The records in these cases under the Federal Employers'
Liability Act being ambiguous as to whether the state court
judgments of dismissal rest on a federal ground or on an adequate
state ground, it is appropriate in the circumstances that the
causes be continued for such period as will enable counsel for
petitioners with all convenient speed to apply to the state court
for amendment, or certificate, which will show whether that court
intended to rest the judgments on an adequate and independent state
ground or whether decision of the federal question was necessary to
the judgments rendered. P.
324 U. S. 128.
384 Ill. 237, 281, 51 N.E.2d 277, 282, considered.
Certiorari, 321 U.S. 759, to review judgments affirming
dismissals of two suits under the Federal Employers' Liability
Act.
Page 324 U. S. 118
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON delivered the opinion of the Court.
Each of these petitioners has made an abortive attempt to
maintain an action in a City Court of Illinois on a cause of action
alleged under the Federal Employers' Liability Act. As their calls
upon us for relief present the same questions, in granting
certiorari, we consolidated the cases for argument. 321 U.S.
759.
Herb alleged injury while employed as a switchman on the Wabash
Railroad at or near the City of Decatur, Mason County, Illinois, on
November 23, 1936. He filed complaint under the Federal Act in the
City Court of Granite City, Madison County, Illinois, in December
of 1937. A verdict of $30,000 was returned, which the trial court
set aside. Further proceedings in the Appellate Court and the
Supreme Court resulted in remand to the City Court. 377 Ill. 405,
36 N.E.2d 555. On March 16, 1942, in other cases, the Supreme Court
of Illinois decided that, under the Illinois Constitution, a city
court is without jurisdiction in any case where the cause of action
arose outside the city where the court is located.
Werner v.
Illinois Central R. Co., 379 Ill. 559, 42 N.E.2d 82;
Mitchell v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 379 Ill. 522, 42
N.E.2d 86. When these decisions were rendered, plaintiff moved in
the City Court for a change of venue, under the Illinois Venue
Statute, to the Circuit Court of Madison County, a court of general
jurisdiction. Meanwhile the two-year period within which an action
could be instituted under the Employers' Liability Act had long
expired. The motion for change of venue was granted, and the papers
certified and transferred accordingly. The defendant, limiting
appearance for the sole and only purpose of the motion, moved, in
the Circuit Court, to dismiss on the grounds that the City Court
had no jurisdiction either to entertain or to transfer the case;
that, since all proceedings theretofore were utterly
Page 324 U. S. 119
void, no action was pending or properly commenced by the City
Court process, nor by the transfer; that, since no action had been
commenced in a court of competent jurisdiction, any right under the
Federal Act had expired by its limitation, which provided that "No
action shall be maintained under this Act unless commenced within
two years from the day the cause of action accrued." 35 Stat. 66,
45 U.S.C. § 56. [
Footnote 1]
The Circuit Court granted the motion to dismiss, and the Supreme
Court of Illinois affirmed. Its affirmance is here claimed to
involve a federal question, erroneously decided.
Belcher alleged that he was a switchman on the Louisville &
Nashville Railroad in its yards at Nashville, Tennessee, where he
was injured on February 15, 1939. He filed his complaint on June
22, 1940, in the City Court of East St. Louis, Illinois. The answer
joined issue generally and pleaded a release and satisfaction.
Reply admitted execution in Nashville, Tennessee, of the document
which defendant pleaded, but set up facts in avoidance. On trial, a
verdict of $20,000 was returned. The trial court set it aside,
holding that the evidence did not warrant the verdict. This was on
September 18, 1941, and at this stage of the litigation the Supreme
Court of Illinois handed down its decisions of March 16, 1942
holding city courts without jurisdiction of causes arising outside
their territorial jurisdiction. The plaintiff moved in City Court
that venue be changed to Circuit Court of St. Clair County,
Illinois, and the motion was granted. The statute of limitations on
the commencement of the action at this
Page 324 U. S. 120
time had run. Defendant made appearance limited to the purpose
of moving to dismiss. The case was dismissed by the Circuit Court,
and the dismissal was sustained by the Supreme Court of Illinois,
in an opinion which adopted the opinion in the companion case.
