A corporation owning a patent for a poisonous fluid compound
containing lead, which, when mixed with the gasoline used as fuel
in high compression internal combustion engines, adds greatly to
their efficiency, and owning also a patent claiming the fuel
mixture and another claiming a method of using it, manufactured the
fluid and sold it, without royalty, under a licensing system, to
nearly all of the leading manufacturers of gasoline in the country,
one of which owned half of the patentee's capital stock. These
refiners mixed the fluid with their gasoline and sold the resulting
patented fluid in great quantities to jobbers, who in turn sold it
to retailers and consumers. Under the license system: refiners
could not sell to jobbers other than those licensed by the
patentee, and must maintain a certain price differential; they must
conform to public health regulations in mixing the fuel and to
conditions touching their use of the patentee's corporate name and
trademark or tradenames; a jobber could sell, within a specified
territory only, the lead-treated gasoline sold him by a designated
licensed refiner, generally the one through whom he must apply for
his license; he must make monthly reports to the patentee, with a
list of all places of sale; must comply with health regulations as
to the handling of the fuel; must post and distribute notices
concerning such handling as required by the patentee; must permit
physical examination of employees; must abstain from adulteration
or dilution of the fuel, and must comply with requirements as to
the use of the patentee's name or tradename. The patentee reserved
the right to cancel jobbers' licenses at will. This licensing
system affected and controlled the business of most of those
engaged in manufacturing motor fuel in the country, including
nearly all the leading oil companies and most of the jobbers. The
greater part of the treated gasoline was sold and transported in
interstate commerce, much of it being distributed through the
licensed jobbers. The patentee made a practice of ascertaining,
through investigations by its agents, what jobbers failed to comply
with the market policies and posted prices of the major oil
companies, and by rejection of applications for licenses,
Page 309 U. S. 437
and in other ways, created a belief among refiners and jobbers
that, under its licensing system, jobbers must yield such
compliance. The patentee thus built up a combination capable of
use, and actually used, as a means of suppressing competition among
jobbers and controlling their prices. It was conceded that, if this
control of the market had been acquired without aid of the patents,
but wholly by contracts with refiners and jobbers, it would involve
violation of the Sherman Act.
Held:
(1) A patentee may not, by attaching a condition to his license,
enlarge his monopoly, and thus acquire some other which the statute
and the patent together did not give. P.
309 U. S.
455.
(2) By the authorized sales of the fuel by refiners to jobbers,
the patent monopoly over it is exhausted, and, after the sale,
neither the patentee nor the refiners may longer rely on the
patents to exercise any control over the price at which the fuel
may be resold. P.
309 U.S.
457.
(3) Agreements for maintaining prices of articles moving in
interstate commerce are, without more, unreasonable restraints
within the meaning of the Sherman Act because they eliminate
competition, and agreements which create power of such price
maintenance, exhibited by its actual exertion for that purpose, are
in themselves unlawful restraints within the meaning of the Sherman
Act. P.
309 U. S.
458.
(4) The use by the corporation of the jobber licensing system in
building up a combination capable of use and actually used as a
means of controlling jobbers' prices and of controlling competition
among them, for which it could not lawfully contract, extends
beyond its patent monopoly and is a violation of the Sherman Act.
P.
309 U. S.
458.
(5) The patent monopoly of one invention may no more be enlarged
for the exploitation of the monopoly of another than for the
exploitation of an unpatented article, or for the exploitation or
promotion of a business not embraced within the patent. P.
309 U. S.
459.
(6) Such interest as the patentee in this case has in protecting
the health of the public in connection with the distribution of the
fuel, and in preventing adulteration, deterioration, and dilution
of the fuel in the hands of the jobbers, may be adequately
protected without resort to the jobber license device. P.
309 U. S.
459.
(7) Since the unlawful control over the jobbers was established
and maintained by resort to the licensing device, the trial court
properly suppressed it, even though it had been, or might be, used
for some lawful purposes. P.
