A night watchman for a manufacturing plant which shipped a
substantial portion of its product in interstate commerce
held covered by the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 as
one engaged in an "occupation necessary to the production" of goods
for interstate commerce. P.
320 U. S.
542.
194 Miss. 573, 11 So. 2d 912, reversed.
Certiorari,
post, p. 726, to review the reversal of a
judgment for the petitioner in a suit to recover overtime
compensation and liquidated damages under the Fair Labor Standards
Act.
Page 320 U. S. 541
MR. JUSTICE BLACK delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is a suit brought against the respondent by an employee,
Fred Walton, in a Mississippi state court to recover overtime
compensation and liquidated damages as authorized by Section 16(b)
of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938. [
Footnote 1] Walton died before the case was tried, and
the suit was revived by his administratrix, the petitioner here. A
judgment for the petitioner rendered by the trial court was
reversed by the Mississippi Supreme Court [
Footnote 2] on the ground that Walton had not been
employed in the production of goods for interstate commerce or in
"any process or occupation necessary to the production thereof,"
[
Footnote 3] and therefore was
not covered by the Act. We granted certiorari because this
interpretation of the Act raised a federal question of importance
and because of the claim by petitioner that the interpretation was
in conflict with our decision in
A. B. Kirschbaum Co. v.
Walling, 316 U. S. 517.
The case was tried on an agreed statement of facts, which, in
brief summary, showed:
The respondent operated a plant in Mississippi in which veneer
was manufactured from logs. A substantial portion of the
manufactured product was destined for shipment in interstate
commerce. Walton worked at the plant as a night watchman. His work
week exceeded
Page 320 U. S. 542
the maximum hours prescribed by the Fair Labor Standards Act
during the period in question. His duties were to make hourly
rounds of the plant, punch the night watchman's clocks at various
stations on the plant, and report any fires and trespassers. The
fire insurance company which insured the plant's buildings,
machinery, and fixtures required respondent to have a night
watchman as a condition to granting reduced premium rates.
Respondent's desire to obtain these reduced rates was the primary
reason why Walton was employed. The plant was not operated at
night, while Walton was on duty, and he did not physically assist
in the manufacture of shipment of veneer.
In holding that these facts fell short of proving that Walton's
work was "necessary to the production" of respondent's goods, the
Mississippi Supreme Court particularly emphasized that Walton had
no other duties to perform in addition to his regular duties as a
night watchman; that he engaged in no manual activities connected
with production; that he was not specially employed to protect
goods assembled for manufacture or awaiting shipment in interstate
commerce, and that no goods were manufactured during the hours he
was on guard. Under our decision in the
Kirschbaum case,
supra, no one of these facts, standing alone, nor all of
them together, can support the Court's conclusion that the nature
of Walton's employment left him without the Act's protection. His
duty was to aid in protecting the building, machinery, and
equipment from injury or destruction by fire or trespass. The very
fact that a fire insurance company was willing to reduce its
premiums upon condition that a night watchman be kept on guard is
evidence that a watchman would make a valuable contribution to the
continuous production of respondent's goods. "The maintenance of a
safe, habitable building is indispensable to that activity."
A.
B. Kirschbaum Co. v. Walling, supra, 316 U. S. 524.
The relationship of Walton's employment to production was therefore
not "tenuous," but
Page 320 U. S. 543
had that "close and immediate tie with the process of production
for commerce" which brought him within the coverage of the Act.
Ibid. 316 U. S.
525.
The judgment is reversed, and the cause is remanded to the
Mississippi Supreme Court for further proceedings not inconsistent
with this opinion.
Reversed.
MR. JUSTICE ROBERTS, considering himself bound by the decision
in
Kirschbaum Co. v. Walling, 316 U.
S. 517, concurs in the result.
[
Footnote 1]
52 Stat. 1069, U.S.C. Title 29, § 216(b).
[
Footnote 2]
11 So. 2d 912.
[
Footnote 3]
Section 3(j) of the Act provides that,
"An employee shall be deemed to have been engaged in the
production of goods if such employee was employed in producing, . .
. such goods, or in any process or occupation necessary to the
production thereof."
52 Stat. 1061, U.S.C. Title 29, § 203(j).