1. The judgment being erroneous on the merits, the Court
abstains from inquiring whether this suit to enjoin a subordinate
federal officer from alleged invasion of plaintiff's rights under
color of a federal statute but without authority, is a suit against
the United States, or whether the Secretary of the Interior should
have been joined as a necessary party defendant, or whether the
state court was without power to enjoin a federal officer. P.
313 U. S.
359.
2. In administering the Taylor Grazing Act of June 28, 1934, the
Secretary of the Interior, relying on the broad powers conferred by
§ 2, issued temporary licenses to stockowners for the grazing of
their livestock upon the public lands within grazing districts, and
charged a uniform price per head, rather than have the grazing
lands go unregulated pending the lengthy period required for
instituting the plan, contemplated by § 3, of renewable term
permits at reasonable fees adjusted to each case, etc. With full
knowledge of this, Congress repeatedly appropriated part of the
money thus brought into the Treasury for expenditure by the
Secretary in improvement of the ranges.
Held, that the Secretary's construction of the statute
was thereby confirmed, and his action as agent of
Page 313 U. S. 355
Congress in the administration of the Act was thereby ratified.
P.
313 U. S.
360.
60 Nev. 219; 106 P.2d 755, reversed.
Certiorari, 312 U.S. 674, to review the affirmance of a decree
of injunction, entered upon the overruling of a demurrer to the
bill.
MR. JUSTICE ROBERTS delivered the opinion of the Court.
The respondents brought suit in a Nevada District Court to
enjoin the petitioner from barring, or threatening to bar, them
from grazing their livestock within Nevada Grazing District No. 1
in default of the payment of certain grazing fees and in default of
their holding a license permitting such use of the public lands by
them. The bill alleged that the respondents were, and for years had
been, in the business of breeding, raising, grazing, and selling
livestock within Nevada and within the district; that it was
impossible for them to own or lease all the land needed for their
business, and they owned or leased a small portion of the required
land and used vacant unappropriated and unreserved public lands of
the United States to satisfy the remainder of their grazing
requirements; that their financial and business necessities made it
impossible to continue to operate if their ability to graze their
livestock on the public range were seriously impaired or interfered
with. They averred that, until May 31, 1955, they had been
impliedly licensed
Page 313 U. S. 356
by the United States to graze livestock on portions of the
public range in Nevada. [
Footnote
1] They recited the passage by Congress of an Act of June 28,
1934, [
Footnote 2] and alleged
that, on April 8, 1935, the Secretary of the Interior, in
accordance with the provisions of the Act, established a grazing
district known as Nevada Grazing District No. 1, which included
portions of the public range upon which the respondents had
theretofore grazed their livestock, and that, on May 31, 1935, the
Director of Grazing, with the approval of the Secretary, had
promulgated rules which required all persons grazing within the
district to obtain temporary licenses so to do, for which no fees
were to be paid; that, pursuant to the rules, the respondents
obtained temporary licenses; that, on March 2, 1936, after an
investigation by the Secretary, the Director of Grazing, with the
approval of his superior, purporting to act under the authority of
§ 2 of the Act of June 28, 1934, promulgated rules for the
administration of grazing districts which provided for the issue of
temporary licenses to expire on a date named in 1937 or upon the
issue of permits provided for by § 3 of the Act, for which licenses
graziers were to pay a fee of five cents per month for each head of
cattle and a fee of one cent per month for each head of sheep for
the privilege of grazing; that the rules further provided that,
after issue of the temporary licenses, no stockman should graze
livestock upon, nor drive them across, the public range within a
grazing district without a license. The complaint recited that,
about May 1, 1936, the respondents were notified by the Register of
the District Land Office that licenses would be granted them upon
payment of the first installment of the grazing fees, and that,
Page 313 U. S. 357
shortly thereafter, the defendant, Brooks, who was acting as
Regional Grazier of the United States, notified the respondents
that, unless they paid the installments and obtained licenses by
June 15th, they would be considered in trespass under the terms of
the Act of 1934, and would be punished by fine as provided in the
Act. The respondents alleged with particularity the urgent
necessity in the conduct of their business that they be permitted
in graze their cattle to public lands and that, unless they can do
so, they will suffer irreparable and serious damage due to the
destruction of their businesses. The bill charges that, although
the Secretary, in promulgating the rules with respect to temporary
licenses, purported to act under the authority of § 2 of the Act of
1934, that section confers upon him no power so to do, and that
grazing fees specified by the rules were fixed without any attempt
to determine their amounts as required by § 3 of the Act, and in
violation of conditions prescribed by § 3.