309 U. S. 461.
27 F. Supp.
959 affirmed.
Page 309 U. S. 438
Appeal from a decree of the District Court enjoining the
appellant corporation and its officers from granting licenses to
Jobbers to sell and distribute its patented lead-treated motor
fuel, and from enforcing provisions in licenses to oil refiners
restricting their sale of the fuel to licensed jobbers. The suit
was by the Government, under the Sherman Anti-Trust Act.
Page 309 U. S. 445
MR. JUSTICE STONE delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Government brought this suit in the District Court for
Southern New York, to restrain appellant Ethyl Gasoline
Corporation, a Delaware corporation, and the other appellants, who
are its officers, from granting licenses, under patents controlled
by it, to jobbers to sell and distribute lead-treated motor fuel,
and from enforcing
Page 309 U. S. 446
provisions in licenses to oil refiners which restrict their sale
of the motor fuel to the licensed jobbers, as violations of the
Sherman Anti-Trust Act. 26 Stat. 209, 15 U.S.C. § 1, as amended
August 17, 1937, 50 Stat. 693. The trial court granted the relief
sought, and, from its decision in favor of the Government, the case
comes here on direct appeal under the provisions of § 2 of the
Expediting Act of February 11, 1903, as amended 36 Stat. 1167, 15
U.S.C. § 29, of the Judicial Code, as amended 43 Stat. 938, 28
U.S.C. § 345.
The case was tried on an agreed statement of facts which was
incorporated in the findings of the trial court and, except as
noted, there is no dispute as to the facts. The appellant
corporation is engaged in the manufacture and sale of a patented
fluid compound containing tetraethyl lead, a poisonous substance,
which, when added to gasoline used as a motor fuel, increases the
efficiency of high pressure combustion engines in which the fuel is
consumed. The Ethyl Corporation owns two patents covering the
composition of the fluid, No. 1,592,954 of July 20, 1926, and No.
1,668,022 of May 1, 1928. It has a third patent, No. 1,573,846 of
February 23, 1926, claiming a motor fuel produced by mixing
gasoline with the patent fluid compound, which is claimed also by
the two patents first mentioned. It also has a patent, No.
1,787,419, of December 30, 1930, claiming a method of using fuel
containing the patented fluid in combustion motors. The corporation
manufactures and sells the patented fluid to oil refiners, solely
for use in the production of the improved type of motor fuel. It
issues licenses under its patents to refiners and to jobbers of
motor fuel on terms and conditions presently to be noted, but it
does not charge or receive any royalty for its licenses. It derives
its profit solely from the sale of the patented ethyl fluid to its
refiner licensees.
Page 309 U. S. 447
The Licensing Agreements.
Appellant grants licenses under its patents to most of the large
oil refining companies in the United States to manufacture, sell,
and distribute motor fuel containing the patented fluid. The
licenses provide that appellant will sell to the licensees their
requirements of the patented fluid. They prohibit the licensees
from selling the manufactured product to any except to other
licensed refiners, to jobbers licensed by appellant, and to retail
dealers and consumers. They require the licensed refiners to mix
the patented fluid with the gasoline at their refineries with
equipment approved by appellant and in conformity to regulations
promulgated by the Surgeon General of the United States and any
other governmental body having jurisdiction. The refiners agree to
impose obligations on all purchasers to conform to such health
regulations and to require them to impose like obligations on those
to whom they sell. The refiners agree, upon notice by appellant, to
discontinue sales to other refiners or jobbers whose licenses
appellant has cancelled. The licenses also provide for the maximum
amount of the fluid to be used in the gasoline, and that, within
that limit, the licensees' regular or "best nonpremium" gasoline
shall have a maximum octane rating of 70 [
Footnote 1] and shall be sold as the next highest
priced motor fuel of the
Page 309 U. S. 448
licensee below the licensee's ethyl gasoline, which shall have a
minimum octane rating of 76 and shall be sold at a certain fixed
price differential above the average net sales price of the
licensees' best nonpremium grade of commercial gasoline. The
licenses further provide the conditions under which the name of the
Ethyl Corporation and its trademark or trade names may be used in
connection with the advertising and sale of the patented motor
fuel. [
Footnote 2]
Jobbers are generally required by appellant to apply for
licenses through the refiners from whom they expect to purchase the
motor fuel. The licenses to jobbers purport to grant the right to
sell and deliver to retail dealers and consumers within a specified
