In a petition to the Supreme Court of Missouri for a writ of
habeas corpus, the petitioner, confined in a state penitentiary for
life upon his plea of guilty to a charge of murder in the first
degree, alleged that he was not represented by counsel, that the
court did not make an effective appointment of counsel, that he did
not waive his constitutional right to counsel, that he was ignorant
of his right to demand counsel, and that he was incapable
adequately of making his own defense. The court allowed the
petitioner to proceed
in forma pauperis, but denied the
petition for failure to state a cause of action.
Held:
1. The allegations of the petition are here assumed to be true.
Williams v. Kaiser, ante, p.
323 U. S. 471. P.
323 U. S.
487.
2. A request for counsel by one accused of a capital offense who
is unable to employ counsel and incapable adequately of making his
own defense is unnecessary; it is the duty of the court in such
case to appoint counsel. P.
323 U. S.
487.
3. That the petition in such a case as this is not drawn with
precision and clarity is not fatal where the substance of the claim
is plain. P.
323 U. S.
487.
4. The nature of the offense charged against the petitioner --
who could have been found guilty of murder in the first or second
degree or of manslaughter, with varying penalties -- emphasized the
need of counsel. P.
323 U. S.
488.
5. The petition sufficiently alleged a deprivation of the right
to counsel in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Powell v.
Alabama, 287 U. S. 45. P.
323 U. S.
489.
Reversed.
Page 323 U. S. 486
Certiorari, 322 U.S. 725, to review an order denying a petition
for a writ of habeas corpus.
MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case is a companion case to
Williams v. Kaiser,
ante, p.
323 U. S. 471. It,
too, is a petition for a writ of habeas corpus here on certiorari
to the Missouri Supreme Court. It is alleged in the petition that
petitioner, in 1934, was charged with murder in the first degree,
pleaded guilty to the charge, and was convicted and sentenced to
the state penitentiary for life, where he is presently confined. T
he petition was filed in 1944. The other salient facts alleged are
as follows:
"The petitioner states that in the proceedings in said Circuit
Court of Pemiscot County, Missouri, he was not represented by
counsel, the Court did not make an effective appointment of
counsel, the petitioner did not waive his constitutional right to
the aid of counsel, and he was ignorant of his right to demand
counsel in his behalf, and he was incapable adequately of making
his own defense."
And he contends that he was deprived of counsel contrary to the
requirements of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Here, as in the
Williams case, the Supreme Court of
Missouri allowed petitioner to proceed
in forma pauperis,
but denied the petition for the reason that it "fails to state a
cause of action." The petition for habeas corpus was denied without
requiring the State to answer or without giving petitioner an
opportunity to
Page 323 U. S. 487
prove his allegations. And the allegations contained in the
petition do not appear to be inconsistent with the recitals of the
certified copy of the sentence and judgment which accompanied the
petition and under which petitioner is confined. Hence, we must
assume here, as in the
Williams case, that the allegations
of the petition are true.
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U. S. 45,
287 U. S. 71,
held that, at least in capital cases
"where the defendant is unable to employ counsel, and is
incapable adequately of making his own defense because of
ignorance, feeble-mindedness, illiteracy, or the like, it is the
duty of the court, whether requested or not, to assign counsel for
him as a necessary requisite of due process of law."
Under that test, a request for counsel is not necessary.
[
Footnote 1] One must be
assigned to the accused if he is unable to employ one and is
incapable adequately of making his defense.
The petition is not drawn with the desirable precision and
clarity. But we can hardly demand of a layman and pauper who draws
his petition behind prison walls the skill of one trained in the
law. If we were to take that course, we would compound the injury
caused by the original denial of counsel. A deprivation of the
constitutional right of counsel should not be readily inferred from
vague allegations. But where the substance of the claim is clear,
we should not insist upon more refined allegations than paupers,
ignorant of their right of counsel and incapable of making their
defense, could be expected to supply.
Page 323 U. S. 488
If this petition is read in that light, it satisfies the
requirements of
Powell v. Alabama. One who was not
represented by counsel, who did not waive his right to counsel, and
who was ignorant of his right to demand counsel is one of the class
which the rule of
Powell v. Alabama was designed to
protect. Certainly, when we read these allegations with the further
assertion in the record that petitioner was at no time prior to
conviction allowed to consult with an attorney, the conclusion is
irresistible that petitioner was unable to employ counsel either
because he was without funds or because he was deprived of the
opportunity.
The nature of the charge emphasizes the need for counsel. Under
Missouri law, one charged with murder in the first degree may be
found guilty of that offense, of murder in the second degree, or of
manslaughter. Rev.Stat. 1939, §§ 4376, 4844. The punishments for
the offenses are different. §§ 4378, 4391. The differences between
them are governed by rules of construction meaningful to those
trained in the law but unknown to the average layman. [
Footnote 2] The defenses cover a wide
range. [
Footnote 3] And the
ingredients of the crime of murder in the first degree, as
distinguished from the lesser offenses, are not simple, but ones
over which
Page 323 U. S. 489
skilled judges and practitioners have disagreements. [
Footnote 4] The guiding hand of counsel
is needed lest the unwary concede that which only bewilderment or
ignorance could justify or pay a penalty which is greater than the
law of the State exacts for the offense which they in fact and in
law committed.
Here, as in the
Williams case, the allegations of the
petition may turn out to be wholly specious. But they are
sufficient to establish a
prima facie case of deprivation
of the constitutional right. The other objections raised by
Missouri have been answered in our opinion in the
Williams
case.
Reversed.
MR. JUSTICE ROBERTS and MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER think the writ
should be dismissed for the reasons set forth in their dissent in
Williams v. Kaiser, ante, p.
323 U. S. 471.
[
Footnote 1]
As noted in the
Williams case, the Missouri statute
governing the appointment of counsel, Rev.Stat. 1939, § 4003,
employs the language "arraigned upon an indictment for a felony."
The prosecution in this case was upon an information. But it seems
that the Supreme Court of Missouri applies the statute in that
situation as well.
See State v. Terry, 201 Mo. 697, 100
S.W. 432;
State v. Steelman, 318 Mo. 628, 300 S.W.
743.
[
Footnote 2]
In
State v. Burrell, 298 Mo. 672, 680, 252 S.W. 709,
711, it was held that
"where there is willful killing with malice aforethought -- that
is, with malice and premeditation, but not deliberation, or in a
cool state of blood, the offense is murder in the second degree.
Nor can any homicide be murder in the second degree unless the act
causing death was committed with malice aforethought -- that is,
with malice and premeditation. Where there is a willful killing
without deliberation and not with malice aforethought, the offense
is manslaughter."
[
Footnote 3]
Self-defense and insanity are defenses. Rev.Stat. 1939, § 4049
Justifiable or excusable homicide is a defense (
id., §
4381) as those terms are defined.
Id., §§ 4379, 4380.
[
Footnote 4]
"The law presumes the killing was murder in the second degree in
the absence of proof of attendant circumstances which tend to raise
the killing to murder in the first degree or to reduce it to
manslaughter."
State v. Henke, 313 Mo. 615, 638, 285 S.W. 392, 399. As
to the necessity on certain evidence to give instructions on a
lesser offense than murder in the first degree,
see State v.
Warren, 326 Mo. 843, 33 S.W.2d 125;
State v. Wright,
337 Mo. 441, 85 S.W.2d 7;
State v. Jackson, 344 Mo. 1055,
130 S.W.2d 595.