1. The 19 1/2% tax imposed by § 3(b) of the Bituminous Coal
Conservation Act (1937) on sales of such coal by producers, "which
would be subject to the application of the conditions and
provisions of the code provided for in § 4, or of the provisions of
§ 4A," applies to producers who are not members of the code,
although under § 4, the provisions of the code are for code members
only. P.
310 U. S.
391.
A contrary construction would read the 19 1/2% tax out of the
Act, (since, by § 3(b), code members are exempt from it); the
essential sanction of the Act would then disappear, and its
effectiveness would be seriously impaired. Section 4 is made
expressly applicable "only to matters and transactions in or
directly affecting interstate commerce." It seems plain that the
tax was intended to apply only to those sales by noncode members
which "would be" subject to regulation under § 4. P.
310 U. S.
392.
2. The constitutionality of the Act is
upheld over the
contentions that the 19 1/2% tax is not a tax, but a penalty; that
Congress lacks power to fix minimum prices for bituminous coal sold
in interstate commerce; that there has been an invalid delegation
of legislative and judicial power, and that the division of
bituminous coal into code and noncode classes is improper. Pp.
310 U. S. 393
et seq.
3. The taxing power of Congress may be used as a sanction for
the exercise of another granted power. P.
310 U. S.
393.
4. The regulatory provisions of the Act are within the commerce
power; they apply only to sales or transactions in, or intimately
affecting, interstate commerce. P.
310 U. S.
393.
5. Price control is a means available to Congress for the
protection and promotion of the public economy. P.
310 U. S.
394.
Courts are not concerned with the wisdom, policy, or
appropriateness of this legislation. But the state of the
bituminous coal industry and its history and public importance
plainly support the judgment of Congress that price-fixing and the
elimination of unfair competitive practices were appropriate
methods for prevention of the financial ruin, low wages, poor
working conditions, strikes, and disruption of the channels of
trade which followed in the wake of the demoralized price
structures. P.
310 U. S.
394.
Page 310 U. S. 382
6. Congress may modify the prohibitions of the Sherman Act by
placing the machinery of price-fixing in the hands of public
agencies. P.
310 U. S.
396.
7. Congress may single out a particular industry and remove as
to it the penalties of the Sherman Act . P.
310 U. S.
396.
8. The commerce clause empowers Congress to stabilize an
interstate industry through a process of price-fixing which
safeguards the public interest by placing price control in the
hands of its administrative representative. P.
310 U. S.
396.
9. The standards specified by § 4, II(c) of the Bituminous Coal
Act to control the Commission in fixing maximum and minimum prices
binding code members, are adequate, and there is no invalid
delegation of legislative power. P.
310 U. S.
397.
10. In the matter of price-making, code members are subordinated
by the Act to the Commission, so that there is no delegation of
legislative authority to the industry. P.
310 U. S.
399.
11. The definition of bituminous coal in the Act, § 17(b), is
adequate as a standard for the Commission's action in determining
what coal is subject to the Act. P.
310 U. S.
399.
12. The Act makes no invalid delegation of judicial power to the
Commission for determining whether a particular coal producer falls
within its provisions, and it grants sufficient judicial review. P.
310 U. S.
400.
13. A contention that the Act, by classifying the coal as code
and noncode and applying the 19 1/2% tax to the latter alone,
violates the Fifth Amendment is rejected, since the procedural
features satisfy due process, and the Fifth Amendment has no equal
protection clause; nor is uniformity required by the commerce
clause. P.
310 U. S.
400.
14. A judgment sustaining on review a determination by the
Bituminous Coal Commission that a producer's coal is "bituminous"
within the meaning of § 17(b) of the Bituminous Coal Conservation
Act, thus subjecting him to the 19 1/2% tax laid on sales by
producers who have not joined the code, is
res judicata in
a suit by the producer to enjoin the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue from collecting the tax. P.
310 U. S.
401.
15. Where Congress has created a special administrative
procedure for determining the status of persons and companies under
a regulatory Act, and has prescribed a procedure satisfying due
process, that remedy is exclusive. P.
310 U. S. 404.
Page 310 U. S. 383
16. In the circumstances of this case, appellant is not entitled
to relief from payment of taxes accrued during the litigation since
the date fixed by the decree below. P.
310 U. S. 404.
Affirmed.
Appeal from a decree of the District Court dismissing a bill to
enjoin the collection of taxes.