The petitioner demurred, and assigned as reasons that the
complaint failed to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of
action against him; that there was a defect of parties defendant
for failure to join the Secretary of the Interior; that, as the
United States, an indispensable party, had not consented to be
sued, the court was without jurisdiction, and that the subject
matter of the complaint was exclusively within the political power
of the United States, and not subject to judicial review. The court
overruled the demurrer, with leave to answer. The petitioner
elected to stand upon his demurrer, and the court thereupon entered
a decree in favor of the respondents, which the Supreme Court of
Nevada affirmed. [
Footnote 3]
We granted certiorari, 312 U.S. 674, because of the importance of
the questions involved.
By § 1 of the Act of 1934, the Secretary of the Interior is
authorized to establish grazing districts not exceeding,
Page 313 U. S. 358
in the aggregate, an area of 80,000,000 acres out of certain
unappropriated and unreserved public lands of the United States
[
Footnote 4] if the lands, in
his opinion, are chiefly valuable for grazing and raising forage
crops. Before any district is created, a hearing is to be held
after notice at which officials and persons interested are to be
heard. Section 2 provides:
"The Secretary of the Interior shall make provision for the
protection, administration, regulation, and improvement of such
grazing districts as may be created under the authority of the
foregoing section, and he shall make such rules and regulations and
establish such service, enter into such cooperative agreements, and
do any and all things necessary to accomplish the purposes of this
Act and to insure the objects of such grazing districts, namely, to
regulate their occupancy and use, to preserve the land and its
resources from destruction or unnecessary injury, to provide for
the orderly use, improvement, and development of the range; . . .
and any willful violation of the provisions of this Act or of such
rules and regulations thereunder after actual notice thereof shall
be punishable by a fine of not more than $500."
Section 3 authorizes the Secretary to issue permits to graze
livestock in grazing districts "upon the payment annually of
reasonable fees in each case to be fixed or determined from time to
time." It commands that preference be given, in the issue of
permits, to certain persons described in the section, and that no
permittee who complies with the rules and regulations of the
Secretary shall be denied the renewal of his permit if such denial
will impair the value of the permittee's grazing unit when such
unit is pledged as security for any
bona fide loan. The
permits are to be for a period of not more
Page 313 U. S. 359
than ten years subject to the preferential right of the
permittee to renewal in the discretion of the Secretary. There are
other provisions for adjustment of the amount of grazing to be
permitted under the permits and a corresponding adjustment of the
grazing fees in the case of the occurrence of range depletion due
to natural causes.
By § 10, it is provided that all moneys received under the
authority of he Act are to be deposited in the Treasury of the
United States, and twenty-five percent of such moneys received from
any district in a fiscal year is made available, when appropriated
by the Congress, for expenditure by the Secretary for range
improvements, and fifty percent. of such money received from a
district in any fiscal year is to be paid at the end of the year,
by the Secretary of the Treasury, to the state in which the grazing
district is situated to be expended by the state for the benefit of
the counties in which the district lies. [
Footnote 5]
The petitioner asserts that the judgment below should be
reversed because the suit is one against the United States; because
the Secretary of the Interior is an indispensable party, and
because the State court was without power to enjoin a federal
officer. He admits that earlier cases in this court are against his
contention, but relies on others which he says sustain his view. As
this Court remarked nearly sixty years ago respecting questions of
this kind, they "have rarely been free from difficulty," and it is
not "an easy matter to reconcile all the decisions of the court in
this class of cases." [
Footnote
6] The statement applies with equal force at this day. We are
not disposed to attempt a critique of the
Page 313 U. S. 360
authorities. Since the jurisdiction and the procedure of the
court below is sustained by decisions of this Court, we are
unwilling to base our judgment upon a resolution of asserted
conflict touching issues of so grave consequence where, as here,
the bill fails to make a case upon the merits.
The respondents say that, under the Act of 1934, the Secretary
is powerless to grant temporary licenses and charge fees therefor;
that his sole authority is to issue permanent permits for specified
periods not to exceed ten years at fees adjusted to the
circumstances of individual permittees, and with preferential
rights of renewal. If this view be correct, it might well be years
before the Secretary could place the users of lands in any district
under permits. The petitioner asserts that it was not the intent of
Congress that the grazing lands should go unregulated and without
license for any such extensive period as would be required for the
issue of permits under § 3. He relies on the broad powers conferred
by § 2, and points out that the section is a replica of the statute
involved in
United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.