First. Whether any case is pending in the Illinois
courts is a question to be determined by Illinois law, as
interpreted by the Illinois Supreme Court. For, as we have said of
the Federal Employers' Liability Act,
"we deem it well to observe that there is not here involved any
attempt by Congress to enlarge or regulate the jurisdiction of
state courts, or to control or affect their modes of procedure, but
only a question of the duty of such a court, when its ordinary
jurisdiction, as prescribed by local laws, is appropriate to the
occasion, and is invoked in conformity with those laws, to take
cognizance of an action to enforce a right of civil recovery
arising under the act of Congress, and susceptible of adjudication
according to the prevailing rules of procedure."
Mondou v. New York, N.H. & H. R. Co., 223 U. S.
1,
223 U. S.
56-57.
"As to the grant of jurisdiction in the Employers' Liability
Act, that statute does not purport to require State Courts to
entertain suits arising under it, but only to empower them to do
so, so far as the authority of the United States is concerned. . .
. But there is nothing in the Act of Congress that purports to
force a duty upon such Courts as against an otherwise valid
excuse."
Douglas v. New York, N.H. & H. R. Co., 279 U.
S. 377,
279 U. S.
387-388.
And see Chambers v. Baltimore & Ohio R.
Co., 207 U. S. 142,
207 U. S.
148-149;
St. Louis I.M. & S. R. Co. v.
Taylor, 210 U. S. 281;
John v. Paullin, 231 U. S. 583.
The plight of petitioners is not due to any failure of the State
of Illinois to provide forums adequate for the hearing of their
cases under the federal statute. The state provides a system of
circuit courts sitting in each of its
Page 324 U. S. 121
counties which have general and unlimited original jurisdiction
at law and in equity. These were open to the petitioners, but they
chose instead to file their complaints in city courts. It would not
be open for us to say that the state, in setting up a local court,
could not limit its jurisdiction to actions arising within the city
for which it is established.
When the Supreme Court held these courts without jurisdiction,
plaintiffs moved in City Court under the Illinois Venue Act,
Illinois Revised Statutes, 1941, ch. 146, § 36, to change venue to
the Circuit Court. The City Courts granted the motion and
transferred the papers to the Circuit Court. The defendants were
served with no process issuing from the Circuit Court, entered no
general appearance in Circuit Court. Instead, appearing specially,
they moved to dismiss. In each case, the motion was grounded in a
complete absence of jurisdiction in the City Courts to begin, hear,
or transfer the case. Each defendant denied that the Venue Act gave
any power to the City Court to transfer, and each claimed that, if
it did, it would be unconstitutional under the State Constitution.
Both also asserted that the federal statute of limitations had run
at the time of purported change of venue because no suit had been
"commenced" in City Court within its meaning.
The Supreme Court of Illinois did not decide whether, under the
State Constitution, the Venue Act was unconstitutional, apparently
because it held the Act not to apply. It pointed out that
"both the subject matter and the parties must be before the
court, and jurisdiction of the one without the other will not
suffice; the two must concur or the judgment will be void in any
case in which the court assumes to act."
The Circuit Court had served no summons on defendants, and they
made no general appearance therein. On the other hand, the City
Court admittedly had no jurisdiction of the subject matter. The
Page 324 U. S. 122
Supreme Court used language which can mean that no valid
proceeding was pending in either court as a matter of state law.
[
Footnote 2] We think that the
Supreme Court probably has decided that as matter of Illinois law
no action is pending against these defendants in any court, and
that all of the proceedings have been of no effect whatever.
Page 324 U. S. 123
The freedom of the state courts so to decide is, of course,
subject to the qualification that the cause of action must not be
discriminated against because it is a federal one.
McKnett v.
St. Louis & S.F. R. Co., 292 U. S. 230. But
we cannot say that the court below, insofar as it did hold the city
courts without power, construed the state jurisdiction and venue
laws in a discriminatory fashion. In
Central Illinois Public
Service Co. v. Industrial Commission, 293 Ill. 62, 127 N.E.
80, and
Gill v. Lynch, 367 Ill. 203, 10 N.E.2d 812, which
are cited to us by petitioners, the Illinois court did uphold the
power of one court to transfer a cause to another court for certain
purposes. One case, however, involved a proceeding begun in a
circuit court, a court of general and unlimited jurisdiction. It
issued a writ of certiorari to review a decision of the state
compensation commission; transfer was made under the venue statute
to another circuit court because the review statute required the
proceeding to be in a county where the defendant resided or could
be found. In the other case, a receivership proceeding was
transferred from county court to the circuit court because the
county court was without equitable jurisdiction. Thus, neither case
involved the jurisdiction of a city court nor the application of
the venue statutes to a city court. Therefore, the cases are too
dissimilar in their facts to make this one appear to be a
discrimination against a federal right, whether or not they are
wholly consistent with some of the language in the present case.
