1. The claim that discrimination by police officers in treating
some persons illegally and others legally violates the equal
protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
held
unsupported. P.
314 U. S.
226.
2. In the sentencing of accomplices, the practice of taking into
consideration their aid to the State as witnesses involves no
denial of due process to a convicted confederate. P.
314 U. S.
227.
3. Whether the testimony of an accomplice in this case was
corroborated as required by the state law was a question for
decision by the courts of the State. P.
314 U. S.
227.
4. Where it was alleged as a basis of release by habeas corpus
in a state court that testimony of an accomplice leading to the
conviction of the petitioner was known by the prosecuting officers
to be false and was induced by their promises and threats, and
affidavits of the accomplice, made several years after the trial,
were produced to substantiate the allegation, the appraisal of the
affidavits with other conflicting evidence in the record was a
matter for the state courts. P.
314 U. S.
226.
5. The admissibility in a murder trial of evidence of another
similar crime, to establish intent, design and system on the part
of the accused, is left by the Fourteenth Amendment to be
determined by the state law and the state courts. P.
314 U. S.
227.
6. Action of state courts in denying a continuance to an accused
in a criminal trial
held not reviewable by this Court
under the Fourteenth Amendment. P.
314 U. S.
228.
7. Where it was part of the State's case that live rattlesnakes
were to be used in pursuance of a conspiracy to murder, and two
such snakes were brought to the courtroom to be identified by a
witness who sold them to one of the conspirators, the propriety of
admitting such evidence was for the state courts to decide; the
claim that its introduction made the trial so unfair as to deny due
process of law, is unsound. P.
314 U. S.
228.
8. The fact that a person accused of a state offense was, some
time before making a confession, subjected to restraints and other
acts of state officers which were in themselves breaches of the
state law and possible violations of due process, may be relevant
to the question
Page 314 U. S. 220
whether the use of the confession at his trial was a denial of
due process, but is not conclusive of that issue. P.
314 U. S.
235.
9. The fact that a confession has been conclusively adjudged by
the state courts to be admissible in evidence under the state law
does not answer the question whether, in view of the circumstances
in which it was made, its use at the trial was a denial of due
process. P.
314 U. S.
236.
10. The state rule against admitting a confession which was not
voluntarily made seeks to exclude false evidence. The aim of due
process in forbidding its use is to prevent fundamental unfairness
of using such evidence, whether true or false. The criteria for
decision in the one case or the other may or may not be the same,
according to the circumstances. P.
314 U. S.
236.
11. To determine a claim that due process was violated by the
use in evidence in a state court of a confession alleged to have
been obtained by coercion or promises, this Court must make an
independent examination of the record. P.
314 U. S.
237.
12. The Court is unable to find that the confessions in this
case were induced by coercion or promises, and that their use in
evidence therefore vitiated the trial, the evidence being
conflicting and the state tribunals having found that the
confessions were free and voluntary, and were therefore admissible
under the state law, and the state supreme court having also found
that their use conformed to due process. P.
314 U. S.
238.
13. Where a prisoner held incommunicado is subjected to
questioning by officers for long periods, and deprived of the
advice of counsel, the Court will scrutinize the record with care
to determine whether the use of his confession was contrary to due
process. P. 240.
14. On the facts, and in the light of the findings in the state
courts, this Court cannot hold that the illegal conduct in which
the law enforcement officers of California indulged by the
prolonged questioning of the prisoner before arraignment and in the
absence of counsel, or their later questioning coerced the
confessions the use of which is complained of as an infringement of
due process. P.
314 U. S.
240.
89 P.2d 39;
14 Cal. 2d
403, 94 P.2d 569, affirmed.
CERTIORARI, 311 U.S. 617, to review the affirmance of a sentence
for murder and a judgment denying the writ of habeas corpus. The
cases were argued together at the last term, and the judgments were
affirmed by an
Page 314 U. S. 221
equally divided Court, 313 U.S. 537. A petition for rehearing
before a full Court was granted; the affirmances were set aside,
and the cases were restored to the docket for reargument, 313 U.S.
597.
MR. JUSTICE ROBERTS delivered the opinion of the Court.
The petitioner was convicted of murder, and sentenced to death,
in the Superior Court of California for Los Angeles County. The
Supreme Court of California affirmed the judgment March 21, 1939,
two judges dissenting. [
Footnote
1] A rehearing was granted, the case was reargued, and, October
5, 1939, the decision was reaffirmed and the former opinion adopted
and amplified, two justices dissenting. [
Footnote 2] No question arising under the Constitution
of the United States had been raised or decided. In a second
petition for rehearing, the petitioner for the first time asserted
that his conviction violated the Fourteenth Amendment. November 3,
1939, the Court ruled: "The petition for a rehearing herein is
denied."
