Companies engaged in catching and canning salmon in Alaska
terminated their agreement with the union representing their
employees at the end of the 1939 season. Prior to the beginning of
the 1940 season, they opened negotiations in San Francisco with the
same union for a new agreement. There ensued a controversy over
wages which resulted in a failure to reach an agreement and a
decision to conduct no operations during the 1940 season.
Individuals who had worked for the companies during the 1939 season
filed claims for unemployment benefits with the Alaska Unemployment
Compensation Commission. The Commission held that they were
disqualified from receiving payments for eight weeks under § 5(d)
of Alaska Extra.Sess. L., 1937, c. 4, as amended by Alaska Sess.
L., 1939, cc. 1, 51, which disqualifies an individual for eight
weeks if "the Commission finds that his . . . unemployment is due
to a labor dispute which is in active progress at the factory,
establishment or other premises at which he . . . was last
employed."
Held:
1. The Commission could properly find that a "labor dispute"
existed within the meaning of § 5(d) of the Alaska Act. Pp.
329 U. S.
149-151.
2. The term "labor dispute," as used in § 5(d) of the Alaska
Act, need not be narrowly construed to require a strike or leaving
of employment, but may be construed as covering a situation where
the controversy precedes the employment. Pp.
329 U. S.
149-151.
3. Evidence that two of the companies had made extensive
preparations for the 1940 operations, purchasing equipment and
supplies, preparing ships and holding them in readiness for the
expedition, and that they negotiated in good faith and failed to
operate only because of their inability to negotiate satisfactory
labor agreements before the beginning of the season, was sufficient
to support the Commission's finding that their unemployment was
"due" to a labor dispute. Pp.
329 U. S.
149-151.
4. Evidence showing,
inter alia, that the withdrawal of
another company from negotiations with the union and its
determination
Page 329 U. S. 144
not to operate during the 1940 season occurred prior to the
deadline for its operations and was caused primarily by factors
other than its inability to negotiate a satisfactory labor contract
did not support a finding by the Commission that its employees were
unemployed "due" to a labor dispute at the establishment at which
they were last employed. Pp.
329 U. S.
152-153.
5. Where the negotiations continued beyond the deadline dates
set by the companies for the consummation of an agreement and
beyond the dates of the applications for unemployment benefits, the
Commission could properly find that a labor dispute was in "active
progress" within the meaning of § 5(d) of the Alaska Act, even if
it be assumed that at some time within the eight-week period of
disqualification the point was reached when all possibility of
settlement disappeared. P.
329 U. S. 153.
(a) The question is one of specific application of a broad
statutory term in a proceeding in which the agency administering
the statute must determine it initially. P.
329 U. S.
153.
(b) The reviewing court's function is limited, and all that is
needed to support the Commission's interpretation is that it has
"warrant in the record" and a "reasonable basis in law." Pp.
329 U. S.
153-154.
6. This Court is unable to say that the Commission's
construction was irrational or without support in the record, since
the Commission might reasonably conclude that the unemployment was
not of the "involuntary" nature which the statute was designed to
alleviate. P.
329 U. S.
154.
7. The fact that, in accordance with the usual procedure, the
wage negotiations were conducted in San Francisco and Seattle,
instead of at the place of work in Alaska, did not prevent the
dispute from being "at the factory, establishment, or other
premises" within the meaning of § 5(d) of the Alaska Act. Pp.
329 U. S.
154-156.
8. A reviewing court usurps the administrative agency's function
when it sets aside an administrative determination on a ground not
theretofore presented and deprives the agency of an opportunity to
consider the matter, make its ruling, and state the reasons for its
action -- where the statute provides that judicial review is
permitted only after exhaustion of administrative remedies. P.
329 U. S.
155.
149 F.2d 447 affirmed in part, reversed in part.
The Unemployment Compensation Commission of Alaska held certain
employees of salmon canneries disqualified for eight weeks from
receiving unemployment
Page 329 U. S. 145
compensation benefits, on the ground that their unemployment was
due to a "labor dispute" within the meaning of the Alaska
Unemployment Compensation Law, Alaska Extra.Sess. L., 1937, c. 4,
as amended by Alaska Sess.L., 1939, cc. 1, 51. The District Court
affirmed the Commission's holding. The Circuit Court of Appeals
reversed. 149 F.2d 447. This Court granted certiorari. 326 U.S.
700. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. P.
329 U. S. 156.
THE CHIEF JUSTICE delivered the opinion of the Court.
In May, 1940, the individual respondents filed claims for
unemployment benefits with the Unemployment Compensation Commission
of the Territory of Alaska. After an initial determination by an
examiner and after decision by a referee, the Commission held that
the claimants were disqualified from receiving benefits for a
period of eight weeks, since their unemployment was due to a labor
dispute in active progress within the meaning of the Alaska
Unemployment Compensation Law. [
Footnote 1] The United States District Court affirmed the
Commission's holding in all particulars. The Circuit Court of
Appeals reversed, one judge dissenting. We granted certiorari
because of the public importance of the questions involved.
[
Footnote 2]
Page 329 U. S. 146
Among the petitioners are three corporations engaged principally
in the business of salmon fishing, canning, and marketing. One of
the companies owns canneries and other facilities at Karluk,
Chignik, and Bristol Bay, Alaska. The other two companies operate
only at Bristol Bay. Catching and canning salmon is a seasonal
activity. [
Footnote 3] The
companies customarily hire workers at San Francisco at the
beginning of the season, transport them to the Alaskan
establishments, and return them to San Francisco at the season's
end. Similar operations are carried on by other companies out of
other west coast ports, notably Seattle and Portland. The
individual respondents are all members of the Alaska Cannery
Workers Union Local No. 5, and each worked in Alaska for one of the
three companies during the 1939 season. Local No. 5 is the
recognized bargaining agent of the cannery workers in the San
Francisco area.
In 1939, as had been the practice for some years, the union
entered into a written agreement with the companies covering in
considerable detail the matters of wages, hours, conditions of
employment, and the like. After the end of the 1939 season, the
companies terminated the agreement then in effect, which made
necessary the negotiation of a new contract for the 1940 season.
Consequently, on March 6, 1940, the companies through their
authorized agent, Alaska Salmon Industry, Inc., invited the union
to enter into negotiations for a new agreement. In a series of
meetings held shortly thereafter, serious disagreement
Page 329 U. S. 147
appeared which quickly developed into an impasse on the question
of wages. The union demanded wages equal to or in excess of those
paid under the terms of the 1939 agreement. The companies offered
wages which, for the most part, were below those paid in 1939. On
April 1, 1940, the union caused the negotiations as to the wage
issue to be transferred from San Francisco to Seattle, where an
attempt was being made to effect a coastwide agreement to cover all
west coast companies carrying on salmon operations in Alaska. Local
No. 5, however, refused to sign a "memorandum" agreement
incorporating such terms as might result from the concurrent
Seattle negotiations.
On April 3, the companies notified the union that, if operations
were to be carried on in Karluk and Chignik during the 1940 season,
an agreement with respect to the former would have to be reached by
April 10 and with respect to the latter by April 12. Although
negotiations proceeded up to the deadlines, the parties arrived at
no understanding, and on April 22, Alaska Salmon Industry, Inc.,
formally announced that no operations would be carried on in Karluk
and Chignik during 1940. Meetings continued, however, in an effort
to come to an understanding with respect to Bristol Bay before the
arrival of the May 3d deadline which had been set for those
operations. Although federal mediators intervened in an attempt to
discover a suitable compromise, the deadline date passed without
agreement. It appears that, after May 3, negotiations continued in
Seattle, where a contract affecting only canners and workers
operating out of ports other than San Francisco was finally
executed on May 29. The companies and union which are involved in
this case were specifically excluded from the terms of the 1940
Seattle agreement.
