1. In providing by the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Act
for payment by employers of compensation for injuries or death
suffered by employees engaged in maritime employment on vessels in
navigable waters, Congress exerted its constitutional power to
modify the admiralty law. P.
309 U. S.
256.
Page 309 U. S. 252
2. The classification excepting from the Act a "master or member
of a crew of any vessel," § 3(a)(1), was within that power. P.
309 U. S.
256.
3. The Act applies to those who serve on vessels as laborers,
whose work is of the sort performed by longshoremen and harbor
workers, and who are thus distinguished from those employees who
are naturally and primarily on board to aid in navigation. P.
309 U. S.
257.
4. Insofar as the decision whether an injured employee was or
was not a "member of the crew" turns on a question of fact, the
authority to determine is conferred by the Act on the deputy
commissioner, and his finding, if sustained by evidence, is
conclusive, and must be accepted by the District Court without
attempting a new trial. P.
309 U. S. 257.
5. The legal meaning of the word "crew" must be determined with
reference to the context and purpose of the particular statute in
which the word is used. P.
309 U. S. 258.
6. The fact that the boat's captain, to make up the complement
of "deckhands" required by a certificate of inspection, included
the employee whose status under this Act is in question does not
fix his status as that of a member of the crew. The question
concerns his actual duties. P.
309 U. S.
260.
7. Evidence
held sufficient to sustain a finding by a
deputy commissioner that the person on account of whose death
compensation was claimed under the above-mentioned Act was not a
member of the crew. P.
309 U. S.
260.
104 F.2d 522 affirmed.
Certiorari, 308 U.S. 532, to review the reversal of a judgment
of the District Court vacating an award under the Longshoremen's
and Harbor Workers' Act.
Page 309 U. S. 253
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE HUGHES delivered the opinion of the Court.
John Schumann, an employee of petitioner, South Chicago Coal
& Dock Company, was drowned while serving his employer on a
vessel in navigable waters of the United States. His widow was
awarded compensation by the deputy commissioner under the
Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act. [
Footnote 1] The deputy commissioner found
that decedent was performing services on the vessel as a laborer,
and fell from the vessel into the water. The employer and its
surety brought suit in the District Court to restrain the
enforcement of the award, contending that decedent was employed as
a member of the crew, and hence that compensation was not payable.
The District Court granted a trial
de novo, and, finding
that the decedent was a member of the crew, vacated the award.
The Court of Appeals found that the evidence before the District
Court was similar to that heard by the deputy commissioner; that
the facts were not in dispute; that the District Court, in
reviewing the finding of the deputy commissioner, was precluded
from weighing the evidence, being required to examine the record
and ascertain whether there was any evidence to support the
commissioner's finding. Holding that there was such evidence, the
Court of Appeals reversed the decree of the District Court and
directed the dismissal of the bill of complaint. 104 F.2d 522.
Because of an alleged conflict with a decision of the Court of
Appeals of the Fifth Circuit in the case of
Maryland Casualty
Co. v.Lawson, 94 F.2d 190, we granted certiorari. 308 U.S.
532.
Page 309 U. S. 254
The statute provides specifically in § 3, as to "Coverage," that
no compensation shall be payable in respect of the disability or
death of a "master or member of a crew of any vessel." [
Footnote 2] And these persons were
excluded from the definition of the term employee. § 2(3).
[
Footnote 3]
It appears that the vessel was a lighter of 312 net tons used
for fueling steamboats and other marine equipment. It was licensed
to operate in the Calumet River and Harbor and in the Indiana River
and Harbor. The Court of Appeals thus summarized its
operations:
"It supplied coal to other vessels on their order, each
operation consuming only a couple of hours. It had no sleeping or
eating quarters. Its certificate of inspection required that,"
"Included in the entire crew hereinafter specified and
designated there must be 1 licensed master and pilot, 1 licensed
chief engineer, 3 seamen, 1 fireman."
"If deceased were counted as a member of the crew, the full
complement of the ship was present. Otherwise not."
