1. Civil liberties, as guaranteed by the Constitution, imply the
existence of an organized society maintaining public order, without
which liberty itself would be lost in the excesses of unrestrained
abuses. P.
312 U. S.
574.
2. The authority of a municipality to impose regulations in
order to assure the safety and convenience of the people in the use
of public highways has never been regarded as inconsistent with
civil liberties, but rather as one of the means of safeguarding the
good order upon which they ultimately depend. P.
312 U. S.
574.
Page 312 U. S. 570
3. As regulation of the use of the streets for parades and
processions is a traditional exercise of control by local
government, the question in a particular case is whether that
control is exerted so as not to deny or unwarrantedly abridge the
right of assembly and the opportunities for the communication of
thought and the discussion of public questions immemorially
associated with resort to public places. P.
312 U. S.
574.
4. A state law providing that no parade or procession upon any
public street shall be permitted unless a special license therefor
shall first be obtained from the selectmen of the town, or from a
licensing committee for the city, and subjecting any violator to a
fine,
held constitutional, in view of its construction by
the state supreme court, as applied to members of the band of
"Jehovah's Witnesses," who marched in groups of from fifteen to
twenty members each, in close single files, along the sidewalks in
the business district of a populous city, each marcher carrying a
sign or placard with "informational" inscriptions. P.
312 U.S. 575.
5. In exercise of its power to license parades on city streets,
the State may charge a license fee reasonably adjusted to the
occasion, for meeting administrative and police expenses. P.
312 U. S.
576.
91 N.H. 137; 16 A.2d 508, affirmed.
APPEAL from the affirmance of judgments imposing fines on
violators of a state law regulating parades in city streets.
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE HUGHES delivered the opinion of the Court.
Appellants are five "Jehovah's Witnesses" who, with sixty-three
others of the same persuasion, were convicted in the municipal
court of Manchester, New Hampshire, for violation of a state
statute prohibiting a "parade or
Page 312 U. S. 571
procession" upon a public street without a special license.
Upon appeal, there was a trial
de novo of these
appellants before a jury in the Superior Court, the other
defendants having agreed to abide by the final decision in that
proceeding. Appellants were found guilty, and the judgment of
conviction was affirmed by the Supreme Court of the State.
State v. Cox, 91 N.H. 137; 16 A.2d 508.
By motions and exceptions, appellants raised the questions that
the statute was invalid under the Fourteenth Amendment of the
Constitution of the United States in that it deprived appellants of
their rights of freedom of worship, freedom of speech and press,
and freedom of assembly, vested unreasonable and unlimited
arbitrary and discriminatory powers in the licensing authority, and
was vague and indefinite. These contentions were overruled, and the
case comes here on appeal.
The statutory prohibition is as follows (New Hampshire, P.L.,
Chap. 145, § 2):
"No theatrical or dramatic representation shall be performed or
exhibited, and no parade or procession upon any public street or
way, and no open-air public meeting upon any ground abutting
thereon, shall be permitted, unless a special license therefor
shall first be obtained from the selectmen of the town, or from a
licensing committee for cities hereinafter provided for."
The provisions for licensing are set forth in the margin.
*
Page 312 U. S. 572
The facts, which are conceded by the appellants to be
established by the evidence, are these: The sixty-eight defendants
and twenty other persons met at a hall in the City of Manchester on
the evening of Saturday, July 8, 1939, "for the purpose of engaging
in an information march." The company was divided into four or five
groups, each with about fifteen to twenty persons. Each group then
proceeded to a different part of the business district of the city,
and there "would line up in single-file formation and then proceed
to march along the sidewalk,
single-file,' that is, following
one another." Each of the defendants carried a small staff with a
sign reading "Religion is a Snare and a Racket," and, on the
reverse, "Serve God and Christ the King." Some of the marchers
carried placards bearing the statement "Fascism or Freedom. Hear
Judge Rutherford and Face the Facts." The marchers also handed out
printed leaflets announcing a meeting to be held at a later time in
the hall from which they had started, where a talk on government
would be given to the public free of charge. Defendants did not
apply for a permit, and none was issued.
There was a dispute in the evidence as to the distance
Page 312 U. S. 573
between the marchers. Defendants said that they were from
fifteen to twenty feet apart. The State insists that the evidence
clearly showed that the "marchers were as close together as it was
possible for them to walk." Appellants concede that this dispute is
not material to the questions presented. The recital of facts which
prefaced the opinion of the state court thus summarizes the effect
of the march:
"Manchester had a population of over 75,000 in 1930, and there
was testimony that, on Saturday nights in an hour's time. 26,000
persons passed one of the intersections where the defendants
marched. The marchers interfered with the normal sidewalk travel,
but no technical breach of the peace occurred. The march was a
prearranged affair, and no permit for it was sought, although the
defendants understood that, under the statute, one was
required."
