner also strongly urges that the evidence in the District
Court was such that the trial judge was justified in directing a
verdict in its favor, and that the judgment resting on that verdict
should be reinstated. Whether a verdict should have been directed,
however, depends upon a number of factors, including an
interpretation of the law of Illinois, where the contract was made,
a proper interpretation of the pleadings, a determination whether
the disputed deposition was admitted in evidence in whole or in
part, and the effect of that evidence if admitted. Under these
circumstances, the judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals in
reversing and remanding the cause to the District Court is
affirmed. But, since the respondents made no motion for judgment
under Rule 50(b), it was error to direct the District Court to
enter a judgment in their favor. The case should go back to the
District Court for a new trial.
It is so ordered.