A municipal ordinance forbidding any person to knock on door,
ring doorbells, or otherwise summon to the door the occupants of
any residence for the purpose of distributing to them handbills or
circulars,
held -- as applied to a person distributing
advertisements for a religious meeting -- invalid under the Federal
Constitution as a denial of freedom of speech and press. Pp.
319 U. S. 142,
319 U. S.
149.
139 Ohio St. 372, 40 N.E.2d 154, reversed.
Appeal from the dismissal of an appeal from a judgment affirming
a conviction for violation of a municipal ordinance.
MR. JUSTICE BLACK delivered the opinion of the Court.
For centuries, it has been a common practice in this and other
countries for persons not specifically invited to go from home to
home and knock on doors or ring doorbells to communicate ideas to
the occupants or to invite them to political, religious, or other
kinds of public meetings. Whether such visiting shall be permitted
has in general been deemed to depend upon the will of the
individual master of each household, and not upon the determination
of the community. In the instant case, the City of Struthers, Ohio,
has attempted to make this decision for all its inhabitants. The
question to be decided is whether the City, consistently with the
federal Constitution's
Page 319 U. S. 142
guarantee of free speech and press, possesses this power.
[
Footnote 1]
The appellant, espousing a religious cause in which she was
interested -- that of the Jehovah's Witnesses -- went to the homes
of strangers, knocking on doors and ringing doorbells in order to
distribute to the inmates of the homes leaflets advertising a
religious meeting. In doing so, she proceeded in a conventional and
orderly fashion. For delivering a leaflet to the inmate of a home,
she was convicted in the Mayor's Court and was fined $10.00 on a
charge of violating the following City ordinance:
"It is unlawful for any person distributing handbills,
circulars, or other advertisements to ring the door bell, sound the
door knocker, or otherwise summon the inmate or inmates of any
residence to the door for the purpose of receiving such handbills,
circulars or other advertisements they or any person with them may
be distributing."
The appellant admitted knocking at the door for the purpose of
delivering the invitation, but seasonably urged in the lower Ohio
state court that the ordinance as construed and applied was beyond
the power of the State because in violation of the right of freedom
of press and religion as guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth
Amendments. [
Footnote 2]
Page 319 U. S. 143
The right of freedom of speech and press has broad scope. The
authors of the First Amendment knew that novel and unconventional
ideas might disturb the complacent, but they chose to encourage a
freedom which they believed essential if vigorous enlightenment was
ever to triumph over slothful ignorance. [
Footnote 3] This freedom embraces the right to
distribute literature,
Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.
S. 444,
303 U. S. 452,
and necessarily protects the right to receive it. The privilege may
not be withdrawn even if it creates the minor nuisance for a
community of cleaning litter from its streets.
Schneider v.
State, 308 U. S. 147,
308 U. S. 162.
Yet the peace, good order, and comfort of the community may
imperatively require regulation of the time, place and manner of
distribution.
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.
S. 296,
310 U. S. 304.
No one supposes, for example, that a city need permit a man with a
communicable disease to distribute leaflets on the street or to
homes, or that the First Amendment prohibits a state from
preventing the distribution of leaflets in a church against the
will of the church authorities.
We are faced in the instant case with the necessity of weighing
the conflicting interests of the appellant in the civil rights she
claims, as well as the right of the individual householder to
determine whether he is willing to receive her message, against the
interest of the community which, by this ordinance, offers to
protect the interests of all of its citizens, whether particular
citizens want that protection or not. The ordinance does not
control anything but the distribution of literature, and, in that
respect,
Page 319 U. S. 144
it substitutes the judgment of the community for the judgment of
the individual householder. It submits the distributor to criminal
punishment for annoying the person on whom he calls, even though
the recipient of the literature distributed is, in fact, glad to
receive it. In considering legislation which thus limits the
dissemination of knowledge, we must "be astute to examine the
effect of the challenged legislation," and must "weigh the
circumstances and . . . appraise the substantiality of the reasons
advanced in support of the regulation."