See also 31 F. Supp. 125
and 105 F.2d 559.
Page 310 U. S. 387
MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS delivered the opinion of the Court.
The labor provisions of the Bituminous Coal Conservation Act of
1935 (49 Stat. 991) were held unconstitutional by this Court in
Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.
S. 238. The Bituminous Coal Act of 1937 (50 Stat. 72)
was thereupon enacted. It eliminated those provisions of the
earlier Act and made other substantive and structural changes.
[
Footnote 1] The basic problem
here involved is the constitutionality of the 1937 Act.
That Act provides for the regulation of the sale and
distribution of bituminous coal by the National Bituminous Coal
Commission [
Footnote 2] with
the cooperation of the bituminous
Page 310 U. S. 388
coal industry. Its aim is the stabilization of the industry
primarily through price-fixing and the elimination of unfair
competition. It is provided in § 4 that the coal producers,
accepting membership, shall be organized under the Bituminous Coal
Code. Some twenty district boards of code members are provided for,
which are to operate as an aid to the Commission, but subject to
its pervasive surveillance and authority. The statute specifies in
detail the methods of their organization and operation, the scope
of their functions, and the jurisdiction of the Commission over
them. The Commission is empowered to fix minimum prices for code
members in accordance with stated standards. Under § 4, II(a), each
board shall, "on its own motion or when directed by the
Commission," propose minimum prices pursuant to prescribed
statutory standards. These may be approved, disapproved, or
modified by the Commission as the basis for the coordination of
minimum prices. Somewhat comparable machinery is provided for such
coordination of minimum prices "in common consuming market areas
upon a fair competitive basis," § 4, II(b), and for establishment
of rules and regulations incidental to the sale and distribution of
coal by code members. § 4, II(a). The Commission is also given
power by § 4, II(c), to establish maximum prices for code members
pursuant to standards prescribed therein. The sale, delivery, or
offer for sale of coal below the minimum or above the maximum
prices established by the Commission is made a violation of the
code. § 4, II(e). So are numerous practices specified in § 4, II(i)
as unfair methods of competition. And contracts for the sale of
coal at prices below the prescribed minimum or above the maximum
are invalid and unenforceable. § 4, II(e). The Commission may,
after hearing, revoke the code membership of any coal producer for
willful violation of the code or of any regulation made thereunder.
§ 5(b).
Page 310 U. S. 389
Sec. 3(a) imposes an excise tax of 1 cent per ton of two
thousand pounds upon the sale or other disposition by the producer
of bituminous coal produced in the United States. [
Footnote 3] Sec. 3(b) imposes an additional
19 1/2% tax (based on sale price or in certain cases on fair market
value) on sales of bituminous coal by producers "which would be
subject to the application of the conditions and provisions of the
code provided for in section 4 or of the provisions of section
4-A." [
Footnote 4] Producers
who are members of the code are exempt from that tax. As we shall
see, the interpretation of § 3(b) is a subject of controversy. But
if, as the government contends, the 19 1/2% tax is applicable to
sales by nonmembers, there are strong inducements for joining the
code.
Machinery is provided in § 4-A for obtaining exemptions. A
producer who believes that any commerce in coal is not, or may not
be made, subject to the provisions of § 4 may file an application
for exemption with the Commission. Subject to qualifications not
material here, the filing of such application "in good faith"
exempts the applicant from any "obligation, duty or liability"
imposed by § 4 pending action by the Commission on the application.
The Commission shall grant the application or,
Page 310 U. S. 390
after notice and opportunity for hearing, shall deny or
otherwise dispose of it. An applicant aggrieved by such denial or
other disposition may obtain a review of the order in the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia or in the Court of Appeals in
the circuit where he resides or has his principal place of
business. § 6(b). The findings of the Commission as to the facts,
if supported by substantial evidence, are conclusive.
Appellant is lessee of coal lands in Arkansas, and is engaged in
the business of mining and shipping coal. It has not subscribed to
or accepted the provisions of the Bituminous Coal Code provided for
in § 4 of the Act. In August, 1937, it filed an application for
exemption on the grounds that its coal was not bituminous coal as
defined in § 17(b) of the Act. [
Footnote 5] The Commission held a public hearing on that
application in October, 1937. [
Footnote 6] Appellant appeared, introduced evidence, and
was heard on oral argument before the Commission. [
Footnote 7] In August, 1938, the Commission
handed down an opinion with findings of fact and conclusions of law
and entered an order denying appellant's application for exemption
on the grounds that its coal was bituminous within the meaning
Page 310 U. S. 391
of § 17(b). Appellant obtained a review of this order in the
Circuit Court of Appeals. That court held that the Commission had
jurisdiction to determine the status of coal claimed to be exempt,
and that the Commission's decision was based on substantial
evidence. It accordingly affirmed the order.