And there is no other basis, in the opinion of the court or
elsewhere, for the intimation that if petitioners' cases had been
brought under state statutes or common law they would not have been
dismissed under the same circumstances as those here present.
Had the Supreme Court rested upon its observations about the
jurisdiction of Illinois courts and the adequacy of their
procedures to bring an action into existence,
Page 324 U. S. 124
we should be without power to direct these courts to try cases
which as matter of local law are not pending. But the Court did not
stop at that.
Second. The case went to the Supreme Court of Illinois
with a certification by the Circuit Court that a federal question
was involved. The federal question whether the action was barred by
the federal statute of limitations, was raised by respondents in
their motion to dismiss in the Circuit Court. In the course of its
opinion, the Illinois Supreme Court used language from which it
seems reasonably clear that the question was decided, [
Footnote 3] either
Page 324 U. S. 125
necessarily, because the Court had not disposed of the case on
state law grounds, or hypothetically. For purposes of passing on
this question, the Court seems to have assumed that an action is
pending under state law; for only if one is pending is there
occasion to consider whether the cause of action is barred.
Petitioners contend therefore that the judgment below does not
rest upon a state ground, but upon an erroneously decided federal
ground -- namely, that, even though the City Court had power to
transfer the case, the action is barred because not "commenced"
until it arrived in Circuit Court.
Third. This Court, from the time of its foundation, has
adhered to the principle that it will not review judgments of state
courts that rest on adequate and independent state grounds.
Murdock v.
Memphis, 20 Wall. 590,
87 U. S. 636;
Berea College v. Kentucky, 211 U. S.
45, 53;
Enterprise Irrigation District v. Farmers'
Mutual Canal Co., 243 U. S. 157,
243 U. S. 164;
Fox Film Corp. v. Muller, 296 U.
S. 207. The reason is so obvious that it has rarely upon
thought to warrant statement. It is found in the partitioning of
power between the state and federal judicial systems and in the
limitations of our own jurisdiction. Our only power
Page 324 U. S. 126
over state judgments is to correct them to the extent that they
incorrectly adjudge federal rights. And our power is to correct
wrong judgments, not to revise opinions. We are not permitted to
render an advisory opinion, and if the same judgment would be
rendered by the state court after we corrected its views of federal
laws, our review could amount to nothing more than an advisory
opinion. If the Illinois court means to hold that the city courts
could not adjudge, transfer, or begin these cases, and that no case
is pending in its courts at the present time, it is manifest that
no view we might express of the federal Act would require its
courts to proceed to the trial of these actions.
But what to do with cases in which the record is ambiguous, but
presents reasonable grounds to believe that the judgment may rest
on decision of a federal question has long vexed the Court. In many
cases, the answer has been a strict adherence to the rule that it
must affirmatively appear that the federal question was decided and
that its decision was essential to disposition of the case, and
that, where it is not clear whether the judgment rests on a federal
ground or an adequate state one, this Court will not review.
Klinger v.
Missouri, 13 Wall. 257,
80 U. S. 263;
De Saussure v. Gaillard, 127 U. S. 216,
127 U. S. 234;
Johnson v. Risk, 137 U. S. 300,
137 U. S. 307;
Wood Mowing Machine Co. v. Skinner, 139 U.
S. 293;
Adams v. Russell, 229 U.
S. 353,
229 U. S. 358,
229 U. S. 361;
Lynch v. New York, 293 U. S. 52.
In other cases where justice seemed to require it, for example,
because of supervening events, the Court has said that to set aside
the judgment and remand the case to the state court for further
consideration is not to review, in any proper sense of the term,
the decision of the state court.
Patterson v. Alabama,
294 U. S. 600,
294 U. S. 607;
State Tax Comm. v. Van Cott, 306 U.
S. 511,
306 U. S. 515.
And in
Minnesota v. National Tea Co., 309 U.
S. 551, uncertainty
Page 324 U. S. 127
as to the grounds of the decision below led the Court to vacate
and remand for further consideration.
National Tea Company v.
State, 205 Minn. 443, 286 N.W. 360, and 208 Minn. 607, 294
N.W. 230. In
Lynch v. New York, 293 U. S.
