In this suit under the Federal Employers Liability Act, brought
in a state court against a carrier to recover damage for the death
of an employee, the evidence was sufficient to go to the jury on
the question whether, as alleged in the complaint, the defendant
was negligent in failing to use reasonable care to furnish the
employee a safe place to work. P.
319 U.S. 354.
113 Vt. 8, 28 A.2d 639, reversed.
Certiorari, 318 U.S. 751, to review the reversal of a judgment
upon a verdict for the plaintiff in a suit under the Federal
Employers Liability Act.
MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS delivered the opinion of the Court.
This action was brought under the Federal Employers' Liability
Act (45 U.S.C. § 51), in the state courts of Vermont to recover
damages for the death of Bernard E. Bailey, one of respondent's
employees. At the close of all the evidence, respondent moved for a
directed verdict. The Court denied the motion and submitted the
case to the jury, which returned a verdict for petitioner. On
appeal, the Supreme Court of Vermont reversed, by a divided vote,
holding that the motion for a directed verdict should have been
granted because negligence was not shown. 113 Vt. 8, 28 A.2d 639.
The case is here on certiorari.
Page 319 U. S. 351
Bailey had worked for respondent as a sectionman for about five
years. On the day in question, May 14, 1940, he went to work on a
work train to a point on the road in Williston, Vt., where he and
other members of the crew unloaded track material to be used on the
roadbed. Instructions were then received to unload a car filled
with cinders. The evidence of the accident, viewed in a light
favorable to petitioner, was as follows:
The car was pulled onto a bridge over a cattle pass so that the
cinders could be dumped through the ties in the bridge floor onto
the roadway below. The floor of the bridge was about 18 feet above
the ground. The only available footing at the side of the car was
about 12 inches wide. Of this space, 8 or 9 inches were taken up by
a raised stringer --
i.e., a timber which lay across the
ties and was set in 3 or 4 inches from their ends. There was no
guard rail. The cinders to be unloaded were in a hopper car. That
type of car has doors in the floor which are closed by a chain
which winds up on a shaft running crossways of the car. The doors
are opened from the side by one man turning a nut on the end of the
shaft while another disengages from a ratchet a dog which holds the
shaft. A wrench is applied to the nut at the end of the shaft, the
operator pulls its handle back to relieve the tension on the dog,
the other person releases the dog, the operator of the wrench
pushes back on it to open the hopper, and the weight of the
material in the car opens the doors. When the hopper starts to
open, the shaft spins, and the operator must disengage the wrench
or let go of it, lest he thrown off balance or knocked down. The
wrench used by Bailey was a heavy frog wrench -- open jaws and a
handle about three feet long. It had been used for many years for
that purpose, and no one had been injured by it. Bailey certainly
was unskilled, and perhaps unfamiliar in the opening of hopper
cars. No one had ever seen him open one. Such an operation was
usually
Page 319 U. S. 352
performed by men older in point of service. Bailey had been
present on a few occasions when hopper cars were unloaded, but
usually he was on top of the car at the time. Cinders were dumped
at this bridge about once a year. As Bailey walked out on the
stringer on the bridge and put the wrench on the nut, the section
foreman said, "Be careful the wrench doesn't catch you." Bailey at
once pushed on the wrench, but the hopper did not open; he gave
another push on the wrench, the hopper opened, the nut spun, and
Bailey was thrown by the wrench into the roadway below. The hopper
car could have been opened before it was moved onto the bridge, and
any cinders which spilled on the roadbed shoveled onto the roadway
beneath the bridge. Or, after the cinders had been dumped upon the
roadbed, a railroad tie could have been utilized as a drag to push
cinders from the roadbed to the ground below the bridge.
Bailey died from the injuries resulting from the fall.
There was, in our view, sufficient evidence to go to the jury on
the question whether, as alleged in the complaint, respondent was
negligent in failing to use reasonable care in furnishing Bailey
with a safe place to do the work.
Sec. 1 of the Act makes the carrier liable in damages for any
injury or death "resulting in whole or in part from the negligence"
of any of its "officers, agents, or employees." The rights which
the Act creates are federal rights protected by federal, rather
than local, rules of law.
In re Second Employers' Liability
Cases, 223 U. S. 1;
Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. Horton, 233 U.
S. 492;
Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co. v. Kuhn,
284 U. S. 44. And
those federal rules have been largely fashioned from the common law
(
Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. Horton, supra) except as
Congress has written into the Act different standards.
Tiller
v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 318 U. S.
54. At common law, the duty of the employer to use
reasonable care in furnishing his employees with a safe place to
work was plain. 3 Labatt,
Page 319 U. S. 353
Master & Servant (2d ed.) § 917. That rule is deeply
engrained in federal jurisprudence.
Patton v. Texas &
Pacific Ry. Co., 179 U. S. 658,
179 U. S. 664,
and cases cited;
Kreigh v. Westinghouse & Co.,
214 U. S. 249,
214 U. S.
256-257;
Kenmont Coal Co. v. Patton, 268 F.
334, 336. As stated by this Court in the
Patton case, it
is a duty which becomes "more imperative" as the risk
increases.