The Chief Justice of the State allowed an appeal, November 6,
1939, and, November 8, 1939, executed a certificate in which he
enumerated the constitutional questions presented by the second
petition for rehearing; stated that the court entertained the
petition, and explicitly overruled each of the contentions made
therein; certified
Page 314 U. S. 222
that the decision denying rehearing
"is to be interpreted and considered as holding against the
appellant's contention that his rights under the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States . . . were
violated,"
and concluded: "It is ordered that this certificate be filed in
this court and made a part of the record on appeal to the Supreme
Court of the United States." On the record so made, this Court has
jurisdiction to review the judgment. [
Footnote 3]
The appellant did not draw in question the constitutional
validity of any statute of California. We therefore dismissed the
appeal, [
Footnote 4] but,
treating the papers as a petition for certiorari, [
Footnote 5] we granted the writ. This case is
No. 4.
October 31, 1939, the petitioner prayed the Supreme Court of
California for a writ of habeas corpus on the theory that his trial
and conviction had deprived him of his life without due process. He
submitted affidavits of one Hope, who had turned state's evidence
against him. In these, Hope asserted that his testimony was false,
had been coerced by threats, and induced by promises of leniency
and by fraud.
November 9, 1939, habeas corpus was denied, without prejudice.
The Chief Justice of California allowed an appeal and made, and
ordered filed of record, a certificate respecting the
constitutional questions presented and decided by the court,
similar to that entered in No. 4. We followed the same course as in
No. 4, and the case is here as No. 5.
The appeals were presented
in forma pauperis. The
typewritten record is of great length. In the belief that
Page 314 U. S. 223
only by briefs and oral argument, and on a record printed by the
court, could proper consideration and decision be had of certain
apparently important questions presented, we issued the writs. The
cases were argued at the October, 1940, term, and the judgments
were affirmed by a divided Court. A petition for rehearing before a
full Court was granted, the affirmances set aside, and the causes
set for rehearing at this term. [
Footnote 6]
The petitioner, who used, and was commonly known by, the name of
Robert S. James (and will be so called), and one Hope were
indicted, May 6, 1936, for the murder of James' wife on August 5,
1935. Hope pleaded guilty, and was sentenced to life imprisonment.
James pleaded not guilty, was tried, convicted, and sentenced to
death. The trial was a long one, in which the petitioner made
objections to rulings and to the charge which raise questions of
state law decided by the opinion below with which we have no
concern. We shall refer only to so much of the evidence as bears
upon the constitutional questions open here.
The State's theory is that the petitioner conceived the plan of
marrying, insuring his wife's life by policies providing double
indemnity for accidental death, killing her in a manner to give the
appearance of accident, and collecting double indemnity.
James employed Mary E. Busch as a manicurist in his barber shop
in March, 1935, and, about a month later, went through a marriage
ceremony with her which was not legal, as he then had a living
wife. While they were affianced, insurance was negotiated on her
life, with James as beneficiary. Upon the annulment of the earlier
marriage, a lawful ceremony was performed. The petitioner made sure
that the policies were not annulled by the fact that, when they
were issued, Mary had not been his lawful wife.
Page 314 U. S. 224
The allegation is that James enlisted one Hope in a conspiracy
to do away with Mary and collect and divide the insurance on her
life. Hope testified that, at James' instigation, he procured
rattlesnakes which were to bite and kill Mary; that they appeared
not to be sufficiently venomous for the purpose, but he ultimately
purchased others and delivered them to James; that James, on August
4, 1935, blindfolded his wife's eyes, tied her to a table, had Hope
bring one of the snakes into the room, and caused the reptile to
bite her foot; that, during the night, James told Hope the bite did
not have the desired effect; and, in the early morning of August 5,
he told Hope that he was going to drown his wife; that later he
said to Hope, "That is that", and still later, at his request, Hope
aided him in carrying the body to the yard, and James placed the
body face down at the edge of a fish pond with the head and
shoulders in the water.
James was at his barber shop on August 5. On that evening, he
took two friends home for dinner. When they arrived the house was
dark and empty, and, upon a search of the grounds, his wife's body
was found in the position indicated. An autopsy showed the lungs
were almost filled with water. The left great toe showed a
puncture, and the left leg was greatly swollen, and almost black.
Nothing came of the investigation of the death.
James attempted to collect double indemnity; the insurers
refused to pay; suits were instituted, and one of them settled. As
a result of this activity, a fresh investigation of Mary James'
death was instituted. On April 19, 1936, officers arrested James
for the crime of incest. He was booked on this charge on the
morning of April 21, was given a hearing and remanded to jail. On
May 2 and 3, he made statements respecting his wife's death to the
prosecuting officials.
At the trial, in addition to that of Hope, testimony was adduced
as to the finding and condition of the body, other
Page 314 U. S. 225
evidence to connect James with the death, and expert testimony
that the condition of the left leg could he attributed to
rattlesnake bites. The purchase of snakes by Hope was proved by him
and several other witnesses, one of whom said he sold the two
snakes to Hope, one of which, Hope claimed, had bitten Mary James.
Two snakes were brought into court, which the witness identified as
those sold to Hope and by Hope resold to the witness.
James' statements were offered in evidence. Objection was made
that they were not voluntary. Before they were admitted, the trial
judge heard testimony offered by the State and the defendant on
that issue. He ruled that the confessions were admissible, and they
were received in evidence.