Sunshine
Anthracite Coal Co. v. National Bituminous Coal Commission,
105 F.2d 559. We denied certiorari. 308 U.S. 604.
In May, 1938, while the above proceeding was pending before the
Commission, appellee demanded that appellant pay the taxes,
penalties, and interest accruing under § 3(b) of the Act for the
period ending February, 1938, and filed a notice of tax lien
against appellant's property. Thereupon appellant filed its
complaint in this suit to enjoin the collection of the tax. A
three-judge court was convened which issued a temporary injunction.
Apparently no further action was taken in this case until after the
decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals in
Sunshine Anthracite
Coal Co. v. National Bituminous Coal Commission, supra, when
appellee filed a supplemental answer stating that the decision in
that case was
res judicata as to the status of appellant's
coal under the Act, and that the district court had no jurisdiction
over that subject matter. The court below denied appellant's motion
to strike that portion of the answer. 31 F. Supp. 125. The case was
tried. The court held the Act to be constitutional, and dismissed
the bill on the merits. [
Footnote
8] The case is here on appeal (50 Stat. 752; 28 U.S.C. §
380a).
I. Appellant argues that it is not subject to the 19 1/2% tax
imposed by § 3(b) because that section does not apply
Page 310 U. S. 392
to producers who are not members of the code. Its argument rests
on the construction of § 3(b) and § 4. As we have seen, the former
places the 19 1/2% tax on the sale or other disposition of coal
"which would be subject to the application of the conditions and
provisions of the code provided for in section 4, or of the
provisions of section 4-A." Sec. 4 provides that the "provisions of
such code shall apply only to such code members." Appellant
therefore contends that the tax is not applicable to its coal,
since the coal produced by a noncode producer such as appellant is
not subject to the provisions of the code.
But if the 19 1/2% tax is not applicable to noncode members, it
is not applicable to anyone, since § 3(b) exempts code members from
that tax. That construction would read the 19 1/2% tax out of the
Act. The essential sanction of the Act would then disappear, and
its effectiveness would be seriously impaired. That alternative
will not be taken where a construction is possible which will
preserve the vitality of the Act and the utility of the language in
question.
See Armstrong Paint & Varnish Works v. Nu-Enamel
Corp., 305 U. S. 315,
305 U. S. 333,
and cases cited. Only a highly strained construction of § 3(b)
would lead to the conclusion that noncode members are exempt from
the 19 1/2% tax. It seems that Congress made a deliberate choice of
words when it said that the tax applied to the sale or other
disposition of coal which "would be" subject to § 4 and § 4-A. Sec.
4 is made expressly applicable "only to matters and transactions in
or directly affecting interstate commerce in bituminous coal."
Hence, it seems plain that the tax was intended to apply only to
those sales by noncode members which "would be" subject to
regulation under § 4. Appellant's coal plainly falls in that class,
since practically its entire output is sold to purchasers outside
the state of Arkansas. To sustain appellant's position, we would
not only have to substitute "is" for "would be;" we would have to
override the express Congressional
Page 310 U. S. 393
plan to make the 19 1/2% tax "in aid of the regulation of
interstate commerce" in bituminous coal. [
Footnote 9] That would be not only to rewrite § 3(b),
but to remake the whole statutory scheme. Obviously such a task is
not for the courts.
II. Appellant challenges the constitutionality of the Act on the
grounds that the 19 1/2% tax is not a tax, but a penalty, that
Congress lacks the power to fix minimum prices for bituminous coal
sold in interstate commerce, that there has been an invalid
delegation of legislative and judicial power, and that the division
of bituminous coal into code and noncode classes is improper.
Clearly this tax is not designed merely for revenue purposes. In
purpose and effect, it is primarily a sanction to enforce the
regulatory provisions of the Act. But that does not mean that the
statute is invalid, and the tax unenforceable. Congress may impose
penalties in aid of the exercise of any of its enumerated powers.
The power of taxation, granted to Congress by the Constitution, may
be utilized as a sanction for the exercise of another power which
is granted it.
