Construction of the Act of Congress passed 5 May, 1830,
entitled
"An act for the further extending the powers of the judges of
the Superior Court of the Territory of Arkansas, under the Act of
26 May, 1824, and for other purposes."
Under the provisions of an Act of Congress passed on 26 May,
1824, proceedings were instituted in the Superior Court of the
Territory of Arkansas, by which a confirmation was claimed of a
grant of land alleged to have been made to the petitioner,
Sampeyreac, by the Spanish government, prior to the cession of
Louisiana to the United States by the Treaty of April 3, 1803. This
claim was opposed by the district attorney of the United States,
and the court after hearing evidence, decreed that the petitioner
recover the land from the United
states. Afterwards, the, district attorney of the United States,
proceeding on the authority of the Act of 8 May, 1830, filed a bill
of review, founded on the allegation that the original decree was
obtained by fraud and surprise, that the documents produced in
support of the claim of Sampeyreac were forged, and that
the witnesses who had been examined to sustain the same were
perjured. At a subsequent term, Stewart was allowed to become a
defendant to the bill of review, and filed an answer, in which the
fraud and forgery are denied, and in which he asserts that if the
same were committed, he is ignorant thereof, and asserts that he is
a
bona fide purchaser of the land for a valuable
consideration, from one John J. Bowie, who conveyed to him the
claim of Sampeyreac by deed, dated about 22 October, 1828. On a
final hearing, the court being satisfied of the forgery, perjury,
and fraud, reversed the original decree.
Held that these
proceedings were legal, and were authorized by the act of 5 May,
1830.
Almost every law providing a new remedy affects and operates
upon causes of action existing at the time the law is passed. The
law of 1830 is in no respect the exercise of judicial powers; it
only organizes a tribunal with the powers to entertain judicial
proceedings. The act, in terms, applies to bills filed, or to be
filed. Such retrospective effect is no unusual course in laws
providing new remedies.
The act of 1830 does not require that all the technical rules in
the ordinary course of chancery proceedings on a bill of review
shall be pursued in proceedings instituted under the law.
In the case of
Polk's Lessee v.
Wendell, 5 Wheat. 308, it is said by this Court
that, on general principles, it is incontestable that a grantee can
convey no more than he possesses. Hence those who come in under a
void grant can acquire nothing.
Page 32 U. S. 223
The appellant, Sampeyreac, under the Act of Congress of 26 May,
1824, entitled
"An act enabling the claimants to lands within the limits of the
State of Missouri, and Territory of Arkansas, to institute
proceedings to try the validity of their claims,"
exhibited the bill against the United States, which was filed in
the clerk's office of the Superior Court in the Territory of
Arkansas, in chancery sitting, on 21 November, 1827, stating that,
being an inhabitant of Louisiana, he did, on 6 October, 1789,
address a letter to the governor of the then Spanish province of
Louisiana, asking for ten arpens of land in front, with the usual
depth, on Strawberry River, within the District of Arkansas, to be
granted to him in full property, and that the said governor did, on
11 October, 1789, make an order of survey upon said petition, which
the appellant alleged, was such a claim as might have been
perfected into a complete title, under and in conformity to the
laws, usages and customs of the government of Spain, under which
the same originated, had not the sovereignty of the country been
transferred to the United States, and was therefore provided for by
the Treaty between the United States and the French republic made
30 April, 1803. The bill prayed that this claim might be confirmed
according to the provisions of the act of Congress before
mentioned.
Upon this petition, the clerk of the court issued a subpoena
against the district attorney of the United States, which was
executed on 24 November, 1827. To this bill, the district attorney
of the United States filed an answer, at the December term of said
court, 1827, denying, generally the facts and allegations in said
bill, and alleging that Sampeyreac was a fictitious person, or was
a foreigner, and then dead. On 19 December, 1827, the district
attorney of the United States moved to postpone the final
adjudication of the case until the following term, for the
following reasons:
1. The petition and subpoena in this case were served on the
United States within one month of the present term of this Court,
but more than fifteen days allowed by law, and in consequence of
this short notice, the United States attorney has not answered this
bill until the present term.
