1. A ruling by the state supreme court made on review of the
first trial of an action on contract and determining the applicable
state statute of limitations must be followed by the federal courts
on a second trial, after removal, in the absence of any intervening
change by legislation or by ruling of the state supreme court. P.
312 U. S.
633.
Page 312 U. S. 631
2. Although a state supreme courts consider itself free, on a
second trial, to reconsider and overrule interpretations of state
law made on the first review, the Circuit Court of Appeals, upon
review following a second trial, after removal, is nevertheless
bound by the state court's interpretations. P.
312 U. S.
633.
3. The right of a workman to sue a railroad company for wrongful
discharge is not dependent upon prior exhaustion of his
administrative remedies under the Railway Labor Act. P.
312 U. S.
634.
112 F.2d 959, reversed; judgment of the District Court,
24 F.
Supp. 731, affirmed.
Certiorari, 311 U.S. 643, to review a judgment of the Circuit
Court of Appeals reversing a judgment recovered by the plaintiff in
the District Court in an action against a railroad company for
wrongful discharge from employment.
MR. JUSTICE BLACK delivered the opinion of the Court.
We granted certiorari in this case, 311 U.S. 643, to review a
judgment in which the Circuit Court of Appeals applied a
Mississippi statute of limitations contrary to the Mississippi
Supreme Court's application of the same statute to the same plea in
the same case.
Compare Moore v. Illinois Central Railroad
Co., 180 Miss. 276, 277, 176 So. 593,
with Illinois
Central Railroad Co. v. Moore, 112 F.2d 959.
Page 312 U. S. 632
Petitioner Moore, a member of the Brotherhood of Railroad
Trainmen, brought suit for damages against respondent railroad
company in a Mississippi state court, claiming that he had been
wrongfully discharged contrary to the terms of a contract between
the Trainmen and the railroad, a copy of the contract being
attached to the complaint as an exhibit. Petitioner alleged that,
as a member of the Trainmen, he was entitled to all the benefits of
the contract. Judgment on the pleadings was rendered against Moore
by the trial court. Upon appeal, the Mississippi Supreme Court
reversed and remanded. One of the railroad's pleas was that the
contract of employment between Moore and the railroad was verbal,
rather than written, and that any action thereon was therefore
barred by the three-year statute of limitations provided by Section
2299 of the Mississippi Code of 1930. With reference to this plea,
the Mississippi Supreme Court said:
"The appellant's suit is not on a verbal contract between him
and the appellee, but on a written contract made with the appellee,
for appellant's benefit, by the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen;
consequently, section 2299, Code of 1930, has no application, and
the time within which the appellant could sue is six years under
section 2292, Code of 1930."
Moore v. Illinois Central Railroad Co., supra, 180
Miss. 291, 176 So. 596.
After the remand by the Mississippi Supreme Court, Moore amended
his bill to ask damages in excess of $3,000, and the railroad
removed the case to the federal courts. The District Court,
considering itself bound by state law, held that the Mississippi
three-year statute of limitations did not apply, [
Footnote 1] but, on this point, the Circuit
Court of Appeals reversed, [
Footnote 2] declining to follow the
Page 312 U. S. 633
Mississippi Supreme Court's ruling. Calling attention to the
fact that the Mississippi Supreme Court does not regard itself as
bound by a decision upon a second appeal, the Circuit Court of
Appeals (one judge dissenting) said:
"Since the removal of the case to the federal court, this court
stands in the place of the Supreme Court of Mississippi, and with
the same power of reconsideration."
But the Circuit Courts of Appeals do not have the same power to
reconsider interpretations of state law by state courts as do the
highest courts of the state in which a decision has been rendered.
The Mississippi Supreme Court had the power to reconsider and
overrule its former interpretation, but the court below did not.
And, in the absence of a change by the Mississippi Legislature, the
court below could reconsider and depart from the ruling of the
highest court of Mississippi on Mississippi's statute of
limitations only to the extent, if any, that examination of the
later opinions of the Mississippi Supreme Court showed that it had
changed its earlier interpretation of the effect of the Mississippi
statute.
Wichita Royalty Co. v. City National Bank,
306 U. S. 103,
306 U. S. 107;
cf. West v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co.,
311 U. S. 223;
Fidelity Union Trust Co. v. Field, 311 U.
