1. This Court inquires
sua sponte into the question of
the federal court's jurisdiction of this case under the
Interpleader Act of January 20, 1936, since its own jurisdiction is
affected thereby. P.
308 U. S.
70.
2. A bill interpleading one group of claimants, all of whom are
citizens of the same State, and another group claiming adversely,
all of whom are citizens of another State, of which latter State
the complainant himself is a citizen, satisfies the requirements of
the Interpleader Act as to diversity of citizenship, since the Act
requires diversity only as between the claimants. P.
308 U. S.
70.
3. Art. III, § 2 of the Federal Constitution, extending the
judicial power of the United States to controversies "between
citizens of different States," is broad enough to authorize the
granting of jurisdiction to the federal court in such a case of
interpleader. P.
308 U. S.
71.
4. The Eleventh Amendment is not infringed by joinder of a state
court judge and a state court receiver as defendants in an
interpleader proceeding in the federal court, in which proceeding
the State has no interest and neither the judge nor the receiver is
enjoined by the final decree. P.
308 U. S.
74.
Page 308 U. S. 67
5. The authority of the federal Court under the Interpleader Act
to enjoin parties to the proceeding from further prosecuting any
suit in any state or federal court in respect of the property
involved is essential to the interpleader jurisdiction and is a
valid exercise of the judicial power. Section 265 of the Judicial
Code -- an earlier statute -- forbidding the federal courts from
staying proceedings in any state court is inapplicable. P.
308 U. S.
74.
6. A final decree of an Idaho state court of general
jurisdiction in a suit to determine the ownership of personal
property, awarding the property to the plaintiff and holding that a
probate court of Washington which had awarded the property to
another, under whom the defendant claimed, was without jurisdiction
of the subject matter,
held, as to the issue of the
jurisdiction of the state courts,
res judicata in a
proceeding in the federal court interpleading the same plaintiff
and defendant in respect of the same property. Pp.
308 U. S. 75,
308 U. S.
78.
99 F.2d 651 affirmed.
Certiorari, 306 U.S. 624, to review the affirmance of a decree,
19 F. Supp. 587, adverse to the petitioner here, in a proceeding
under the Interpleader Act. In an earlier phase of the controversy,
certiorari to review a decree of the Supreme Court of Idaho, 57
Idaho 10, 59 P.2d 1087, was denied by this Court, 299 U.S. 615.
MR. JUSTICE REED delivered the opinion of the Court.
This writ of certiorari was granted to review the action of the
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in affirming [
Footnote 1] a decree of the District Court of
Idaho [
Footnote 2] upon a
bill
Page 308 U. S. 68
of interpleader filed by the Sunshine Mining Company, a
Washington corporation, against Evelyn H. Treinies and other
citizens of the State of Washington, Claimants to certain stock of
the Sunshine Mining Company and the dividends therefrom, and
Katherine Mason and T. R. Mason, her husband, and other citizens of
the State of Idaho, adverse claimants to the same stock and
dividends.
The occasion for the interpleader was the existence of
inconsistent judgments as to the ownership of the Sunshine stock.
The Superior Court of Spokane County, Washington, in administering
the estate of Amelia Pelkes, adjudged that it was the property of
John Pelkes, assignor of petitioner, Evelyn H. Treinies, and the
District Court of Shoshone County, Idaho, adjudged that the same
property belonged to respondent, Katherine Mason. They are the sole
disputants. Other parties may be disregarded. On account of
conflict between the judgments of the respective courts of sister
states and the assertion of the failure to give full faith and
credit to both in the interpleader action, we granted
certiorari.