Head Money Cases, 112 U.
S. 580,
112 U. S. 596.
And see Sonzinsky v. United States, 300 U.
S. 506. It is so utilized here.
The regulatory provisions are clearly within the power of
Congress under the commerce clause of the Constitution. These
provisions are applicable only to sales or transactions in, or
directly or intimately affecting, interstate commerce. The fixing
of prices, the proscription of unfair trade practices, the
establishment of marketing rules respecting such sales of
bituminous coal constitute regulations within the competence of
Congress under the commerce clause. As stated by Mr. Justice
Cardozo in
Page 310 U. S. 394
his dissent in
Carter v. Carter Coal Co., supra, p.
298 U. S. 326,
"To regulate the price for such transactions is to regulate
commerce itself, and not alone its antecedent conditions or its
ultimate consequences."
See Tagg Bros. & Moorhead v. United
States, 280 U. S. 420.
What is true of prices is true of the attachment of other
conditions to the flow of a commodity in interstate channels.
Mulford v. Smith, 307 U. S. 38, and
cases cited. Since this power, when it exists, is complete in
itself,
Gibbons v.
Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1,
22 U. S. 196,
there can be no question but that the provisions of this Act are an
exertion of the paramount federal power over interstate commerce.
See United States v. Rock Royal Cooperative, Inc.,
207 U. S.
533.
Nor does the Act violate the Fifth Amendment. Price control is
one of the means available to the states (
Nebbia v. New
York, 291 U. S. 502) and
to the Congress (
United States v. Rock Royal Cooperative, Inc.,
supra) in their respective domains (
Baldwin v. G.A.F.
Seelig, Inc., 294 U. S. 511) for
the protection and promotion of the welfare of the economy. But
appellant claims that this Act is not an appropriate exercise of
the Congressional power. It urges that the nature and use of
bituminous coal in nowise endanger the health and morals of the
populace; that no question of conservation is involved; that the
ills of the industry are attributable to overproduction; that the
increase of prices will cause a further loss of markets and add to
the afflictions which beset the industry, and that the consuming
public will be deprived of the wholesome restriction of the
antitrust laws. Those matters, however, relate to questions of
policy, to the wisdom of the legislation, and to the
appropriateness of the remedy chosen -- matters which are not our
concern. If we endeavored to appraise them, we would be trespassing
on the legislative domain. And if we undertook to narrow the scope
of federal intervention in this field, as suggested by appellant,
we would be blind to at least
Page 310 U. S. 395
thirty years of history. For a generation, there have been
various manifestations of incessant demand for federal intervention
in the coal industry. [
Footnote
10] The investigations preceding the 1935 and 1937 Acts are
replete with an exposition of the conditions which have beset that
industry. [
Footnote 11]
Official [
Footnote 12] and
private [
Footnote 13]
records give eloquent testimony to the statement of Mr. Justice
Cardozo in the
Carter case (p.
298 U. S. 330)
that free competition had been "degraded into anarchy" in the
bituminous coal industry. Overproduction and savage competitive
warfare wasted the industry. Labor and capital alike were the
victims. Financial distress among operators and acute poverty among
miners prevailed even during periods of general prosperity. This
history of the bituminous coal industry is written in blood, as
well as in ink.
It was the judgment of Congress that price-fixing and the
elimination of unfair competitive practices were appropriate
methods for prevention of the financial ruin, low wages, poor
working conditions, strikes, and disruption of the channels of
trade which followed in the wake of the demoralized price
structures in this industry. If the strategic character of this
industry in our economy and the chaotic conditions which have
prevailed in it do not justify legislation, it is difficult to
imagine what would. To invalidate this Act we would have to
deny
Page 310 U. S. 396
the existence of power on the part of Congress under the
commerce clause to deal directly and specifically with those forces
which in its judgment should not be permitted to dislocate an
important segment of our economy and to disrupt and burden
interstate channels of trade. That step could not be taken without
plain disregard of the Constitution. There are limits on the powers
of the states to act as respects these interstate industries.
Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., supra. If the industry,
acting on its own, had endeavored to stabilize the markets through
price-fixing agreements, it would have run afoul of the Sherman
Act.
United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., Inc. ante, p.