territory regular and ethyl gasoline, manufactured and sold by a
designated licensed refiner. [
Footnote 3] The licensed jobbers are required to furnish
appellant monthly with a list of all places at which the motor fuel
is sold under the licenses. They agree to comply with health
regulations relating to the handling of the motor fuel promulgated
by the Surgeon General or other governmental agency; to post and
distribute any notices concerning the handling of such fuel as
required by the appellant; to permit physical examination of
employees, and to require customers purchasing for resale to assume
similar obligations. Adulteration and dilution of motor fuel
distributed under the licenses is prohibited, and requirements
similar to those contained in refiner licenses are imposed with
respect to the use of
Page 309 U. S. 449
appellant's corporate name and trade names in connection with
the advertising and sale of the motor fuel. Appellant is given the
right to cancel the jobbers' licenses at any time for failure to
comply with their terms, and either party may cancel, with or
without cause, on thirty days' written notice.
Effect of the Licensing Agreements on the Oil
Industry.
The licensing system established by appellant affects and
controls the business of the major part of those engaged in
manufacturing and distributing motor fuel oil in the United States.
Appellant issues licenses to 123 refiners, including every leading
oil company except one, the Sun Oil Company, which does not
generally do business through jobbers. They refine 88% of all
gasoline sold in the United States, and the gasoline processed by
them under the license agreements is 70% of all the gasoline thus
sold, and 85% of all gasoline processed to obtain a high octane
rating.
Any jobber in the United States desiring to sell lead-treated
gasoline must secure a license from the Ethyl Corporation,
revocable at its will, before it can procure the gasoline from
licensed refiners. Of the 12,000 jobbers doing business in the
United States, approximately 11,000 are licensed by appellant. The
jobber must procure a new license on changing his source of supply.
The greater part of all gasoline treated with the patented fluid is
sold and transported in interstate commerce. It is sold in part
through wholesale and retail outlets owned and controlled by the
refiners and in part to individual retailers and consumers. A large
volume and a substantial part of the whole is distributed through
licensed jobbers to whom it is delivered at their bulk storage
plants through the channels of interstate commerce.
By their terms, the licensing agreements serve to exclude all
unlicensed jobbers from the market, and, in the
Page 309 U. S. 450
particulars already mentioned and in others presently to be
discussed, they control the conduct of the business of licensed
jobbers in the distribution of the patented motor fuel and enable
appellant at will to exclude others from the business. The
refiners' licenses also, in terms, place restraints on the sales
price of refiners by establishing the prescribed differential
between regular and ethyl gasoline. From this and from the other
stipulated facts, the Government argues that the control acquired
through the licensing agreements over the refiners and jobbers has
been used by appellants to control the business practices of the
jobbers, and particularly to maintain resale prices of the patented
motor fuel in unlawful restraint of interstate commerce. In support
of this contention, it relies upon the long established practice of
appellant to refuse to grant licenses to jobbers who cut prices or
refuse to conform to the marketing policies and posted prices of
the major refineries or the market leaders among them.
Decision Below and Contentions of Appellants.
The trial court concluded that, in view of the indefinite
language of the stipulation, it was perhaps a permissible, though
not a necessary, conclusion that an agreement or understanding for
the maintenance of prices existed between the appellant and the
jobber licensees. But it considered it unnecessary to decide this
issue, since it found that the appellant's licensing practices
affecting the jobbers, in conjunction with the agreements and
cooperation of the licensed refiners, had been used by appellant as
the means of excluding from the market the unlicensed jobbers who
do not conform to the market policies and posted gasoline prices
adopted by the major oil companies or the market leaders among
them, and that appellant uses the control thus established to
coerce adherence to those policies and prices generally by the
licensed jobbers, and that this restriction upon the industry
effected
Page 309 U. S. 451
through the license contracts with refiners and jobbers was not
within appellant's patent monopoly, and operated unreasonably to
restrain interstate commerce in the processed gasoline.