The alleged rights of the respective claimants arose as follows:
Amelia Pelkes, the wife of John Pelkes, died testate in Spokane,
Washington, in 1922, leaving her husband and one child, Katherine
Mason, the offspring of a former marriage as the beneficiaries of
her will. As a part of her community estate, there were 30,598
shares of Sunshine Mining stock. It was considered valueless, and
was not inventoried or appraised. The order of distribution
assigned a three-fourths undivided interest in these shares to
Pelkes and a one-fourth to Mrs. Mason, an omnibus clause covering
unknown property. The estate of Mrs. Pelkes was not distributed
according to the order of distribution. Instead, Pelkes and his
stepdaughter, Mrs. Mason, divided the inventoried
Page 308 U. S. 69
property between themselves in accordance with their wishes.
It is the contention of Pelkes and his assignee that this
partition of the property was in consideration of the release by
Mrs. Mason to Pelkes of all of her interest in the shares of the
stock of the Sunshine Mining Company. On the other hand, Mrs. Mason
asserts that Pelkes was to hold one-half of the amount owned,
15,299 shares, in trust for her.
In August, 1934, Mrs. Mason instituted a suit in the District
Court of Idaho for Shoshone County against Pelkes, Evelyn H.
Treinies, the Sunshine Mining Company, and others not important
here, alleging that she was the owner of 15,299 shares of the
stock, that these had been acquired by Miss Treinies from Pelkes
with knowledge of Mrs. Mason's rights, and praying that the trust
be established, and the stock and dividends be awarded to her, Mrs.
Mason. It was finally decreed by the District Court on August 18,
1936, after an appeal to the Supreme Court of Idaho, [
Footnote 3] that the stock and dividends
belonged to Mrs. Mason. Certiorari to the Supreme Court of Idaho
was refused by this Court. [
Footnote 4]
Before the entry of the first decree of the District Court of
Idaho, Katherine Mason filed a petition in the Superior Court of
Spokane County, Washington, in the probate proceedings involving
Amelia Pelkes' will, to remove the executor, John Pelkes, for
failure to file his report of distribution and for dissipation of
the Sunshine stock. Pelkes, by cross-petition and petition, claimed
the stock. Thereupon Mrs. Mason applied to the Supreme Court of
Washington for a writ of prohibition against further proceedings in
the Superior Court on the ground
Page 308 U. S. 70
of lack of jurisdiction in that court to determine the
controversy over the stock. The writ was refused. On May 31, 1935,
a judgment was entered in the Superior Court upholding in full the
ownership of Pelkes.
After the Supreme Court of Idaho had decided the Idaho suit
against Pelkes and Miss Treinies, they filed in August, 1936, a
suit in the Superior Court of Washington against Katherine Mason
and others alleging that they were the owners of the stock, further
alleging that the Idaho decree was invalid for lack of
jurisdiction, and asking that their title to the stock be quieted,
and the Sunshine Mining Company, a party to this and the Idaho
suit, be compelled to recognize their ownership. It was at this
point in the litigation that the Sunshine Company filed the bill of
interpleader now under consideration. Further proceedings in the
suit to quiet title were enjoined by the District Court in this
action.
Jurisdiction. -- Before considering the questions
raised by the petition for certiorari, the jurisdiction of the
federal court under the Act of January 20, 1936, [
Footnote 5] must be determined. As this issue
affects the jurisdiction of this Court, it is raised on its own
motion. [
Footnote 6] By the Act
of January 20, 1936, the district courts have jurisdiction of suits
in equity, interpleading two or more adverse claimants, instituted
by complainants who have property of the requisite value claimed by
citizens of different states. The suit may be maintained
"although the titles or claims of the conflicting claimants do
not have a common origin, or are not identical, but are adverse to
and independent of one another."
Process may run at least throughout all the states.
As required by the Act, this case was begun by the complainant,
a corporation of the State of Washington, impleading
Page 308 U. S. 71
one group of claimants who are citizens of that same state and
another, the adverse group, who are citizens of Idaho. Under the
interpleader act, this identity of citizenship is permissible,
since diversity only between claimants is required. The
Interpleader Act is based upon the clause of Section Two, Article
III, of the Constitution, which extends the judicial power of the
United States to controversies "between citizens of different
States." Is this grant of jurisdiction broad enough to cover the
present situation?