310 U. S. 150. But
that does not mean that there is a no man's land between the state
and federal domains. Certainly what Congress has forbidden by the
Sherman Act, it can modify. It may do so by placing the machinery
of price-fixing in the hands of public agencies. It may single out
for separate treatment, as it has done on various occasions,
[
Footnote 14] a particular
industry, and thereby remove the penalties of the Sherman Act as
respects it. Congress, under the commerce clause, is not impotent
to deal with what it may consider to be dire consequences of
laissez-faire. It is not powerless to take steps in
mitigation of what in its judgment are abuses of cut-throat
competition. And it is not limited in its choice between
unrestrained self-regulation, on the one hand, and rigid
prohibitions, on the other. The commerce clause empowers it to
undertake stabilization of an interstate industry through a process
of price-fixing which safeguards the public interest by placing
price control in the hands of its administrative representative.
United States v. Rock Royal Cooperative, Inc., supra. That
was the choice which Congress made here. There is nothing
Page 310 U. S. 397
in the
Carter case which stands in the way. The
majority of the Court in that case did not pass on the price-fixing
features of the earlier Act. The Chief Justice and Mr. Justice
Cardozo, in separate minority opinions, expressed the view that the
price-fixing features of the earlier Act were constitutional. We
rest on their conclusions for sustaining the present Act.
Nor does the Act contain an invalid delegation of legislative
power. Under § 4, II(c), the Commission may fix maximum prices
when, in the public interest, it deems it necessary in order to
protect the consumer against unreasonably high prices. These
maximum prices must be fixed at a uniform increase above minimum
prices so that, in the aggregate, they will yield a reasonable
return above the weighted average total cost of the district. And
no maximum price shall be established for any mine which will not
yield a fair return on the fair value of the property. The minimum
prices to be fixed must conform to the following standards: the
weighted average cost for each minimum price area must be computed,
the elements of cost being defined; a classification of the various
sizes and grades of coal shall be made which reflects as nearly as
possible the relative market value of the various kinds, qualities,
and sizes of coal which is just and equitable as between producers
within the district and which has due regard to the interests of
the consuming public, and coordinated minimum prices shall be
established for such coal (a) which reflect as nearly as possible
the relative market values at points of delivery taking into
account specifically enumerated factors, (b) which preserve as
nearly as may be existing fair competitive opportunities, (c) which
are just and equitable as between the districts, and (d) which,
consistently with the process of coordination, yield a return to
each area approximating its weighted average cost per ton.
Page 310 U. S. 398
The problem of fixing reasonable prices for bituminous coal
cannot be differentiated legally from the task of fixing rates
under the Interstate Commerce Act (41 Stat. 484, 49 U.S.C. § 15)
and the Packers and Stockyards Act (42 Stat. 166, 7 U.S.C. § 211).
The latter provide the standard of "just and reasonable" to guide
the administrative body in the ratemaking process. The validity of
that standard (
Tagg Bros. & Moorhead v. United States,
supra), the appropriateness of the criterion of the "public
interest" in various contexts (
New York Central Securities
Corp. v. United States, 287 U. S. 12,
287 U. S. 24;
United States v. Chemical Foundation, Inc., 272 U. S.
1;
Avent v. United States, 266 U.
S. 127), the legality of the standard of "unreasonable
obstruction" to navigation (
Union Bridge Co. v. United
States, 204 U. S. 364) all
make it clear that there is a valid delegation of authority in this
case. The standards which Congress has provided here far exceed in
specificity others which have been sustained. Certainly, in the
hands of experts, the criteria which Congress has supplied are
wholly adequate for carrying out the general policy and purpose of
the Act. To require more would be to insist on a degree of
exactitude which not only lacks legal necessity, but which does not
comport with the requirements of the administrative process.
Delegation by Congress has long been recognized as necessary in
order that the exertion of legislative power does not become a
futility.
Currin v. Wallace, 306 U. S.
1,
306 U. S. 15, and
cases cited. But the effectiveness of both the legislative and
administrative processes would become endangered if Congress were
under the constitutional compulsion of filling in the details
beyond the liberal prescription here. Then, the burdens of minutiae
would be apt to clog the administration of the law and deprive the
agency of that flexibility and dispatch which are its salient
virtues. For these reasons, we hold that the standards with which
Congress has supplied the Commission are
Page 310 U. S. 399
plainly valid.
United States v. Rock Royal Cooperative,
Inc., supra.
Nor has Congress delegated its legislative authority to the
industry. The members of the code function subordinately to the
Commission. It, not the code authorities, determines the prices.