2.
Page 32 U. S. 224
Has not had a sufficient length of time to take
counter-depositions, if counterevidence does exist.
3. There are many more cases pending in this Court on the same
principles, and similarly situated in all respects, and the
attorney for the United States asks this continuance for the
purpose of procuring such evidence as may exist on the part of the
government.
The court proceeded to hear the cause, and upon the deposition
of one John Heberard, entered on that day a decree against the
United States in favor of said Sampeyreac for four hundred arpens
of land.
On 14 February, 1828, a deed, purporting to be a deed executed
by Sampeyreac, transferring his claim to the clerk's certificate of
the existence of this decree, and of all his right, title, and
interest in said decree, to John J. Bowie, was proved and admitted
to record on the 22 day of October, 1828, in the office of the
Circuit Court of Hempstead County, in the Territory of Arkansas,
and which title was transferred by Bowie to Joseph Stewart, in
December, 1828, by virtue of which transfer the said Stewart filed
with the register of the land office at Little Rock, an application
for the N.E. 17, 11 S., 26 W., and E. 1/2, S.E. 17, 11 S., 26 W.,
and W. 1/2 N.E. 13, 11 S., 27 W. which application was admitted by
the register, on 13 December, 1828.
At the April term, 1830 of the court, the United States
attorney, upon leave granted, filed a bill charging that the decree
entered by the court, at the December term, 1827, in the case of
Sampeyreac, was obtained by fraud and surprise, and alleging that
the court erred in proceeding to the trial of said cause at the
said December term without having set said cause for hearing and
without affording the United States time to prove the injustice of
the claim. The bill charged that the original petition to Governor
Mero and the order of survey were forgeries which fact had come to
the knowledge of the attorney since the decree was made; that
Sampeyreac was a fictitious person, or, if he ever did exist, was
dead; that Heberard and the other witnesses committed perjury in
this case; and that the petition and order of survey were made
since 1789; and that record evidence had been discovered since
the
Page 32 U. S. 225
decree which would be produced upon the hearing to prove the
forgery.
Sampeyreac was proceeded against as an absent defendant, after
the return of the subpoena, that "he was not to be found in the
Territory of Arkansas," and a decree
pro confesso was
entered as to him on 28 October, 1830. Before this decree was
entered, Joseph Stewart was permitted to file his answer and was
made a defendant in this case, which was excepted to on the part of
the United States, and a bill of exceptions was signed by the court
on 28 October, 1830.
It was not charged or contended that Stewart purchased with a
knowledge of the forgery either of the original grant or of the
transfer from Sampeyreac to Bowie.
The final decree reversing and annulling the decree entered in
favor of Sampeyreac at December term, 1827, was delivered by the
court February 7, 1831. From this decree this appeal was taken by
Joseph Stewart for himself and Sampeyreac.
Page 32 U. S. 234
MR. JUSTICE THOMPSON delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case comes up on appeal from the Superior Court in the
Territory of Arkansas. The decree of the court was founded upon
proceedings instituted under an act of Congress entitled
"An act for further extending the powers of the judges of the
Superior Court of the Territory of Arkansas under the Act of 26
May, 1824, and for other purposes,"
passed 8 May, 1830, 4 Stat. 399. This act declares that the act
of 1824,
id., 39,
Page 32 U. S. 235
shall be continued in force so far as the said act relates to
the claims within the Territory of Arkansas, until 1 July, 1831,
for the purpose of enabling the court in Arkansas, having
cognizance of claims under the said act, to proceed by bills of
review, filed or to be filed in the said court on the part of the
United States for the purpose of revising all or any of the decrees
of the said court in cases wherein it shall appear to the said
court or be alleged in such bills of review that the jurisdiction
of the same was assumed in any case on any forged warrant,
concession, grant, order of survey, or other evidence of title. And
in every case wherein it shall appear to the said court, on the
prosecution of any such bill of review, that such warrant,
concession, grant, order of survey, or other evidence of title is a
forgery, it shall be lawful, and the said court is hereby
authorized to proceed, by further order and decree to reverse and
annul any prior decree or adjudication upon such claim, and
thereupon such prior decree or adjudication shall be deemed and
held in all places whatever to be null and void to all intents and
purposes.