The Judicial Code, Section 24, provides for original
jurisdiction of suits of a civil nature between citizens of
different states in precisely the language of the Constitution. The
present wording is practically the same as that of the Act of March
3, 1875, [
Footnote 7] "the
circuit courts . . . shall have original cognizance . . . of all
suits . . . in which there shall be a controversy between citizens
of different States," and that of the original Judiciary Act of
September 24, 1789, [
Footnote
8] "the suit is between a citizen of the State where the suit
is brought, and a citizen of another State." Without ruling as to
possible limitations of the constitutional grant, it is held by
this Court that the statutory language of the respective judiciary
acts forbids suits in the federal courts unless all the parties on
one side are of citizenship diverse to those on the other side.
[
Footnote 9] For the
determination of the validity of the Interpleader Act, we need not
decide whether the words of the Constitution, "Controversies . . .
between citizens of different States," have a different meaning
from that given by judicial construction to similar words in the
Judiciary Act. Even though the constitutional language limits
the
Page 308 U. S. 72
judicial power to controversies wholly between citizens of
different states, that requirement is satisfied here. [
Footnote 10]
This is for the reason that there is a real controversy between
the adverse claimants. They are brought into the court by the
complainant stakeholder, who simultaneously deposits the money or
property due and involved in the dispute into the registry of the
court. This was done in this case. The act provides that the "court
shall hear and determine the cause and shall discharge the
complainant from further liability." Such deposit and discharge
effectually demonstrates the applicant's disinterestedness as
between the claimants and as to the property in dispute, [
Footnote 11] an essential in
interpleaders. [
Footnote 12]
The complainant is a proper party for the determination of the
controversy between the adverse claimants, citizens of different
states. Their controversy could have been settled by litigation
between them in the federal courts. Under similar circumstances as
to parties, this Court ruled that a removal of separable
controversies to the federal court was permissible even though a
proper defendant was a citizen of the same state as the plaintiff.
[
Footnote 13] We so held as
to a stakeholder in
Salem Trust Co. v. Manufacturers' Co.
[
Footnote 14] There, a suit
was brought in a state court against the Manufacturers' Company, a
Delaware corporation,
Page 308 U. S. 73
and against a co-citizen of plaintiff, a Massachusetts
corporation, the International Trust Company. The Manufacturers'
Company removed, and plaintiff sought a remand alleging its
co-citizen was a necessary party. The suit was to determine rights
to a fund in the co-citizen's hands, "and to have the same paid to"
the plaintiff. The right of removal was upheld on the ground that
the only obligation of the stakeholder was to pay over the money
deposited with it. In
Cramer v. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins.
Co., [
Footnote 15] the
Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, considering that
the claimants were the real contestants, construed the Interpleader
Act of May 8th, 1926, [
Footnote
16] to give jurisdiction to the federal court although the
interpleader and certain claimants were citizens of the same state.
The language as to citizenship is the same as that of the act here
involved. [
Footnote 17]
Application of Interpleader Act. -- The inclusion as
defendants of the judge of the Superior Court of Washington, the
administrator of John Pelkes, and a court receiver of the property
in dispute is said to violate the
Page 308 U. S. 74
rule against a citizen suing a state embodied in the Eleventh
Amendment. [
Footnote 18]
Without analyzing all the pleadings, a short answer against the
petitioner's contention is the fact that neither the receiver nor
the judge is enjoined by the final decree. Pelkes' administrator
and Miss Treinies are enjoined from further prosecution of the
Washington action to quiet title. They are the parties whose
individual rights to the stock are settled in this action. The
State of Washington has no interest, and no infringement of the
Eleventh Amendment occurs.
Neither are the provisions of Section 265 of the Judicial Code
applicable. That section forbids a United States court from staying
proceedings in any state court. The Interpleader Act, passed
subsequently, however, authorizes the enjoining of parties to the
interpleader from further prosecuting any suit in any state or
United States court on account of the property involved. Such
authority is essential to the protection of the interpleader
jurisdiction, and is a valid exercise of the judicial power.
