1. There is an actual controversy in this case between
plaintiffs and defendants, respecting the constitutionality of the
Tobacco Inspection Act of August 23, 1935, entitling the plaintiffs
to invoke the Declaratory Judgment Act. P.
306 U. S. 9.
2. The Tobacco Inspection Act of August 23, 1935, authorizes the
Secretary of Agriculture to establish standards of tobacco and to
designate those auction markets where tobacco bought and sold moves
in interstate or foreign commerce, and it provides, under penalty,
that at a market so designated, no tobacco shall be offered for
sale at auction until it has been inspected and certified by an
authorized representative of the Secretary according to such
standards. He cannot designate a market unless two-thirds of the
growers voting at a prescribed referendum favor it. In case
competent inspectors are not available or for other reasons the
Secretary is unable to provide for inspection and certification at
all auction markets within a type area, he shall first designate
those markets where the greatest number of growers may be served
with the facilities available. He may suspend inspection and
certification at a market he has designated if competent inspectors
are not available or the quantity of tobacco is not enough to
justify the cost of the service.
Held:
(1) Such regulation, for the protection of sellers or
purchasers, or both, is within the commerce power as respects the
selling for transportation to other States or abroad, and in view
of the manner of the selling at the auctions, where all
transactions are conducted indiscriminately and virtually at the
same time, Congress
Page 306 U. S. 2
was authorized to apply its regulation to intrastate sales in
order to make it effective as to the sales in interstate and
foreign commerce. Pp.
306 U. S. 9,
306 U. S. 11.
(2) The auction is a part of the sales consummated,
notwithstanding that, in the market practice, the growers are not
bound to accept bids, and in some instances reject them. P.
306 U. S. 10.
(3) Regulations under the commerce clause may have the quality
of police regulations. P.
306 U. S. 11.
(4) The inspection and grading under the Act, though they take
place before the auction, have immediate relation to the sales in
interstate and foreign commerce. P.
306 U. S. 12.
(5) The fact that, for want of a sufficient number of experts to
inspect and grade the tobacco, but a few of the tobacco auction
markets in North Carolina have been designated, with the result
that some warehousemen operating such markets are bound by the
requirements of inspection and certification, while others, in the
same sort of business and competing for the patronage of the same
growers, remain free from such requirements, does not render the
regulation invalid for discrimination. P.
306 U. S. 13.
(6) Mere lack of uniformity does not invalidate a regulation of
interstate or foreign commerce. P.
306 U. S. 14.
(7) The provision for a referendum vote of tobacco growers is
merely a condition upon the application of the Congressional
regulation, and does not involve unconstitutional delegation of
legislative power. P.
306 U. S. 15.
(8) The Act does not involve unconstitutional delegation of
legislative power to the Secretary of Agriculture. P.
306 U. S. 16.
3. It does not appear that, in this case, the power of the
Secretary of Agriculture under the Tobacco Inspection Act was
arbitrarily or capriciously used. P.
306 U. S. 18.
4. The claim of the plaintiffs in this case, who are
warehousemen and auctioneers selling tobacco on commission for the
growers who own the tobacco, that the Act inflicts upon them a loss
of patronage and business, was not sustained by proof. P.
306 U. S. 18.
95 F.2d 856 affirmed.
Certiorari, 305 U.S. 584, to review a decree reversing a decree
of the District Court, 19 F. Supp. 211, which at the suit of
certain warehousemen and auctioneers, enjoined the Secretary of
Agriculture and other federal officers from enforcing certain
requirements of the Tobacco Inspection Act.
Page 306 U. S. 5
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE HUGHES delivered the opinion of the Court.
Plaintiffs, tobacco warehousemen and auctioneers in Oxford,
North Carolina, seek a declaratory judgment [
Footnote 1] that the Tobacco Inspection Act of
August 23, 1935, [
Footnote 2]
is unconstitutional and an injunction against its enforcement. The
Circuit Court of Appeals, reversing the District Court, [
Footnote 3] sustained the validity of
the Act and directed the dismissal of the bill of complaint. 95
F.2d 856. We granted certiorari. October 10, 1938, 305 U.S.