It concluded that the licensing system was not, as appellant
argues, necessary for the protection of such legitimate interests
as the patentee had in the protection of the quality of the treated
gasoline sold upon the market and its use by the jobbers with
safety to the public health. Appellants were accordingly enjoined
from enforcing or attempting to enforce, or including in any
subsequent agreement provisions that refiners shall sell
lead-treated gasoline only to licensed jobbers, and from requiring
or attempting to require jobbers to secure licenses, and from
enforcing or attempting to enforce the provisions of any
outstanding jobber licenses. The decree also declared the jobber
licenses illegal, and required appellant to notify the jobbers that
the licenses have been cancelled.
Appellant, insisting that it does not use the jobbers' licensing
system to maintain prices, makes two principal attacks on the
decree. It urges that the licensing of the refiners and jobbers,
the restraints upon the sale of the patented fuel by the refiners,
and the restrictions placed upon the jobbers are all reasonably
necessary for the commercial development of appellant's patents and
for insuring a financial return from them, and are therefore within
its patent monopoly. In any case, it is said that the conditions
attached to the refiners' and jobbers' licenses are appropriate and
reasonably adapted to the maintenance of the quality of the product
and for the protection of the public in its use of a product
containing a dangerous poison, and both are essential to the
maintenance of the market for the patented fuel, on which the
market for appellant's patented fluid depends. And since the
jobbers' licenses are a necessary or appropriate
Page 309 U. S. 452
means of protecting the interests of appellant and the public in
the quality and safe use of the patented product, it is argued that
the decree abolishing the whole system of jobbers' licenses went
further than was necessary or proper to prevent such restraint as
there may have been exerted on the jobbers with respect to prices
and marketing policies.
Relation of the Licensing Agreements to Price
Maintenance.
For the moment, we may lay to one side the particular
restrictions enumerated in the contracts of the refiners with
jobbers, and turn to the relation of appellant's licensing policy
to the maintenance of price policies by the jobbers. While the
trial court found no contract or agreement which purports to
prescribe resale prices or to exact any price policy of the
jobbers, the stipulation of facts shows that appellant, through its
patents, its contracts, and its licensing policy, has acquired the
power to exclude at will from participation in the nationwide
market for lead-treated motor fuel all of the 12,000 motor fuel
jobbers of the country, by refusing to license any of the 1,000
unlicensed jobbers, or by cancelling, as it may at will, the
licenses of any of the 11,000 licensed jobbers. This we assume, for
present purposes, it could lawfully do by virtue of the power
conferred by its patent to exclude any or all others from selling
the patented product. But it does not follow that it can lawfully
exercise that power in such manner as to control the patented
commodity in the hands of the licensed jobbers who had purchased
it, or their actions with respect to it in ways not within the
limits of the patent monopoly, and conspicuously among such
controls which the Sherman law prohibits and the patent law does
not sanction is the regulation of prices and the suppression of
competition among the purchasers of the patented articles. That
appellant, by the plan
Page 309 U. S. 453
and scope of its licensing policy, has acquired vast potential
power to accomplish that end cannot be doubted. And we think the
record supports the finding of the trial court that appellant has
exercised that power continuously for a considerable period as a
means of control over the price policies of the licensed
jobbers.
From the stipulation of facts, it appears that, since 1929,
appellant has pursued the practice of investigating, through field
agents, the "business ethics" of jobbers applying for licenses, and
of rejecting such applications upon the adverse report of the
agent. Appellant admits that the phrase "business ethics" is used
to denote compliance with "marketing policies and prevailing prices
of the petroleum industry," which are the "marketing policies and
posted prices of the major oil companies or the market leaders
among them." Among these is the Standard Oil Company of New Jersey,
which owns one-half of the capital stock of the appellant.