The captain testified before the deputy commissioner that he had
five men on the boat with him, one
Page 309 U. S. 255
engineer, fireman and three "deckhands," the decedent being one
of the latter. The Court of Appeals described his chief task as
"facilitating the flow of coal from his boat to the vessel being
fueled -- removing obstructions to the flow with a stick. He
performed such additional tasks as throwing the ship's rope in
releasing or making the boat fast. He performed no navigation
duties. He occasionally did some cleaning of the boat. He did no
work while the boat was en route from dock to the vessel to be
fueled."
The Court of Appeals thought it significant that his only duty
relating to navigation was the incidental task of throwing the
ship's line; that his primary duty was to free the coal if it stuck
in the hopper while being discharged into the fueled vessel while
both boats were at rest; that he had no duties while the boat was
in motion; that he was paid an hourly wage; that he had no
"articles;" that he slept at home and boarded off ship; that he was
called very early in the morning each day as he was wanted; that,
while he had worked only three weeks, and it might have been
possible that he would have been retained for years to come, his
employment was somewhat akin to temporary employment.
In
Nogueira v. New York, New Haven & Hartford R.
Co., 281 U. S. 128, we
had occasion to consider the purpose and scope of the
Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act. Its general
scheme was to provide compensation to employees engaged in maritime
employment, except as stated, for disability or death resulting
from injury occurring upon the navigable waters of the United
States where recovery through workmen's compensation proceedings
might not validly be provided by state law. We had held that one
engaged as a stevedore in loading a ship lying in port in navigable
waters was performing a maritime service and that the rights and
liabilities of the parties were matters within the admiralty
jurisdiction.
Atlantic Transport Co. of West Virginia v.
Imbrovek, 234 U. S. 52.
But
Page 309 U. S. 256
the Court had also held that in the case of a longshoreman who
was injured on the land, although engaged in unloading a vessel,
the local law governed and hence the workmen's compensation law of
the state applied.
State Industrial Commission v. Nordenholt
Corporation, 259 U. S. 263. The
distinction had thus been maintained between injuries on land and
those suffered by persons engaged in maritime employment on a
vessel in navigable waters. As to the latter, no doubt was
entertained of the power of Congress to modify the admiralty law
and to provide for the payment by employers of compensation.
[
Footnote 4] And, in thus
providing, Congress had constitutional authority to define the
classes of such employees who should receive compensation and to
exclude those described in § 3.
Nogueira v. New York, N.H.
& H. R. Co., supra.
The legislative history of the exception now before us throws
light upon the intention of Congress. For those employees who are
entitled to compensation, the remedy under the Act is exclusive. §
5. [
Footnote 5] This made
inapplicable to such employees the provision of § 33 of the
Merchant Marine Act (called the Jones Act) which carried to
"seamen" at their election the benefit of the provisions of the
Federal Employers' Liability Act. [
Footnote 6] The bill, which became the Longshoremen's and
Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, was at one stage amended so as to
include a master and members of a crew of a vessel owned by a
Page 309 U. S. 257
citizen of the United States. [
Footnote 7] They preferred, however, to remain outside the
compensation provisions, and thus to retain the advantages of their
election under the Jones Act, and the bill was changed accordingly
so as to exempt "seamen." Then, in its final passage, the words "a
master or member of a crew" were substituted for "seamen."
[
Footnote 8] We think that this
substitution has an important significance here. For we had held
that longshoremen engaged on a vessel at a dock in navigable
waters, in the work of loading or unloading, were "seamen."
International Stevedoring Co. v. Haverty, 272 U. S.
50;
Northern Coal & Dock Co. v. Strand,
278 U. S. 142.
And, also, that such seamen if injured on a vessel in navigable
waters, unlike one injured on land, could not have the benefit of a
state workmen's compensation act.
Southern Pacific Co. v.
Jensen, 244 U. S. 205. We
think it is clear that Congress in finally adopting the phrase "a
master or member of a crew" in making its exception, intended to
leave entitled to compensation all those various sorts of
longshoremen and harbor workers who were performing labor on a
vessel [
Footnote 9] and to whom
state compensation statutes were inapplicable. The question is
whether the decedent in this instance fell within that class.