"Reasonable care becomes, then, a demand of higher supremacy,
and yet, in all cases, it is a question of the reasonableness of
the care, reasonableness depending upon the danger attending the
place or the machinery."
179 U.S. p.
179 U. S. 664.
It is that rule which obtains under the Employers' Liability Act.
See Coal & Coke Ry. Co. v. Deal, 231 F. 604;
Northwestern Pacific R. Co. v. Fiedler, 52 F.2d 400;
Thomson v. Boles, 123 F.2d 487; 2 Roberts, Federal
Liabilities of Carriers (2d ed.) § 807. That duty of the carrier is
a "continuing one" (
Kreigh v. Westinghouse, C., K. & Co.,
supra, p.
214 U. S. 256)
from which the carrier is not relieved by the fact that the
employee's work at the place in question is fleeting or
infrequent.
The nature of the task which Bailey undertook, the hazards which
it entailed, the effort which it required, the kind of footing he
had, the space in which he could stand, the absence of a guard
rail, the height of the bridge above the ground, the fact that the
car could have been opened or unloaded near the bridge on level
ground -- all these were facts and circumstances for the jury to
weigh and appraise in determining whether respondent in furnishing
Bailey with that particular place in which to perform the task was
negligent. The debatable quality of that issue, the fact that
fair-minded men might reach different conclusions, emphasize the
appropriateness of leaving the question to the jury. The jury is
the tribunal under our legal system to decide that type of issue
(
Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., supra) as well as
issues involving controverted evidence.
Jones v.
East Tennessee v. & G. R. Co., 128 U.S.
Page 319 U. S. 354
443,
128 U. S. 445;
Washington & Georgetown R. Co. v. McDade, 135 U.
S. 554,
135 U. S. 572.
To withdraw such a question from the jury is to usurp its
functions.
The right to trial by jury is "a basic and fundamental feature
of our system of federal jurisprudence."
Jacob v. New York
City, 315 U. S. 752. It
is part and parcel of the remedy afforded railroad workers under
the Employers' Liability Act. Reasonable care and cause and effect
are as elusive here as in other fields. But the jury has been
chosen as the appropriate tribunal to apply those standards to the
facts of these personal injuries. That method of determining the
liability of the carriers and of placing on them the cost of these
industrial accidents may be crude, archaic, and expensive as
compared with the more modern systems of workmen's compensation.
But, however inefficient and backward it may be, it is the system
which Congress has provided. To deprive these workers of the
benefit of a jury trial in close or doubtful cases is to take away
a goodly portion of the relief which Congress has afforded
them.
Since the evidence of respondent's negligence in failing to
provide Bailey with a safe place to work is sufficient to support
the verdict of the jury and the judgment of the trial court, we do
not reach the other issues which have been presented by
petitioner.
Reversed.
MR. JUSTICE ROBERTS.
I am of opinion that this case is one of a type not intended by
Congress to be brought to this court for review. Actions under the
Federal Employers' Liability Act constitute but one category of the
great total of actions triable in Federal District Courts and in
the courts of the forty-eight states which may come to this court.
While the legal principles binding alike on court and jury in such
actions are, for the most part, settled the complexes of fact
to
Page 319 U. S. 355
which these principles are applicable rarely are identical in
any two litigations. If, in every case where, peradventure, this
court might differ from a lower court in appraising the legal
effect of the proofs adduced by plaintiff or defendant, we
independently review the facts to determine whether there was
evidence for a jury's consideration, we shall reverse a course
founded in over fifty years of history.
While a litigant has no constitutional right of appellate
review, Congress has seen fit to grant it. And, until 1891, this
court was, with negligible exceptions, the only instrument of such
review. The increasing volume of our appellate work bade fair to
render the court incompetent to give needed consideration to
important cases which the public interest required that it decide.
To preserve the privilege of appellate review, and to provide an
appellate tribunal where most federal litigation should end without
resort of this court, Congress created the Circuit Courts of
Appeals. [
Footnote 1] The
relief thus afforded this court prevented the substantial breakdown
of our appellate function. But the relief proved insufficient, and
Congress continued to adopt means to render it possible for us to
do the indispensable work of the court. In 1915, it made the
judgments of Circuit Courts of Appeals final in certain classes of
cases arising in Puerto Rico and Hawaii, and also in bankruptcy
cases, subject, as to the latter, to our discretionary power to
take cases involving important questions. [
Footnote 2] The House Committee, in its report, said as
to the objects of the bill: [
Footnote 3]
"Relieving the Supreme Court of the United States from the
necessity of reviewing such cases from the Supreme Courts of Porto
Rico and Hawaii as involved no Federal question, but depend
entirely upon the local or general
Page 319 U. S. 356
law. Under the law as it now stands, the decisions of the
Supreme Courts of Porto Rico and Hawaii are reviewable by the
Supreme Court of the United States not only when some Federal right
is in controversy, but also in all cases which involve more than
$5,000, without respect to the character of the questions involved.
This section, as amended, includes Porto Rico with Hawaii, and
continues the existing right to review in the Supreme Court when
Federal rights are in controversy, but leaves all other cases to be
dealt with upon a petition for a writ of certiorari, as is now the
law with respect to most of the cases in the circuit court of
appeals."