52, the Court strongly intimated that, had petitioners
requested a continuance in this Court to permit an application to
the state court for amendment or clarification of its remittitur,
there would be power and willingness to grant it. ,Later, in
International Steel & Iron Co. v. National Surety Co.,
297 U. S. 657,
297 U. S. 662,
the record failed to disclose that a federal question had been
presented or decided. Counsel requested at the bar continuance to
apply for amplification, and it was granted. Reargument was had in
the state court upon the federal question, the court did pass on
it, the further proceedings were certified, and this Court asserted
jurisdiction and proceeded to decision. The practice has become
common by which some state courts, such as the New York Court of
Appeals, provide counsel on motion with a certificate of the court
or of the Chief Judge that a stated federal question was presented
and necessarily passed upon if such was the case.
See,
e.g., cases cited in Robertson and Kirkham, Jurisdiction of
the Supreme Court, § 75.
It is no criticism of a state court that we are unable to say in
a case where both state and federal questions are presented,
discussed, and perhaps decided, that the judgment would have been
the same had only one of the grounds been present. Those courts may
adjudicate both kinds of questions, and, because it is not
necessary to their functions to make a sharp separation of the two,
their discussion is often interlaced. But we cannot perform our
duty to refrain from interfering in state law questions and also to
review federal ones without making a determination whether the one
or the other controls the judgment. And in cases where the answer
is not clear to us,
Page 324 U. S. 128
it seems consistent with the respect due the highest courts of
states of the Union that they be asked, rather than told, what they
have intended. If this imposes an unwelcome burden, it should be
mitigated by the knowledge that it is to protect their jurisdiction
from unwitting interference, as well as to protect our own from
unwitting renunciation.
It is our purpose scrupulously to observe the long standing rule
that we will not review a judgment of a state court that rests on
an adequate and independent ground in state law. Nor will we review
one until the fact that it does not do so appears of record. But
because we will not proceed with a review while our jurisdiction is
conjectural, it does not follow that we should not take steps to
protect our jurisdiction when we are given reasonable grounds to
believe it exists. We think the simplest procedure to do so, where
the record is deficient, is to hold the case pending application to
the state court for clarification or amendment. It need not be
elaborate or formal if it is clear and decisive in stating whether
a federal question, and if so, what federal question, was decided
as a necessary ground for reaching the judgment under review. In
proper cases, we may grant counsel's request for continuance for
the purpose. In proper cases, we will impose the duty of applying
for it upon petitioner or appellants upon our own motion.
These causes are continued for such period as will enable
counsel for petitioners, with all convenient speed, to apply to the
Supreme Court of Illinois for amendment, or certificate, which will
show whether it intended to rest the judgments herein on an
adequate and independent state ground or whether decision of the
federal question was necessary to the judgment rendered.
* Together with No. 25,
Belcher v. Louisville &
Nashville Railroad Co., also on certiorari to the Supreme
Court of Illinois.
[
Footnote 1]
An amendment adopted after the present causes of action accrued
extended the limitation period to three years, 53 Stat. 1404, but
no question of its applicability is raised, and, in any event, in
each case, the transfer to the circuit court was made more than
three years after the cause of action accrued.
[
Footnote 2]
"The question involved relates to the effect of the proceedings
had in a court wholly incompetent to render a valid judgment,
because, if the judgment to be rendered would be void, it
necessarily follows the preliminary proceedings of the court,
necessary to rendition of judgment, must likewise be void. If the
court has no jurisdiction of the subject matter for judgment, there
can be no jurisdiction giving effect to process or pleadings."
"
* * * *"
"The fallacy of [plaintiff's] argument rests in the fact that it
becomes necessary to give validity to proceedings in a court, the
judgment of which, if rendered upon such proceedings, would be
wholly void. If the ultimate object to be obtained in a suit at
law,
viz., a judgment, is utterly void, it is difficult to
understand how any of the preliminaries to such a judgment, such as
summons, pleadings, interlocutory orders, and the like have any
effect, when the result, had such a proceeding been concluded in
the first court, would have been a nullity."
"
* * * *"
". . . if appellant's contention is sustained, a valid judgment
could be obtained by transferring the cause to the proper court
upon a summons or notice that defendants could safely disregard
when served upon them. This would give the order to transfer by the
city court the effect of vitalizing process that was void and
considering a case commenced and pending in a proper court during a
period when, in legal contemplation, no judicial control of
defendants had yet been exercised."
"
* * * *"
"It is clear a suit was not commenced by filing the present suit
in the city court of Granite City, or by issuing summons or filing
a complaint. Lacking requisite jurisdiction because of the
provisions of the constitution limiting it to cases arising within
the limits of the city, such court was wholly incompetent to render
any judgment or to authorize any proceedings which would result in
a judgment."