And it has authority and surveillance over the activities of these
authorities. Since lawmaking is not entrusted to the industry, this
statutory scheme is unquestionably valid.
Currin v. Wallace,
supra, and cases cited.
But appellant maintains that the delegation of authority to the
Commission to determine what coal is subject to the Act is unlawful
because of uncertainty in the statutory definition of bituminous
coal. Sec. 17(b) defines the term "bituminous coal" as follows:
"The term 'bituminous coal' includes all bituminous,
semibituminous, and subbituminous coal, and shall exclude lignite,
which is defined as a lignitic coal having calorific value in
British thermal units of less than seven thousand six hundred per
pound and having a natural moisture content in place in the mine of
30 percentum or more."
As in the case of the term "interurban" electric railway in the
Railway Labor Act (
Shields v. Utah Idaho Central Railroad
Co., 305 U. S. 177), we
think the definition of bituminous coal is wholly adequate as a
standard for administrative action. The fact that it is not a
chemist's or an engineer's definition is not fatal. The definition
is not devoid of meaning. We are unable to say that it cannot be
applied so as to delineate the areas in which Congress intended to
make this system of control effective. The fact that many instances
may occur where its application may be difficult is merely to
emphasize the nature of the administrative problem, and the reason
for the grant of latitude by the Congress. The difficulty or
impossibility of drawing a statutory line is one of the reasons for
supplying
Page 310 U. S. 400
merely a statutory guide.
Cf. Piedmont & Northern Ry.
Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 286 U.
S. 299,
286 U. S. 312.
That guide is sufficiently precise for an intelligent determination
of the ultimate questions of fact by experts.
Nor is there an invalid delegation of judicial power. To hold
that there was would be to turn back the clock on at least a half
century of administrative law. The question of whether or not
appellant should be subjected to the regulatory provisions of the
Bituminous Coal Act was one which the Congress could decide in the
exercise of its powers under the commerce clause. In lieu of making
that decision itself, it could bring to its aid the services of an
administrative agency. And it could delegate to that agency the
determination of the question of fact whether a particular coal
producer fell within the Act.
Shields v. Utah Idaho Central R.
Co., supra, p.
305 U. S. 180.
The fact that such determination involved an interpretation of the
term "bituminous coal" is of no more significance here than was the
fact that, in the
Shields case, a decision by the
Interstate Commerce Commission of what constituted an "interurban"
electric railway was necessary for the ultimate finding as to the
applicability of the Railway Labor Act to carriers. That problem
involves no more than the adequacy of the standard governing the
exercise of the delegated authority. Furthermore, on this phase of
the case, appellant has received all the judicial review to which
it is entitled. As we have seen, it obtained a review under § 6(b)
of the Commission's denial of its application for exemption. The
functions of the courts cease when it is ascertained that the
findings of the Commission meet the statutory test.
Rochester
Telephone Corp. v. United States, 307 U.
S. 125,
307 U. S.
146.
Appellant contends that the statutory classification of coal
into code and noncode classes, and the application
Page 310 U. S. 401
of the 19 1/2% tax to the latter, are improper under the Fifth
Amendment. Its objection is not premised on lack of due process.
Nor could it be, in view of the elaborate machinery and procedure
for the Act's enforcement which the Congress has provided. Rather,
appellant's objection is founded on its claim of discrimination.
But the Fifth Amendment, unlike the Fourteenth, has no equal
protection clause.
Steward Machine Co. v. Davis,
301 U. S. 548,
301 U. S. 584,
and cases cited. And there is "no requirement of uniformity in
connection with the commerce power."
Currin v. Wallace,
supra, p.
306 U. S. 14. The
lack of similarity in treatment of the two classes of coal is an
integral and essential feature of this Act. As we have said, it is
through that device that Congress sought to obtain an effective
sanction for the Act's enforcement. Coercion is the very essence of
any penalty exacted for failure of submission. "It is of the
essence of the plenary power conferred" by the commerce clause
"that Congress may exercise its discretion in the use of the
power."
Currin v. Wallace, supra, p.
306 U. S. 14. A
part of that discretion is the selection of the sanction for the
law's enforcement. Discrimination constitutionally may be the price
of noncompliance.
"Inquiry into the hidden motives which may move Congress to
exercise a power constitutionally conferred upon it is beyond the
competency of courts."
Sonzinsky v. United States, supra, p.
300 U. S.
513-514.
And see Mulford v. Smith, supra, p.