584.
The Act states its scope and purpose. §§ 1, 2. It applies to
transactions involving the sale of tobacco at auction as commonly
conducted at auction markets. These transactions are carried on by
tobacco producers and by persons engaged in the business of buying
and selling tobacco in commerce as defined -- that is, in commerce
which is interstate or foreign or is with or within the Territories
or the District of Columbia. [
Footnote 4] Congress finds that the
Page 306 U. S. 6
classification of tobacco according to type, grade, and other
characteristics affects the prices received; that "without uniform
standards of classification and inspection the evaluation of
tobacco is susceptible to speculation, manipulation, and control"
and "unreasonable fluctuations in prices and quality determinations
occur," constituting a burden upon commerce, and that the use of
uniform standards is imperative "for the protection of producers
and others engaged in commerce and the public interest
therein."
The Secretary of Agriculture is authorized to investigate the
handling, inspection, and marketing of tobacco and to establish
standards by which its type, grade, size, condition, or other
characteristics may be determined, and these standards are to be
the official standards of the United States, §§ 3, 4.
The Secretary is authorized to designate those markets where
tobacco bought and sold at auction or the products customarily
manufactured therefrom move in commerce. He is not to designate a
market unless two-thirds of the growers, voting at a prescribed
referendum, favor it. The Act provides that, after public notice
that a market has been so designated, no tobacco shall be offered
for sale at auction thereon until it has been inspected and
certified by an authorized representative of the Secretary
according to the established standards. There is a proviso that, in
case competent inspectors are not available or for other reasons
the Secretary is unable to provide for such inspection and
certification at all auction markets within a type area, he shall
first designate those markets where the greatest number of growers
may be served with the facilities available. § 5.
Warehousemen must provide space on warehouse tickets or other
tags or labels used by them for showing the grades as determined by
an authorized inspector. § 8. The Secretary is authorized to
publish and distribute,
Page 306 U. S. 7
without cost to the grower, timely information on the "market
supply and demand, location, disposition, quality, condition, and
market prices." § 9. Violation of the requirement of inspection and
certification at designated markets is made a misdemeanor
punishable by a fine of not more than $1,000 or imprisonment for
not more than one year, or both. § 12.
The market practices which led to this enactment are disclosed
by the record. They are described at length in the Report of the
Committee on Agriculture of the House of Representatives on the
submission of the bill. [
Footnote
5] The growers sort their tobacco for market as best they can.
It is tied in bundles or "hands" and brought to the auction
warehouse, where it is put in baskets, weighed, and placed in rows
on the warehouse floor with a ticket on each pile. The warehousemen
auction the tobacco, acting as representatives of the growers and
receiving fees at rates fixed by the state law. The auction goes
forward with extreme rapidity -- about one basket every ten seconds
-- the auctioneer proceeding along one side of a row and the buyers
moving with him. The auction is conducted with a technical
vocabulary intelligible only to the initiated, bids being made by
well understood gestures. The sale is not completed until the
grower accepts the bid; he may decline the bid and take his tobacco
away. The bidders are representatives of tobacco companies and
speculators who are experts in grades. [
Footnote 6] The Committee reported that
"The possession of grade and price information by the buyers and
the lack of it on the part of the growers places the growers under
a severe handicap in the marketing of their tobacco, and opens the
way to abuses and practices by which farmers are victimized. . .
.
Page 306 U. S. 8
It is the thought of the committee that, if the purchaser needs
an expert in grades in order to protect his interest in the sale,
the growers should be accorded the same protection."
It also appears from the record that, because of the speed of
the sale, few buyers have the opportunity to make a satisfactory
examination of the tobacco, and consequently many errors are made,
although, on the average, the buyers are not supposed to suffer
seriously. The effect of the methods used is to introduce an
unusual degree of uncertainty in the prices which a grower may
receive for tobacco of any particular grade.