Schneider v. State,
supra, 161.
Ordinances of the sort now before us may be aimed at the
protection of the householders from annoyance, including intrusion
upon the hours of rest, and at the prevention of crime. Constant
callers, whether selling pots or distributing leaflets, may lessen
the peaceful enjoyment of a home as much as a neighborhood glue
factory or railroad yard which zoning ordinances may prohibit. In
the instant case, for example, it is clear from the record that the
householder to whom the appellant gave the leaflet which led to her
arrest was more irritated than pleased with her visitor. The City,
which is an industrial community most of whose residents are
engaged in the iron and steel industry, [
Footnote 4] has vigorously argued that its inhabitants
frequently work on swing shifts, working nights and sleeping days,
so that casual bell pushers might seriously interfere with the
hours of sleep although they call at high noon. In addition,
burglars frequently pose as canvassers, either in order that they
may have a pretense to discover whether a house is empty, and hence
ripe for burglary, or for the purpose of spying out the premises in
order that they may return later. [
Footnote 5] Crime prevention may thus be the purpose of
regulatory ordinances.
Page 319 U. S. 145
While door-to-door distributors of literature may be either a
nuisance or a blind for criminal activities, they may also be
useful members of society engaged in the dissemination of ideas in
accordance with the best tradition of free discussion. The
widespread use of this method of communication by many groups
espousing various causes attests its major importance.
"Pamphlets have proved most effective instruments in the
dissemination of opinion. And perhaps the most effective way of
bringing them to the notice of individuals is their distribution at
the homes of the people."
Schneider v. State, supra, 308 U. S. 164.
Many of our most widely established religious organizations have
used this method of disseminating their doctrines, [
Footnote 6] and laboring groups have used it
in recruiting
Page 319 U. S. 146
their members. [
Footnote 7]
The federal government, in its current war bond selling campaign,
encourages groups of citizens to distribute advertisements and
circulars from house to house. [
Footnote 8] Of, course, as every person acquainted with
political life knows, door to door campaigning is one of the most
accepted techniques of seeking popular support, while the
circulation of nominating papers would be greatly handicapped if
they could not be taken to the citizens in their homes. [
Footnote 9] Door-to-door distribution
of circulars is essential to the poorly financed causes of little
people.
Freedom to distribute information to every citizen wherever he
desires to receive it is so clearly vital to the
Page 319 U. S. 147
preservation of a free society that, putting aside reasonable
police and health regulations of time and manner of distribution,
it must be fully preserved. The dangers of distribution can so
easily be controlled by traditional legal methods, leaving to each
householder the full right to decide whether he will receive
strangers as visitors, that stringent prohibition can serve no
purpose but that forbidden by the Constitution, the naked
restriction of the dissemination of ideas.
Traditionally, the American law punishes persons who enter onto
the property of another after having been warned by the owner to
keep off. General trespass after warning statutes exist in at least
twenty states, [
Footnote 10]
while similar statutes of narrower scope are on the books of at
least twelve states more. [
Footnote 11] We know of no state which,
Page 319 U. S. 148
as does the Struthers ordinance in effect, makes a person a
criminal trespasser if he enters the property of another for an
innocent purpose without an explicit command from the owners to
stay away. [
Footnote 12] The
National Institute of Municipal Law Officers has proposed a form of
regulation to its member cities [
Footnote 13] which would make it an offense for any
person to ring the bell of a householder who has appropriately
indicated that he is unwilling to be disturbed. This or any similar
regulation leaves the decision as to whether distributors of
literature may lawfully call at a home where it belongs -- with the
homeowner himself. A city can punish those who call at a home in
defiance of the previously expressed will of the occupant and, in
addition, can, by identification devices, control the abuse of the
privilege by criminals posing as canvassers. [
Footnote 14] In any case, the problem must be
worked
Page 319 U. S. 149
out by each community for itself with due respect for the
constitutional rights of those desiring to distribute literature
and those desiring to receive it, as well as those who choose to
exclude such distributors from the home.