Shortly after May 3, the individual respondents filed claims for
unemployment benefits with the Alaska Unemployment
Page 329 U. S. 148
Compensation Commission. The Commission, acting through an
examiner, held that respondents were disqualified from receiving
payments for the statutory period of eight weeks under the
provisions of § 5(d) of the Alaska law. At the time this case
arose, that section stated in part:
"An individual shall be disqualified for benefits . . . (d) For
any week with respect to which the Commission finds that his total
or partial unemployment is due to a labor dispute which is in
active progress at the factory, establishment, or other premises at
which he is or was last employed; provided, that such
disqualification shall not exceed the 8 weeks immediately following
the beginning of such dispute. . . ."
In pursuance of the appeal provisions of the statute, [
Footnote 4] respondents asked for a
review of the examiner's determination. The Commission, in response
to this application, appointed a Referee to pass on the disputed
claims. The scope of the hearings was confined to the issue of
whether the unemployment of the claimants was caused by the
existence of a labor dispute. At the end of the proceedings, the
Referee came to the conclusion that, although there was a labor
dispute in existence initially, the dispute was no longer "in
active progress" after the passing of the dates fixed by the
companies for consummation of the working agreements. Consequently,
the disqualification under § 5(d) with respect to each of the
localities was held no longer to attach after the passage of the
respective deadline dates. [
Footnote 5]
Page 329 U. S. 149
The Commission, on appeal, [
Footnote 6] reversed the Referee's decision and held that,
within the meaning of the Alaska law, a labor dispute was in active
progress throughout the entire eight-week statutory period of
disqualification beginning with the opening of the season in each
locality. Consequently, no benefits were payable until the
expiration of the disqualification period. The United States
District Court affirmed the Commission's decision in all
particulars. [
Footnote 7] The
Circuit Court of Appeals, with one judge dissenting, reversed,
however, on the ground that the labor dispute was not physically at
the Alaska canneries where the individual respondents had been last
employed.
We are met at the outset with the contention that the facts of
this case do not present a "labor dispute" within the meaning of §
5(d) of the Alaska Act. Respondents urge that the term must be
narrowly construed to require a strike or leaving of employment,
which, in turn, calls for a presently existing employment relation
at the time the dispute arises. [
Footnote 8] According to this view, the term
Page 329 U. S. 150
would not cover a situation, such as presented here, where the
controversy precedes the employment. Respondents would justify this
restricted construction on the ground that the Unemployment
Compensation Law is remedial legislation, and any provision
limiting benefits under the Act should be narrowly interpreted.
The term "labor dispute" is not defined in the statute. The term
appears in the Act in one other connection, however. Section
5(c)(2)(A) provides that benefits under the Act will not be denied
any individual, otherwise eligible, who refuses to accept new work
"if the position offered is vacant due directly to a strike,
lockout, or other labor dispute." The Social Security Act of 1935
[
Footnote 9] requires that the
state or territorial law contain a provision to this effect before
the legislation can be approved by the Social Security Board.
Obviously, for the purposes of § 5(c)(2)(A), the term, "labor
dispute," has a broader meaning than that attributed to it by
respondents. Unless the Territorial Legislature intended to give a
different meaning to the same language appearing in another
subdivision of the same section, the term must be given a broader
meaning than that contended for by the respondents, for the
purposes of § 5(d) as well. We need not determine whether "labor
dispute" must in all cases be construed as broadly as it is defined
in the Norris-LaGuardia Act, [
Footnote 10] and the
Page 329 U. S. 151
National Labor Relations Act. [
Footnote 11] But here, there was full-scale controversy.
Companies engaged in carrying on a seasonal business were ranged
against a union representing seasonal workers who had been employed
by the companies in the previous year. Dispute there certainly was,
and the subject of that dispute consisted of matters usually
contested in labor disputes as that term is normally understood.
[
Footnote 12] Since we find
nothing to indicate that the Territorial Legislature intended a
contrary result, we conclude that the Commission might properly
find a "labor dispute" here presented within the meaning of § 5(d)
of the Alaska Act.