[
Footnote 4] While not all
applicants who have failed to maintain prices and marketing
policies have been rejected, the record leaves no doubt that
appellant has made use of its dominant position in the trade to
exercise control over prices and marketing policies of jobbers in a
sufficient number of cases and with sufficient continuity to make
its attitude toward price-cutting a pervasive influence in the
jobbing trade.
In many instances, although not in all, an adverse report by the
investigator as to the applicant's business ethics has been the
sole ground for rejecting his application, and appellant admits
that the greater number of applications for licenses which have
been denied were rejected because of such an adverse report. In the
cases in which licenses have been refused, something less than
one-half of the rejected applicants were later granted licenses on
their assurance that their marketing practices
Page 309 U. S. 454
would be changed. The total number of rejections for failure to
comply with that standard does not appear, for appellant has failed
to keep any record of the ground of rejection of applications for
licenses, admittedly because it is reluctant to preserve in its
records "the extent to which maintenance of prices and marketing
policies by jobbers entered into the granting of licenses."
Jobbers' licenses do not appear to have been cancelled because
of failures to maintain policies or prices of the major oil
companies whenever they have occurred, but it is an established
practice of appellant to investigate the business ethics of
licensed jobbers in order to ascertain whether they maintain the
marketing prices, policies, and practices prevailing or ostensibly
prevailing in the industry. Representatives of appellant have from
time to time, but not in every case, reported a jobber to his
supplier or refiner for not maintaining the marketing policies of
the latter, and in some cases they have united in persuading the
jobber to mend his ways. Appellant has generally required each
licensed jobber to purchase all his treated fuel from a single
refiner, and, in some instances, has refused a license to jobbers
who wished to change their source of supply from one licensed
refiner to another.
These long continued practices have had the effect upon the
industry naturally to be expected. Large numbers of refiners and
the majority of jobbers believe that the jobbers must maintain the
required business ethics in order to obtain licenses, and a number
of licensed jobbers believe that they are required by appellant's
licensing practices to maintain prices and abide by the marketing
practices of the major oil companies. Appellant, in its printed
instructions to field representatives as to the manner of
conducting investigations of licensed jobbers, after pointing out
that one of the reasons for the investigation of the jobber before
the issuance of the license
Page 309 U. S. 455
is to insure that he "will not resort to unethical methods in
competing with our other licensed jobbers and refiners," and after
describing the methods of conducting the investigation, [
Footnote 5] sums up the result as
follows:
"We have, through these supplemental investigations, been able
to correct the ethyl picture to a considerable extent, and have
succeeded in eliminating from our jobber lists some of our former
accounts who were not a credit to us as licensees of the Ethyl
Gasoline Corporation."
Scope of the Patent Monopoly.
It is not denied, and could not well be, that, if appellant's
comprehensive control of the market in the distribution of the
lead-treated gasoline, as disclosed by the record, had been
acquired without aid of the patents, but wholly by the contracts
with refiners and jobbers, such control would involve a violation
of the Sherman Act.
Paramount Famous Corp. v. United
States, 282 U. S. 30,
282 U. S. 43;
United States v. First
National Pictures Inc., 282 U.S.
Page 309 U. S. 456
44;
cf. Frey & Son, Inc. v. Cudahy Packing Co.,
256 U. S. 208;
Federal Trade Commission v. Beech-Nut Packing Co.,
257 U. S. 441. And
so we turn to the consideration of the patents and the patent law
to ascertain whether the monopoly which they have given appellant
affords a lawful basis for the control over the marketing of motor
fuel which the record discloses.
Cf. United States v. General
Electric Co., 272 U. S. 476. In
considering that question, we assume the validity of the patents,
which is not questioned here.