Section 265 is a mere limitation upon the general equity powers of
the United States courts, and may be varied by Congress to meet the
requirements of federal litigation. [
Footnote 19]
Res Judicata of the Idaho Decree. -- On the merits,
petitioner's objection to the decree below is that it fails to
consider and give effect to the Washington judgment of May 31,
1935, awarding the property in question to Pelkes, petitioner's
assignor. It is petitioner's claim that the Washington judgment
must be considered as effective in this litigation because the
question of the jurisdiction of the Washington court was actually
litigated before
Page 308 U. S. 75
the Supreme Court of Washington and determined favorably to
petitioner by the refusal to grant a writ of prohibition against
the exercise of jurisdiction by the Washington Superior Court in
probate. This failure to give effect to the judgment is said to
infringe the full faith and credit clause of the Constitution. The
decree of the Court of Appeals is based upon the doctrine of
res judicata. The applicability of that doctrine arises
from a determination of pertinent matters by the Supreme Court of
Idaho. Accordingly, we turn to a discussion of whether or not the
issues tendered below by petitioner were foreclosed by the decision
of the Supreme Court of Idaho of July 23, 1936.
The issues tendered by petitioner in the trial court in this
interpleader proceeding were (1) the invalidity of the Idaho
decree, and (2) the conclusiveness of the Washington decree of May
31, 1935, awarding the property to Pelkes. Both of these issues
rest on petitioner's contention that complete jurisdiction of the
probate of Mrs. Pelkes' estate was in the Superior Court of
Washington, that the stock was at all times a part of that estate,
and that therefore that court's jurisdiction over the disposition
of the stock was exclusive of all other courts.
The Idaho decree was pleaded in this proceeding as
res
judicata of the controversy between petitioner and respondent.
The proceedings in Idaho showed a cause of action based on an
alleged oral agreement of Pekles, made in Idaho at the time of
distribution of Mrs. Pelkes' estate, to hold the Sunshine Mining
Company stock in trust for the joint benefit of himself and Mrs.
Mason. All parties, including this petitioner, were before the
court, and a decree was entered sustaining the trust and awarding
the stock and dividends, as claimed, to respondent, Mrs. Mason,
with directions to the Mining Company to recognize the assignment
of the certificates and adjudging a recovery
Page 308 U. S. 76
for prior dividends against Pelkes and petitioner. The Idaho
court was a court of general jurisdiction. [
Footnote 20]
The Court of Appeals held that the Idaho suit settled that the
stock was distributed in 1923, and that therefore the Idaho court
had jurisdiction to determine rights under the alleged oral trust.
It was further of the view that the Idaho court's invalidation of
the Washington judgment and its decree upholding Mrs. Mason's claim
to the disputed property were
res judicata in this action.
Petitioner's only ground for objection to the conclusion that the
Idaho decree is
res judicata rests on the argument that,
by such ruling below, the "judgment of the courts of the Washington
affecting the same subject matter and parties" is ignored.
In the Idaho proceeding, the Washington judgment awarding the
stock and dividends to Pelkes was pleaded in bar to Mrs. Mason's
suit to recover the stock. The effectiveness of the Washington
judgment as a bar depended upon whether the court which rendered it
had jurisdiction, after an order of distribution, to deal with
settlements of distributees with respect to the assets of an
estate. On consideration, it was determined in the Idaho proceeding
that the Washington court did not have this jurisdiction, and that
the stock of the Mining Company became the property of Mrs. Mason.