Upon the proceedings on the bill of review instituted under this
act, the court pronounced the following decree:
"It is therefore adjudged, ordered, and decreed that the former
decree of this court in favor of the defendant, Bernardo
Sampeyreac, against the United States, for four hundred acres of
land, pronounced and recorded at the December term of this court in
the year 1827, be and the same is hereby reversed, annulled, and
held for naught."
From this decree the present appeal was taken.
To a right understanding of the questions which have been made
at the bar, it will be necessary briefly to state the proceedings
which took place under the original bill. That bill or petition was
filed on 21 November, 1827, under the provisions of the Act of 26
May, 1824, 4 Stat. 39, setting forth that the complainant, Bernardo
Sampeyreac, on 6 October, 1789, he then being an inhabitant of
Louisiana, presented a petition to the then governor of the
province asking a grant for a tract of land in full property
containing ten arpens in front, by the usual depth, on
Page 32 U. S. 236
Strawberry River, &c. That afterwards, on 11 October, 1789,
the governor granted the petition. That at the time the grant was
so made, an order of survey was issued to the surveyor general of
the province. That by virtue of such grant and order of survey, the
petitioner acquired a claim to the land, which claim was secured to
him by the Treaty between the United States and the French Republic
of the 30 April, 1803. The district attorney put in an answer
denying the several facts and allegations in the bill and alleging
that grants could only be made legally to persons in existence and
actually residing in Louisiana. That Sampeyreac, in whose name the
bill is filed, was a fictitious person, never having had any actual
existence, or, if such person ever had any existence, he was a
foreigner, or was now dead and made no transfer or assignment of
the claim in his lifetime. That he had no legal representative in
existence, nor was there anyone now living who was authorized to
file this bill or prosecute this suit, and prayed that the bill
might be dismissed. A witness named John Heberard was examined and
sworn to all the material facts necessary to establish the claim,
and the court thereupon ordered, adjudged, and decreed that the
said Bernardo Sampeyreac recover of the United States the said four
hundred arpens of land.
The bill of review is founded upon the allegation that the
original decree was obtained by fraud and surprise. That the
original petition and order of survey exhibited in the case are
forged. That Heberard and the other witnesses in the cause
committed the crime of perjury. That the order of survey was never
signed by Mero, Governor of Louisiana, as the same purports to have
been, and that this fact has come to the knowledge of the district
attorney since the decree was entered, and the bill further charges
that the said Sampeyreac is a fictitious person. At the October
term, 1830, this bill was taken
pro confesso against
Sampeyreac, at which term the appellant, Joseph Stewart, appeared
in court and prayed to be made a defendant and have leave to file
an answer to the bill. This was resisted
Page 32 U. S. 237
by the district attorney, but an order was made by the court
permitting Stewart to be made a defendant, with leave to file an
answer, to which the district attorney excepted. The answer of
Stewart denies the frauds and forgeries alleged in the bill, but
avers that if there was any fraud, corruption, or forgery, he is
ignorant of it, and that he was a
bona fide purchaser of
the claim for a valuable consideration, from one John J. Bowie, who
conveyed to him the claim of the said Bernardo Sampeyreac by deed
bearing date about 22 October, 1828. Upon the final hearing, the
court reversed the original decree, as has been already stated.
The objections which have been taken at the bar to this decree
may be considered under the following points:
1. Whether, under the act of 1824, the court had authority to
entertain the bill of review, and if not, then
2. Whether the act of 1830 is a constitutional law, and confers
such authority.
3. Whether the proceedings on this bill of review can be
sustained under the act of 1830.
4. Whether, admitting Stewart to be a
bona fide
purchaser of the claim of Sampeyreac, he is protected against the
title set up by the United States.
1. We think it unnecessary to go into an examination of the
questions which have been made under the first point. Although the
act of 1824 directs that every petition which shall be presented
under its provisions shall be conducted according to the rules of a
court of equity, it may admit of doubt whether all the powers of a
court of chancery in relation to bills of review, are vested in
that court. And as the view taken by this Court upon the other
points renders a decision upon this unnecessary, we pass it over
without expressing any opinion upon it.