The Struthers ordinance does not safeguard these constitutional
rights. For this reason, and wholly aside from any other possible
defects, on which we do not pass but which are suggested in other
opinions filed in this case, we conclude that the ordinance is
invalid because in conflict with the freedom of speech and
press.
The judgment below is reversed for further proceedings not
inconsistent with this opinion.
Reversed.
[
Footnote 1]
This ordinance was not directed solely at commercial
advertising.
Cf. Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U. S.
52;
Green River v. Fuller Brush Co., 65 F.2d
112.
Compare, for possible different results under state
constitutions,
Prior v. White, 132 Fla. 1, 180 So. 347;
City of Orangeburg v. Farmer, 181 S.C. 143, 186 S.E.
783.
[
Footnote 2]
The appellant's judgment of conviction was appealed to the
Supreme Court of Ohio, which dismissed the appeal on the stated
ground that: "No debatable constitutional question is involved."
139 Ohio St. 372, 40 N.E.2d 154. We at first dismissed the appeal,
thinking that the Supreme Court of Ohio meant that no
constitutional question had been properly raised in accordance with
Ohio procedure. 317 U.S. 589. Upon reconsideration, we concluded
that, since a constitutional question had been presented in the
lower State court, the language of the Order of the Supreme Court
of Ohio should be construed as a decision upon the constitutional
question. 318 U.S. 739.
[
Footnote 3]
"The only security of all is in a free press. The force of
public opinion cannot be resisted when permitted freely to be
expressed. The agitation it produces must be submitted to. It is
necessary to keep the waters pure."
Jefferson to Lafayette, Writings of Thomas Jefferson, Washington
ed. v. 7, p. 325.
[
Footnote 4]
16th Census, "Population -- 2d Series -- Ohio," 133, 151.
[
Footnote 5]
For a discussion of such practices,
see Soderman and
O'Connell, Modern Criminal Investigation, chap. 13 and chap. 20;
Federal Bureau of Investigation Law Enforcement Bulletin, July,
1938; 20 Public Management 83 (an analysis of the criminal records
of a group of canvassers in Winnetka, Illinois). Sacramento,
California, has rested a canvassing ordinance on crime prevention,
In re Hartmann, 25 Cal. App. 2d
55, 76 P.2d 709, and courts have been aware of this aspect of
the problem in dealing with such ordinances.
Allen v.
McGovern, 169 A. 345, 12 N.J.Misc. 12, 13;
Dziatkiewicz v.
Maplewood, 115 N.J.L. 37, 178 A. 205.
[
Footnote 6]
Representatives of the American Tract Society, an
interdenominational organization engaged in colportage since 1841,
have visited over twenty-five million families. Article on
"American Tract Society," 1 Encyclopedia Americana (1932 ed.) 566;
Annual Reports of the American Tract Society (
e.g., the
116th Report, 1941, 37-38; 117th Report, 1942, pp. 37-38); Baird,
Religion in America (1856), 334-340.
See also the activities of the American Bible Society.
Jones, Colportage Sketches (1883); Dwight, The Centennial History
of he American Bible Society (1916) 177-81, 293-95, 460; Annual
Reports of the American Bible Society (
e.g., 126th Report,
1942,
passim.).
For the worldwide colportage activities of the British and
Foreign Bible Society,
see the Society's 137th Report,
1941,
passim; For Wayfaring Men, (1939), 31-78; Ritson,
The World Is our Parish (1939), 116-18.
This practice has been followed by many religious groups.
See, e.g., Barnes, Barnes and Stephenson, Pioneers of
Light (1924), 81-104; Stevens, The First Hundred Years of the
American Baptist Publication Society (1925), 30-32. During the
fiscal year 1939-1940, representatives of the American Baptist
Publication Society visited 52,832 families. More than six million
families have been visited over a one hundred-year period. Annual
of Northern Baptist Convention, 1940, 671, 673; Year Book of the
Northern Baptist Convention, 1942, 332-335.