The State offered evidence with respect to the death of a former
wife of James, in 1932. This tended to prove that, while driving
down Pike's Peak, their automobile went off the road. James went
for aid. When the persons called upon reached the automobile, they
found James' wife lying partly outside the car with her head badly
crushed and a bloody hammer in the back of the car. James appeared
unhurt. The woman recovered from her injuries, but, shortly
afterwards, was discovered, by James and another man, drowned in
the bathtub in a house James had temporarily leased at Colorado
Springs
James collected double indemnity from insurance companies for
her death, the insurance having been placed at about the time he
married her and her death having occurred within a few months
thereafter. This evidence was admitted over objection and, at the
close of the State's case, defendant's counsel moved for an
adjournment so that they might take depositions of witnesses in
Colorado. The court refused the application for want of a
sufficient showing.
The petitioner's contentions, based upon the Fourteenth
Amendment, are: that the conduct of the prosecuting
Page 314 U. S. 226
officials and police officers denied him the equal protection of
the laws; that his conviction deprived him of his life without due
process, because the testimony of Hope, an accomplice, was not
corroborated as required by the Penal Code of California, and was,
therefore, insufficient to sustain a conviction; because Hope's
affidavits filed since the trial showed that his testimony was
obtained by deceit, fraud, collusion, and coercion, and was known
to the prosecutor to be false, and hence the trial was a mere
pretense; because the alleged occurrences in Colorado were wholly
disconnected from the crime charged, and petitioner was afforded no
opportunity to answer the State's evidence respecting them; because
the production of the rattlesnakes in the court was solely for the
purpose of inflaming the jury, and because physical violence,
threats, and other coercive means produced the confessions, and
denial of requested opportunity to consult counsel preceded and
accompanied their procurement
First. The contention that illegal conduct on the part
of the State's officers deprived petitioner of the equal protection
of the laws hardly needs notice. The claim is that, where officers
violate the law so that some defendants are treated as was
petitioner, and others are treated as the law requires, inequality
and discrimination results which denies equal protection. The
contention is frivolous. The record is bare of any proof to support
it.
Second. The petitioner asserts that Hope's testimony
was not corroborated. Under California law, the uncorroborated
testimony of an accomplice is not sufficient to sustain a
conviction. [
Footnote 7]
Petitioner contends that, in consideration of Hope's confessing and
turning state's evidence, leniency was extended him by the court.
Petitioner says that Hope's affidavits show that the prosecuting
officials well knew that Hope's testimony was a
Page 314 U. S. 227
fabrication; that he was persuaded so to testify by fraud,
promises of leniency, and threats, and the trial was a mere sham.
[
Footnote 8]
These contentions need but brief notice. The Fourteenth
Amendment does not forbid a state court to construe and apply its
laws with respect to the evidence of an accomplice. There is no
adequate showing that there was a corrupt bargain with Hope, and
the practice of taking into consideration, in sentencing an
accomplice, his aid to the State in turning state's evidence can be
no denial of due process to a convicted confederate. Hope's
affidavits not only were prepared after the State Supreme Court had
passed upon the case and its opinion had been published, but after
the lapse of nearly three years from the trial. They could,
therefore, be considered only in the habeas corpus case. The State
contends that it had no opportunity to answer them. This is
contested by the petitioner. In any event, it was stipulated that
the record on appeal in the other case should be part of the record
on the habeas corpus hearing, and comparison of the testimony at
the trial with the allegations of the affidavits raises serious
doubts as to their truthfulness. The appraisal of the conflicting
evidence was for the court below. Even if its refusal to believe
Hope's depositions were erroneous, the error would be no more a
denial of due process than was its approval, on appeal, of the
trial Judge's refusal to direct a verdict on the ground of
insufficiency of evidence.
Third. Testimony was admitted concerning the death of
James' former wife, on the widely recognized principle that similar
but disconnected acts may be shown to establish intent, design, and
system. [
Footnote 9] The
Fourteenth Amendment leaves California free to adopt a rule of
relevance
Page 314 U. S. 228
which the court below holds was applied here in accordance with
the State's law.
The insistence that the trial judge's refusal to grant a
continuance, so that petitioner could take answering depositions,
was a denial of due process goes even farther afield. Counsel had
notice at the opening of the trial, or shortly thereafter, that the
State intended to introduce evidence on this subject -- but waited
until the State had rested before asking the continuance. Even
then, the showing was inadequate as to the identity of the
witnesses and the nature of the expected evidence. The judge, in
the exercise of his discretion, denied the motion. The Fourteenth
Amendment gives this Court no mandate to review his action or
inquire whether he abused his discretion in such a field.
Fourth. A part of the State's case was that Hope had
purchased snakes and brought them to the petitioner in pursuance of
the conspiracy. Two snakes were brought into the courtroom to be
identified by the witness who said he sold them to Hope. The
petitioner says that the sole purpose of the production of the
snakes was to prejudice the jury against him, and that those in the
courtroom, including the jury, were in a panic as a result of the
incident. For this he cites current newspaper accounts and
affidavits of his counsel. The State denies any improper purpose,
and, to rebut the assertions of petitioner, relies on a
counter-affidavit and a statement by the trial judge. The record
discloses that, at a subsequent stage of the trial, the snakes were
brought into court at the defendant's request.