In declining to give effect to the Washington decree for lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter, the Idaho court determined
also the basic question raised by petitioner in the interpleader
action. The contention of petitioner in the interpleader
proceedings that the Idaho court did not have jurisdiction of the
stock controversy because that controversy was in the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Washington probate court must fall because of
the Idaho decision that the Washington probate court did not
have
Page 308 U. S. 77
exclusive jurisdiction. This is true even though the question of
the Washington jurisdiction had been actually litigated and decided
in favor of Pelkes in the Washington proceedings. If decided
erroneously in the Idaho proceedings, the right to review that
error was in those (the Idaho) proceedings. While petitioner sought
review from the decree of the Supreme Court of Idaho by petition
for certiorari to this Court, which was denied, no review was
sought from the final decree of the Idaho District Court of August
18, 1936, on new findings of fact and conclusions of law on
remittitur from the Supreme Court of Idaho. [
Footnote 21]
Page 308 U. S. 78
The Court of Appeals correctly determined that the issue of
jurisdiction
vel non of the Washington court could not be
relitigated in this interpleader. As the Idaho District Court was a
court of general jurisdiction, its conclusions are unassailable
collaterally except for fraud or lack of jurisdiction. The holding
by the Idaho court of no jurisdiction in Washington necessarily
determined the question raised here as to the Idaho jurisdiction
against Miss Treinies' contention. She is bound by that
judgment.
The power of the Idaho court to examine into the jurisdiction of
the Washington court is beyond question. [
Footnote 22] Even where the decision against validity
of the original judgment is erroneous, it is a valid exercise of
judicial power by the second court. [
Footnote 23]
One trial of an issue is enough. [
Footnote 24] "The principles of
res judicata
apply to questions of jurisdiction as well as to other issues,"
[
Footnote 25] as well to
jurisdiction of the subject matter as of the parties. [
Footnote 26]
Decree affirmed.
MR. JUSTICE BUTLER took no part in the consideration or decision
of this case.
[
Footnote 1]
99 F.2d 651.
[
Footnote 2]
19 F. Supp. 587.
[
Footnote 3]
57 Idaho 10, 59 P.2d 1087.
[
Footnote 4]
Pelkes v. Mason, 299 U.S. 615.
[
Footnote 5]
49 Stat. 1096, 28 U.S.C. § 41(26).
[
Footnote 6]
Mansfield, C. & L.M. Ry. Co. v. Swan, 111 U.
S. 379,
111 U. S.
384.
[
Footnote 7]
18 Stat. 470, § 1.
[
Footnote 8]
1 Stat. 78, § 11.
[
Footnote 9]
Strawbridge v.
Curtiss, 3 Cranch 267;
Camp v. Gress,
250 U. S. 308,
250 U. S.
312.
[
Footnote 10]
Cf. Chafee, Interpleader in the United States Courts,
41 Yale L.J. 1134, 1141, 1165, and Chafee, The Federal Interpleader
Act of 1936, 45 Yale L.J. 963, 973.
[
Footnote 11]
Diversity requirements for federal equity jurisdiction to avoid
a multiplicity of suits from diverse claimants with claims
contested by the debtor is not involved.
Cf. Di Giovanni v.
Camden Ins. Assn., 296 U. S. 64,
296 U. S.
70.
[
Footnote 12]
Sanders v. Armour Fertilizer Works, 292 U.
S. 190,
292 U. S. 200;
Killian v. Ebbinghaus, 110 U. S. 568,
110 U. S.
571.
[
Footnote 13]
Barney v. Latham, 103 U. S. 205,
103 U. S. 213;
cf. Pullman Co. v. Jenkins, 305 U.
S. 534,
305 U. S.
538.
[
Footnote 14]
264 U. S. 264 U.S.
182,
264 U. S.
189.
[
Footnote 15]
91 F.2d 141, 146.
See also Mutual Life Ins. Co. v.
Lott, 275 F. 365, 372;
New York Life Ins. Co. v.
Cross, 7 F. Supp.
130;
cf. Eagle, Star & British Dominions v.
Tadlock, 14 F. Supp.
933,
reversed, Security Trust & Savings Bank v.
Walsh, 91 F.2d 481;
Ackerman v. Tobin, 22 F.2d
541.