The great mass of litigation in state and federal courts arising
under the Employers' Liability Act and railway safety appliance
legislation still could be brought to this court as of right under
existing law. [
Footnote 4] In
1916, Congress abolished the right, and made the judgments of state
appellate courts and Circuit Courts of Appeals final in this class
of cases, subject to our discretionary review. [
Footnote 5] The Senate Committee report on the
bill was entitled "Relief of the Supreme Court," and to it was
appended a memorandum prepared by the clerk of this court
exhibiting the congested state of our docket. [
Footnote 6] Finally, in 1925, Congress dealt in
the same fashion with all litigation sought to be brought here for
review from state and federal tribunals, save for certain narrowly
restricted classes. [
Footnote
7]
Without the benefit of this restriction of its obligatory
jurisdiction, this court could not have attained the end and aim of
its creation. But there remains the constant danger that, by taking
cases lying outside defined areas
Page 319 U. S. 357
of importance, the court will limit its ability adequately to
deal with those which all will agree it must adjudicate.
And so the policy of the court has been to abstain from taking a
case even though it thought it erroneously decided below, whether
on an issue of law or fact, if the decision did not involve an
important question of law, did not create a diversity of decision
in lower courts, or would not seriously affect the administration
of the law in other cases. And this has been especially so where a
decision below recognized the controlling legal principles, but was
claimed to have applied them improperly to the specific facts
disclosed. The instant case plainly belongs in the class last
mentioned. All members of the Supreme Court of Vermont agreed upon
the controlling legal rule. They sharply and almost evenly divided
on the question whether the plaintiff's evidence brought her case
within that rule. What they decided, and what we decide, can add
nothing to the body of jurisprudence. And it is irrelevant to the
question of our exercise of the power of review that, if we had
been charged with the responsibility of a trial judge or a member
of the court below, we might have held the case one for submission
to a jury.
In almost every litigation, the parties are afforded hearings in
at least two courts. This was true here, the appellate court being
the supreme court of the state of the parties' residence. If, in
such a case, we accord a third hearing whenever we should have
applied the law differently, we shall have little time or
opportunity to do aught else than examine the claims of plaintiffs
and defendants that, in the special circumstances disclosed,
prejudicial errors have been committed in the admission of evidence
in rulings of law, and in charges to juries.
There is no reason why a preference should be given, in these
respects, to actions instituted under the Federal Employers'
Liability Act, over others founded on other
Page 319 U. S. 358
federal statutes, over contract cases, or admiralty cases, where
a failure properly to rule on the facts is asserted to have wrought
injury to one of the parties. [
Footnote 8]
It seems to be thought, however, that any ruling which takes a
case from the jury, albeit it will not serve as a precedent, is of
such paramount importance as to require review here. I merely state
my conviction that the Seventh Amendment envisages trial not by
jury, but by court and jury, according to the view of the common
law, and that federal and state courts have not usurped power
denied them by the fundamental law in directing verdicts where a
party failed to adduce proof to support his contention, or in
entering judgment notwithstanding a verdict for like reason. But
this I do say -- that this court does not sit to redress every
apparent error committed by competent and responsible courts whose
judgments we are empowered to review. And, if we undertake any such
task, we shall disenable the court to fulfill its high office in
the scheme of our government.
Finally, I cannot concur in the intimation, which I think the
opinion gives, that, as Congress has seen fit not to enact a
workmen's compensation law, this court will strain the law of
negligence to accord compensation where the employer is without
fault. I yield to none in my belief in the wisdom and equity of
workmen's compensation laws, but I do not conceive it to be within
our judicial function to write the policy which underlies
compensation laws into acts of Congress when Congress has not
chosen that policy, but, instead, has adopted the common law
doctrine of negligence.
MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER joins in this opinion.
[
Footnote 1]
Act of March 3, 1891, 26 Stat. 826.
[
Footnote 2]
Act of January 28, 1915, 38 Stat. 803.
[
Footnote 3]
H.R. No. 847, 63d Cong., 3d Sess.
[
Footnote 4]
Southern Ry. Co. v. Crockett, 234 U.
S. 725.
[
Footnote 5]
Act of Sept. 6, 1916, c. 448, 39 Stat. 726, § 3.
See Andrews
v. Virginian Ry. Co., 248 U. S. 272.
[
Footnote 6]
S.R. No. 775, 64th Cong., 1st Sess.
See also the House
Report No. 794, 64th Cong., 1st Sess.
[
Footnote 7]
Act of February 13, 1925, 43 Stat. 936.
[
Footnote 8]
See the dissent in
Deputy v. Du Pont,
308 U. S. 488,
308 U. S.
499.
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE STONE.
I agree with MR. JUSTICE ROBERTS that the present case is not an
appropriate one for the exercise of our discretionary
Page 319 U. S. 359
power to afford a second appellate review of the state court
judgment by writ of certiorari. But, as we have adhered to our
longstanding practice of granting certiorari upon the affirmative
vote of four Justices, the case is properly here for decision, and
is, I think, correctly decided.