We do not sit to review state court action on questions of the
propriety of the trial judge's action in the admission of evidence.
We cannot hold, as petitioner urges, that the introduction and
identification of the snakes so infused the trial with unfairness
as to deny due process of law. The fact that evidence admitted as
relevant by
Page 314 U. S. 229
a court is shocking to the sensibilities of those in the
courtroom cannot, for that reason alone, render its reception a
violation of due process.
Fifth. The important question is whether the use of the
confessions rendered petitioner's conviction a deprivation of his
life without due process of law. Recital of the relevant facts is
essential to a decision.
The petitioner, while having almost no formal education, is a
man of intelligence and business experience. After his arrest on
the charge of incest on the morning of Sunday, April 19, 1936, he
was taken for a short time to the adjoining house and shown a
dictaphone there installed. He was brought to the District
Attorney's offices, where he was lodged in the Bureau of
Investigation. He says that, during the two or three hours he
stayed there, he was not questioned. He was taken into an office
where the District Attorney showed him a statement made by a Miss
Wright respecting the incest charge and asked him what he cared to
say about it. He replied that he would not talk about it. He was
questioned for about an hour. He says he was asked about his wife's
death; others who were present deny this.
He was held in the District Attorney's suite until 5 or 6
o'clock, was given supper at a cafe, and then conducted to the
house next door to his home, where he arrived about 7 or 7:30.
Various officers questioned him there, in relays throughout the
night, concerning his wife's death. He sat in a chair fully
dressed, and had no sleep. Monday morning, he was taken out for
breakfast and went with the officers to point out to them a house
at 9th and Alvarado Streets, after which he was taken to the
District Attorney's offices. He was brought back to the house next
door to his home, and the questioning was resumed, and continued
until about 3 o'clock Tuesday morning, when, he says, he fainted,
and others present say he fell asleep and slept until 7 or 8
o'clock. After he had breakfasted, he was
Page 314 U. S. 230
booked at the jail, arraigned before a magistrate, and committed
on the incest charge.
James testified that about 10 p.m. Monday, April 20, the
officers began to beat him; that his body was made black and blue;
that the beating impaired his hearing, and caused a hernia; that,
later that night, an Assistant District Attorney questioned him,
and that, after this ordeal, he collapsed. It is admitted that an
officer slapped his face that night. This is said to have occurred
as the result of an offensive remark James made concerning his
wife; he denies having made the remark. In corroboration of James'
testimony, two witnesses said they noticed that one or both of his
ears were bruised and swollen when he was lodged in the jail. All
of this testimony is contradicted by numerous witnesses for the
State, save only that it is admitted James was repeatedly and
persistently questioned at intervals during the period from Sunday
night until Tuesday morning. It is testified that, except for the
one slap, no one laid a hand on James; that no inducement was held
out to him; that no threats were made; that he answered questions
freely and intelligently, and that he was at ease, cool, and
collected. He admits that no promises or threats were made or
maltreatment administered on the occasions when he was in the
District Attorney's office. It is significant that James stated to
one of the other officers that Officer Southard had slapped him and
that, when, May 2, the District Attorney asked how he had been
treated, he again referred to the slap. In neither case did he say
anything of any other mistreatment. During the period April 19-21,
James made no incriminating admission or confession.
James says that, shortly after his arrest on Sunday morning, he
asked, and was refused, permission to get into touch with Mr.
Silverman, who had been his attorney for a number of years. This is
denied. There is evidence that he saw Mr. Silverman on Monday,
April 20, at the District
Page 314 U. S. 231
Attorney's office. Mr. Silverman testified that he saw the
petitioner immediately after his formal arrest; that he was with
the petitioner at the arraignment on Tuesday, April 21st, and again
on April 25th in the jail. It is not suggested that James was not
allowed to see his attorney as often as he desired, or that any
obstacle was interposed to the attorney's interviewing him between
April 21 and May 2.
There is no claim that, from April 21, when he was lodged in the
jail, until May 2, he was interviewed, questioned, threatened, or
mistreated by anyone. During this period, his attorney told him
that he would be indicted for his wife's murder, and should not
answer any questions unless his attorney was present.
May 1, Hope was arrested and made a statement. On the morning of
May 2, James was brought from his cell to the chaplain's room in
the prison and confronted with Hope. An Assistant District Attorney
outlined Hope's story and asked James whether he had anything to
say, to which he replied: "Nothing."
He went back to his cell and, about noon, an order of court was
obtained to remove him from the prison. He was taken to his former
home by two deputy sheriffs. The evidence does not disclose clearly
either the purpose or the incidents of this trip. He was then
brought to the District Attorney's office, and that official began
to question him. He requested that his attorney be sent for. In his
presence, a telephone call was made which disclosed that Mr.
Silverman was not in Los Angeles. He asked that another attorney be
summoned. He states that the District Attorney said it would take
too long to acquaint any other attorney with the facts; others say
that James did not give the name of the other attorney he wanted,
and it took some time to discover whom he had in mind. The attorney
was not summoned.