2. The ground upon which it has been argued that the act of 1830
is unconstitutional is that a right had become vested in Stewart
before the act was passed, and that the effect and operation of the
law is to deprive him of a vested right. To determine the force and
application of this objection, it becomes necessary to look at the
claim as it now appears before the Court. It is found by the decree
of the court below and is
Page 32 U. S. 238
admitted at the bar that Sampeyreac is a fictitious person. That
the petition purporting to have been presented by him to Mero,
Governor of the province of Louisiana, and the order of survey
alleged to have been made thereupon, are forgeries. These are the
only evidence of title upon which the original claim rests. And it
is proved and admitted that the deed purporting to have been given
by Sampeyreac to Bowie, under whom Stewart claims, is also a
forgery. The bill or petition filed in the original cause alleges
that the claim is secured by the Treaty between the United States
and the French Republic of 30 April, 1803. This, however, has not
been insisted upon on the argument here, and there is certainly no
color for pretending that a claim founded in fraud and forgery is
sanctioned by the treaty. The title to the land in question passed
by the treaty, and became vested in the United States, and there
has been no act on the part of United States by which they have
parted with the title.
It is contended, however, that this right or title has been
taken away by the original decree in this case under the act of
1824. By the 14th section of that act, all its provisions are
extended to the Territory of Arkansas, and it is declared that the
superior court of that territory shall have, hold, and exercise
jurisdiction in all cases in the same manner and under the same
restrictions and regulations in all respects as is given by the
said act to the District Court of the State of Missouri. And by the
second section of the act it is declared that in all cases, the
party, against whom the judgment or decree of the court may be
finally given shall be entitled to appeal within one year from its
rendition to the Supreme Court of the United States, the decision
of which court shall be final and conclusive between the parties,
and should no appeal be taken, the judgment or decree of the
district court shall in like manner be final and conclusive. No
appeal was taken within the year, and the question is whether the
United States, by neglecting to appeal, has lost its right, and if
not whether the remedy provided by the act of 1830 to assert that
right is in violation of the Constitution. If Sampeyreac was a real
person and appeared here, setting up this objection, it might
present a different question, although it is not admitted, even in
that case,
Page 32 U. S. 239
that the United States would be concluded as to the right. But
the original decree in this case was a mere nullity; it gave no
right to anyone. The title still remained in the United States, and
the most that can be said is that by omitting to appeal within the
time limited by the act, the remedy thereby provided was gone, and
the decree became final and conclusive with respect to such remedy.
But the act of 1830 provides a new remedy, and it may be added that
the act of 1824 declares the decree to be final and conclusive
between the parties. And as Sampeyreac was a fictitious person, he
was no party to the decree, and the act, in strictness, does not
apply to the case. But considering the act of 1830 as providing a
remedy only, it is entirely unexceptionable. It has been repeatedly
decided in this Court that the retrospective operation of such a
law forms no objection to it. Almost every law providing a new
remedy affects and operates upon causes of action existing at the
time the law is passed. The law of 1830 is in no respect the
exercise of judicial powers; it only organizes a tribunal with
powers to entertain judicial proceedings. When the original decree
was entered, there was no person in existence whose claim could be
ripened into a right against the United Stated by omitting to
appeal. Stewart was not only no party to the decree, but his
purchase from Bowie was nearly a year after the decree was entered.
Had Sampeyreac been a real person having a decree in his favor, and
Stewart had afterwards purchased of Bowie the right which that
decree established, it might have given him some equitable claim;
but it would have been subject to all prior equitable as well as
legal rights. Nor would it be available in any respect in the
present case, for Stewart in no manner whatever connects himself
with Sampeyreac. As it is admitted that the deed purporting to have
been given by Sampeyreac to Bowie is a forgery, Stewart is
therefore a mere stranger to this decree, and can derive no benefit
from it.