[
Footnote 3]
"The material point for consideration is whether the plaintiff
has commenced an action within two years of the date of his injury
in a court having jurisdiction to hear and determine the same, as
required by section 6 of the Federal Employers' Liability Act."
"
* * * *"
". . . We observe recovery under the Federal Employers'
Liability Act is conditioned upon two things: (1) commencing an
action within two years from the date of the injury; and (2)
commencing such action in a court having jurisdiction to hear and
determine the same. . . . The plaintiff, having predicated his case
upon the Federal Employers' Liability Act, must comply with its
provisions, both with respect to the time of commencing the suit
and of bringing it in a court having jurisdiction to hear and
determine it."
"
* * * *"
"Conceding, but not deciding, that, in proper cases, a court
without jurisdiction of the subject matter could, by statute, be
authorized to transfer its proceedings . . . , still the condition
that the action be commenced within two years is not met . . . ;
such statutes cannot recreate a right given under a Federal statute
that has ceased to exist by the terms of the [Federal]
statute."
"
* * * *"
"In this case, jurisdiction of the suit was wholly lacking
until July 31, 1942 (if we consider the change of venue
act valid), and at this time the condition imposed upon the
plaintiff with respect to bringing his suit had expired by lapse of
time. This determination
makes it unnecessary to pass upon
either the constitutional question involved or the validity of the
change of venue statute."
(Italics supplied.)
In the
Belcher case, the court said:
"Upon parallel facts,
Herb v. Pitcairn, decided this
day, holds that an action is not commenced within two years of the
date of injury in a court of competent jurisdiction, as prescribed
by section 6 of the Federal Employers' Liability Act, by
transferring the cause from a city court having no jurisdiction of
the subject matter at a date when the action, if instituted
originally on such date in the circuit court, could not be
maintained because not commenced within the statutory time. Our
disposition of the identical issue in
Herb v. Pitcairn is
decisive here."
MR. JUSTICE BLACK, dissenting.
Far-reaching implications of the Court's action in both these
cases impel me to state the reasons for my disagreement.
Page 324 U. S. 129
In November, 1936, Herb (the petitioner in No. 24) lost a leg
and suffered other severe injuries. He commenced an action against
the railroad in an Illinois City Court, was awarded a verdict, the
trial judge entered judgment for the railroad notwithstanding the
verdict, and an Illinois intermediate appellate court reversed and
directed that judgment be entered for Herb. 306 Ill.App. 583, 29
N.E.2d 543. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed the Appellate
Court's judgment insofar as it had directed that a judgment be
entered for Herb, and remanded the case to the City Court for the
trial judge to pass upon a motion for new trial should one be made.
377 Ill. 405, 36 N.E.2d 555. Although five years had already
elapsed since Herb's injuries, his efforts to secure a judicial
determination of his rights under federal law had just begun.
Apparently, as the lengthy history of Herb's case shows, it had
long been assumed by the courts, as well as by the legal
profession, that Illinois City Courts had jurisdiction to try
railroad employees' cases arising under federal law. But after
remand of his case to the City Court, the state Supreme Court
handed down opinions in two other cases holding that City Courts
did not have jurisdiction to hear and determine actions for
injuries which occurred outside their territorial limits.* In view
of this new obstacle to his action, the petitioner then moved for a
change of venue to the Circuit Court, under an Illinois statute
authorizing transfer from a "wrong court or county" to a "proper
court or county." Ch. 146, Ill.Rev.Stat.1941, § 36. The motion was
granted, and in the Circuit Court, the railroad moved to dismiss
the cause on the ground that (1) all of the orders of the City
Court, including the change of venue, were invalid; (2) the statute
authorizing transfer was unconstitutional; (3) the suit had not
been "commenced" within two years after the date
Page 324 U. S. 130
of the injury as required by Section 6 of the Federal Employers'
Liability Act.
The motion to dismiss was sustained, and Herb appealed. The
Circuit Court Judge's certification to the Illinois Supreme Court
recited that the judgment involved construction of the Illinois and
United States Constitution, the validity of an Illinois statute,
and the validity and construction of Section 6 of the Federal
Employers' Liability Act.