S. 169. But the court below did not rely upon any change
brought about by the Mississippi Legislature or the Mississippi
Supreme Court. On the contrary, it concluded that it should
reexamine the law because there was involved the interpretation and
application of a collective contract of an interstate railroad with
its employees. The court below also based its failure to follow the
Mississippi Supreme Court's decision in Moore's case on the ground
that, in an earlier case, the Mississippi Supreme Court had said
that the three-year statute applied unless a contract was "provable
wholly by writing," a situation which the court below did not think
existed
Page 312 U. S. 634
here. [
Footnote 3] But, even
before the decision in
Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins,
304 U. S. 64, the
federal courts applied state statutes of limitations in accordance
with the interpretations given to such statutes by the states'
highest courts. As early as 1893, this court said:
"The construction given to a statute [of limitations] of a state
by the highest judicial tribunal of such state is regarded as a
part of the statute, and is as binding upon the courts of the
United States as the text. If the highest judicial tribunal of a
state adopt new views as to the proper construction of such a
statute, and reverse its former decisions, this court will follow
the latest settled adjudications. [
Footnote 4]"
It was error for the court below to depart from the Mississippi
Supreme Court's interpretation of the state statute of
limitations.
But respondent says that there is another reason why the
judgment in its favor should be sustained. [
Footnote 5] This reason, according to respondent, is
that both the District Court and the Circuit Court of Appeals erred
in failing to hold that Moore's suit was prematurely brought
because of his failure to exhaust the administrative remedies
granted him by the Railway Labor Act, 44 Stat. 577, as amended, 48
Stat. 1185, 45 U.S.C. § 151
et seq. But we find nothing in
that Act which purports to take away from the courts the
jurisdiction to determine a controversy over a wrongful discharge
or to make an administrative finding a prerequisite to filing a
suit in court. In support of its contention, the railroad points
especially to section 153(i), which, as amended in 1934,
provides
Page 312 U. S. 635
that disputes growing out of grievances or out of the
interpretation or application of agreements
"shall be handled in the usual manner up to and including the
chief operating officer of the carrier designated to handle such
disputes; but, failing to reach an adjustment in this manner, the
disputes may be referred by petition of the parties or by either
party to the appropriate division of the Adjustment Board with a
full statement of the facts and all supporting data bearing upon
the disputes."
And, in connection with this statutory language, the railroad
also directs our attention to a provision in the agreement between
the Trainmen and the railroad -- a provision authorizing Moore to
submit his complaint to officials of the railroad, offer witnesses
before them, appeal to higher officers of the company in case the
decision should be unsatisfactory, and obtain reinstatement and pay
for time lost if officials of the railroad should find that his
suspension or dismissal was unjust. It is to be noted that the
section pointed out, § 153(i), as amended in 1934, provides no more
than that disputes "may be referred . . . to the . . . Adjustment
Board. . . ." It is significant that the comparable section of the
1926 Railway Labor Act (44 Stat. 577, 578), had, before the 1934
amendment, provided that, upon failure of the parties to reach an
adjustment a "dispute shall be referred to the designated
adjustment board by the parties, or by either party. . . ." Section
3(c). This difference in language, substituting "may" for "shall,"
was not, we think, an indication of a change in policy, but was
instead a clarification of the law's original purpose. For neither
the original 1926 Act nor the Act as amended in 1934 indicates that
the machinery provided for settling disputes was based on a
philosophy of legal compulsion. On the contrary, the legislative
history of the Railway Labor Act shows a consistent purpose on the
part of
Page 312 U. S. 636
Congress to establish and maintain a system for peaceful
adjustment and mediation voluntary in its nature. [
Footnote 6] The District Court and the
Circuit Court of Appeals properly decided that petitioner was not
required by the Railway Labor Act to seek adjustment of his
controversy with the railroad as a prerequisite to suit for
wrongful discharge. But, for failure to follow state law on the
state statute of limitations, the judgment of the Circuit Court of
Appeals is reversed; the judgment of the District Court is
affirmed.
Affirmed.
MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER concurs in the result.
[
Footnote 1]
24 F. Supp.
731.
[
Footnote 2]
112 F.2d 959, 964.
[
Footnote 3]
City of Hattiesburg v. Cobb Bros. Construction Co., 174
Miss. 20, 163 So. 676.
[
Footnote 4]
Bauserman v. Blunt, 147 U. S. 647,
147 U. S. 654,
quoting from
Leffingwell v.
Warren, 2 Black 599,
67 U. S. 603.
And see Balkam v. Woodstock Iron Co., 154 U.
S. 177,
154 U. S.
187.
[
Footnote 5]
Cf. Helvering v. Gowran, 302 U.
S. 238.
[
Footnote 6]
See, e.g., H.Rep. No. 328, 69th Cong., 1st Sess., p.
4