We think that there is evidence in the record to support the
Commission's conclusion that respondents' unemployment was "due" to
a labor dispute insofar as that holding relates to the individual
respondents employed in 1939 by the Alaska Packers Association and
the Red Salmon Canning Company. At the hearings before the Referee,
the respondents attempted to establish that the companies called
off their 1940 operations for reasons other than their inability to
negotiate a satisfactory labor agreement. It was argued, for
example, that the companies feared a poor catch as a result of
governmental restrictions on fishing applicable to the 1940 season.
The evidence adduced
Page 329 U. S. 152
before the Referee indicates that both of the above-mentioned
companies made extensive preparations for the 1940 operations. In
anticipation, equipment and supplies of the value of several
hundred thousand dollars were purchased. Ships were prepared and
held in readiness for the expeditions. The Referee found that these
companies negotiated in good faith, and failed to operate in Alaska
during the 1940 season only because of their inability to negotiate
satisfactory labor agreements before the passing of the deadline
dates. There is evidence that the Alaska Packers Association
expected to hire about two-thirds the number of workers in 1940 it
had employed in 1939. But there is nothing in the record to
establish that any of the claimants in this action would have been
unemployed as a result of this contemplated curtailment in activity
or, if any of the respondents would have been affected, which of
their number would have been unemployed. It appears that the Red
Salmon Canning Company expected to use the same number of workers
in 1940 as in 1939, or possibly a few more. Under these
circumstances, we think that the Commission's finding that the
unemployment was "due" to the labor dispute should stand insofar as
it relates to the claimants indicated.
But a different situation is presented with reference to the
respondents employed by the Alaska Salmon Company in 1939. That
company has an establishment only at Bristol Bay. On April 30,
three days before the deadline relating to the Bristol Bay
operations, Alaska Salmon withdrew from the negotiations with the
union and announced that it was unable to send an expedition to
Alaska in 1940. The Referee found that the withdrawal was caused
primarily by factors other than the company's inability to
negotiate a satisfactory labor contract. At the hearings before the
Referee, counsel for the company stipulated that, even though the
other companies had negotiated a labor agreement with the union
before the deadline
Page 329 U. S. 153
date, Alaska Salmon would have conducted no operations out of
San Francisco in 1940 after its withdrawal from negotiations. We
conclude that the record does not support the finding of the
Commission that the respondents employed by the Alaska Salmon
Company in 1939 were unemployed "due" to a labor dispute at the
establishment at which last employed.
Respondents urge that, assuming their unemployment was due to a
labor dispute, there was no labor dispute in "active progress"
within the meaning of the Act after the passage of the deadline
dates. It is argued that, when the expeditions were abandoned by
the companies, the dispute must necessarily have terminated, since
there was no possible way in which negotiations could have brought
about a settlement. It should be observed, however, that the record
does not reveal that negotiations abruptly terminated with the
passing of the last deadline date. Conferences continued at Seattle
in which both the companies and the union were represented. The
respondents considered the negotiations sufficiently alive to make
an offer of terms at least as late as May 29. Even if it be assumed
that, at some time within the eight-week period of
disqualification, the point was reached when all possibility of
settlement disappeared, it does not follow that the Commission's
finding of a dispute in "active progress" must be overturned. Here,
as in
Labor Board v. Hearst Publications, Inc.,
322 U. S. 111,
322 U. S. 131,
the question presented "is one of specific application of a broad
statutory term in a proceeding in which the agency administering
the statute must determine it initially." To sustain the
Commission's application of this statutory term, we need not find
that its construction is the only reasonable one, or even that it
is the result we would have reached had the question arisen in the
first instance in judicial proceedings. The "reviewing court's
function is limited." All that is needed to support the
Commission's interpretation is that it has
Page 329 U. S. 154
"warrant in the record" and a "reasonable basis in law."
Labor Board v. Hearst Publications, Inc., supra; Rochester
Telephone Corp. v. United States, 307 U.
