1. A State can not, consistently with the freedom of religion
and the press guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments,
impose criminal punishment upon a person engaged in religious
activities and distributing religious literature in a village owned
by the United States under a Congressional program designed to
provide housing for workers engaged in national defense activities,
where the village is freely accessible and open to the public and
has all the characteristics of a typical American town, even though
the punishment is attempted under a state statute making it
unlawful for any "peddler or hawker of goods or merchandise"
willfully to refuse to leave the premises after having been
notified to do so by the owner or possessor thereof. P.
326 U. S.
519.
2. Neither the Federal Housing Act nor the Housing Authority
Regulations indicate a purpose to restrict freedom of religion and
of the press within villages such as the one here involved. P.
326 U. S.
520.
3. A judgment of an intermediate state court sustaining a state
statute challenged as repugnant to the Federal Constitution is
reviewable here under § 237(a) of the Judicial Code, where such
intermediate court is the highest court of the State in which a
decision in the case could be had. P.
326 U. S.
518.
Reversed.
Appeal from a judgment sustaining a conviction for violation of
a state statute challenged as invalid under the Federal
Constitution.
Page 326 U. S. 518
MR. JUSTICE BLACK delivered the opinion of the Court.
The appellant was charged in the Justice Court of Medina County,
Texas, with violating Article 479, Chap. 3 of the Texas Penal Code,
which makes it an offense for any "peddler or hawker of goods or
merchandise" willfully to refuse to leave premises after having
been notified to do so by the owner or possessor thereof. The
appellant urged in his defense that he was not peddler or hawker of
merchandise, but a minister of the gospel engaged in the
distribution of religious literature to willing recipients. He
contended that to construe the Texas statute as applicable to his
activities would, to that extent, bring it into conflict with the
Constitutional guarantees of freedom of press and religion. His
contention was rejected, and he was convicted. On appeal to the
Medina County Court, his Constitutional contention was again
overruled. Since he could not appeal to a higher state court, this
appeal under Sec. 237(a) of the Judicial Code, 28 U.S.C. 344(a), is
properly before us.
Largent v. Texas, 318 U.
S. 418.
The facts shown by the record need be but briefly stated.
Appellant is an ordained minister of the group known as Jehovah's
Witnesses. In accordance with the practices of this group, he calls
on people from door to door, presents his religious views to those
willing to listen, and distributes religious literature to those
willing to receive it. In the course of his work, he went to the
Hondo Navigation Village located in Medina County, Texas. The
village is owned by the United States under a Congressional program
which was designed to provide housing for persons engaged in
National Defense activities. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1521-1553. According to
all indications, the
Page 326 U. S. 519
village was freely accessible and open to the public, and had
the characteristics of a typical American town. The Federal Public
Housing Authority had placed the buildings in charge of a manager
whose duty it was to rent the houses, collect the rents, and
generally to supervise operations, subject to over-all control by
the Authority. He ordered appellant to discontinue all religious
activities in the village. Appellant refused. Later the manager
ordered appellant to leave the village. Insisting that the manager
had no right to suppress religious activities, appellant declined
to leave, and his arrest followed. At the trial, the manager
testified that the controlling Federal agency had given him full
authority to regulate the conduct of those living in the village,
and that he did not allow preaching by ministers of any
denomination without a permit issued by him in his discretion. He
thought this broad authority was entrusted to him at least in part,
by a regulation, which the Authority's Washington office had
allegedly promulgated. He testified that this regulation provided
that no peddlers or hawkers could come into or remain in the
village without getting permission from the manager.
326 U.
S. we accept their holding in this respect for the
purposes of this appeal.
The foregoing statement of facts shows their close similarity to
the facts which led us this day to decide, in
Marsh v. Alabama,
ante, p.
326 U. S. 501,
that managers of a company-owned town could not bar all
distribution of religious literature within the town, or condition
distribution upon a permit issued at the discretion of its
management.
Page 326 U. S. 520
The only difference between this case and
Marsh v.
Alabama is that here, instead of a private corporation, the
Federal Government owns and operates the village. This difference
does not affect the result. Certainly neither Congress nor Federal
agencies acting pursuant to Congressional authorization may abridge
the freedom of press and religion safeguarded by the First
Amendment. True, under certain circumstances, it might be proper
for security reasons to isolate the inhabitants of a settlement,
such as Hondo Village, which houses workers engaged in producing
war materials. But no such necessity and no such intention on the
part of Congress or the Public Housing Authority are shown
here.
It follows from what we have said that, to the extent that the
Texas statute was held to authorize appellant's punishment for
refusing to refrain from religious activities in Hondo Village, it
is an invalid abridgement of the freedom of press and religion.
We think it only proper to add that neither the Housing Act
passed by Congress nor the Housing Authority Regulations contain
language indicating a purpose to bar freedom of press and religion
within villages such as the one here involved. The case is
reversed, and the cause remanded for further proceedings not
inconsistent with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON took no part in the consideration or
decision of this case.
|
326
U.S. 517|
* The available Regulations of the Authority, of which we can
take judicial notice,
Bowles v. United States,
319 U. S. 33,
319 U. S. 35, do
not show a regulation of this kind.
MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER, concurring.
It will be time enough to consider the constitutionality of an
Act of Congress that is claimed to be in defiance of the First
Amendment when such legislation by Congress confronts us with the
problem. The present case does not present such a situation.
Subject to this reservation, I
Page 326 U. S. 521
agree with the opinion of the Court for the reasons briefly
stated in
Marsh v. Alabama, ante, p.
326 U. S. 501. In
the case of communities established under the sponsorship of the
United States by virtue of its pending power, it would, I should
think, be even less desirable than in the case of company towns to
make the constitutional freedoms of religion and speech turn on
gossamer distinctions about the extent to which land has been
"dedicated" to public uses.
THE CHIEF JUSTICE, MR. JUSTICE REED and MR. JUSTICE BURTON,
dissenting.
THE CHIEF JUSTICE, MR. JUSTICE REED, and MR. JUSTICE BURTON
construe the record in this case as showing a conviction for
refusing at the request of its authorized agent, to leave premises
which are owned by the United States and which have not been shown
to be dedicated to general use by the public. We therefore would
affirm the conviction for the reasons given in the dissent in
Marsh v. Alabama, ante, p.
326 U. S. 501.