See, for the
practice of other religions, Stewart, Sheldon Jackson (1908), 32;
Goodykoontz, Home Missions on the American Frontier (1939),
120-122; Keller, The Second Great Awakening in Connecticut (1942),
117-121.
[
Footnote 7]
Lorwin and Flexner, The American Federation of Labor, 352;
International Ladies Garment Workers Union, Handbook of Trade Union
Methods, 10; Brooks, When Labor Organizes, chap. 1 ("Organizing a
Union").
[
Footnote 8]
"Women's Handbook," pp. 22 and 63, a publication of the Women's
Section of the War Savings Staff of the Department of the Treasury;
The Home Front Journal, April 1943, p. 1, a publication of the same
group; "A Program of Action for Clubs," p. 3, a publication of the
Department of the Treasury. Presumably a citizen of Struthers
distributing to homes the pamphlets recommended in "A Program of
Action" would violate the City's ordinance.
[
Footnote 9]
Merriam and Gosnell, The American Party System, 317 (The
Canvass); Bruce, American Parties and Politics, 407; Ostogoskii,
Democracy, 153-155, 453; Pierson, In the Brush, 142 (politics in
the old Southwest); Barnes, The Antislavery Impulse, 137-143
(circulation of antislavery petitions). The American Politician,
ed. by J. T. Salter, 19, 235, 310, 339, and The American Political
Scene, ed. by Edward Logan, 64, 150, indicate by passing references
to practices in many states the extent to which the door-to-door
canvass is a staple of political life.
For encouragement of this practice,
see Handbook of
Club Organization, National Federation of Women's Republican Clubs
(1942) 21, and Precinct Organization in War Time, a recent
publication of the Democratic National Committee.
[
Footnote 10]
Alabama Code (1940), Tit. 14, § 426; Connecticut Gen.Stat.
(1930), § 6119; Florida Stat. (1941), § 821.01; Georgia Code Ann.
(1938), § 26-3002; Illinois Ann.Stat. (Smith Hurd, 1935), Ch. 38, §
565; Indiana Stat. (Burns, 1933), § 10-4506; Maryland Ann.Code
(Flack, 1939), Art. 27, §§ 24, 286; Massachusetts Ann.Laws (1933)
v. 9, Ch. 266, § 120; Mississippi Code Ann. (1930), § 1168;
Nebraska Comp.Stat. (1929), §§ 76-807, 76-808; Nevada Comp.Laws
(1929), § 10447; North Carolina Code (1943), § 14-134; Ohio Code
Ann. (Throckmorton, 1942), § 12522; Oklahoma Stat. (1937), Tit. 21,
§ 1835; Oregon Comp.Laws Ann. (1940), §§ 23-593, 23-594;
Pennsylvania Ann.Stat. (Purdon, 1942 pocket part), Title 18, §
4954; South Carolina Code (1942), § 1190; Virginia Code (1936), §
4480a; Washington Rev.Stat. (Remington, 1932), § 2665; Wyoming
Rev.Stat. (1931), § 32-337.
[
Footnote 11]
Arkansas Stat. (Pope, 1937), § 3181; California Penal Code
(Deering, 1941), §§ 602, 627; Colorado Stat.Ann. (1935), vol. 3,
Ch. 73, § 118; Kentucky Rev.Stat. (Baldwin, 1942), §§ 433.720,
433.490; Louisiana Gen.Stat. (Dart, 1939), § 9463; Maine Rev.Stat.
(1930), Ch. 139, § 22; Minnesota Stat. (1941), § 621.57; Montana
Rev.Code Ann. (1935) § 11482; New Hampshire Public Laws (1926), Ch.