The patent law confers on the patentee a limited monopoly, the
right or power to exclude all others from manufacturing, using or
selling his invention. R.S. § 4884, 35 U.S.C. § 40. The extent of
that right is limited by the definition of his invention, as its
boundaries are marked by the specifications and claims of the
patent.
Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg.
Co., 243 U. S. 502,
243 U. S. 510.
He may grant licenses to make, use, or vend, restricted in point of
space or time, or with any other restriction upon the exercise of
the granted privilege, save only that, by attaching a condition to
his license, he may not enlarge his monopoly, and thus acquire some
other which the statute and the patent together did not give.
He may not, by virtue of his patent, condition his license so as
to tie to the use of the patented device or process the use of
other devices, processes, or materials which lie outside of the
monopoly of the patent licensed;
Motion Picture Patents Co. v.
Universal Film Mfg. Co., supra; Carbice Corp. v. American Patents
Corp., 283 U. S. 27,
283 U. S. 31;
Leitch Manufacturing Co. v. Barber Co., 302 U.
S. 458;
cf. United Shoe Machinery Co. v. United
States, 258 U. S. 451,
258 U. S. 462;
International Business Machines Corp. v. United States,
298 U. S. 131,
298 U. S. 140;
or condition the license so as to control conduct by the licensee
not embraced in the patent monopoly,
Standard Sanitary Mfg. Co.
v. United States, 226 U. S. 20;
Interstate Circuit,
Inc.
Page 309 U. S. 457
v. United States, 306 U. S. 208,
306 U. S.
228-230; or upon the maintenance of resale prices by the
purchaser of the patented article.
Adams v.
Burke, 17 Wall. 453;
Bobbs-Merrill Co. v.
Straus, 210 U. S. 339;
Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co.,
220 U. S. 373;
Bauer & Cie. v. O'Donnell, 229 U. S.
1;
Straus v. Victor Talking Machine Co.,
243 U. S. 490;
Boston Store of Chicago v. American Graphophone Co.,
246 U. S. 8;
cf.
United States v. General Electric Co., supra, 272 U. S.
485.
Appellant, as patentee, possesses exclusive rights to make and
sell the fluid and also the lead-treated motor fuel. By its sales
to refiners, it relinquishes its exclusive right to use the
patented fluid and it relinquishes to the licensed jobbers its
exclusive rights to sell the lead-treated fuel by permitting the
licensed refiners to manufacture and sell the fuel to them. And, by
the authorized sales of the fuel by refiners to jobbers, the patent
monopoly over it is exhausted, and, after the sale, neither
appellant nor the refiners may longer rely on the patents to
exercise any control over the price at which the fuel may be
resold.
Adams v. Burke, supra; Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus,
supra; Bauer & Cie v. O'Donnell, supra; Motion Picture Patents
Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., supra.
The picture here revealed is not that of a patentee exercising
its right to refuse to sell or to permit his licensee to sell the
patented products to price-cutters.
Compare United States v.
Colgate & Co., 250 U. S. 300,
with United States v. A. Schrader's Son, Inc.,
252 U. S. 85. A
very different scene is depicted by the record. It is one in which
appellant has established the marketing of the patented fuel in
vast amounts on a nationwide scale through the 11,000 jobbers and,
at the same time, by the leverage of its licensing contracts
resting on the fulcrum of its patents, it has built up a
combination capable of use, and actually used, as a means of
controlling jobbers' prices and suppressing competition among them.
It
Page 309 U. S. 458
seems plain that this attempted regulation of prices and market
practices of the jobbers with respect to the fuel purchased, for
which appellant could not lawfully contract, cannot be lawfully
achieved by entering into contracts or combinations through the
manipulation of which the same results are reached by the exercise
of the power which they give to control the action of the
purchasers. Such contracts or combinations which are used to
obstruct the free and natural flow in the channels of interstate
commerce of trade even in a patented article, after it is sold by
the patentee or his licensee, are a violation of the Sherman Act.