Under the operation of the Act, federal inspectors examine the
tobacco about an hour before the sale. They pull samples from each
pile and place tickets indicating the grade. Each day there is
displayed in the warehouse a report indicating the average price
for the government grades sold on the previous day, and weekly
reports are issued for the preceding week.
The Secretary promulgated regulations to be effective January 2,
1936. Later, official standard grades for flue-cured tobacco were
prescribed. The Secretary designated twenty-three markets
throughout the country for compulsory inspection and grading. In
North Carolina, tobacco was marketed on forty auction markets.
Three of these, at Oxford, Goldsboro, and Farmville, were
designated. [
Footnote 7] In
view of the lack of expertly trained inspectors and graders, all
markets in North Carolina could not be designated, and defendants
say that the markets above named were selected because, in previous
years, the Department had established at these places voluntary
inspection of tobacco under the Farm Products Inspection Act,
[
Footnote 8] and the growers
were familiar with the benefits accruing from the federal
action.
Page 306 U. S. 9
In relation to Oxford, the market here in question, the required
referendum was had. Upwards of 8,600 ballots were distributed to
growers who had sold on that market during the previous season;
1,896 ballots were returned, of which 1,782 were in favor of the
designation. There were 248 other ballots returned, of which 96
percent. were favorable.
Plaintiffs contend (1) that the transaction of offering tobacco
for sale at auction on the warehouse floor is not a transaction in
interstate commerce, and hence is not subject to congressional
regulation; (2) that the Act is invalid because of its
discriminatory character; (3) that the Act provides for an
unconstitutional delegation of legislative power, and (4) that the
Act violates the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment.
The Circuit Court of Appeals found, and the record supports the
finding, that there is an actual controversy between plaintiffs and
defendants, entitling plaintiffs to invoke the Declaratory Judgment
Act.
See Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.
S. 227,
300 U. S.
240-241.
First. -- Plaintiffs urge that tobacco "is not
inherently an interstate commodity;" that the auction transaction
is not a sale, as title is not passed until the grower accepts the
price; that, after the auction, the grower may, and often does,
reject the bid, and he may take his tobacco away; that the
inspection required by the Act is done prior to the offering for
sale, and that, until sale and delivery to the purchaser, the
tobacco is not in interstate commerce, and its control is reserved
to the State. These objections are untenable. The record shows that
the sales consummated on the Oxford auction market are
predominantly sales in interstate and foreign commerce. The
principal purchasers are few in number, and, in the main, are
engaged in the export trade or in the manufacture of tobacco
products in other States. It appears that, in a given week, shortly
before the beginning of this suit,
Page 306 U. S. 10
approximately 2,000,000 pounds of tobacco were sold on the
Oxford market, only 15.3 percent. of which were definitely destined
for manufacture in North Carolina. About 14 percent. were in part
for manufacture in North Carolina and in part for other States, and
about 62 percent. moved directly into foreign commerce. The fact
that the growers are not bound to accept bids, and in certain
instances reject them, does not remove the auction from its
immediate relation to the sales that are consummated upon the
offers that the growers do accept. The auction in such cases is
manifestly a part of the transaction of sale. So far as the sales
are for shipment to other States or to foreign countries, it is
idle to contend that they are not sales in interstate or foreign
commerce and subject to congressional regulation. Where goods are
purchased in one State for transportation to another, the commerce
includes the purchase quite as much as it does the transportation.
Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.
S. 375,
196 U. S.
398-399;
Dahnke-Walker Milling Co. v.
Bondurant, 257 U. S. 282,
257 U. S. 290,
291;
Lemke v. Farmers' Grain Co., 258 U. S.
50,
258 U. S. 54;
Stafford v. Wallace, 258 U. S. 495,
258 U. S. 519;
Flanagan v. Federal Coal Co., 267 U.
S. 222,
267 U. S. 225;
Shafer v. Farmers' Grain Co., 268 U.