380, § 11; New Jersey Rev.Stat. (1937), Tit. 4, § 17-2; New York
Consol.Laws Ann. (McKinney, 1941), Conservation Law, §§ 361-364;
Texas Stat. (Vernon, 1936), P.C. Art. 1377.
[
Footnote 12]
Municipalities have occasionally made canvassers trespassers
without requiring that the householder give an explicit notice, as
the instant ordinance testifies.
See e.g., People v.
Bohnke, 287 N.Y. 154, 38 N.E. 478.
[
Footnote 13]
Municipalities and the Law in Action (1943), National Institute
of Municipal Law Officers, 373. We do not, by this reference, mean
to express any opinion on the wisdom or validity of the particular
proposals of the Institute.
[
Footnote 14]
"Nothing we have said is intended even remotely to imply that,
under the cloak of religion, persons may, with impunity, commit
frauds upon the public. Certainly penal laws are available to
punish such conduct. Even the exercise of religion may be at some
slight inconvenience in order that the state may protect its
citizens from injury. Without doubt, a state may protect its
citizens from fraudulent solicitation by requiring a stranger in
the community, before permitting him publicly to solicit funds for
any purpose, to establish his identity and his authority to act for
the cause which he purports to represent."
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.
S. 296,
310 U. S.
306,.
MR. JUSTICE MURPHY, concurring.
I join in the opinion of the Court, but the importance of this
and the other cases involving Jehovah's Witnesses decided today
moves me to add this brief statement.
I believe that nothing enjoys a higher estate in our society
than the right given by the First and Fourteenth Amendments freely
to practice and proclaim one's religious convictions.
Cf. Jones
v. Opelika, 316 U. S. 584 at
316 U. S. 621.
The right extends to the aggressive and disputatious, as well as to
the meek and acquiescent. The lesson of experience is that, with
the passage of time and the interchange of ideas, organizations,
once turbulent, perfervid and intolerant in their origin mellow
into tolerance and acceptance by the community or else sink into
oblivion. Religious differences are often sharp and pleaders at
times resort
"to exaggeration, to vilification of men who have been, or are,
prominent in church or state, and even to false statement. But the
people of this nation have ordained, in the light of history, that,
in spite of the probability of excesses and abuses, these liberties
are, in the long view, essential to enlightened opinion and right
conduct on the part of the citizens of a democracy."
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.
S. 296,
310 U. S. 310.
If a religious belief
Page 319 U. S. 150
has substance, it can survive criticism, heated and abusive
though it may be, with the aid of truth and reason alone. By the
same method, those who follow false prophets are exposed.
Repression has no place in this country. It is our proud
achievement to have demonstrated that unity and strength are best
accomplished not by enforced orthodoxy of views, but by diversity
of opinion through the fullest possible measure of freedom of
conscience and thought.
Also, few, if any, believe more strongly in the maxim "a man's
home is his castle" than I.
Cf. Goldman v. United States,
316 U. S. 129 at
316 U. S. 136.
If this principle approaches a collision with religious freedom,
there should be an accommodation, if at all possible, which gives
appropriate recognition to both. That is, if regulation should be
necessary to protect the safety and privacy of the home, an effort
should be made at the same time to preserve the substance of
religious freedom.
There can be no question but that appellant was engaged in a
religious activity when she was going from house to house in the
City of Struthers distributing circulars advertising a meeting of
those of her belief. Distribution of such circulars on the streets
cannot be prohibited.
Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.
S. 413. Nor can their distribution on the streets or
from house to house be conditioned upon obtaining a license which
is subject to the uncontrolled discretion of municipal officials,
Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U. S. 444;
Schneider v. State, 308 U. S. 147;
Largent v. Texas, 318 U. S. 418, or
upon payment of a license tax for the privilege of so doing.
Murdock v. Pennsylvania, ante, p.
319 U. S. 105;
Jones v. Opelika, ante, p.
319 U. S. .
Preaching from house to house is an age-old method of proselyting,
and it must be remembered that "one is not to have the exercise of
his liberty of expression in appropriate places abridged on the
plea that it may be exercised in some other place."