[
Footnote 16]
44 Stat. 416.
[
Footnote 17]
We do not determine whether the ruling here is inconsistent with
the conclusion in those cases where jurisdiction was rested on
diversity of citizenship between the applicant and co-citizens who
are claimants. (
Mallers v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc., 87
F.2d 233,
cert. denied, 301 U.S. 685 (New York corporation
impleads Illinois claimants);
Security Trust & Savings Bank
of San Diego v. Walsh, 91 F.2d 481 (English corporation
impleads California claimants);
Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co. v.
Meguire, 13 F. Supp.
967, 971 (Pennsylvania corporation impleads Kentucky
claimants);
Turman Oil Co. v. Lathrop, 8 F. Supp.
870, 872 (Delaware corporation impleads Oklahoma
claimants)).
[
Footnote 18]
Worcester County Trust Co. v. Riley, 302 U.
S. 292,
302 U. S. 296,
is relied upon.
[
Footnote 19]
Smith v. Apple, 264 U. S. 274,
264 U. S. 278;
Dugas v. American Surety Co., 300 U.
S. 414,
300 U. S.
428.
[
Footnote 20]
Constitution of Idaho, Art. 5, § 20; Idaho Code, 1932, §
1-705.
[
Footnote 21]
It is unnecessary to consider whether the Idaho determination as
to the jurisdiction of the Washington court was properly made. As
the procedure by which a state court examines into the question of
the jurisdiction of the court of a sister state is a matter within
the control of the respective states (
Adam v. Saenger,
303 U. S. 59,
303 U. S. 63),
it need only be added that such procedure is subject to question
only on direct appeal.
It was stipulated by all parties to the Idaho cause that the
Idaho courts might take judicial notice of the statutes and
decisions of Washington. Some constitutional and statutory
provisions relating to the jurisdiction of the Superior Court were
pleaded and admitted. It has long been the rule in Idaho that its
courts do not take judicial notice of the laws of another state,
and that, without allegation and evidence, it will be assumed the
laws are the same as those of Idaho.
Maloney v. Winston
Bros., 18 Idaho 740, 757, 762, 111 P. 1080, 1086;
Douglas
v. Douglas, 22 Idaho 336, 343, 125 P. 796;
Mechanics &
Metals Nat. Bk. v. Pingree, 40 Idaho 118, 129, 232 P. 5;
State v. Martinez, 43 Idaho 180, 192, 250 P. 239;
Kleinschmidt v. Scribner, 54 Idaho 185, 189, 30 P.2d 362.
While none of these cases involved a stipulation, the decision of
the Supreme Court of Idaho (
Mason v. Pelkes, 57 Idaho 10,
59 P.2d 1087) declares the law of that jurisdiction. It follows
from the Idaho court's refusal to look into the statutes of
Washington that the jurisdiction of the Washington court was
presumed to be governed by Idaho law. Under proper proof, the Idaho
court would have been compelled to examine the jurisdiction of the
Washington court under Washington law.
[
Footnote 22]
Old Wayne Life Assn. v. McDonough, 204 U. S.
8,
204 U. S. 15;
Thompson v.
Whitman, 18 Wall. 457,
85 U. S. 468;
Adam v. Saenger, 303 U. S. 59,
303 U. S.
62.
[
Footnote 23]
Chicago Life Ins. Co. v. Cherry, 244 U. S.
25,
244 U. S. 30;
Stoll v. Gottlieb, 305 U. S. 165,
305 U. S. 172;
Roche v. McDonald, 275 U. S. 449,
275 U. S.
454.
[
Footnote 24]
Baldwin v. Traveling Men's Assn., 283 U.
S. 522,
283 U. S.
525.
[
Footnote 25]
American Surety Co. v. Baldwin, 287 U.
S. 156,
287 U. S.
166.
[
Footnote 26]
Stoll v. Gottlieb, supra, note 23 305 U. S.
172.
No decision or statute relative to the reexamination of the
decree or judgment of an Idaho court on a contested issue of
jurisdiction has been found or called to our attention. It is
concluded that the rule here expressed states too the law of
Idaho.