Appellants urge that each of the defendants was a minister
ordained to preach the gospel in accordance with his belief, and
that the participation of these ministers in the march was for the
purpose of disseminating information in the public interest, and
was one of their ways of worship.
The sole charge against appellants was that they were "taking
part in a parade or procession" on public streets without a permit
as the statute required. Thy were not prosecuted for distributing
leaflets, or for conveying information by placards or otherwise, or
for issuing invitations to a public meeting, or for holding a
public meeting, or for maintaining or expressing religious beliefs.
Their right to do any one of these things, apart from engaging in a
"parade or procession" upon a public street, is not here involved,
and the question of the validity of a statute addressed to any
other sort of conduct than that complained of is not before us.
There appears to be no ground for challenging the ruling of the
state court that appellants were, in fact,
Page 312 U. S. 574
engaged in a parade or procession upon the public streets. As
the state court observed:
"It was a march in formation, and its advertising and
informatory purpose did not make it otherwise. . . . It is
immaterial that its tactics were few and simple. It is enough that
it proceeded in an ordered and close file as a collective body of
persons on the city streets."
Civil liberties, as guaranteed by the Constitution, imply the
existence of an organized society maintaining public order without
which liberty itself would be lost in the excesses of unrestrained
abuses. The authority of a municipality to impose regulations in
order to assure the safety and convenience of the people in the use
of public highways has never been regarded as inconsistent with
civil liberties, but, rather, as one of the means of safeguarding
the good order upon which they ultimately depend. The control of
travel on the streets of cities is the most familiar illustration
of this recognition of social need. Where a restriction of the use
of highways in that relation is designed to promote the public
convenience in the interest of all, it cannot be disregarded by the
attempted exercise of some civil right which, in other
circumstances, would be entitled to protection. One would not be
justified in ignoring the familiar red traffic light because he
thought it his religious duty to disobey the municipal command, or
sought by that means to direct public attention to an announcement
of his opinions. As regulation of the use of the streets for
parades and processions is a traditional exercise of control by
local government, the question in a particular case is whether that
control is exerted so as not to deny or unwarrantedly abridge the
right of assembly and the opportunities for the communication of
thought and the discussion of public questions immemorially
associated with resort to public places.
Lovell v.
Griffin, 303 U. S. 444,
303 U. S. 451;
Hague v. Committee for
Industrial Organization,
Page 312 U. S. 575
307 U. S. 496,
307 U. S. 515,
307 U. S. 516;
Schneider v. State, 308 U. S. 147,
308 U. S. 160;
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296,
310 U. S. 306,
310 U. S.
307.
In the instant case, we are aided by the opinion of the Supreme
Court of the State, which construed the statute and defined the
limitations of the authority conferred for the granting of licenses
for parades and processions. The court observed that, if the clause
of the Act requiring a license "for all open-air public meetings
upon land contiguous to a highway" was invalid, that invalidity did
not nullify the Act in its application to the other situations
described. Recognizing the importance of the civil liberties
invoked by appellants, the court thought it significant that the
statute prescribed "no measures for controlling or suppressing the
publication on the highways of facts and opinions, either by speech
or by writing"; that communication "by the distribution of
literature or by the display of placards and signs" was in no
respect regulated by the statute; that the regulation with respect
to parades and processions was applicable only "to organized
formations of persons using the highways", and that "the
defendants, separately, or collectively in groups not constituting
a parade or procession," were "under no contemplation of the Act."
In this light, the court thought that interference with liberty of
speech and writing seemed slight; that the distribution of
pamphlets and folders by the groups "traveling in unorganized
fashion" would have had as large a circulation, and that
"signs carried by members of the groups not in marching
formation would have been as conspicuous, as published by them
while in parade or procession."
It was with this view of the limited objective of the statute
that the state court considered and defined the duty of the
licensing authority and the rights of the appellants to a license
for their parade, with regard only to considerations of time, place
and manner so as to
Page 312 U. S. 576
conserve the public convenience. The obvious advantage of
requiring application for permit was noted as giving the public
authorities notice in advance, so as to afford opportunity for
proper policing. And the court further observed that, in fixing
time and place, the license served
"to prevent confusion by overlapping parades or processions, to
secure convenient use of the streets by other travelers, and to
minimize the risk of disorder."
But the court held that the licensing board was not vested with
arbitrary power or an unfettered discretion; that its discretion
must be exercised with
"uniformity of method of treatment upon the facts of each
application, free from improper or inappropriate considerations and
from unfair discrimination;"
that a
"systematic, consistent and just order of treatment, with
reference to the convenience of public use of the highways, is the
statutory mandate."
