1. The Railway Labor Act imposes on a labor organization, acting
by authority of the statute as the exclusive bargaining
representative of a craft or class of railway employees, the duty
to represent all the employees in the craft without discrimination
because of their race, and the courts have jurisdiction to protect
the minority of the craft or class from the violation of such
obligation. P.
323 U. S.
199.
2. The Railway Labor Act imposes on the statutory representative
of a craft at least as exacting a duty to protect equally the
interests of a member of the craft as the Constitution imposes upon
a legislature to give equal protection to the interests of those
for whom it legislates. The Act confers on the bargaining
representative powers comparable to those possessed by a
legislative body both to create and restrict the rights of those
whom it represents, but it also imposes on the representative a
corresponding duty. P.
323 U. S.
202.
3. So long as a labor union assumes to act as the statutory
representative of a craft, it cannot rightly refuse to perform the
duty, which is inseparable from the power of representation
conferred upon it, to represent the entire membership of the craft.
While the statute does not deny to such a bargaining labor
organization the right to determine eligibility to its membership,
it does require the union, in collective bargaining and in making
contracts with the carrier, to represent nonunion or minority union
members of the craft without hostile discrimination, fairly,
impartially, and in good faith. Wherever necessary to that end, the
union is required to consider requests of nonunion members of the
craft and expressions of their views with respect to collective
bargaining with the employer and to give to them notice of and
opportunity for hearing upon its proposed action. P.
323 U. S.
204.
4. The right asserted by the petitioner, to a remedy for breach
of the statutory duty of the bargaining representative to represent
and act for the members of a craft without discrimination against
Negroes solely because of their race, is claimed under the
Constitution and a statute of the United States; and the adverse
decision of the highest court of the State is reviewable here under
§ 237(b) of the Judicial Code. P.
323 U. S.
204.
Page 323 U. S. 193
5. The petitioner here has no available administrative remedy
under the Railway Labor Act, and the bill of complaint states a
cause of action entitling him to relief. P.
323 U. S.
205.
6. The Railway Labor Act contemplates resort to the usual
judicial remedies of injunction and award of damages when
appropriate for breach of the duty imposed by the statute on a
union representative of a craft to represent the interests of all
its members. P.
323 U. S.
207.
245 Ala. 113,16 So. 2d 416, reversed.
Certiorari, 322 U.S. 722, to review the affirmance of a judgment
sustaining a demurrer to a complaint asserting a federal right.
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE STONE delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question is whether the Railway Labor Act, 48 Stat. 1185, 45
U.S.C. § 151
et seq., imposes on a labor organization,
Page 323 U. S. 194
acting by authority of the statute as the exclusive bargaining
representative of a craft or class of railway employees, the duty
to represent all the employees in the craft without discrimination
because of their race, and, if so, whether the courts have
jurisdiction to protect the minority of the craft or class from the
violation of such obligation.
The issue is raised by demurrer to the substituted amended bill
of complaint filed by petitioner, a locomotive fireman, in a suit
brought in the Alabama Circuit Court against his employer, the
Louisville & Nashville Railroad Company, the Brotherhood of
Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen, an unincorporated labor
organization, and certain individuals representing the Brotherhood.
The Circuit Court sustained the demurrer, and the Supreme Court of
Alabama affirmed. 245 Ala. 113, 16 So. 2d 416. We granted
certiorari, 322 U.S. 722, the question presented being one of
importance in the administration of the Railway Labor Act.
The allegations of the bill of complaint, so far as now
material, are as follows: Petitioner, a Negro, is a locomotive
fireman in the employ of respondent railroad, suing on his own
behalf and that of his fellow employees who, like petitioner, are
Negro firemen employed by the Railroad. Respondent Brotherhood, a
labor organization, is, as provided under § 2, Fourth of the
Railway Labor Act, the exclusive bargaining representative of the
craft of firemen employed by the Railroad, and is recognized as
such by it and the members of the craft. The majority of the
firemen employed by the Railroad are white, and are members of the
Brotherhood, but a substantial minority are Negroes who, by the
constitution and ritual of the Brotherhood, are excluded from its
membership. As the membership of the Brotherhood constitutes a
majority of all firemen employed on respondent Railroad, and as,
under § 2, Fourth, the members because they are the majority
Page 323 U. S. 195
have the right to choose and have chosen the Brotherhood to
represent the craft, petitioner and other Negro firemen on the road
have been required to accept the Brotherhood as their
representative for the purposes of the Act.