The District Attorney and, at times, others questioned James
until supper time. Sandwiches and coffee were
Page 314 U. S. 232
procured. James says he had coffee, but someone took his
sandwiches. There is testimony that he had them. The questioning,
based on Hope's confession, was continued into the night without
James having refused to answer questions or having made any
incriminating answers.
There is a sharp conflict as to how the session terminated.
James says that Officer Southard, who had struck him on April 20,
occupied the room alone with him, all others having left; that the
officer told him he had been lying all evening and that, if he did
not tell the truth, the officer would take him back to the house
and beat him; that this so frightened him that he agreed to do his
best to recite to the District Attorney the same story Hope had
told. There is much evidence that no such incident occurred. Deputy
Sheriff Killion says that, sometime before midnight, the others had
left petitioner alone with him, and that petitioner turned to him
and said something to the effect: "Why can't we go out and get
something to eat; if we do, I'll tell you the story." To this,
Killion replied that they could go out. Killion and another Deputy
Sheriff, Gray, a lady friend, and another person accompanied
petitioner to a public cafe, where they had a supper and afterwards
had cigars. James testified that neither Killion nor Gray nor the
District Attorney ever laid hand on him, threatened him or offered
him any inducement to confess.
The State's evidence is that, after they started to smoke, James
told a story, of which Killion took notes. Killion narrated at the
trial what James had told him. The party returned to the District
Attorney's office, and there, responding to a question by the
District Attorney, James said he had told Killion the story, and,
in answer to questions, he repeated that story. The interview was
stenographically recorded. Most of the questions were asked by the
District Attorney, some few by Killion and one or two
Page 314 U. S. 233
other officers who were present. The group seems to have
consisted of the District Attorney, an Assistant District Attorney,
two officers, the two deputy sheriffs, and the stenographer.
Hope's statement laid on James the initiation of the murder
plot, the attempt to consummate it with snake poison, the drowning,
and the disposition of her body. The account James gave Killion and
the District Attorney, which he now says was an attempt to retell
the tale Hope had told, which had been constantly dinned into his
ears, is by no means a reiteration of Hope's story. On the
contrary, James insisted that Hope suggested the destruction of
Mary James, and the rattlesnake expedient, which Hope carried out;
that, when this failed, Hope suggested that he, Hope, burn down the
house to make it appear that Mrs. James died by accident, and that
Hope also volunteered to commit an abortion on Mrs. James and also
to do away with her. James asserted that, while he was absent from
his home on the morning of August 5, 1935, Hope drowned his wife in
the bathtub and told James that he had done so.
It is also to be noted that James' statement presents a lurid
picture of the heavy drinking and intoxication of Hope, James, and
Mary James during the three days anterior to the death of the
latter. The effort evidently was to suggest that all were more or
less irresponsible for their actions.
If Hope's story is true, James planned and accomplished the
murder of his wife to obtain the insurance on her life. If James'
statement is true, Hope planned the murder, James desired to
abandon the scheme and thought that all Hope ultimately intended to
do was to commit an abortion on James' wife, and was shocked and
surprised to learn that Hope had murdered her.
James said during supper at the cafe, and stated on another
occasion, that there were not enough men in the
Page 314 U. S. 234
District Attorney's office to make him talk, and if Hope had not
talked, he would never have told the story.
Scrutiny of the two statements indicates that James carefully
considered what Hope had said, and made up his mind to tell a story
consistent with his intimacy with Hope, and with various incidents
James could not deny, and then depict a drunken orgy as a result of
which his will power was so enfeebled that he could not resist
Hope's determination to make away with Mrs. James.
At the trial, James contradicted the essential particulars of
Hope's testimony and most of his own confession, including the
evidence respecting the snakes. He swore all Hope was to do was to
attempt an abortion; he believed Hope did not accomplish this, and
that his wife died as a result of falling into the pond in a
fainting fit due to her pregnancy.
The evidence as to the treatment of James and the conduct of
officials and officers, from the moment of his arrest until the
close of his statement to the District Attorney, was heard
preliminarily by the trial judge in order to determine whether the
State had, as required by California law, carried its burden of
proving the confessions voluntary. The ruling was that it had, and
the confessions were admitted. The trial judge, at defendant's
request, charged the jury, in accordance with the State law, that
the confessions must be utterly disregarded unless they were
voluntary, that is, not the result of inducements, promises,
threats, violence, or any form of coercion.
The failure of the arresting officers promptly to produce the
petitioner before an examining magistrate, their detention of him
in their custody from Sunday morning to Tuesday morning, and any
assault committed upon him, were violations of state statutes
[
Footnote 10] and criminal
offenses. [
Footnote 11]
Page 314 U. S. 235
We find no authority for the issue of the court order under
which the sheriff's deputies took the accused from jail to his
former home, and to the District Attorney's office for questioning.
[
Footnote 12] The denial of
opportunity to consult counsel, requested on May 2nd, was a
misdemeanor. [
Footnote 13]
It may be assumed this treatment of the petitioner also deprived
him of his liberty without due process, and that the petitioner
would have been afforded preventive relief if he could have gained
access to a court to seek it.