The court below, in the very first sentence after reciting the
facts, stated that "the material point for consideration" was
whether the requirements of Section 6 of the Federal Employers'
Liability Act had been met. Throughout its entire opinion, the
Court construed Section 6 and the City Court's jurisdiction as
related to its construction of that section, in order to determine
whether or not its requirements had been met. Then, having decided
that the action was not "commenced" within the federal statutory
period, it summarily disposed of the state questions raised with
this one sentence:
"This determination makes it unnecessary to pass upon either the
[Illinois] constitutional questions involved, or the validity of
the [Illinois] change of venue statute."
It is true that the court below held that "proceedings in the
City Court were of no effect." In so holding, it did not decide
that this fact alone authorized dismissal of the cases from the
Circuit Court, which admittedly had jurisdiction to try cases
arising under the federal Act. Consequently, it cannot be said that
this holding provides an independent state ground for the Circuit
Court's dismissal. The only reason why the Circuit Court could
dismiss under the State Court's view was because Section 6 of the
federal Act required a suit to be "commenced" in two years. This
made it necessary for the court to interpret the meaning and scope
of "commenced." It construed the word as meaning not only that a
suit should be filed
Page 324 U. S. 131
within two years of an injury, but that such suit must be filed
in a court having jurisdiction to hear and determine the cause.
Having thus by construction superimposed this condition on the
federal Act, it proceeded to determine whether the City Court had
such power. It held that the City Court did not have such power (a
state question). Then, applying its construction of the federal
statute, it decided that the action had not been "commenced" within
two years from the date of the injuries (a federal question). All
of this shows a determination of federal questions which we should
decide.
But this Court says that other language in the state court's
opinion indicates that its judgment might really have been rested
on a state procedural ground, adequate to support the dismissals.
So now, more than eight years after Herb was injured, both cases
are to be held here to give counsel an opportunity to ask the state
Supreme Court if it
"intended to rest the judgments herein on an adequate and
independent state ground or whether decision of the federal
question was necessary to the judgment rendered."
I would not thus lightly abdicate our ultimate responsibility to
protect federally created rights. To
"admit that the authority to review the action of a state court
where it has decided a Federal question can be rendered unavailing
by a suggestion 'that the court below may have rested its judgment'
on a non-Federal ground, would simply amount to depriving this
court of all power to review Federal questions if only a party
chose to make such a suggestion."
St. Louis, I.M. & S. R. Co. v. McWhirter,
229 U. S. 265,
229 U. S.
275-276.
Furthermore, even a final determination that there was an
adequate state procedural ground for dismissal of these particular
suits would not end the controversies, although it might protract
litigation for five more years. This is true because it is beyond
belief that dismissals on these procedural grounds would bar new
actions based on the
Page 324 U. S. 132
injuries. And the federal question so clearly presented here and
now could hardly be escaped in new actions. That question is, "Are
these suits barred by Section 6 of the Federal Employers' Liability
Act"? This question presents a twofold problem: (1) does Section 6
have any application to these actions; (2) if so, should the word
"commenced" be construed so as to make the beginning of the suit in
the City Court such a commencement?
As to (1), it is to be noted that both complainants claim
damages for violation of the Federal Safety Appliance Act. 27 Stat.
531
et seq., 45 U.S.C. § 1
et seq. Violation of
the Safety Appliance Act, even without the Federal Employers'
Liability Act, gives rise to a cause of action on the part of an
employee injured as the proximate result of that violation.
Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co. v. Layton,
243 U. S. 617,
243 U. S. 620;
Texas & Pacific R. Co. v. Rigsby, 241 U. S.
33,
241 U. S. 39.
That Act contains no statute of limitations. No authority has been
cited to support the proposition that the condition of liability
imposed by § 6 of the Federal Employers' Liability Act applies to
actions for damages for violation of the Safety Appliance Act. The
rule of this Court has been to give the Safety Appliance Act, under
which these claims are filed, a liberal construction, and one which
will promote, not defeat, its purpose.
Swinson v. Chicago, St.
P., M. and O. R. Co., 294 U. S. 529,
294 U. S.
531.
Assuming that petitioners here are to be required to file new
suits, and that the two year limitation of Section 6 of the Federal
Employers' Liability Act applies to injuries resulting from
violation of the Safety Appliance Act, it still must be determined
whether filing these suits in the City Courts "commenced" actions
within the meaning of that word as used in Section 6.
Certainly the railroads had notice of the suits. They evidently
thought they had been "commenced" when they contested them in all
the courts of Illinois. The lawyers for all the litigants
undoubtedly felt sure that they were
Page 324 U. S. 133
trying law suits in proper forums. Neither the Illinois Court of
Appeals nor the State Supreme Court which remanded Herb's case to
the City Court had any doubt at that time that suits had been
"commenced."