Schneider
v. State, supra, p,
308 U. S.
163.
Page 319 U. S. 151
No doubt there may be relevant considerations which justify
considerable regulation of door-to-door canvassing even for
religious purposes -- regulation as to time, number and
identification of canvassers, etc. -- which will protect the
privacy and safety of the home and yet preserve the substance of
religious freedom. And, if a householder does not desire visits
from religious canvassers, he can make his wishes known in a
suitable fashion. The fact that some regulation may be permissible,
however, does not mean that the First Amendment may be abrogated.
We are not dealing here with a statute "narrowly drawn to cover the
precise situation" that calls for remedial action,
Thornhill v.
Alabama, 310 U. S. 88,
310 U. S. 105;
Cantwell v. Connecticut, supra, 310 U. S. 311. As
construed by the state courts and applied to the case at bar, the
Struthers ordinance prohibits door-to-door canvassing of any kind,
no matter what its character and purpose may be, if attended by the
distribution of written or printed matter in the form of a circular
or pamphlet. I do not believe that this outright prohibition is
warranted. As I understand it, the distribution of circulars and
pamphlets is a relatively minor aspect of the problem. The primary
concern is with the act of canvassing as a source of inconvenience
and annoyance to householders. But if the city can prohibit
canvassing for the purpose of distributing religious pamphlets, it
can also outlaw the door-to-door solicitations of religious
charities, or the activities of the holy mendicant who begs alms
from house to house to serve the material wants of his fellowmen.
and thus obtain spiritual comfort for his own soul.
Prohibition may be more convenient to the lawmaker, and easier
to fashion, than a regulatory measure which adequately protects the
peace and privacy of the home without suppressing legitimate
religious activities. But that does not justify a repressive
enactment like the one now before us.
Cf. Schneider v. State,
supra, p.
308 U. S. 164.
Freedom of religion has a higher dignity under the Constitution
Page 319 U. S. 152
than municipal or personal convenience. In these days, free men
have no loftier responsibility than the preservation of that
freedom. A nation dedicated to that ideal will not suffer, but will
prosper, in its observance.
MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS and MR. JUSTICE RUTLEDGE join in this
opinion.
MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER.
From generation to generation, fresh vindication is given to the
prophetic wisdom of the framers of the Constitution in casting it
in terms so broad that it has adaptable vitality for the drastic
changes in our society which they knew to be inevitable, even
though they could not foresee them. Thus, it has come to be that
the transforming consequences resulting from the pervasive
industrialization of life find the Commerce Clause appropriate, for
instance, for national regulation of an aircraft flight wholly
within a single state. Such exertion of power by the national
government over what might seem a purely local transaction would,
as a matter of abstract law, have been as unimaginable to Marshall
as to Jefferson precisely because neither could have foreseen the
present conquest of the air by man. But law, whether derived from
acts of Congress or the Constitution, is not an abstraction. The
Constitution cannot be applied in disregard of the external
circumstances in which men live and move and have their being.
Therefore neither the First nor the Fourteenth Amendment is to be
treated by judges as though it were a mathematical abstraction, an
absolute having no relation to the lives of men.
The habits and security of life in sparsely settled rural
communities, or even in those few cities which a hundred and fifty
years ago had a population of a few thousand, cannot be made the
basis of judgment for determining the area of allowable
self-protection by present-day industrial communities. The lack of
privacy and the hazards
Page 319 U. S. 153
to peace of mind and body caused by people living not in
individual houses, but crowded together in large human beehives, as
they so widely do, are facts of modern living which cannot be
ignored.