307 U. S.
48.
III. Appellant contends here, as it did below, that
Sunshine
Anthracite Coal Co. v. National Bituminous Coal Commission
supra, is not determinative of the present issues, since that
case did not involve the assessment of taxes, and since the
Commission had no authority to determine the status of appellant's
coal.
These contentions are untenable. In the first place, the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue is merely the agency to collect
taxes levied under the Act; he is not the
Page 310 U. S. 402
administrative agent whom Congress has designated to determine
what coal is exempt from the 19 1/2% tax. That function is
entrusted to the Commission. By the terms of § 4-A, it is the
Commission which determines whether an application for exemption
should be granted or denied. By the provisions of § 3(b), it is the
Commission which certifies to the Commissioner those who are code
members, and consequently exempt from the 19 1/2% tax. Hence, the
Commission determines the scope of the provisions of the Act and
their applicability to various producers. The Commissioner is given
no administrative functions whatsoever except tax collection. In
the second place, the underlying issue in each of these two suits
is the same. In
Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. National
Bituminous Coal Commission, supra, the question was whether or
not appellant's coal was "bituminous" within the meaning of §
17(b). When that issue was decided adversely to appellant,
liability for the 19 1/2% tax followed unless appellant joined the
code, in which event it would be entitled to a certificate from the
Commission evidencing its tax exemption. In the present suit,
appellant is seeking to raise the identical issue, since its
purpose is to enjoin collection of the self-same tax.
The result is clear. Where the issues in separate suits are the
same, the fact that the parties are not precisely identical is not
necessarily fatal. As stated in
Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry. Co.
v. Schendel, 270 U. S. 611,
270 U. S.
620,
"Identity of parties is not a mere matter of form, but of
substance. Parties nominally the same may be, in legal effect,
different . . . , and parties nominally different may be, in legal
effect, the same."
A judgment is
res judicata in a second action upon the
same claim between the same parties or those in privity with them.
Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U. S.
351. There is privity between officers of the same
government, so that a judgment
Page 310 U. S. 403
in a suit between a party and a representative of the United
States is
res judicata in relitigation of the same issue
between that party and another officer of the government.
See
Tait v. Western Maryland Ry. Co., 289 U.
S. 620. The crucial point is whether or not, in the
earlier litigation, the representative of the United States had
authority to represent its interests in a final adjudication of the
issue in controversy.
Cf. Gunter v. Atlantic Coast Line R.
Co., 200 U. S. 273,
200 U. S.
284-289. Cases holding that a judgment in a suit against
a collector for unlawful exaction is not a bar to a subsequent suit
by or against the Commissioner or the United States (
Sage v.
United States, 250 U. S. 33;
Bankers' Pocahontas Coal Co. v. Burnet, 287 U.
S. 308) are not in point, since the suit against the
collector is "personal, and its incidents, such as the nature of
the defenses open and the allowance of interest, are different."
Sage v. United States, supra, p.
250 U. S. 37.
But here, the authority of the Commission is clear. There can be no
question that it was authorized to make the determination of the
status of appellant's coal under the Act. It represented the United
States in that determination, and the delegation of that power to
the Commission was valid, as we have said. That suit therefore
bound the United States, as well as the appellant. Where a suit
binds the United States, it binds its subordinate officials.
Tait v. Western Maryland Ry. Co., supra. The suggestion
that the doctrine of
res judicata does not apply unless
the court rendering the judgment had jurisdiction of the cause is
sufficiently answered by
Stoll v. Gottlieb, 305 U.
S. 165, and
Treinies v. Sunshine Mining Co.,
308 U. S. 66. As
held in those cases, in general, the principles of
res
judicata apply to questions of jurisdiction, as well as to
other matters -- whether it be jurisdiction of the subject matter
or of the parties. Accordingly, the lower court correctly held that
it had no jurisdiction to determine
Page 310 U. S. 404
whether appellant's coal was "bituminous," as defined in the
Act. Furthermore where, as here, Congress has created a special
administrative procedure for the determination of the status of
persons or companies under a regulatory act and has prescribed a
procedure which meets all requirements of due process, that remedy
is exclusive.
See Anniston Manufacturing Co. v. Davis,
301 U. S. 337.
The decree below subjected appellant to payment of taxes accrued
or assessed against it under § 3(b) after December 4, 1939. To
relieve against payment of taxes until final termination of the
litigation would be to put a premium on dilatory tactics in a
situation where, under the authority of
Currin v. Wallace,
Mulford v. Smith, and
United States v. Rock Royal
Cooperative, Inc., supra, the subject of the Act was clearly
one over which the jurisdiction of Congress was complete.