So far as the decision that this employee, who was at work on
this vessel in navigable waters when he sustained his injuries, was
or was not "a member of a crew" turns on questions of fact, the
authority to determine such questions has been confided by Congress
to the deputy commissioner. [
Footnote 10]
Page 309 U. S. 258
Hence, the Court of Appeals correctly ruled that his finding, if
there was evidence to support it, was conclusive, and that it was
the duty of the District Court to ascertain whether it was so
supported and, if so, to give it effect without attempting a
retrial. We have so held with respect to the conclusiveness of the
finding of the deputy commissioner that an injury to an employee
arose "out of and in the course of the employment,"
Voehl v.
Indemnity Insurance Co., 288 U. S. 162,
288 U. S. 166,
as to the finding of the dependency of a claimant for compensation,
L'Hote v. Crowell, 286 U.S. 528,
The Admiral
Peoples, 295 U. S. 649,
295 U. S.
653-654, and as to the finding that the employee had
committed suicide, and hence that compensation was not payable,
Del Vecchio v. Bowers, 296 U. S. 280,
296 U. S. 287. In
the
Del Vecchio case, the question was with respect to the
application of the exception made by paragraph (b) of Section 3
with respect to "Coverage," and we see no reason for a different
view as to the application of paragraph (a)(1) of the same
section.
Petitioners urge that the question whether the decedent was a
member of a "crew" was a question of law. That is, that, upon the
undisputed facts, the decedent must be held as a matter of law to
have been a member of a "crew," as distinguished from a
longshoreman or laborer at work upon the vessel. We are unable so
to conclude.
The word "crew" does not have an absolutely unvarying legal
significance. As Mr. Justice Story said in
United States v.
Winn, 3 Sumn. 209, [
Footnote 11] the general sense of the word crew is
"equivalent to ship's company," which would embrace all the
officers as well as the common seamen. But it was observed that the
laws upon
Page 309 U. S. 259
maritime subjects sometimes used the word crew in that general
sense, and "sometimes in other senses, more limited and
restrained."
"It is sometimes used to comprehend all persons composing the
ship's company, including the master; sometimes to comprehend the
officers and common seamen, excluding the master, and sometimes to
comprehend the common seamen only, excluding the master and
officers."
It was therefore deemed necessary to consider the context of the
particular use of the term and the object to be accomplished by the
enactment under consideration. In
The Bound Brook, 146 F.
160, 164, it was said that
"When the 'crew' of a vessel is referred to, those persons are
naturally and primarily meant who are on board her aiding in her
navigation, without reference to the nature of the arrangement
under which they are on board."
Judge Hough in
The Buena Ventura, 243 F. 797, 799,
thought that statement was a fair summary, and, in his view, one
who served the ship "in her navigation" was a member of the "crew."
Id., p. 800.
See also Seneca Washed Gravel Corp. v.
McManigal, 65 F.2d 779. Recently, in considering the
application of the Jones Act to "any seaman," we adverted to the
"range of variation" in the use of the word "crew," and it was
again emphasized that what concerned us in that case, which had
relation to the status of a "master," was "not the scope of the
class of seamen at other times and in other contexts." We said that
our concern there was "to define the meaning for the purpose of a
particular statute which must be read in the light of the mischief
to be corrected and the end to be attained."
Warner v.
Goltra, 293 U. S. 155,
293 U. S.
158.
That is our concern here in construing this particular statute
-- the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act -- with
appropriate regard to its distinctive aim. We find little aid in
considering the use of the term
Page 309 U. S. 260
"crew" in other statutes having other purposes. This Act, as we
have seen, was to provide compensation for a class of employees at
work on a vessel in navigable waters who, although they might be
classed as seamen (
International Stevedoring Company v.
Haverty, supra), were still regarded as distinct from members
of a "crew." They were persons serving on vessels, to be sure, but
their service was that of laborers, of the sort performed by
longshoremen and harbor workers and thus distinguished from those
employees on the vessel who are naturally and primarily on board to
aid in her navigation.
See De Wald v. Baltimore & Ohio R.