S. 125.
Applying these tests, we are unable to say that the Commission's
construction was irrational or without support in the record. The
Commission apparently views a dispute as "active" during the
continuance of a work stoppage induced by a labor dispute. That
agency might reasonably conclude that the unemployment resulting
from such work stoppage is not of the "involuntary" nature which
the statute was designed to alleviate, as indicated by the
statement of public policy incorporated in the Act by the
Territorial Legislature. [
Footnote 13] We see nothing in such a view to require our
substituting a different construction from that made by the
Commission entrusted with the responsibility of administering the
statute. [
Footnote 14]
Nor can we accept the argument of the majority of the Court of
Appeals that, since negotiations between the companies and the
workers were carried on in San Francisco and Seattle, the dispute
could not be said to be "at" the
Page 329 U. S. 155
Alaskan establishments as required by the statute. So far as we
are able to determine, this issue was injected for the first time
by the opinion of the majority of the Court of Appeals. The
contention does not seem to have been raised or pressed by
respondents up to that point. The responsibility of applying the
statutory provisions to the facts of the particular case was given
in the first instance to the Commission. A reviewing court usurps
the agency's function when it sets aside the administrative
determination upon a ground not theretofore presented, and deprives
the Commission of an opportunity to consider the matter, make its
ruling, and state the reasons for its action. [
Footnote 15] Nor do we find the argument
advanced below convincing on its merits. It is clear that the
subject matter of the dispute related to the operation of the
Alaskan establishments. As a result of the dispute, the normal
activities involved in catching and canning salmon were not carried
on throughout the 1940 season at any of those establishments. We do
not consider significant the fact that the companies and the union
did not negotiate at the canneries or on the ships in Alaskan
waters. A legislature familiar with the nature of seasonal
operations carried on in the Territory could hardly have been
unaware of the fact that companies and workers customarily carried
on negotiations far distant from the Alaskan establishments. It
seems unlikely that it was intended that this ordinary and usual
procedure should defeat the disqualification for benefits
incorporated in the Act. Furthermore, it should be observed that
the respondent union
Page 329 U. S. 156
voluntarily entered into the negotiations conducted at San
Francisco and Seattle, and at no time challenged the propriety of
this practice. Thus, if we assume with respondents that this issue
is properly presented for consideration, we conclude that, under
the circumstances of this case, the dispute was "at the factory,
establishment, or other premises" in the sense intended by the
Territorial Legislature.
For the reasons stated, the judgment of the Circuit Court of
Appeals is affirmed insofar as it holds that the statutory
eight-week period of disqualification is inapplicable to the
individual respondents employed by the Alaska Salmon Company in
1939. In all other particulars, the judgment of the Circuit Court
of Appeals is reversed, and the case remanded to the District Court
with instructions to remand for further proceedings pursuant to
this opinion.
[
Footnote 1]
Extraordinary Session Laws of Alaska, 1937, Chapter 4, as
amended by Chapters 1 and 51, Session Laws of Alaska, 1939.
[
Footnote 2]
The Alaska statute is part of the legislative scheme for
unemployment compensation induced by the provisions of the Social
Security Act of 1935. 49 Stat. 620, 626-627, 640. It is said that
forty-three states and territories have provisions similar to those
in the Alaska law disqualifying from unemployment benefits persons
unemployed due to a labor dispute.
[
Footnote 3]
As provided by Benefit Regulation No. 10 of the Alaska
Unemployment Compensation Commission, the season at Karluk extends
from April 5 to September 5 at Chignik from April 1 to September
10, and at Bristol Bay from May 5 to August 25.
[
Footnote 4]
Section 6(c) and § 6(d). Chapter 1, Session Laws of Alaska,
1939.
[
Footnote 5]
The Referee found that there had been unemployment due to a
labor dispute in active progress at Karluk from April 5, when the
season opened, to April 10, the deadline date, and at Chignik from
April 1 to April 12. Since the deadline date with respect to
Bristol Bay was set two days before the season opened there, the
Referee found that there was no dispute in active progress at those
plants.
[
Footnote 6]
This procedure was in pursuance of § 6(e) of the Act as amended
by Chapter 1, Session Laws of Alaska, 1939.