But illegal acts, as such, committed in the course of obtaining
a confession, whatever their effect on its admissibility under
local law, do not furnish an answer to the constitutional question
we must decide. The effect of the officers' conduct must be
appraised by other considerations in determining whether the use of
the confessions was a denial of due process. Moreover, petitioner
does not, and cannot, ask redress in this proceeding for any
disregard of due process prior to his trial. The gravamen of his
complaint is the unfairness of the use of his confessions, and what
occurred in their procurement is relevant only as it bears on that
issue.
Page 314 U. S. 236
On the other hand, the fact that the confessions have been
conclusively adjudged by the decision below to be admissible under
State law, notwithstanding the circumstances under which they were
made, does not answer the question whether due process was lacking.
The aim of the rule that a confession is inadmissible unless it was
voluntarily made is to exclude false evidence. Tests are invoked to
determine whether the inducement to speak was such that there is a
fair risk the confession is false. [
Footnote 14] These vary in the several States. [
Footnote 15] This Court has
formulated those which are to govern in trials in the federal
courts. [
Footnote 16] The
Fourteenth Amendment leaves California free to adopt, by statute or
decision, and to enforce, such rule as she elects, whether it
conform to that applied in the federal or in other state courts.
But the adoption of the rule of her choice cannot foreclose inquiry
as to whether, in a given case, the application of that rule works
a deprivation of the prisoner's life or liberty without due process
of law. The aim of the requirement of due process is not to exclude
presumptively false evidence, but to prevent fundamental unfairness
in the use of evidence, whether true or false. The criteria for
decision of that question may differ from those appertaining to the
State's rule as to the admissibility of a confession.
As applied to a criminal trial, denial of due process is the
failure to observe that fundamental fairness essential to the very
concept of justice. In order to declare a denial of it, we must
find that the absence of that fairness fatally infected the trial;
the acts complained of must be of such quality as necessarily
prevents a fair trial. Such unfairness exists when a coerced
confession is used as a means
Page 314 U. S. 237
of obtaining a verdict of guilt. We have so held in every
instance in which we have set aside for want of due process a
conviction based on a confession.
To extort testimony from a defendant by physical torture in the
very presence of the trial tribunal is not due process. The case
stands no better if torture induces an extrajudicial confession
which is used as evidence in the courtroom. [
Footnote 17]
A trial dominated by mob violence in the courtroom is not such
as due process demands. [
Footnote 18] The case can stand no better if mob violence
anterior to the trial is the inducing cause of the defendant's
alleged confession.
If, by fraud, collusion, trickery, and subornation of perjury,
on the part of those representing the State, the trial of an
accused person results in his conviction, he has been denied due
process of law. [
Footnote
19] The case can stand no better if, by the same devices, a
confession is procured and used in the trial.
The concept of due process would void a trial in which, by
threats or promises in the presence of court and jury, a defendant
was induced to testify against himself. The case can stand no
better if, by resort to the same means, the defendant is induced to
confess and his confession is given in evidence. As we have said,
"due process of law . . . commands that no such practice . . .
shall send any accused to his death." [
Footnote 20]
Where the claim is that the prisoner's statement has been
procured by such means, we are bound to make an independent
examination of the record to determine the validity of the claim.
The performance of this duty cannot be foreclosed by the finding of
a court, or the verdict
Page 314 U. S. 238
of a jury, or both. [
Footnote
21] If the evidence bearing upon the question is
uncontradicted, the application of the constitutional provision is
unembarrassed by a finding or a verdict in a state court; even
though, in ruling that the confession was admissible, the very
tests were applied in the state court to which we resort to answer
the constitutional question. [
Footnote 22]
There are cases, such as this one, where the evidence as to the
methods employed to obtain a confession is conflicting, and in
which, although denial of due process was not an issue in the
trial, an issue has been resolved by court and jury which involves
an answer to the due process question. In such a case, we accept
the determination of the triers of fact unless it is so lacking in
support in the evidence that to give it effect would work that
fundamental unfairness which is at war with due process.
Here, judge and jury passed on the question whether the
petitioner's confessions were freely and voluntarily made, and the
tests applied in answering that question rendered the decision one
that also answered the question whether the use of the confessions
involved a denial of due process; this notwithstanding the issue
submitted was not
eo nomine one concerning due process.
Furthermore, in passing on the petitioner's claim, the Supreme
Court of the State found no violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Our duty, then, is to determine whether the evidence requires that
we set aside the finding of two courts and a jury, and adjudge the
admission of the confessions so fundamentally unfair, so contrary
to the common concept of ordered liberty, as to amount to a taking
of life without due process of law.
Page 314 U. S. 239
In view of the conflicting testimony, we are unable to say that
the finding below was erroneous so far as concerns the petitioner's
claims of physical violence, threats, or implied promises of
leniency. There remains the uncontradicted fact that, on two
occasions, separated by an interval of eleven days, the petitioner
was questioned for protracted periods. He made no admission
implicating him in his wife's death during, or soon after, the
interrogations of April 19, 20, and 21. If, without more, eleven
days later, confessions had been forthcoming, we should have no
hesitation in overruling his contention respecting the admission of
his confessions.