Affirmed.
MR. JUSTICE McREYNOLDS is of opinion that the Act under review
is beyond any power granted to Congress, and that the judgment
below should be reversed.
[
Footnote 1]
H. Report No. 294, 75th Cong., 1st Sess., pp. 2-3.
[
Footnote 2]
Though we refer throughout to the Commission, it should be noted
that its functions have been administered since July 1, 1939, by
the Bituminous Coal Division of the Department of the Interior.
Reorganization Plan No. II, § 4(a) and (b), submitted by the
President to the Congress May 9, 1939. Pub.Res. No. 20, 76th Cong.,
1st Sess., c.193, approved June 7, 1939.
[
Footnote 3]
These provisions are now found in § 3520 of the Internal Revenue
Code (53 Stat. 430). The 1� tax was apparently designed to cover
the administrative costs of the Act.
See H. Report No.
294,
supra, note 1 pp.
2-3, recommending a 1/2% tax which in conference was changed to 1�
per ton. H. Report No. 578, 75th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 5.
[
Footnote 4]
Sec. 4, as we have seen, governs the constitution and operation
of the code. Sec. 4-A provides,
inter alia, that the
Commission shall subject coal in intrastate commerce to the
provisions of § 4 if it finds after hearing that transactions in
that coal
"cause any undue or unreasonable advantage, preference, or
prejudice as between persons and localities in such commerce, on
the one hand. and interstate commerce in coal, on the other hand,
or any undue, unreasonable, or unjust discrimination against
interstate commerce in coal, or in any manner directly affect
interstate commerce in coal."
[
Footnote 5]
Sec. 17(b) provides:
"The term 'bituminous coal' includes all bituminous,
semibituminous, and subbituminous coal and shall exclude lignite,
which is defined as a lignitic coal having calorific value in
British thermal units of less than seven thousand six hundred per
pound and having a natural moisture content in place in the mine of
30 percentum or more."
[
Footnote 6]
This hearing was not restricted to appellant's application.
Other producers in the same field intervened.
[
Footnote 7]
The liberal notice and opportunity to be heard afforded
appellant are illustrated by the following: in January, 1938, the
report of the examiner was served on appellant. In May, 1938, a
proposed report of the Commission was issued giving appellant 30
days to file exceptions and briefs, and in that event to apply for
oral argument. Appellant filed exceptions and asked for oral
argument. Notice of oral argument was issued, and oral argument was
had. Thereafter, the Commission issued its order denying the
application.
[
Footnote 8]
It granted, however, a permanent injunction against collection
of taxes prior to December 4, 1939, the date on which this Court
denied a petition for rehearing on the petition for certiorari. 308
U.S. 638. Appellee has not appealed from that part of the decree.
The Court also granted a stay with respect to collection of taxes
accruing after December 4, 1939, pending final disposition of this
appeal.
[
Footnote 9]
H. Report, No. 294,
supra, note 1 states concerning this tax (p. 4):
"Under subsection (b), a tax of 19 1/2 percent is applied to
coal which would be subject to the provisions in section 4 or the
provisions of section 4A. Producers who are code members are exempt
from this tax. This tax is intended to be in aid of the regulation
of interstate commerce in coal provided for in sections 4 and
4A."
[
Footnote 10]
National Resources Committee, Energy Resources and National
Policy (1939) pp. 41-123, 338-346, 405-423.
[
Footnote 11]
Hearings on H.R. 8479, 74th Cong., 1st Sess.
[
Footnote 12]
National Resources Committee, Energy Resources and National
Policy,
supra, note 10;
HRep. No. 1800, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., covering the 1935 Act;
S.Rep. No. 252, H.Rep. No. 294, 75th Cong., 1st Sess., covering the
1937 Act;
Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States,
288 U. S. 344;
Third Annual Report Under the Bituminous Coal Act of 1937 (1940)
pp. 4-5.
[
Footnote 13]
Hamilton & Wright, The Case of Bituminous Coal (1926);
Report of the Fifteenth Annual Meeting of the National Coal Assoc.,
Oct.1934, pp. 9-11, 96-97.
[
Footnote 14]
See United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., Inc.,
supra, p.
310 U. S.
225.