1. Under the state law, the appellant in this case could appeal
to no higher state court than that from which the appeal here was
taken; and, since the judgment sustained a municipal ordinance the
validity of which under the Federal Constitution was challenged,
this Court has jurisdiction of the appeal under Jud.Code § 237(a).
P.
318 U. S.
414.
2. A municipal ordinance is a "statute" of the State, within the
meaning of Jud.Code § 237(a).
King Mf. Co. v. Augusta,
277 U. S. 100,
followed. P.
318 U. S.
414.
3. A municipal ordinance which, as construed and applied,
prohibits the dissemination of information by handbills,
held a denial of the freedom of the press and violative of
the Fourteenth Amendment. P.
318 U. S.
415.
4. A State may not, consistently with the Fourteenth Amendment,
prohibit the distribution of handbills in the pursuit of a clearly
religious activity merely because the handbills invite the purchase
of books for the improved understanding of the religion or because
they seek to promote the raising of funds for religious purposes.
P.
318 U. S.
416.
Reversed.
MR. JUSTICE BLACK delivered the opinion of the Court.
The appellant, a member of the Jehovah's Witnesses, was charged
with distributing handbills on the streets of Dallas, Texas, in
violation of an ordinance of that city which prohibits their
distribution. She was convicted in the Corporation Court of Dallas,
and appealed to the
Page 318 U. S. 414
County Criminal Court where, after a trial
de novo, she
was again convicted, and a fine of $5.00 and costs was imposed.
Under Texas law, she could appeal to no higher state court,
[
Footnote 1] and since she
properly raised federal questions of substance in both courts, the
case is rightfully here on appeal under § 237(a) of the Judicial
Code.
King Manufacturing Co. v. Augusta, 277 U.
S. 100. The appellee has asked us to reconsider the
doctrine of the
King Manufacturing Co. case under which
this Court takes jurisdiction on appeal from judgments sustaining
the validity of municipal ordinances. We see no reason for
reconsidering the
King Manufacturing Co. case, and follow
it here.
We think the judgment below must be reversed because the Dallas
ordinance denies to the appellant the freedom of press and of
religion guaranteed to her by the First and Fourteenth Amendments
of the Federal Constitution.
The stipulated facts show that the appellant, after three years
of special training, had devoted many years to the work of the
Jehovah's Witnesses. At the time of her arrest, the appellant was
distributing handbills in an orderly and quiet manner to
pedestrians whom she met on the street. On one side of the handbill
was an invitation to attend a gathering in a Dallas park which was
to be one of fifty simultaneous gatherings of Jehovah's Witnesses
in as many cities to hear an address by a leader of the group on
"Peace, Can It Last." The other side of the handbill repeated the
invitation, and described at the bottom two books which explained
the Jehovah's Witnesses' interpretation of the Bible and set out
their religious views. This was followed by a statement that the
books would be mailed "Postage Prepaid on your contribution of
25�." While the books were not actually sold on the streets,
the
Page 318 U. S. 415
appellant would have delivered them to the home of any one who
made the twenty-five cents contribution. The books would have cost
her more than twenty-five cents.
The Dallas ordinance, which is set forth in the margin,
[
Footnote 2] has been construed
by the state court to forbid the distribution of leaflets by the
appellant in the fashion outlined above. [
Footnote 3] The city seeks to uphold the ordinance here
on the contention (a) that it is justified as an exercise of the
city's plenary control of its streets, and (b) that appellant's
activity may be forbidden because the leaflets include "commercial
advertising of books which the distributor is offering for
sale."
First. The city contends that its power over its
streets is not limited to the making of reasonable regulations for
the control of traffic and the maintenance of order, but that it
has the power absolutely to prohibit the use of the streets for the
communication of ideas. It relies primarily on
Davis v.
Commonwealth, 167 U. S. 43. This
same argument
Page 318 U. S. 416
made in reliance upon the same decision has been directly
rejected by this Court.
Hague v. CIO, 307 U.