Federal Trade Commission v. Beech-Nut Company, supra,
257 U. S. 453;
United Shoe Machinery Co. v. United States, supra; Victor
Talking Machine Co. v. Kemeny, 271 F. 810, 817;
cf. United
States v. A. Schrader's Son, Inc., supra. Agreements for price
maintenance of articles moving in interstate commerce are, without
more, unreasonable restraints within the meaning of the Sherman Act
because they eliminate competition,
United States v. Trenton
Potteries Co., 273 U. S. 392, and
agreements which create potential power for such price maintenance
exhibited by its actual exertion for that purpose are in themselves
unlawful restraints within the meaning of the Sherman Act, which is
not only a prohibition against the infliction of a particular type
of public injury, but "a limitation of rights . . . which may be
pushed to evil consequences, and therefore restrained."
Standard Sanitary Mfg. Co. v. United States, supra,
226 U. S. 49;
American Column Co. v. United States, 257 U.
S. 377,
257 U. S. 400;
United States v. American Linseed Oil Co., 262 U.
S. 371;
United States v. Trenton Potteries Co.,
supra, 273 U. S.
397-398.
The extent to which appellant's dominion over the jobbers'
business goes beyond its patent monopoly is emphasized by the
circumstances here present that the prices and market practices
sought to be established are not those prescribed by
appellant-patentee, but by the
Page 309 U. S. 459
refiners. Appellant neither owns nor sells the patented fuel nor
derives any profit through royalties or otherwise from its sale. It
has chosen to exploit its patents by manufacturing the fluid
covered by them and by selling that fluid to refiners for use in
the manufacture of motor fuel. Such benefits as result from control
over the marketing of the treated fuel by the jobbers accrues
primarily to the refiners and indirectly to appellant, only in the
enjoyment of its monopoly of the fluid secured under another
patent. The licensing conditions are thus not used as a means of
stimulating the commercial development and financial returns of the
patented invention which is licensed, but for the commercial
development of the business of the refiners and the exploitation of
a second patent monopoly not embraced in the first. The patent
monopoly of one invention may no more be enlarged for the
exploitation of a monopoly of another,
see Standard Sanitary
Mfg. Co. v. United States, supra, than for the exploitation of
an unpatented article,
United Shoe Machinery Co. v. United
States, supra; Carbice Corp. v. American Patents Corporation,
supra; Leitch Manufacturing Co. v. Barber Co., supra; American
Lecithin Co. v. Warfield Co., 105 F.2d 207, or for the
exploitation or promotion of a business not embraced within the
patent.
Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, supra,
306 U. S.
228-230.
Protection of Health and Quality of Product.
The trial court was of opinion that such interest as appellant
has in protecting the health of the public in connection with the
distribution of the fuel, and in preventing adulteration,
deterioration, and dilution of the motor fuel in the hands of the
jobbers may be adequately protected without resort to the jobber
license device which has been and is capable of being used for
other and illicit purposes.
Compare International Business
Machines Corp. v. United States, supra, 298 U. S.
139-140. This
Page 309 U. S. 460
conclusion is, we think, amply supported by the record. The
precautions taken to protect the public health in the handling of
the motor fuel by jobbers and service stations includes the health
restrictions imposed on jobbers by the refiners included in their
contracts with jobbers, inspections, more or less perfunctory, by
representatives of appellant, and the posting by jobbers and
distributors of notices supplied by appellant stating that the fuel
contains lead and is for use as a motor fuel only. These activities
are not interfered with by the decree.
There is no authentic instance of injury resulting from the
handling of lead-treated gasoline after its manufacture
attributable to its lead content. Extensive expert study, carried
on under direction of appellant over a period of years, detailed in
the record, resulted in a report that the risk arising from the
absorption of lead through the skin in the handling of the
lead-treated fuel is so small as to be negligible, and that the use
of the fuel made in conformity to the refiners' licenses has not
caused or produced any dangers or hazards to health.