It is said that if this bill of review was filed under the act
of 1830, the court had no jurisdiction, the bill having been filed
in April and the law not passed until the May following. But the
act in terms applies to bills filed or to be filed, and of
course
Page 32 U. S. 240
cures his defect, if any existed. Such retrospective effect is
no unusual course in laws providing new remedies. The act of 1803,
amending the judicial system of the United States, 2 Stat. 244,
declares that from all final judgments or decrees rendered or to be
rendered, in any circuit court, &c., an appeal shall be allowed
to the Supreme Court, &c. It therefore forms no objection to
the law that the cause of action existed antecedent to its passage
so far as it applies to the remedy, and does not affect the
right.
3. But it is objected in the next place, that this bill or
review cannot be sustained under the act of 1830. That it was not
filed and prosecuted under the limitations and restrictions and
according to the course and practice of a court of chancery in such
a proceeding. We think it unnecessary to examine whether all the
technical rules required in the ordinary course of chancery
proceedings on a bill of review have been pursued in the present
case. The act clearly does not require it. It authorizes bills of
review to be filed on the part of the United States, for the
purpose of revising all or any of the decrees of the said court in
cases wherein it shall appear to the said court or be alleged in
such bills of review that the jurisdiction of the same was assumed,
in any case on any forged warrant, concession, grant, order of
survey or other evidence of title. If Congress had a right to
provide a tribunal in which the remedy might be prosecuted, it
clearly had a right to prescribe the manner in which it should be
pursued. The great and leading object was to provide for revising
the original decree or granting a new trial. The material
allegation required is that the original decree was founded upon
some forged evidence of title, and this is very fully set out in
the bill. That it was not the intention of the law that the court
should be confined to the technical rules of a court of chancery on
bills of review is evident from the provision in the last clause of
the first section of the act, which directs the court to proceed on
such bills of review by such rules of practice and regulations as
it may adopt for the execution of the powers vested or confirmed in
them by the act.
4. The next inquiry is whether the appellant, Stewart, has
Page 32 U. S. 241
acquired a right to the land by reason of his standing in the
character of a
bona fide purchaser. The record contains an
admission on the part of the United States that he purchased the
claims of John J. Bowie by deed for a valuable consideration in
good faith sometime in November or December, 1828. But this gave
him no right to be let in as a party in the bill of review; he was
not a party to the original bill, nor could he connect himself with
Sampeyreac, the only party to the bill -- he being a fictitious
person, and the interest of Stewart, whatever it might be, was
acquired long after the original decree was entered. He was
therefore a perfect stranger to that decree. The deed purporting to
have been given by Sampeyreac to Bowie is admitted to be a forgery.
Bowie, of course, had no interest, legal or equitable, which he
could convey to Stewart. But admitting Stewart to have been
properly let in as a party in the bill of review, the only
colorable equity which he showed, was the certificate of entry
given by the register of the land office, December 13, 1828, and
this certificate, founded on a decree in favor of Sampeyreac, a
fictitious person, obtained by fraud and upon forged evidence of
title. This certificate is entirely unavailable to Stewart. He can
obtain no patent under it if the original decree should remain
unreversed, for the act of 1830 forbids any patent thereafter to be
issued except in the name of the original party to the decree and
on proof, to the satisfaction of the officers, that the party
applying is such original party or is duly authorized by such
original party or his heirs to receive such patent. The original
party to the decree being a fictitious person, no title would pass
under the patent if issued; it would still remain in the United
States. But Stewart acquired no right whatever under the deed from
Bowie, the latter having no interest that he could convey. In the
case of
Polk's Lessee v.
Wendall, 5 Wheat. 308, it is said by this Court
that on general principles it is incontestable that a grantee can
convey no more than he possesses. Hence those who come in under the
holder of a void grant can acquire nothing. Upon the whole, we
think Stewart was improperly admitted
Page 32 U. S. 242
to become a party, but considering him a proper party, he has
shown no ground upon which he can sustain a right to the land in
question. The decree of the court below is accordingly
Affirmed with costs.
This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of the record
from the Superior Court for the Territory of Arkansas and was
argued by counsel, on consideration whereof it is decreed and
ordered by this Court that the decree of the said superior court in
this cause be and the same is hereby affirmed with costs.