[
Footnote 7]
Section 6(i) of the Act provides that, within thirty days after
the decision of the Commission has become final, any party
aggrieved may secure judicial review in the United States District
Court. The section states,
"In any judicial proceeding under this Section, the findings of
the Commission as to the facts, if supported by evidence and in the
absence of fraud, shall be conclusive, and the jurisdiction of said
Court shall be confined to questions of law."
[
Footnote 8]
A number of state courts, in construing similar legislation,
have found "labor disputes" to have existed in situations where no
contractual employment relation presently existed. Each of these
cases involved a work stoppage in the interval between the
expiration of an old labor contract and the consummation of a new
agreement.
Miners in General Group v. Hix, 123 W.Va. 637,
17 S.E.2d 810;
Ex parte Pesnell, 240 Ala. 457, 199 So.
726;
Barnes v. Hall, 285 Ky. 160, 146 S.W.2d 929;
Block Coal & Coke Co. v. United Mine Workers of
America, 177 Tenn. 247, 148 S.W.2d 364, 149 S.W.2d 469;
Sandoval v. Industrial Comm'n, 110 Colo. 108, 130 P.2d
930.
[
Footnote 9]
49 Stat. 640, 26 U.S.C. § 1603(5)(A).
[
Footnote 10]
47 Stat. 70, 29 U.S.C. § 101. The Norris-LaGuardia Act contains
the following definition:
"The term 'labor dispute' includes any controversy concerning
terms or conditions of employment, or concerning the association or
representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining,
changing, or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of employment,
regardless of whether or not the disputants stand in the proximate
relation of employer and employee."
47 Stat. 73, 29 U.S.C. § 113(c). A number of state courts have
found this and the similar definition in the National Labor
Relations Act persuasive in their construction of the term
appearing in unemployment compensation legislation similar to the
Alaska Act.
Miners in General Group v. Hix, 123 W.Va. 637,
17 S.E.2d 810;
Barnes v. Hall, 285 Ky. 160, 146 S.W.2d
929;
Ex parte Pesnell, 240 Ala. 457, 199 So. 726;
Sandoval v. Industrial Comm'n, 110 Colo. 108, 130 P.2d
930. The Alabama legislature incorporated the definition appearing
in the Norris-LaGuardia Act into the Alabama unemployment
compensation act. Ala.Code, Tit. 26 § 214(A).
[
Footnote 11]
49 Stat. 449, 29 U.S.C. § 151.
[
Footnote 12]
The Examiner, the Referee, the Commission, the District Court,
and presumably the Circuit Court of Appeals all found a "labor
dispute" to have existed at least before the arrival of the
deadline dates.
[
Footnote 13]
The "Declaration of Territorial Public Policy" states that
"Involuntary unemployment is . . . a subject of general interest
and concern which requires appropriate action by the legislature."
It is further stated that the public welfare demands the compulsory
setting aside of unemployment reserves "for the benefit of persons
unemployed through no fault of their own." Chapter 4, Extraordinary
Session Laws of Alaska, 1937.
Several state courts have concluded that the disqualification
relating to unemployment due to a labor dispute is a reflection of
the broad policy of the legislation to compensate only persons
involuntarily unemployed.
Barnes v. Hall, 285 Ky. 160, 146
S.W.2d 929;
Deshler Broom Factory v. Kinney, 140 Neb. 889,
2 N.W.2d 332;
Sandoval v. Industrial Commission, 110 Colo.
108, 130 P.2d 930.
[
Footnote 14]
Labor Board v. Hearst Publications, supra; Rochester
Telephone Corp. v. United States, supra. Cf. Social
Security Board v. Nierotko, 327 U. S. 358.
[
Footnote 15]
Section 6(h) of the Act states that judicial review of the
Commission's decision "shall be permitted only after any party
claiming to be aggrieved thereby has exhausted his administrative
remedies as provided in the Act."
Cf. Myers v. Bethlehem
Shipbuilding Co., 303 U. S. 41,
303 U. S. 50-51;
Regal Knitwear Co. v. Labor Board, 324 U. S.
9,
324 U. S. 13;
Phelps Dodge Corp. v. Labor Board, 313 U.
S. 177,
313 U. S.
196-197.