Does the questioning on May 2nd, in and of itself, or in the
light of his earlier experience, render the use of the confessions
a violation of due process? If we are so to hold, it must be upon
the ground that such a practice, irrespective of the result upon
the petitioner, so tainted his statements that, without considering
other facts disclosed by the evidence, and without giving weight to
accredited findings below that his statements were free and
voluntary, as a matter of law, they were inadmissible in his trial.
This would be to impose upon the state courts a stricter rule than
we have enforced in federal trials. [
Footnote 23] There is less reason for such a holding when
we reflect that we are dealing with the system of criminal
administration of California, a
quasi-sovereign; that, if
federal power is invoked to set aside what California regards as a
fair trial, it must be plain that a federal right has been
invaded.
We have not hesitated to set aside convictions based in whole or
in substantial part upon confessions extorted in graver
circumstances. These were secured by protracted and repeated
questioning of ignorant and untutored persons, in whose minds the
power of officers
Page 314 U. S. 240
was greatly magnified; who sensed the adverse sentiment of the
community and the danger of mob violence; who had been held
incommunicado, without the advice of friends or of counsel; some of
whom had been taken by officers at night from the prison into dark
and lonely places for questioning. [
Footnote 24] This case is outside the scope of those
decisions.
Like the Supreme Court of California, we disapprove the
violations of law involved in the treatment of the petitioner, and
we think it right to add that, where a prisoner, held
incommunicado, is subjected to questioning by officers for long
periods, and deprived of the advice of counsel, we shall scrutinize
the record with care to determine whether, by the use of his
confession, he is deprived of liberty or life through tyrannical or
oppressive means. Officers of the law must realize that, if they
indulge in such practices they may, in the end, defeat, rather than
further, the ends of justice. Their lawless practices here took
them close to the line. But, on the facts as we have endeavored
fairly to set them forth, and in the light of the findings in the
state courts, we cannot hold that the illegal conduct in which the
law enforcement officers of California indulged, by the prolonged
questioning of the prisoner before arraignment, and in the absence
of counsel, or their questioning on May 2, coerced the confessions,
the introduction of which is the infringement of due process of
which the petitioner complains. The petitioner has said that the
interrogation would never have drawn an admission from him had his
confederate not made a statement; he admits that no threats,
promises, or acts of physical violence were offered him during this
questioning or for eleven days preceding it. Counsel had been
afforded full opportunity to see him, and had advised him.
Page 314 U. S. 241
He exhibited a self-possession, a coolness, and an acumen
throughout his questioning and at his trial which negatives the
view that he had so lost his freedom of action that the statements
made were not his, but were the result of the deprivation of his
free choice to admit, to deny, or to refuse to answer.
The judgments are
Affirmed.
[
Footnote 1]
89 P.2d 39.
[
Footnote 2]
14 Cal. 2d
403, 94 P.2d 569.
[
Footnote 3]
Roby v. Colehour, 146 U. S. 153;
Gulf & Ship Island R. Co. v. Hewes, 183 U. S.
66;
Whitney v. California, 274 U.
S. 357;
Honeyman v. Hanan, 300 U. S.
14.
[
Footnote 4]
Judicial Code § 237, as amended; 28 U.S.C. § 344(a).
[
Footnote 5]
Judicial Code § 237, as amended; 28 U.S.C. § 344(c).
[
Footnote 6]
313 U.S. 537, 597.
[
Footnote 7]
Penal Code § 1111.
[
Footnote 8]
Cf. Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.
S. 103.
[
Footnote 9]
See Wigmore, Evidence (3rd Ed.) Vol. II, § 363.
[
Footnote 10]
California Penal Code §§ 849, 4004.
[
Footnote 11]
Id., §§ 145, 146, 149.
[
Footnote 12]
The record does not disclose whether the application for the
order was in the form of a petition; whether defendant was apprised
of the motion for the order; whether he consented to its issue, or
what representations were made to the court which granted the
order. Section 4004 of the 1941 Code (§ 1600 of the 1935 Code)
requires a prisoner committed by a magistrate to be confined in a
jail until legally discharged, and declares that, if he is
permitted to go at large out of the jail, except by virtue of a
legal order or process, this shall constitute an escape. The only
statutes we are able to find authorizing an order for the removal
of a prisoner from jail are §§ 4011 and 4012 of the Penal Code,
1941, (§§ 1607 and 1608 of the 1935 Code) which provide for cases
of individual illness or a general outbreak of pestilence or
disease in a prison. Section 4011 permits a removal without court
order in case of fire.
[
Footnote 13]
Penal Code, § 825.
[
Footnote 14]
Wigmore, Evidence (3d Ed.) §§ 823, 824.
[
Footnote 15]
Id., § 824
[
Footnote 16]
Sparf and Hansen v. United States, 156 U. S.
51,
156 U. S. 55;
Wilson v. United States, 162 U. S. 613,
162 U. S. 622;
Bram v. United States, 168 U. S. 532;
Wan v. United States, 266 U. S. 1,
266 U. S. 14.
[
Footnote 17]
Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U. S. 278.
[
Footnote 18]
Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U. S. 86.
[
Footnote 19]
Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U. S. 103.