On March 28, 1940, the Brotherhood, purporting to act as
representative of the entire craft of firemen, without informing
the Negro firemen or giving them opportunity to be heard, served a
notice on respondent Railroad and on twenty other railroads
operating principally in the southeastern part of the United
States. The notice announced the Brotherhood's desire to amend the
existing collective bargaining agreement in such manner as
ultimately to exclude all Negro firemen from the service. By
established practice on the several railroads so notified, only
white firemen can be promoted to serve as engineers, and the notice
proposed that only "promotable,"
i.e., white, men should
be employed as firemen or assigned to new runs or jobs or permanent
vacancies in established runs or jobs.
On February 18, 1941, the railroads and the Brotherhood, as
representative of the craft, entered into a new agreement which
provided that not more than 50% of the firemen in each class of
service in each seniority district of a carrier should be Negroes;
that, until such percentage should be reached, all new runs and all
vacancies should be filled by white men; and that the agreement did
not sanction the employment of Negroes in any seniority district in
which they were not working. The agreement reserved the right of
the Brotherhood to negotiate for further restrictions on the
employment of Negro firemen on the individual railroads. On May 12,
1941, the Brotherhood entered into a supplemental agreement with
respondent Railroad further controlling the seniority rights of
Negro firemen and restricting their employment. The Negro firemen
were not given notice or opportunity to be
Page 323 U. S. 196
heard with respect to either of these agreements, which were put
into effect before their existence was disclosed to the Negro
firemen.
Until April 8, 1941, petitioner was in a "passenger pool," to
which one white and five Negro firemen were assigned. These jobs
were highly desirable in point of wages, hours and other
considerations. Petitioner had performed and was performing his
work satisfactorily. Following a reduction in the mileage covered
by the pool, all jobs in the pool were, about April 1, 1941,
declared vacant. The Brotherhood and the Railroad, acting under the
agreement, disqualified all the Negro firemen and replaced them
with four white men, members of the Brotherhood, all junior in
seniority to petitioner and no more competent or worthy. As a
consequence, petitioner was deprived of employment for sixteen
days, and then was assigned to more arduous, longer, and less
remunerative work in local freight service. In conformity to the
agreement, he was later replaced by a Brotherhood member junior to
him, and assigned work on a switch engine, which was still harder
and less remunerative, until January 3, 1942. On that date, after
the bill of complaint in the present suit had been filed, he was
reassigned to passenger service.
Protests and appeals of petitioner and his fellow Negro firemen,
addressed to the Railroad and the Brotherhood, in an effort to
secure relief and redress, have been ignored. Respondents have
expressed their intention to enforce the agreement of February 18,
1941, and its subsequent modifications. The Brotherhood has acted
and asserts the right to act as exclusive bargaining representative
of the firemen's craft. It is alleged that, in that capacity, it is
under an obligation and duty imposed by the Act to represent the
Negro firemen impartially and in good faith; but instead, in its
notice to and contracts with the railroads, it has been hostile and
disloyal to the Negro firemen, has deliberately discriminated
against them, and has sought
Page 323 U. S. 197
to deprive them of their seniority rights and to drive them out
of employment in their craft, all in order to create a monopoly of
employment for Brotherhood members.
The bill of complaint asks for discovery of the manner in which
the agreements have been applied and in other respects; for an
injunction against enforcement of the agreements made between the
Railroad and the Brotherhood; for an injunction against the
Brotherhood and its agents from purporting to act as representative
of petitioner and others similarly situated under the Railway Labor
Act, so long as the discrimination continues, and so long as it
refuses to give them notice and hearing with respect to proposals
affecting their interests; for a declaratory judgment as to their
rights; and for an award of damages against the Brotherhood for its
wrongful conduct.