S. 189,
268 U. S. 198;
Foster-Fountain Packing Co. v. Haydel, 278 U. S.
1,
278 U. S. 10.
There is no permissible constitutional theory which would apply
this principle to purchases of livestock as in the
Swift
and
Stafford cases, and of grain as in the
Lemke
and
Shafer cases, and deny its application to tobacco. In
the
Lemke case (
supra at pp.
258 U. S.
60-61), condemning the effort of a State to control the
buying of grain for shipment to other States, the Court referred to
the power of Congress to provide its own regulation for such
transactions, saying:
"It is alleged that such legislation is in the interest of the
grain growers, and essential to protect them from fraudulent
purchases, and to secure payment to them of fair prices for the
grain actually sold. This
Page 306 U. S. 11
may be true, but Congress is amply authorized to pass measures
to protect interstate commerce if legislation of that character is
needed."
And again, in the
Shafer case,
supra at
268 U. S. 199,
the Court said:
"The right to buy it [grain] for shipment, and to ship it, in
interstate commerce, is not a privilege derived from state laws,
and which they may fetter with conditions, but is a common right,
the regulation of which is committed to Congress and denied to the
states by the commerce clause of the Constitution."
The fact that intrastate and interstate transactions are
commingled on the tobacco market does not frustrate or restrict the
congressional power to protect and control what is committed to its
own care. As we said in the
Shreveport case,
234 U.
S. 342,
234 U. S.
351-352, with respect to the intrastate rates of
interstate carriers:
"Wherever the interstate and intrastate transactions of carriers
are so related that the government of the one involves the control
of the other, it is Congress, and not the state, that is entitled
to prescribe the final and dominant rule, for otherwise Congress
would be denied the exercise of its constitutional authority, and
the states, and not the nation, would be supreme within the
national field."
See also Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U.
S. 352,
230 U. S. 399;
Wisconsin Railroad Comm'n v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co.,
257 U. S. 563,
257 U. S. 588;
Stafford v. Wallace, supra at
258 U. S. 522.
Here, the transactions on the tobacco market were conducted
indiscriminately at virtually the same time, and in a manner which
made it necessary, if the congressional rule were to be applied, to
make it govern all the tobacco thus offered for sale.
Having this authority to regulate the sales on the tobacco
market, Congress could prescribe the conditions under which the
sales should be made in order to give protection to sellers or
purchasers or both. Congress is not to be denied the exercise of
its constitutional authority
Page 306 U. S. 12
in prescribing regulations merely because these may have the
quality of police regulations. It is on that principle that
misbranding under the Food and Drugs Act [
Footnote 9] embraces false or misleading statements as
to the ingredients of commodities or the effects of their use.
See Seven Cases v. United States, 239 U.
S. 510. Inspection and the establishment of standards
for commodities has been regarded from colonial days as appropriate
to the regulation of trade, and the authority of the States to
enact inspection laws is recognized by the Constitution. Art. 1, §
10, par. 2.
See Turner v. Maryland, 107 U. S.
38,
107 U. S. 39,
107 U. S. 51-54;
Pacific States Co. v. White, 296 U.
S. 176,
296 U. S. 181.
But the inspection laws of a State relating to exports or to
articles purchased for shipment to other States are subject to the
paramount regulatory power of Congress.
Turner v. Maryland,
supra at
107 U. S. 57-58.
And Congress has long exercised this authority in enacting laws for
inspection and the establishment of standards in relation to
various commodities involved in transactions in interstate or
foreign commerce. [
Footnote
10] The fact that the inspection and grading of the tobacco
take place before the auction does not dissociate the former from
the latter, but, on the contrary, it is obvious that the inspection
and grading have immediate relation to the sales in interstate and
foreign commerce which Congress thus undertakes to govern.
In
Townsend v. Yeomans, 301 U.