The plainest principles of justice demand that these employees
be afforded a trial. No reason that can be conceived for erecting a
statutory bar of two years justifies an inference that Congress
intended that employees who made
bona fide efforts to
prosecute their claims in a court should be barred because of
unanticipated decisions as to jurisdiction. The words of the
statute justify the construction that these actions were
"commenced" when they were filed in the City Courts. Any other
construction results in a frustration of the board objectives of
the Act.
Finally, I can find no warrant whatever for saying that the
state Supreme Court may have sustained dismissal on the ground that
no suits at all were "pending" in the state Circuit Court. That
court had jurisdiction to try them. The complaints were there.
True, they might have been brought there by a City Court Clerk,
although, so far as the record shows, petitioner's attorneys may
have taken them to the Circuit Court. But the state Supreme Court's
opinions do not indicate that Illinois law requires that a
complaint be physically filed by the hands of no one except an
injured person. I shall not believe the state court would make such
a holding until it does so.
For special reasons, in addition to those above stated, I think
that this Court's action in requiring Belcher (petitioner in No.
25) to obtain some kind of certificate of "intention" from the
Illinois Supreme Court is without any conceivable justification.
The argument of parties before us and the Court's opinion have
treated the
Belcher case as though the Supreme Court of
Illinois had sustained its dismissal and the Herb dismissal, in No.
24, on identical grounds. This treatment of the two cases is not
justified unless the State Court's opinion in
Belcher's
case is given
Page 324 U. S. 134
a strained interpretation. The
Belcher opinion did cite
the
Herb opinion as presenting "parallel facts" to those
of the
Belcher case. But the "parallel facts" in the two
cases upon which the
Belcher dismissal was premised, were
carefully limited by the
Belcher opinion's statement of
the issue to this effect:
"Defendant, appearing specially, made a motion to quash the
summons issued by the city court and to dismiss the cause for the
reason, among others, that the cause having been ordered
transferred to the circuit court on July 17, 1942, more than two
years after the date plaintiff suffered his injuries, namely,
February 15, 1939, he could neither institute nor maintain his
action in the circuit court, since it had not been commenced within
two years from the day the cause of action accrued, conformably to
section 6 of the Federal Employers' Liability Act."
Belcher v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 384 Ill. 281,
283, 51 N.E.2d 282, 283.
After stating the issue in this limited fashion, the
Belcher opinion then went on to say:
"Upon parallel facts,
Herb v. Pitcairn, . . . decided
this day, holds that an action is not commenced within two years of
the date of injury in a court of competent jurisdiction, as
prescribed by section 6 of the Federal Employers' Liability Act, by
transferring the cause from a city court having no jurisdiction of
the subject matter at a date when the action, if instituted
originally on such date in the circuit court, could not be
maintained because not commenced within the statutory time. Our
disposition of the identical issue in
Herb v. Pitcairn is
decisive here."
Belcher v. Louisville & N. R. Co., supra, 384 Ill.
282, 283, 51 N.E.2d 283.
It thus appears that the
Belcher opinion sustaining
dismissal rested squarely and exclusively on the state court's
conclusion that the cause of action was barred by Section 6 of the
Federal Employers' Liability Act. Notwithstanding this, the Court
now, six years after Belcher's injuries, delays a final decision on
the applicability of the federal Act,
Page 324 U. S. 135
to await a statement from the state court as to whether it would
have decided it on a hypothetical state ground had that ground been
considered by it in the first instance.
MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS and MR. JUSTICE MURPHY join in this
dissent.
*
Werner v. Illinois Central R. Co., 379 Ill. 559, 42
N.E.2d 82;
Mitchell v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co.,
379 Ill. 522, 42 N.E.2d 86.
MR. JUSTICE RUTLEDGE, dissenting.
I concur with MR. JUSTICE BLACK's opinion insofar as it relates
to the failure of the Illinois Supreme Court to take account of
petitioners' claims based on the Federal Safety Appliance Act.
Clearly Section 6 of the Federal Employers' Liability Act does not
apply to causes arising under the former Act and, on this ground
alone, the judgments should be reversed.