The Supreme Court of Alabama took jurisdiction of the cause but
held on the merits that petitioner's complaint stated no cause of
action. [
Footnote 1] It pointed
out that the Act places a mandatory duty on the Railroad to treat
with the Brotherhood as the exclusive representative of the
employees in a craft, imposes heavy criminal penalties for willful
failure to comply with its command, and provides
Page 323 U. S. 198
that the majority of any craft shall have the right to determine
who shall be the representative of the class for collective
bargaining with the employer,
see Virginian R. Co. v. System
Federation, 300 U. S. 515,
300 U. S. 545.
It thought that the Brotherhood was empowered by the statute to
enter into the agreement of February 18, 1941, and that, by virtue
of the statute, the Brotherhood has power by agreement with the
Railroad both to create the seniority rights of petitioner and his
follow Negro employees and to destroy them. It construed the
statute not as creating the relationship of principal and agent
between the members of the craft and the Brotherhood, but as
conferring on the Brotherhood plenary authority to treat with the
Railroad and enter into contracts fixing rates of pay and working
conditions for the craft as a whole, without any legal obligation
or duty to protect the rights of minorities from discrimination or
unfair treatment, however gross. Consequently it held that neither
the Brotherhood nor the Railroad violated any rights of petitioner
or his fellow Negro employees by negotiating the contracts
discriminating against them.
If, as the state court has held, the Act confers this power on
the bargaining representative of a craft or class of employees
without any commensurate statutory duty toward its members,
constitutional questions arise. For the representative is clothed
with power, not unlike that of a legislature, which is subject to
constitutional limitations on its power to deny, restrict, destroy
or discriminate against the rights of those for whom it legislates,
and which is also under an affirmative constitutional duty equally
to protect those rights. If the Railway Labor Act purports to
impose on petitioner and the other Negro members of the craft the
legal duty to comply with the terms of a contract whereby the
representative has discriminatorily restricted their employment for
the benefit and advantage of the Brotherhood's own members, we
Page 323 U. S. 199
must decide the constitutional questions which petitioner raises
in his pleading.
But we think that Congress, in enacting the Railway Labor Act
and authorizing a labor union, chosen by a majority of a craft, to
represent the craft, did not intend to confer plenary power upon
the union to sacrifice, for the benefit of its members, rights of
the minority of the craft, without imposing on it any duty to
protect the minority. Since petitioner and the other Negro members
of the craft are not members of the Brotherhood or eligible for
membership, the authority to act for them is derived not from their
action or consent, but wholly from the command of the Act. Section
2, Fourth, provides:
"Employees shall have the right to organize and bargain
collectively through representatives of their own choosing. The
majority of any craft or class of employees shall have the right to
determine who shall be the representative of the craft or class for
the purposes of this Act. . . ."
Under § 2, Sixth and Seventh, when the representative bargains
for a change of working conditions, the latter section specifies
that they are the working conditions of employees "as a class."
Section 1, Sixth, of the Act defines "representative" as meaning
"Any person or . . . labor union . . . designated either by a
carrier or a group of carriers or by its or their employees, to act
for it or them." The use of the word "representative," as thus
defined and in all the contexts in which it is found, plainly
implies that the representative is to act on behalf of all the
employees which, by virtue of the statute, it undertakes to
represent.
By the terms of the Act, § 2, Fourth, the employees are
permitted to act "through" their representative, and it represents
them "for the purposes of" the Act. Sections 2, Third, Fourth,
Ninth. The purposes of the Act declared by § 2 are the avoidance of
"any interruption to commerce or to the operation of any carrier
engaged therein," and this aim is sought to be achieved by
encouraging "the
Page 323 U. S. 200
prompt and orderly settlement of all disputes concerning rates
of pay, rules, or working conditions."
Compare Texas & New
Orleans R. Co. v. Brotherhood of Clerks, 281 U.
S. 548,
281 U. S. 569.
These purposes would hardly be attained if a substantial minority
of the craft were denied the right to have their interests
considered at the conference table and if the final result of the
bargaining process were to be the sacrifice of the interests of the
minority by the action of a representative chosen by the majority.
The only recourse of the minority would be to strike, with the
attendant interruption of commerce, which the Act seeks to
avoid.
Section 2, Second, requiring carriers to bargain with the
representative so chosen, operates to exclude any other from
representing a craft.
Virginian R. Co. v. System Federation,
supra, 300 U. S. 545.
The minority members of a craft are thus deprived by the statute of
the right, which they would otherwise possess, to choose a
representative of their own, and its members cannot bargain
individually on behalf of themselves as to matters which are
properly the subject of collective bargaining.