S. 496,
307 U. S.
514-516. Of course, states may provide the control of
travel on their streets in order to insure the safety and
convenience of the traveling public.
Cox v. New Hampshire,
312 U. S. 569,
312 U. S. 574.
They may punish conduct on the streets which is in violation of a
valid law.
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.
S. 568. But one who is rightfully on a street which the
state has left open to the public carries with him there, as
elsewhere, the constitutional right to express his views in an
orderly fashion. This right extends to the communication of ideas
by handbills and literature, as well as by the spoken word.
Hague v. CIO, supra; Schneider v. Irvington, 308 U.
S. 147,
308 U. S. 162.
Here, the ordinance, as construed and applied, prohibits the
dissemination of information by handbills. As such, it cannot be
sustained.
Second. The right to distribute handbills concerning
religious subjects on the streets may not be prohibited at all
times, at all places, and under all circumstances. This has been
beyond controversy since the decision in
Lovell v.
Griffin, 303 U. S. 444. The
city contends, however, that, in the instant case, the prohibition
is permissible because the handbills, although they were
distributed for the unquestioned purpose of furthering religious
activity, contained an invitation to contribute to the support of
that activity by purchasing books related to the work of the group.
The mere presence of an advertisement of a religious work on a
handbill of the sort distributed here may not subject the
distribution of the handbill to prohibition. In
Schneider v.
Irvington, supra, we held that the city of Irvington might not
forbid conduct almost precisely the same as that with which the
appellant in the instant case is charged. Even where handbills
carrying notice of a public gathering contained a statement of an
admission
Page 318 U. S. 417
fee, we held that they could not be barred from distribution on
the streets.
Schneider v. Irvington, supra, 308 U. S. 154,
308 U. S.
162-163. No admission was to be charged at the meeting
for which the appellant was circulating leaflets in the instant
case. In
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.
S. 296,
310 U. S. 305,
we said that a state might not prevent the collection of funds for
a religious purpose by unreasonably obstructing or delaying their
collection.
The state can prohibit the use of the street for the
distribution of purely commercial leaflets, even though such
leaflets may have "a civic appeal, or a moral platitude" appended.
Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U. S.
52,
316 U. S. 55.
They may not prohibit the distribution of handbills in the pursuit
of a clearly religious activity merely because the handbills invite
the purchase of books for the improved understanding of the
religion or because the handbills seek in a lawful fashion to
promote the raising of funds for religious purposes.
Reversed.
MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER acquiesces in the refusal to reconsider
King Mfg. Co. v. Augusta, 277 U.
S. 100, although, for the reasons set forth by Holmes
and Brandeis, JJ., dissenting, he deems that case to have been
erroneously decided. Otherwise, he agrees with the opinion in this
case.
MR. JUSTICE RUTLEDGE took no part in the consideration or
decision of this case.
[
Footnote 1]
The Texas practice under which this is the highest state court
to which appellant could appeal is considered in
Largent v.
Texas, post, p.
318 U. S. 418,
decided this day.
[
Footnote 2]
"Scattering handbills, etc. -- It shall be unlawful for any
person to carry or hold by hand or otherwise, any billboard,
showcard, placard or advertisement, or to wear any costume for the
purpose of attracting attention of the public, or to scatter or
throw any handbills, circulars, cards, newspapers or any
advertising device of any description, along or upon any street or
sidewalk in the city of Dallas. Any person violating any of the
provisions of this article shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor,
and upon conviction, may be fined in any sum not exceeding one
hundred dollars."
[
Footnote 3]
The complaint under which the appellant was convicted alleged
that she did "carry, hold by hand, distribute, scatter and throw
handbills as an advertising medium" in violation of the ordinance.
It will be noted that the word "distribute," which does not appear
in the ordinance, is a part of the complaint, and that the words
"carry or hold by hand," which appear in the first clause of the
ordinance as relating to billboards, et cetera, have been applied
in the complaint as though relating to "handbills." which appears
in the second clause of the ordinance in connection with papers
scattered or thrown on the street.