S. 441, we recently had under consideration the
legislation of Georgia prescribing maximum charges for the services
of tobacco
Page 306 U. S. 13
warehousemen who conducted their business in a manner similar to
that prevailing in North Carolina. There, the warehousemen strongly
insisted that they were engaged in interstate and foreign commerce,
as the tobacco sold on their floors was destined for interstate or
foreign shipment, and hence that the State was without power to fix
their fees. They invoked the federal Act in support of their
contention. But we found nothing in the federal Act which undertook
to regulate the charges of warehousemen, and hence we concluded
that Congress had restricted its requirements and left the State
free to deal with the matters not covered by the federal
legislation and not inconsistent therewith. The authority of
Congress to enact the Tobacco Inspection Act was not
questioned.
Second. Plaintiffs complain that the Act is
discriminatory. They say that warehousemen on other tobacco markets
in North Carolina, doing the same sort of business and competing
for patronage among the same growers, are at liberty to conduct
sales in their warehouses without inspection and certification.
The reason for the selection is shown. The lack of a sufficient
number of expert inspectors made it impracticable to supply
inspection and grading at all tobacco auction markets. Having this
practical difficulty in mind, Congress directed that when, for that
reason or others, the Secretary was unable to provide for
inspection and certification at all such markets within a type
area, he should first designate those where the greatest number of
growers may be served with the facilities that are available. § 5.
We do not doubt that such a selection was within the congressional
power.
We have repeatedly said that the power given to Congress to
regulate interstate and foreign commerce is
"complete in itself, may be exercised to its utmost extent, and
acknowledges no limitations, other than are prescribed
Page 306 U. S. 14
in the constitution."
Gibbons v.
Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1,
22 U. S. 196. To
hold that Congress, in establishing its regulation, is restricted
to the making of uniform rules would be to impose a limitation
which the Constitution does not prescribe. There is no requirement
of uniformity in connection with the commerce power (Art. 1, § 8,
par. 3) such as there is with respect to the power to lay duties,
imposts and excises (Art. 1, § 8, par. 1).
Clark Distilling Co.
v. Western Maryland R. Co., 242 U. S. 311,
242 U. S. 327.
Undoubtedly, the exercise of the commerce power is subject to the
Fifth Amendment (
Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United
States, 148 U. S. 312,
148 U. S. 336;
United States v. Cress, 243 U. S. 316,
243 U. S. 326;
Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.
S. 555,
295 U. S.
589); but that Amendment, unlike the Fourteenth, has no
equal protection clause.
LaBelle Iron Works v. United
States, 256 U. S. 377,
256 U. S. 392.
Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.
S. 548,
301 U. S.
584.
If it be assumed that there might be discrimination of such an
injurious character as to bring into operation the due process
clause of the Fifth Amendment, that is a different matter from a
contention that mere lack of uniformity in the exercise of the
commerce power renders the action of Congress invalid. For that
contention we find no warrant. It is of the essence of the plenary
power conferred that Congress may exercise its discretion in the
use of the power. Congress may choose the commodities and places to
which its regulation shall apply. Congress may consider and weigh
relative situations and needs. Congress is not restricted by any
technical requirement, but may make limited applications and resort
to tests so that it may have the benefit of experience in deciding
upon the continuance or extension of a policy which under the
Constitution it is free to adopt. As to such choices, the question
is one of wisdom and not of power.
Page 306 U. S. 15
Third. The argument that there is an unconstitutional
delegation of legislative power is equally untenable. This is not a
case where Congress has attempted to abdicate, or to transfer to
others, the essential legislative functions with which it is vested
by the Constitution. Art. 1, § 1; § 8, par. 18.
See Panama
Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U. S. 388,
293 U. S. 421;
Schechter Corp. v. United States, 295 U.
S. 495,
295 U. S. 529,
295 U. S.
541-542,
295 U. S. 553.
We have always recognized that legislation must often be adapted to
conditions involving details with which it is impracticable for the
legislature to deal directly. We have said that:
"The Constitution has never been regarded as denying to the
Congress the necessary resources of flexibility and practicality
which will enable it to perform its function in laying down
policies and establishing standards while leaving to selected
instrumentalities the making of subordinate rules within prescribed
limits and the determination of facts to which the policy as
declared by the Legislature is to apply. Without capacity to give
authorizations of that sort, we should have the anomaly of a
legislative power which in many circumstances calling for its
exertion would be but a futility."
Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, supra. In such cases, "a
general provision may be made, and power given to those who are to
act under such general provisions, to fill up the details."
Wayman v.
Southard, 10 Wheat. 1,
23 U. S. 43. We
think that the Tobacco Inspection Act belongs to that class.
So far as growers of tobacco are concerned, the required
referendum does not involve any delegation of legislative
authority. Congress has merely placed a restriction upon its own
regulation by withholding its operation as to a given market
"unless two-thirds of the growers voting favor it." Similar
conditions are frequently found in police regulations.
Cusack
Co. v. Chicago, 242 U. S. 526,
242 U. S. 530.
This is not a case where a group of producers may make the law and
force it upon a minority (
see
Page 306 U. S. 16
Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.
S. 238,
298 U. S. 310,
298 U. S. 318)
or where a prohibition of an inoffensive and legitimate use of
property is imposed not by the legislature, but by other property
owners (
see Washington ex rel. Seattle Trust Co. v.
Roberge, 278 U. S. 116,
278 U. S.
122). Here, it is Congress that exercises its
legislative authority in making the regulation and in prescribing
the conditions of its application. The required favorable vote upon
the referendum is one of these conditions. The distinction was
pointed out in
Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States,
276 U. S. 394,
276 U. S. 407,
where, in sustaining the so-called "flexible tariff provision" of
the Act of September 21, 1922, [
Footnote 11] and the authority it conferred upon the
President, we said:
"Congress may feel itself unable conveniently to determine
exactly when its exercise of the legislative power should become
effective, because dependent on future conditions, and it may leave
the determination of such time to the decision of an executive, or,
as often happens in matters of state legislation, it may be left to
a popular vote of the residents of a district to be affected by the
legislation. While in a sense one may say that such residents are
exercising legislative power, it is not an exact statement, because
the power has already been exercised legislatively by the body
vested with that power under the Constitution, the condition of its
legislation going into effect being made dependent by the
legislature on the expression of the voters of a certain
district."
Nor is there an unconstitutional delegation to the Secretary of
Agriculture. Congress has set forth its policy for the
establishment of standards for tobacco according to type, grade,
size, condition, and other determinable characteristics. §§ 3, 4.
The provision that the Secretary shall make the necessary
investigations to that end and fix the standards according to kind
and quality is
Page 306 U. S. 17
plainly appropriate, and conforms to familiar legislative
practice as shown by the various statutes already mentioned.
[
Footnote 12] It is not
different in principle from the authority conferred upon the
Secretary of the Treasury to establish "uniform standards of
purity, quality, and fitness for consumption of all kinds of teas
imported into the United States" (
Buttfield v. Stranahan,
192 U. S. 470,
192 U. S.
494), or from that conferred upon the Interstate
Commerce Commission to fix standards for safety devices and
equipment (
St. Louis, Iron Mountain R. Co. v. Taylor,
210 U. S. 281,
210 U. S.
286-287;
Napier v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co.,
272 U. S. 605,
272 U. S.
612), or from that conferred upon the Secretary of War
to determine whether bridges and other structures constitute
unreasonable obstructions to navigation and to specify and
prescribe the structural changes that are required (
Union
Bridge Co. v. United States, 204 U. S.
364).
The Secretary of Agriculture is authorized to designate those
markets where tobacco bought and sold thereon at auction moves in
commerce. § 5. This calls for the ascertainment of a fact. The
intention of Congress is clear that markets thus ascertained shall
be designated subject to the prescribed conditions and as rapidly
as facilities for inspection are available. We find no unfettered
discretion lodged with the administrative officer. The requirement
of a referendum, as already noted, calls for the expression of the
wishes of the growers, and the Secretary acts merely as an
administrative agent in conducting the referendum. The provision
for the suspension of a designated market because competent
inspectors are not available or the quantity of tobacco is not
enough to justify the cost of the service sets forth definite, as
well as reasonable, criteria. The statute also lays down a
practical rule for the guidance of the Secretary in the
Page 306 U. S. 18
selection of markets in the event that, because of lack of
inspectors or other reasons the Secretary is unable to furnish
inspection and certification at all auction markets within a type
area. In that case, he is first to designate those auction markets
"where the greatest number of growers may be served with the
facilities available to him."