Order of
Railroad Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, 321 U.
S. 342,
and see, under the like provisions of
the National Labor Relations Act,
J. I. Case Co. v. Labor
Board, 321 U. S. 332, and
Medo Photo Supply Corp. v. Labor Board, 321 U.
S. 678.
The labor organization chosen to be the representative of the
craft or class of employees is thus chosen to represent all of its
members, regardless of their union affiliations or want of them. As
we have pointed out with respect to the like provision of the
National Labor Relations Act in
J. I. Case Co. v. Labor Board,
supra, 321 U. S.
338,
"The very purpose of providing by statute for the collective
agreement is to supersede the terms of separate agreements of
employees with terms which reflect the strength and bargaining
power and serve the welfare of the group. Its benefits and
advantages are open to every employee of the represented
Page 323 U. S. 201
unit. . . ."
The purpose of providing for a representative is to secure those
benefits for those who are represented and not to deprive them or
any of them of the benefits of collective bargaining for the
advantage of the representative or those members of the craft who
selected it.
As the National Mediation Board said in In The Matter of
Representation of Employees of the St. Paul Union Depot Company,
Case No. R-635:
"Once a craft or class has designated its representative, such
representative is responsible under the law to act for all
employees within the craft or class, those who are not members of
the represented organizations, as well as those who are members.
[
Footnote 2]"
Unless the labor union representing a craft owes some duty to
represent nonunion members of the craft, at least to the extent of
not discriminating against them as such in the contracts which it
makes as their representative, the minority would be left with no
means of protecting their interests, or indeed their right to earn
a livelihood by pursuing the occupation in which they are
employed.
Page 323 U. S. 202
While the majority of the craft chooses the bargaining
representative, when chosen it represents, as the Act by its terms
makes plain, the craft or class, and not the majority. The fair
interpretation of the statutory language is that the organization
chosen to represent a craft is to represent all its members, the
majority as well as the minority, and it is to act for, and not
against, those whom it represents. [
Footnote 3] It is a principle of general application that
the exercise of a granted power to act in behalf of others involves
the assumption toward them of a duty to exercise the power in their
interest and behalf, and that such a grant of power will not be
deemed to dispense with all duty toward those for whom it is
exercised unless so expressed.
We think that the Railway Labor Act imposes upon the statutory
representative of a craft at least as exacting a duty to protect
equally the interests of the members of the craft as the
Constitution imposes upon a legislature to give equal protection to
the interests of those for whom it legislates. Congress has seen
fit to clothe the bargaining representative with powers comparable
to those possessed by a legislative body both to create and
restrict the rights of those whom it represents,
cf. J.I. Case
Co. v. Labor Board, supra, 321 U. S. 335,
but it has also imposed on the representative a corresponding duty.
We hold that the language of the Act to which we have referred,
read in the light of the purposes of the Act, expresses the aim of
Congress to impose on the bargaining representative of a craft
Page 323 U. S. 203
or class of employees the duty to exercise fairly the power
conferred upon it in behalf of all those for whom it acts, without
hostile discrimination against them.
This does not mean that the statutory representative of a craft
is barred from making contracts which may have unfavorable effects
on some of the members of the craft represented. Variations in the
terms of the contract based on differences relevant to the
authorized purposes of the contract in conditions to which they are
to be applied, such as differences in seniority, the type of work
performed, the competence and skill with which it is performed, are
within the scope of the bargaining representation of a craft, all
of whose members are not identical in their interest or merit.
Cf. Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke Co.,
301 U. S. 495,
301 U. S.
509-510,
301 U. S. 512,
and cases cited;
Washington v. Superior Court,
289 U. S. 361,
289 U. S. 366;
Metropolitan Casualty Ins. Co. v. Brownell, 294 U.
S. 580,
294 U. S. 583.
Without attempting to mark the allowable limits of differences in
the terms of contracts based on differences of conditions to which
they apply, it is enough for present purposes to say that the
statutory power to represent a craft and to make contracts as to
wages, hours and working conditions does not include the authority
to make among members of the craft discriminations not based on
such relevant differences. Here, the discriminations based on race
alone are obviously irrelevant and invidious. Congress plainly did
not undertake to authorize the bargaining representative to make
such discriminations.