S. 506, and there held to authorize similar rules and
regulations.
With knowledge that the Department of the Interior was issuing
temporary licenses instead of term permits, and that uniform fees
were being charged and collected for the issue of temporary
licenses, Congress repeatedly appropriated twenty-five percent. of
the money thus coming into the Treasury for expenditure by the
Secretary in improvements upon the ranges. [
Footnote 7] The information in
Page 313 U. S. 361
the possession of Congress was plentiful, and from various
sources. It knew from the annual reports of the Secretary of the
Interior that a system of temporary licensing was in force.
[
Footnote 8] The same
information was furnished the Appropriations Committee at its
hearings. [
Footnote 9] Not only
was it disclosed by the annual report of the Department that no
permits were issued in 1936, 1937, and 1938, and that permits were
issued in only one district in 1939, but it was also disclosed in
the hearings that uniform fees were being charged and collected for
the issue of temporary licenses. And members from the floor
informed the Congress that the temporary licensing system was in
force, and that as much as $1,000,000 had been or would be
collected in fees for such licenses. [
Footnote 10] The repeated appropriations of the proceeds
of the fees thus covered and to be covered into the Treasury not
only confirms the departmental construction of the statute,
[
Footnote 11] but
constitutes a ratification of the action of the Secretary as the
agent of Congress in the administration of the act. [
Footnote 12]
Page 313 U. S. 362
The judgment is reversed, and the cause remanded for further
proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
Reversed.
[
Footnote 1]
See Buford v. Houtz, 133 U. S. 320;
Omaechevarria v. Idaho, 246 U. S. 343.
[
Footnote 2]
C. 865, 48 Stat. 1269, as amended by Act of June 26, 1936, c.
842, 46 Stat. 1976, 43 U.S.C.Supp. V, § 315
et seq.
[
Footnote 3]
106 P.2d 755.
[
Footnote 4]
Increased to an aggregate of 142,000,000 acres by the amendatory
Act of June 26, 1936,
supra, Note 1
[
Footnote 5]
By § 11, provision is made for disposition of moneys received
from districts located on Indian lands. Twenty-five percent. is
made available, when appropriated for expenditure by the Secretary
for range improvement.
[
Footnote 6]
Cunningham v. Macon & Brunswick R. Co.,
109 U. S. 446,
109 U. S.
451.
[
Footnote 7]
Act of June 22, 1936, c. 691, 49 Stat. 1757, 1758; Act of August
9, 1937, c. 570, 50 Stat. 564, 565; Act of May 9, 1938, c. 187, 52
Stat. 291, 292; Act of May 10, 1939, c. 119, 53 Stat. 685, 687; Act
of June 18, 1940, c. 395, 54 Stat. 406. The form of the
Appropriations Act of June 22, 1936, is typical. It is:
"For construction, purchase, and maintenance of range
improvements within grazing districts, pursuant to the provisions
of sections 10 and 11 of the Act of June 28, 1934 (48 Stat., p.
1269), and not including contributions under section 9 of said Act,
$250,000:
Provided, That expenditures hereunder in any
grazing district shall not exceed 25 percentum of all moneys
received under the provisions of said Act from such district during
the fiscal years 1936 and 1937."
[
Footnote 8]
Annual Report Secretary of the Interior 1936, pp. 16-17.
Id., 1937, pp. xii, 102, 105-107.
Id., 1938, pp.
xv, 107.
[
Footnote 9]
Hearings Subcommittee of House Committee on Appropriations on
H.R. 10,630, 74th Cong., 2d Sess., pp. 13-15; Hearings Subcommittee
of House Committee on Appropriations on H.R. 6958, 75th Cong., 1st
Sess., pp. 80, 83, 89; Hearings Subcommittee of House Committee on
Appropriations on H.R. 9621, 75th Cong., 3d Sess., pp. 65, 70, 71;
Hearing Subcommittee of Senate Committee on Appropriations on H.R.
9621, 75th Cong., 3d Sess., pp. 3, 28, 29.
[
Footnote 10]
81 Cong.Rec. part 4, pp. 4570, 4571; 83 Cong.Rec. part 11, p.
2376; 84 Cong.Rec. part 13, pp. 2931, 2932, 2933.
[
Footnote 11]
Wells v. Nickles, 104 U. S. 444,
104 U. S.
447.
[
Footnote 12]
Isbrandtsen-Moller Co. v. United States, 300 U.
S. 139,
300 U. S.
147.