[
Footnote 20]
Chambers v. Florida, 309 U. S. 227,
309 U. S.
241.
[
Footnote 21]
Brown v. Mississippi, supra, 297 U. S. 278;
Chambers v. Florida, supra; Canty v. Alabama, 309 U.S.
629;
White v. Texas, 310 U. S. 530;
Vernon v. Alabama, 313 U.S. 547;
Lomax v. Texas,
313 U.S. 544.
[
Footnote 22]
Cases
supra, Note
21
[
Footnote 23]
Wan v. United States, 266 U. S. 1,
266 U. S. 14, and
cases cited.
[
Footnote 24]
See Chambers v. Florida; Canty v. Alabama; White v. Texas;
Vernon v. Alabama; Lomax v. Texas, supra, Note 21
MR. JUSTICE BLACK, dissenting, with whom MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS
concurs:
I believe the confession used to convict James was the result of
coercion and compulsion, and that the judgment should be reversed
for that reason. The testimony of the officers to whom the
confession was given is enough, standing alone, to convince me that
it could not have been free and voluntary.
Cf. Bram v. United
States, 168 U. S. 532. In
brief, those officers admitted the following:
Suspecting the defendant of murder, they entered his home on
Sunday, April 19, 1936, at 9 a.m. He was taken to a furnished house
next door in which the State's Attorney's office had installed a
dictaphone. For the next forty-eight hours, or a little longer, the
State's Attorney, his assistants, and investigators held James as
their prisoner. He was so held not under indictment or warrant of
arrest, but by force. At about 4 a.m. Monday, one Southard, an
investigator, "slapped" the defendant, whose left ear was
thereafter red and swollen. James was apparently kept at the
State's Attorney's office during the daylight hours; the full
extent to which he was questioned there is not clear. But on Monday
and Tuesday nights, at the furnished house, with no one present but
James and the officers, he was subjected to constant interrogation.
The questioning officers divided themselves into squads, so that
some could sleep while the others continued the questioning.
Page 314 U. S. 242
The defendant got no sleep during the first forty-two hours
after the officers seized him. And about 3:30 or 4 a.m. Tuesday
morning, while sitting in the chair he occupied while being
interrogated, at the very moment a question was being asked him,
the defendant fell asleep. There he remained asleep until about 7
or 8 a.m. At about 11 a.m., the officers took him to jail and
booked him on a charge of incest. During the entire forty-two hours
defendant was held, he repeatedly denied any complicity in or
knowledge of the murder of his wife.
The second episode during which the officers held defendant
incommunicado, and which produced the confession, was on May 2 and
in the early hours of May 3. About 11 a.m. on May 2, an
investigator for the District Attorney took James from his cell to
the chaplain's room of the jail. In the presence of an Assistant
District Attorney, he was confronted by Hope and told that Hope had
made a confession implicating James in his wife's murder. James
refused to talk, and was then carried back to his cell. A short
time later, under a purported order of court the nature or
authority of which does not appear, James was taken from the jail
to his home, and then, somewhere between 1 and 4 p.m., to the
District Attorney's office. The doors were locked. From then until
about midnight, the District Attorney, his Assistants, and
investigators, subjected James to constant interrogation. Upon
asking for his attorney, James was told he was out of the city. He
then asked for another, but whatever efforts the officers made to
satisfy this request were unsuccessful. He was again confronted
with Hope, but neither this nor the questioning had elicited an
admission of any nature, by midnight. At that time, according to
the investigators, James said to one of them, "Can't we go out and
get something to eat -- if you fellows will take me out to eat now,
I will
Page 314 U. S. 243
tell you the story." [
Footnote
2/1] He was taken out to eat by some of the officers; remained
about an hour and a half; while at the restaurant, made damaging
admissions, and, upon his return to the District Attorney's office;
made the full statement which was used to bring about his
conviction, completing it at about 3 a.m. Southard, the
investigator who had previously "slapped" him, was one of the
signed witnesses of the confession. [
Footnote 2/2]
I think the facts set out are sufficient to make applicable the
principles announced in
Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.
S. 227, and the conclusion there announced that:
"Due process of law, preserved for all by our Constitution,
commands that no such practice as that disclosed by this record
shall send any accused to his death."
White v. Texas, 310 U. S. 530,
310 U. S. 533;
Canty v. Alabama, 309 U.S. 629;
Vernon v.
Alabama, 313 U.S. 547.
Cf. Bram v. United States,
supra.
[
Footnote 2/1]
This is rather close to a part of James' own testimony,
to-wit:
"He continued to question me until later on in the evening. I
was very sick. I was hungry; I was tired, and I told him a thousand
times that I didn't know anything about Hope's story."
[
Footnote 2/2]
James' testimony at this point was that Southard, left alone
with him shortly before midnight, said James had been lying to the
District Attorney long enough, and threatened to take him back once
again to the house next door to his home where James had been
questioned April 19 to 21. In response to an inquiry whether he was
told his confession might be used against him, James replied:
"I didn't know whether the statement would be used against me or
not. I would rather die than to have gone back to that house and
went through torture like the three days I was out there. I didn't
care whether the statement was taken or not."