Cf. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.
S. 356;
Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad, 271 U.
S. 500;
Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada,
305 U. S. 337;
Hill v. Texas, 316 U. S. 400.
The representative which thus discriminates may be enjoined from
so doing, and its members may be enjoined from taking the benefit
of such discriminatory action. No more is the Railroad bound by or
entitled to take the benefit of a contract which the bargaining
representative
Page 323 U. S. 204
is prohibited by the statute from making. In both cases, the
right asserted, which is derived from the duty imposed by the
statute on the bargaining representative, is a federal right
implied from the statute and the policy which it has adopted. It is
the federal statute which condemns as unlawful the Brotherhood's
conduct.
"The extent and nature of the legal consequences of this
condemnation, though left by the statute to judicial determination,
are nevertheless to be derived from it and the federal policy which
it has adopted."
Deitrick v. Greaney, 309 U. S. 190,
309 U. S.
200-201;
Board of Commissioners v. United
States, 308 U. S. 343;
Sola Electric Co. v. Jefferson Electric Co., 317 U.
S. 173,
317 U. S.
176-177;
cf. Clearfield Trust Co. v. United
States, 318 U. S. 363.
So long as a labor union assumes to act as the statutory
representative of a craft, it cannot rightly refuse to perform the
duty, which is inseparable from the power of representation
conferred upon it, to represent the entire membership of the craft.
While the statute does not deny to such a bargaining labor
organization the right to determine eligibility to its membership,
it does require the union, in collective bargaining and in making
contracts with the carrier, to represent nonunion or minority union
members of the craft without hostile discrimination, fairly,
impartially, and in good faith. Wherever necessary to that end, the
union is required to consider requests of nonunion members of the
craft and expressions of their views with respect to collective
bargaining with the employer and to give to them notice of and
opportunity for hearing upon its proposed action.
Since the right asserted by petitioner "is . . . claimed . . .
under the Constitution" and a "statute of the United States," the
decision of the Alabama court adverse to that contention is
reviewable here under § 237(b) of the Judicial Code unless the
Railway Labor Act itself has excluded petitioner's claims from
judicial consideration. The question
Page 323 U. S. 205
here presented is not one of a jurisdictional dispute,
determinable under the administrative scheme set up by the Act,
cf. Switchmen's Union v. National Mediation Board,
320 U. S. 297;
General Committee v. M.-K.-T. R. Co., 320 U.
S. 323;
General Committee v. Southern Pacific
Co., 320 U. S. 338;
Brotherhood of Clerks v. United Transport Service
Employees, 320 U.S. 715, or restricted by the Act to voluntary
settlement by recourse to the traditional implements of mediation,
conciliation and arbitration.
General Committee v. M.-K.-T. R.
Co., supra, 320 U. S. 323,
320 U. S. 337.
There is no question here of who is entitled to represent the
craft, or who are members of it, issues which have been relegated
for settlement to the Mediation Board,
Switchmen's Union v.
National Mediation Board, supra; General Committee v. M.-K.-T. R.
Co., supra. Nor are there differences as to the interpretation
of the contract which by the Act are committed to the jurisdiction
of the Railroad Adjustment Board.
Section 3, First (i), which provides for reference to the
Adjustment Board of
"disputes between an employee or group of employees and a
carrier or carriers growing out of grievances or out of the
interpretation or application of agreements,"
makes no reference to disputes between employees and their
representative. Even though the dispute between the railroad and
the petitioner were to be heard by the Adjustment Board, that Board
could not give the entire relief here sought. The Adjustment Board
has consistently declined in more than 400 cases to entertain
grievance complaints by individual members of a craft represented
by a labor organization. "The only way that an individual may
prevail is by taking his case to the union and causing the union to
carry it through to the Board." Administrative Procedure in
Government Agencies, S.Doc. No. 10, 77th Cong., 1st Sess., Pt. 4,
p. 7. Whether or not judicial power might be exerted to require the
Adjustment Board to consider individual grievances,
Page 323 U. S. 206
as to which we express no opinion, we cannot say that there is
an administrative remedy available to petitioner, or that resort to
such proceedings in order to secure a possible administrative
remedy, which is withheld or denied, is prerequisite to relief in
equity. Further, since § 3, First (c), permits the national labor
organizations chosen by the majority of the crafts to "prescribe
the rules under which the labor members of the Adjustment Board
shall be selected" and to "select such members and designate the
division on which each member shall serve," the Negro firemen would
be required to appear before a group which is in large part chosen
by the respondents against whom their real complaint is made. In
addition, § 3, Second, provides that a carrier and a class or craft
of employees, "all acting through their representatives, selected
in accordance with the provisions of this Act," may agree to the
establishment of a regional board of adjustment for the purpose of
adjusting disputes of the type which may be brought before the
Adjustment Board. In this way, the carrier and the representative
against whom the Negro firemen have complained have power to
supersede entirely the Adjustment Board's procedure and to create a
tribunal of their own selection to interpret and apply the
agreements now complained of to which they are the only parties. We
cannot say that a hearing, if available, before either of these
tribunals would constitute an adequate administrative remedy.