The statute thus defines the policy of Congress, and establishes
standards within the framework of which the administrative agent is
to supply the details. The provisions of the Act are well within
the principle of permissible delegation which we applied in
relation to the administration of the forest reserve in
United
States v. Grimaud, 220 U. S. 506,
220 U. S. 517;
to the allocation of licenses, wave lengths, etc. in
Federal
Radio Commission v. Nelson Bros. Co., 289 U.
S. 266,
289 U. S. 285,
and to the exercise of the powers conferred upon the Interstate
Commerce Commission in
New York Central Securities Corp. v.
United States, 287 U. S. 12,
287 U. S.
24.
Nor does it appear that, in his use of his authority in the
instant case, the Secretary has acted in an arbitrary and
capricious manner. As he did not have an adequate corps of experts
to supply all the North Carolina markets, he selected those where
there had been voluntary inspection under the prior Act. [
Footnote 13] It cannot be said that
this was an unreasonable course.
Fourth. Finally, plaintiffs invoke the due process
clause of the Fifth Amendment. Plaintiffs are warehousemen and
auctioneers acting as agents for the growers who own the tobacco
and pay their commissions. Plaintiffs are thus in the position of
contesting a regulation for the benefit of their principals because
of an alleged interference with their business. The Act does not
affect their rate of charges, and does not deprive them of any
property. The growers, to be sure, may take their tobacco where
they please. But even if it were assumed that the contention that
the markets subject to the inspection provision would lose
patronage could afford ground for resisting this sort of
regulation, otherwise valid, the claim in this instance rests more
on conjecture than on proof. We agree with the Circuit Court of
Appeals that, as to the asserted difference of prices obtainable on
inspected markets, as compared with those not inspected, the
evidence has little probative value, and that the loss of business
from growers who do not desire the inspection would seem by the
record to be more than counterbalanced by the gain of business from
those who desire it. 95 F.2d page 861.
The decree of the Circuit Court of Appeals is
Affirmed.
MR. JUSTICE McREYNOLDS and MR. JUSTICE BUTLER dissent.
[
Footnote 1]
Declaratory Judgment Act, 48 Stat. 955.
[
Footnote 2]
49 Stat. 731, 7 U.S.C.Supp. III, 511 to 511q.
[
Footnote 3]
19 F. Supp. 211.
[
Footnote 4]
See Section 1.
[
Footnote 5]
Report, Committee of Agriculture, June 5, 1935, to accompany
H.R. 8026.
[
Footnote 6]
The methods are similar to those followed in Georgia as
described in
Townsend v. Yeomans, 301 U.
S. 441,
301 U. S.
445.
[
Footnote 7]
A referendum was also had at Smithfield which resulted
unfavorably.
[
Footnote 8]
7 U.S.C. § 492.
[
Footnote 9]
21 U.S.C. § 10.
[
Footnote 10]
See, e.g., United States Cotton Standards Act, 7 U.S.C.
§§ 51-65; Food and Drugs Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 14a, 15, 20, 41, 71, 74,
89, 143; United States Warehouse Act, 7 U.S.C. § 243; Certification
of condition, etc., of agricultural products shipped in interstate
commerce, 7 U.S.C. § 414; Farm Products Inspection Act, 7 U.S.C. §
492; Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act, 7 U.S.C. § 499n.
[
Footnote 11]
42 Stat. 858, 941, 942.
[
Footnote 12]
See Note 10
[
Footnote 13]
Farm Products Inspection Act, 7 U.S.C. § 492.