I agree also that the Illinois court has determined the causes
under the Employers' Liability Act solely by its view of federal
law, and that it has done so erroneously. It has held that neither
action was "commenced" in time within the meaning of Section 6,
and, in doing so, has interpreted "commenced" to mean begun in a
court competent to hear and determine the cause. Under this
decision, the causes would not have been commenced, even if similar
causes arising under state law were held sufficiently begun, for
similar purposes, in identical circumstances. We do not know and
cannot know whether local actions so filed and transferred would be
barred. We do not know this because, as MR. JUSTICE BLACK points
out, the Illinois Supreme Court expressly disavowed that it had
applied or determined the validity of the Illinois venue statutes,
which, on their face, purport to authorize just such transfers as
occurred in these causes.* Consequently until the
Page 324 U. S. 136
validity and effect of those statutes are determined, the
Illinois court's decision in these cases must be taken to rest
wholly upon its view of the meaning of Section 6, entirely
independently of the meaning of the state venue statutes, and to be
founded solely upon a federal ground.
That ground as the Illinois court decided it is, in my opinion,
clearly wrong. It was, apparently, that "commenced" in Section 6
always means "commenced in a court competent to hear and determine
the cause," regardless of whether local causes may be sufficiently
commenced, for similar purposes, in a court of limited jurisdiction
capable of transferring but not of hearing and deciding them.
Nothing in Section 6 or the Act so states. On the contrary, when
the suit is in a state court, it is to be taken, by fair
implication, that whatever is sufficient generally to constitute
beginning
Page 324 U. S. 137
of suit for other actions is beginning of suit for these. If,
for instance, it should be the state law that local causes are
sufficiently commenced from the time of filing the complaint,
though in the wrong court for reasons of jurisdiction relating to
trial and decision, if, nevertheless, upon discovery of the error,
the cause is transferred to another court having complete
jurisdiction, nothing in Section 6 or the Federal Employers'
Liability Act requires or permits suits brought under that Act to
be treated differently. A state may confer upon its courts of
limited jurisdiction limited powers over causes they are not
competent to hear and decide. A salutary instance would be to
safeguard litigants against unwitting loss of their rights of
action through stumbling into jurisdictional pitfalls, by providing
that actions filed in the wrong court should not be defeated
through lapse of time merely because the plaintiff had mistaken his
court, if upon discovery of the error, though after the period, the
cause were transferred promptly to a fully competent court. Such a
provision would merely create either an exception to the statute of
limitations or a means of suspending the time of its running. On
their face, that is what the Illinois venue statutes purport to do,
though whether this is their effect is of course for the state
courts to decide.
In any event, such a statute would not be contrary to or
inconsistent with Section 6 or any other provision of the Federal
Employers' Liability Act. On the contrary, litigants in the state
courts under that Act would be entitled to the benefit of such a
provision if this were given to litigants having causes arising
under state law.
Accordingly, since the Illinois court has held that Section 6,
by its own terms, requires that the commencing event take place in
a court having jurisdiction not only to begin and transfer, but
also to hear and to decide, the judgments should be reversed and
remanded.
* The pertinent provisions of the Illinois venue statutes are as
follows:
"That wherever any suit or proceeding shall hereafter
be
commenced, in any court of record in this state,
and it
shall appear to the court where the same is pending,
that
the same has been commenced in the wrong court or county,
then upon motion of either or any of the parties to such
suit or proceeding,
the court shall change the venue of
such suit or proceeding
to the proper court or county,
and the same when the venue shall be so changed,
shall
be then pending and triable in such court or county to which
the same shall be so changed
the same as in other cases of
change of venue: Provided, that where either party to such
suit or proceeding shall procure the change of venue as herein
provided for, that the court shall require the plaintiff in said
suit to pay all costs in such suit or proceeding, up to and
including the costs of the change of venue except such costs, if
any there are, as shall have been made or occasioned by answer to
the merits and a trial thereon, if any such shall have been had or
made, and such costs, if any, caused by answer to the merits and
trial thereon shall abide the final result of such suit or
proceeding the same as in other cases of change of venue."
Ill.Rev.Stat.1943, c. 146, § 36.
"Change of venue
from city courts, for the same causes
and in the same manner,
may be taken as from circuit courts,
and the cases sent to any other city court, or to
any
circuit court, or to any other court of competent jurisdiction
where the cause complained of does not exist. . . ."
Ill.Rev.Stat.1943, c. 37, § 346.
"The clerk of the court to which the change of venue is granted
shall file the transcript and papers transmitted to him and docket
the cause,
and such cause shall be proceeded in and
determined in all things, as well before as after judgment,
as if it had originated in such court."
Ill.Rev.Stat.1943, c. 146, § 16. (Emphasis added.)