Cf. Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U. S. 510.
There is no administrative means by which the Negro firemen can
secure separate representation for the purposes of collective
bargaining. For the Mediation Board
"has definitely ruled that a craft or class of employees may not
be divided into two or more on the basis of race or color for the
purpose of choosing representatives. [
Footnote 4] "
Page 323 U. S. 207
In the absence of any available administrative remedy, the right
here asserted, to a remedy for breach of the statutory duty of the
bargaining representative to represent and act for the members of a
craft, is of judicial cognizance. That right would be sacrificed or
obliterated if it were without the remedy which courts can give for
breach of such a duty or obligation and which it is their duty to
give in cases in which they have jurisdiction.
Switchmen's
Union v. National Mediation Board, supra, 320 U. S. 300;
Stark v. Wickard, 321 U. S. 288,
321 U. S.
306-307. Here, unlike
General Committee v. M.-K.-T.
R. Co., supra, and
General Committee v. Southern Pacific
Co., supra, there can be no doubt of the justiciability of
these claims. As we noted in
General Committee v. M.-K.-T. R.
Co., supra, 320 U. S. 331,
the statutory provisions which are in issue are stated in the form
of commands. For the present command, there is no mode of
enforcement other than resort to the courts, whose jurisdiction and
duty to afford a remedy for a breach of statutory duty are left
unaffected. The right is analogous to the statutory right of
employees to require the employer to bargain with the statutory
representative of a craft, a right which this Court has enforced
and protected by its injunction in
Texas & New Orleans R.
Co. v. Brotherhood of Clerks, supra, 281 U. S.
556-557,
281 U. S. 560,
and in
Virginian R. Co. v. System Federation, supra,
300 U. S. 548,
and like it is one for which there is no available administrative
remedy.
We conclude that the duty which the statute imposes on a union
representative of a craft to represent the interests of all its
members stands on no different footing, and that the statute
contemplates resort to the usual judicial remedies of injunction
and award of damages when appropriate for breach of that duty.
Page 323 U. S. 208
The judgment is accordingly reversed and remanded for further
proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
Reversed.
MR. JUSTICE BLACK concurs in the result.
[
Footnote 1]
The respondents urge that the Circuit Court sustained their
demurrers on the ground that the suit could not be maintained
against the Brotherhood, an unincorporated association, since, by
Alabama statute such an association cannot be sued unless the
action lies against all its members individually, and on several
other state law grounds. They argue accordingly that the judgment
of affirmance of the state Supreme Court may be rested on an
adequate nonfederal ground. As that court specifically rested its
decision on the sole ground that the Railway Labor Act places no
duty upon the Brotherhood to protect petitioner and other Negro
firemen from the alleged discriminatory treatment, the judgment
rests wholly on a federal ground, to which we confine our review.
Grayson v. Harris, 267 U. S. 352,
267 U. S. 358;
International Steel & Iron Co. v. National Surety Co.,
297 U. S. 657,
297 U. S. 666;
Indiana ex rel. Anderson v. Brand, 303 U. S.
95,
303 U. S. 98,
99, and cases cited.