The avoidance of such dangers as there may be in the handling of
the motor fuel by jobbers and distributors is plainly not beyond
control by public health regulations, and would seem, as the
district court thought, to be amply secured, in any case, through
the self-interest of the refiners in requiring the purchasers of
their gasoline to take proper health precautions, including the
posting of notices which appellant supplies and by the continuance
of appellant's inspection, all of which are permissible under the
decree. It is likewise apparent that the interest the appellant has
in preventing dilution, adulteration, and deterioration of the
treated gasoline in the hands of the jobbers may be similarly
protected without continued resort to jobber licenses, which is
precluded by reason of their use and the danger of their continued
use for other and illegal purposes.
Page 309 U. S. 461
Since the unlawful control over the jobbers was established and
maintained by resort to the licensing device, the decree rightly
suppressed it even though it had been or might continue to be used
for some lawful purposes. The court was bound to frame its decree
so as to suppress the unlawful practices and to take such
reasonable measures as would preclude their revival.
Local 167
v. United States, 291 U. S. 293;
Warner & Co. v. Lilly & Co., 265 U.
S. 526,
265 U. S. 532.
It could, in the exercise of its discretion, consider whether that
could be accomplished effectively without disestablishing the
licensing system, and whether there were countervailing reasons for
continuing it as a necessary or proper means for appellant to carry
out other lawful purposes. Since the court rightly concluded that
these reasons were without substantial weight, it properly
suppressed the means by which the unlawful restraint was achieved.
Local 167 v. United States, supra, 291 U. S.
299-300;
cf. Merchants' Warehouse Co. v. United
States, 283 U. S. 501,
283 U. S.
513.
Affirmed.
MR. JUSTICE McREYNOLDS and MR. JUSTICE ROBERTS took no part in
the consideration or decision of this case.
[
Footnote 1]
The utility of lead-treated gasoline for use in high compression
engines is expressed in terms of octane numbers, an arbitrary scale
of measurement indicating the relative degree of compression to
which the fuel may be subjected without causing "knock" in the
engine, which is prevented or reduced by the use of the fuel. The
octane rating of motor fuel increases with the amount of the
patented fluid added to the gasoline which, in any case, is small.
Appellant's licenses to refiners authorize the manufacture of
gasoline of high octane rating, 68 or more, of two classes,
"regular," in which there is one part of tetraethyl lead to 4200
parts of gasoline, and "ethyl gasoline," in which there is one part
of tetraethyl lead to 1700 parts of gasoline.
[
Footnote 2]
The name of the Ethyl Corporation and its trademark or trade
names "Ethyl" and "Q" may not be used in connection with the
advertising and sale of regular gasoline. All the licensees, with
the exception of the Standard Oil Company of New Jersey, which
markets the product under the name "Esso," are required to use the
word "Ethyl" in connection with the sale and distribution of the
Ethyl gasoline.
[
Footnote 3]
The only obligation which the licensor assumes toward the
jobbers is to defend them against patent and trademark infringement
suits.
[
Footnote 4]
The remainder is owned by General Motors Corporation and E. I.
du Pont de Nemours Company.
[
Footnote 5]
The investigator is reminded in the Field Representative Manual
that the question as to "business ethics" "can be answered only if
the field representative has obtained sufficient information to be
sure of his opinion."
"Ethics of the jobber is based on the territory in which he is
marketing and the conditions surrounding the sale of gasoline by
other ethyl gasoline distributors. Care should be taken, if
possible, to find out the instigator of any practices which tend to
unfair competition. Business ethics is a relative quality, and no
hard and fast rule can be given to govern all cases. Information
given to field representatives and picked up in the various
contacts should be weighed carefully before a final decision is
reached. One of the three words, 'good,' 'questionable,' or
'unethical,' is to be used in answering this question."
In January, 1935 the question as to "business ethics" was
eliminated from the form report of field agents. But business
ethics has since continued to be one of the principal subjects of
investigation, and, as before, the result of the field agent's
investigation has been included in his report, and his
recommendations have been generally accepted and acted upon by his
superiors.