Co., 71 F.2d 810;
Diomede v. Lowe, 87 F.2d 296;
Moore Dry Dock Co. v. Pillsbury, 100 F.2d 245.
Regarding the word "crew" in this statute as referring to the
latter class, we think there was evidence to support the finding of
the deputy commissioner. The fact that the certificate of
inspection called for three "deckhands," and that the captain
included the decedent to make up that complement, is not
controlling. The question concerns his actual duties. These duties,
as the Court of Appeals said, did not pertain to navigation, aside
from the incidental task of throwing the ship's rope or making the
boat fast, a service of the sort which could readily be performed
or aided by a harbor worker. What the court considered as
supporting the finding of the deputy commissioner was that the
primary duty of the decedent was to facilitate the flow of coal to
the vessel being fueled, that he had no duties while the boat was
in motion, that he slept at home and boarded off ship and was
called each day as he was wanted, and was paid an hourly wage.
Workers of that sort on harbor craft may appropriately be regarded
as "in the position of longshoremen or other casual workers on the
water."
Scheffler v. Moran Towing & Transportation
Co., 68 F.2d 11, 12. Even if it could be said that the
evidence permitted conflicting inferences, we think that
Page 309 U. S. 261
there was enough to sustain the deputy commissioner's
ruling.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is
Affirmed.
MR. JUSTICE MURPHY took no part in the consideration and
decision of this case.
[
Footnote 1]
44 Stat. 1424; 33 U.S.C. and U.S.C.Supp. IV, sec. 901
et
seq.
[
Footnote 2]
The entire text of § 3 is as follows:
"Sec. 3.
Coverage."
"(a) Compensation shall be payable under this chapter in respect
of disability or death of an employee, but only if the disability
or death results from an injury occurring upon the navigable waters
of the United States (including any drydock) and if recovery for
the disability or death through workmen's compensation proceedings
may not validly be provided by State law. No compensation shall be
payable in respect of the disability or death of --"
"(1) A master or member of a crew of any vessel, nor any person
engaged by the master to load or unload or repair any small vessel
under eighteen tons net; or"
"(2) An officer or employee of the United States or any agency
thereof or of any State or foreign government, or of any political
subdivision thereof."
"(b) No compensation shall be payable if the injury was
occasioned solely by the intoxication of the employee or by the
willful intention of the employee to injure or kill himself or
another."
33 U.S.C. § 903.
[
Footnote 3]
33 U.S.C. § 902(3).
[
Footnote 4]
See Waring v.
Clarke, 5 How. 441,
46 U. S.
457-458;
The
Lottawanna, 21 Wall. 558,
88 U. S. 577;
Butler v. Boston & S. Steamship Co., 130 U.
S. 527,
130 U. S.
556-557;
In re Garnett, 141 U. S.
1,
141 U. S. 14;
Atlantic Transport Co. of West Virginia v. Imbrovek,
234 U. S. 52,
234 U. S. 60-62;
Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.
S. 205,
244 U. S. 215;
Washington v. W. C. Dawson & Co., 264 U.
S. 219,
264 U. S.
227-228;
Panama R. Co. v. Johnson, 264 U.
S. 375,
264 U. S.
386-388;
Nogueira v. New York, N.H. & H. R.
Co., 281 U. S. 128,
281 U. S. 138.
[
Footnote 5]
33 U.S.C. § 905.
[
Footnote 6]
41 Stat. 1007.
[
Footnote 7]
House Rep. No. 1767, 69th Cong., 2d Sess., pp. 1, 2, 20.
[
Footnote 8]
Cong.Rec. 69th Cong., 2d Sess., vol. 68, pt. 5, pp. 5402, 5403,
5908;
Nogueira v. New York, N.H. & H. R. Co.,
281 U. S. 128,
281 U. S.
136.
[
Footnote 9]
Except where they are engaged "to load or unload or repair any
small vessel under eighteen tons net." § 3(a)(1), 33 U.S.C. §
903(a)(1).
[
Footnote 10]
33 U.S.C. § 919(a), 921.
[
Footnote 11]
28 Fed.Cas. 733, 737, No. 16,740.