[
Footnote 2]
The Mediation Board's decision in this case was set aside in
Brotherhood of Clerks v. United Transport Service
Employees, 78 U.S.App.D.C. 125, 137 F.2d 817,
reversed on
jurisdictional grounds, 320 U.S. 715. The Court of Appeals was
of the opinion that a representative is not only required to act in
behalf of all the employees in a bargaining unit, but that a labor
organization which excludes a minority of a craft from its
membership has no standing to act as such representative of the
minority.
The Act has been similarly interpreted by the Emergency Board
referred to in
General Committee v. Southern Pacific Co.,
320 U. S. 338,
320 U. S.
340-343, note. It declared in 1937:
"When a craft or class, through representatives chosen by a
majority, negotiates a contract with a carrier, all members of the
craft or class share in the rights secured by the contract,
regardless of their affiliation with any organization of employees.
. . . The representatives of the majority represent the whole craft
or class in the making of an agreement for the benefit of all. . .
."
[
Footnote 3]
Compare the House Committee Report on the N.L.R.A.
(H.Rep. No. 1147, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., pp. 20-22) indicating
that, although the principle of majority rule "written into the
statute books by Congress in the Railway Labor Act of 1934" was to
be applicable to the bargaining unit under the N.L.R.A., the
employer was required to give "equally advantageous terms to
nonmembers of the labor organization negotiating the agreement."
See also the Senate Committee Report on the N.L.R.A. to
the same effect. S.Rep. No. 573, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 13.
[
Footnote 4]
National Mediation Board, The Railway Labor Act and the National
Mediation Board, p. 17;
see In the Matter of
Representation of Employees of the Central of Georgia Ry. Co., case
No. R-234; In the Matter of Representation of Employees of the St.
Paul Union Depot Co., Case No. R-635, set aside in
Brotherhood
of Clerks v. United Transport Service Employees, 78
U.S.App.D.C. 125, 137 F.2d 817,
reversed on jurisdictional
grounds, 320 U.S. 715.
MR. JUSTICE MURPHY, concurring.
The economic discrimination against Negroes practiced by the
Brotherhood and the railroad under color of Congressional authority
raises a grave constitutional issue that should be squarely
faced.
The utter disregard for the dignity and the wellbeing of colored
citizens shown by this record is so pronounced as to demand the
invocation of constitutional condemnation. To decide the case and
to analyze the statute solely upon the basis of legal niceties,
while remaining mute and placid as to the obvious and oppressive
deprivation of constitutional guarantees, is to make the judicial
function something less than it should be.
The constitutional problem inherent in this instance is clear.
Congress, through the Railway Labor Act, has conferred upon the
union selected by a majority of a craft or class of railway workers
the power to represent the entire craft or class in all collective
bargaining matters. While such a union is essentially a private
organization, its power to represent and bind all members of a
class or craft is derived solely from Congress. The Act contains no
language which directs the manner in which the bargaining
representative shall perform its duties. But it cannot be assumed
that Congress meant to authorize the representative to act so as to
ignore rights guaranteed by the Constitution. Otherwise, the Act
would bear the stigma of unconstitutionality under the Fifth
Amendment in this respect. For that reason, I am willing to read
the statute as not permitting or allowing any action by the
Page 323 U. S. 209
bargaining representative in the exercise of its delegated
powers which would in effect violate the constitutional rights of
individuals.
If the Court's construction of the statute rests upon this
basis, I agree. But I am not sure that such is the basis. Suffice
it to say, however, that this constitutional issue cannot be
lightly dismissed. The cloak of racism surrounding the actions of
the Brotherhood in refusing membership to Negroes and in entering
into and enforcing agreements discriminating against them, all
under the guise of Congressional authority, still remains. No
statutory interpretation can erase this ugly example of economic
cruelty against colored citizens of the United States. Nothing can
destroy the fact that the accident of birth has been used as the
basis to abuse individual rights by an organization purporting to
act in conformity with its Congressional mandate. Any attempt to
interpret the Act must take that fact into account, and must
realize that the constitutionality of the statute in this respect
depends upon the answer given.
The Constitution voices its disapproval whenever economic
discrimination is applied under authority of law against any race,
creed, or color. A sound democracy cannot allow such discrimination
to go unchallenged. Racism is far too virulent today to permit the
slightest refusal, in the light of a Constitution that abhors it,
to expose and condemn it wherever it appears in the course of a
statutory interpretation.