Concededly, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
did not abrogate the power of the states to recognize that homes
are sanctuaries from intrusions upon privacy and of opportunities
for leading lives in health and safety. Door-knocking and
bell-ringing by professed peddlers of things or ideas may therefore
be confined within specified hours and otherwise circumscribed so
as not to sanctify the rights of these peddlers in disregard of the
rights of those within doors. Acknowledgement is also made that the
City of Struthers, the particular ordinance of which presents the
immediate issue before us, is one of those industrial communities
the residents of which have a working day consisting of twenty-four
hours, so that, for some portions of the city's inhabitants,
opportunities for sleep and refreshment require during day as well
as night whatever peace and quiet is obtainable in a modern
industrial town. It is further recognized that the modern multiple
residences give opportunities for pseudo-canvassers to ply evil
trades -- dangers to the community pursued by the few but
far-reaching in their success and in the fears they arouse.
The Court's opinion apparently recognizes these factors as
legitimate concerns for regulation by those whose business it is to
legislate. But it finds, if I interpret correctly what is wanting
in explicitness, that, instead of aiming at the protection of
householders from intrusion upon needed hours of rest or from those
plying evil trades, whether pretending the sale of pots and pans or
the distribution of leaflets, the ordinance before us merely
penalizes the distribution of "literature." To be sure, the
prohibition of this ordinance is within a small circle. But it is
not our business to require legislatures to extend the area
Page 319 U. S. 154
of prohibition or regulation beyond the demands of revealed
abuses. And the greatest leeway must be given to the legislative
judgment of what those demands are. The right to legislate implies
the right to classify. We should not, however unwittingly, slip
into the judgment seat of legislatures. I myself cannot say that
those in whose keeping is the peace of the City of Struthers and
the right of privacy of its home dwellers could not single out, in
circumstances of which they may have knowledge -- and I certainly
have not -- this class of canvassers as the particular source of
mischief. The Court's opinion leaves one in doubt whether
prohibition of all bell-ringing and door-knocking would be deemed
an infringement of the constitutional protection of speech. It
would be fantastic to suggest that a city has power, in the
circumstances of modern urban life, to forbid house-to-house
canvassing generally, but that the Constitution prohibits the
inclusion in such prohibition of door-to-door vending of
phylacteries or rosaries or of any printed matter. If the scope of
the Court's opinion, apart from some of its general observations,
is that this ordinance is an invidious discrimination against
distributors of what is politely called literature, and therefore
is deemed an unjustifiable prohibition of freedom of utterance, the
decision leaves untouched what are, in my view, controlling
constitutional principles, if I am correct in my understanding of
what is held, and I would not be disposed to disagree with such a
construction of the ordinance.
MR. JUSTICE REED, dissenting.
While I appreciate the necessity of watchfulness to avoid
abridgments of our freedom of expression, it is impossible for me
to discover in this trivial town police regulation a violation of
the First Amendment. No ideas are being suppressed. No censorship
is involved. The freedom to teach or preach by word or book is
unabridged, save only the right to call a householder to the door
of
Page 319 U. S. 155
his house to receive the summoner's message. I cannot expand
this regulation to a violation of the First Amendment.
Freedom to distribute publications is obviously a part of the
general freedom guaranteed the expression of ideas by the First
Amendment. It is trite to say that this freedom of expression is
not unlimited. Obscenity, disloyalty, and provocatives do not come
within its protection.
Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.
S. 697,
283 U. S. 712,
283 U. S. 716;
Schenck v. United States, 249 U. S.
47,
249 U. S. 51;
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.
S. 568,
315 U. S. 572,
315 U. S. 574.
All agree that there may be reasonable regulation of the freedom of
expression.
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.
S. 296,
310 U. S. 304.
One cannot throw dodgers "broadcast in the streets."
Schneider
v. State, 308 U. S. 147,
308 U. S.
161.