The defendants, said the court,
"had a right, under the Act, to a license to march when, where,
and as they did if, after a required investigation, it was found
that the convenience of the public in the use of the streets would
not thereby be unduly disturbed, upon such conditions or changes in
time, place and manner as would avoid disturbance."
If a municipality has authority to control the use of its public
streets for parades or processions, as it undoubtedly has, it
cannot be denied authority to give consideration, without unfair
discrimination, to time, place and manner in relation to the other
proper uses of the streets. We find it impossible to say that the
limited authority conferred by the licensing provisions of the
statute in question as thus construed by the state court
contravened any constitutional right.
There remains the question of license fees which, as the court
said, had a permissible range from $300 to a nominal amount. The
court construed the Act as requiring "a reasonable fixing of the
amount of the fee." "The
Page 312 U. S. 577
charge," said the court,
"for a circus parade or a celebration procession of length, each
drawing crowds of observers, would take into account the greater
public expense of policing the spectacle compared with the slight
expense of a less expansive and attractive parade or procession, to
which the charge would be adjusted."
The fee was held to be
"not a revenue tax, but one to meet the expense incident to the
administration of the Act and to the maintenance of public order in
the matter licensed."
There is nothing contrary to the Constitution in the charge of a
fee limited to the purpose stated. The suggestion that a flat fee
should have been charged fails to take account of the difficulty of
framing a fair schedule to meet all circumstances, and we perceive
no constitutional ground for denying to local governments that
flexibility of adjustment of fees which, in the light of varying
conditions, would tend to conserve, rather than impair, the liberty
sought.
There is no evidence that the statute has been administered
otherwise than in the fair and nondiscriminatory manner which the
state court has construed it to require.
The decisions upon which appellants rely are not applicable. In
Lovell v. Griffin, supra, the ordinance prohibited the
distribution of literature of any kind at any time, at any place,
and in any manner without a permit from the city manager, thus
striking at the very foundation of the freedom of the press by
subjecting it to license and censorship. In
Hague v. Committee
for Industrial Organization, supra, the ordinance dealt with
the exercise of the right of assembly for the purpose of
communicating views; it did not make comfort or convenience in the
use of streets the standard of official action, but enabled the
local official absolutely to refuse a permit on his mere opinion
that such refusal would prevent "riots, disturbances or disorderly
assemblage." The ordinance
Page 312 U. S. 578
thus created, as the record disclosed, an instrument of
arbitrary suppression of opinions on public questions. The court
said that
"uncontrolled official suppression of the privilege cannot be
made a substitute for the duty to maintain order in connection with
the exercise of the right."
In
Schneider v. State, supra, (p.
308 U. S. 163)
the ordinance was directed at canvassing, and banned unlicensed
communication of any views, or the advocacy of any cause, from door
to door, subject only to the power of a police officer to determine
as a censor what literature might be distributed and who might
distribute it. In
Cantwell v. Connecticut, supra, (p.
310 U. S. 305)
the statute dealt with the solicitation of funds for religious
causes, and authorized an official to determine whether the cause
was a religious one and to refuse a permit if he determined it was
not, thus establishing a censorship of religion.
Nor is any question of peaceful picketing here involved, as in
Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88, and
Carlson v. California, 310 U. S. 106. The
statute, as the state court said, is not aimed at any restraint of
freedom of speech, and there is no basis for an assumption that it
would be applied so as to prevent peaceful picketing as described
in the cases cited.
The argument as to freedom of worship is also beside the point.
No interference with religious worship or the practice of religion
in any proper sense is shown, but only the exercise of local
control over the use of streets for parades and processions.
The judgment of the Supreme Court of New Hampshire is
Affirmed..
* New Hampshire, P.L., Chap. 145, §§ 3, 4, and 5 are as
follows:
"Section 3: Licensing Board. Any city may create a licensing
board to consist of the person who is the active head of the police
department, the mayor of such city and one other person who shall
be appointed by the city government, which board shall have
delegated powers to investigate and decide the question of granting
licenses under this chapter, and it may grant revocable blanket
licenses to fraternal and other like organizations, to theatres and
to undertakers."
"Section 4: Licenses: Fees. Every such special license shall be
in writing, and shall specify the day and hour of the permit to
perform or exhibit or of such parade, procession or open-air public
meeting. Every licensee shall pay in advance for such license, for
the use of the city or town, a sum not more than three hundred
dollars for each day such licensee shall perform or exhibit, or
such parade, procession or open-air public meeting shall take
place; but the fee for a license to exhibit in any hall shall not
exceed fifty dollars."
"Section 5: Penalty. If any person shall violate the provisions
of the preceding sections he shall be fined not more than five
hundred dollars, and it shall be the duty of the selectmen to
prosecute for every violation of this chapter."