The ordinance forbids
"any person distributing handbills, circulars or other
advertisements to ring the doorbell, sound the door knocker, or
otherwise summon the inmate or inmates . . . to the door"
to receive the advertisement. The Court's opinion speaks of
prohibitions against the distribution of "literature." The precise
matter distributed appears in the footnote. [
Footnote 2/1] I do not
Page 319 U. S. 156
read the ordinance as prohibiting the distribution of
literature, nor can I appraise the dodger distributed as falling
into that classification. If the ordinance, in my view, did
prohibit the distribution of literature, while permitting all other
canvassing, I should believe such an ordinance discriminatory. This
ordinance is different. The most, it seems to me, that can be or
has been read into the ordinance is a prohibition of free
distribution of printed matter by summoning inmates to their doors.
There are excellent reasons to support a determination of the city
council that such distributors may not disturb householders while
permitting salesmen and others to call them to the door. Practical
experience may well convince the council that irritations arise
frequently from this method of advertising. The classification is
certainly not discriminatory. [
Footnote
2/2]
If the citizens of Struthers desire to be protected from the
annoyance of being called to their doors to receive printed matter,
there is, to my mind, no constitutional provision which forbids
their municipal council from modifying the rule that anyone may
sound a call for the householder to attend his door. It is the
council which is entrusted by the citizens with the power to
declare and abate the myriad nuisances which develop in a
community. Its determination should not be set aside by this Court
unless clearly and patently unconstitutional.
The antiquity and prevalence of colportage are relied on to
support the Court's decision. But the practice has persisted
because the householder was acquiescent. It can hardly be thought,
however, that long indulgence of a practice which many or all
citizens have welcomed or tolerated creates a constitutional right
to its continuance.
Page 319 U. S. 157
Changing conditions have begotten modification by law of many
practices once deemed a part of the individual's liberty.
The First Amendment does not compel a pedestrian to pause on the
street to listen to the argument supporting another's views of
religion or politics. Once the door is opened, the visitor may not
insert a foot and insist on a hearing. He certainly may not enter
the home. To knock or ring, however, comes close to such invasions.
To prohibit such a call leaves open distribution of the notice on
the street or at the home without signal to announce its deposit.
Such assurance of privacy falls far short of an abridgment of
freedom of the press. The ordinance seems a fair adjustment of the
privilege of distributors and the rights of householders.
MR. JUSTICE ROBERTS and MR. JUSTICE JACKSON join in this
dissent.
See also opinion of MR. JUSTICE JACKSON,
post,
p.
319 U. S.
166.
[
Footnote 2/1]
"RELIGION AS A WORLD REMEDY, The Evidence in Support Thereof.
Hear Judge Rutherford, Sunday, July 28, 4 P.M., E.S.T. Free. All
Persons of Goodwill Welcome! Free. Columbus Coliseum, Ohio State
Fair Grounds."
(On one side.)
"1940's Event of Paramount Importance To YOU! What is it? THE
THEOCRATIC CONVENTION OF JEHOVAH'S WITNESSES. Five days -- July
24-28 -- Thirty Cities. All Lovers of Righteousness -- Welcome! The
strange fate threatening all 'Christendom' makes it imperative that
you Come and Hear the public address on RELIGION AS A WORLD REMEDY,
The Evidence in Support Thereof, by Judge Rutherford at the
Coliseum of the Ohio State Fair Grounds, Columbus, Ohio, Sunday,
July 28 at 4 p.m., E.S.T. 'He that hath an ear to hear' will come
to one of the auditoriums of the convention cities listed below,
tied in with Columbus by direct wire. Some of the 30 cities are [21
are listed]. For detailed information concerning these conventions
write WATCHTOWER CONVENTION COMMITTEE, 117 Adams St., Brooklyn,
N.Y."
(On the other side.)
[
Footnote 2/2]
Keokee Coke Co. v. Taylor, 234 U.
S. 224;
German Alliance Insurance Co. v.
Kansas, 233 U. S. 389;
Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co., 242 U.
S. 539;
Minnesota v. Probate Court,
309 U. S. 270;
Labor Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.,
301 U. S. 1,
301 U. S. 46;
Carmichael v. Southern Coal Co., 301 U.
S. 495,
301 U. S.
509.