The taxpayer sold all of its interest in certain oil and gas
properties in consideration of cash down and deferred payments in
several stated amounts, the agreement further providing that, when
the vendee had been reimbursed for expenditures in acquisition,
development and operation, the taxpayer should receive one-third of
the net profits of production and operation of the properties.
Held:
Page 303 U. S. 373
1. That there was an absolute sale divesting the taxpayer of all
interest or investment in the properties, including oil and gas in
place. P.
303 U. S.
375.
2. The provision for payment from profits was merely a personal
covenant of the vendee.
Id.
3. The taxpayer is not entitled under the Revenue Act of 1928, §
114(b)(3), to a deduction for depletion computed on the cash
payments.
Id.
Neither the cash payments nor the agreement for a share of
subsequent profits constituted an advance royalty, or a "bonus" in
the nature of an advance royalty, within the decisions recognizing
a right to the depletion allowance with respect to payments of that
sort.
4. The words "gross income from the property," as used in the
statute governing the allowance for depletion, mean gross income
received from the operation of the oil and gas wells by one who has
a capital investment therein, not income from the sale of the oil
and gas properties themselves. P.
303 U. S.
375.
91 F.2d 127 reversed.
Certiorari, 302 U.S. 677, to review the reversal of a decision
of the Board of Tax Appeals, 34 B.T.A. 333, sustaining the
Commissioner's disallowance of deductions for depletion.
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE HUGHES delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question is whether certain payments received by respondent
in the years 1928 and 1929 constituted "gross income from the
property" within the meaning of that phrase as used in relation to
oil and gas wells in section 114(b)(3) of the Revenue Act of 1928,
45 Stat. 821, so as to entitle respondent to the prescribed
depletion allowance. The Circuit
Page 303 U. S. 374
Court of Appeals, reversing the decision of the Board of Tax
Appeals (34 B.T.A. 333), sustained respondent's claim. 91 F.2d 127.
Certiorari was granted because of an asserted conflict with the
decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in
Commissioner v. Fleming, 82 F.2d 324.
Respondent is a California corporation which acquired certain
properties consisting of oil and gas prospecting permits, drilling
agreements, leases, and equipment. Development work resulted in the
discovery of oil. On October 3, 1927, respondent conveyed all its
right, title, and interest in the described properties to the
Honolulu Consolidated Oil Company. The latter agreed to pay to
respondent $350,000 upon the execution of the agreement, and, if
the Honolulu Company should not elect to abandon the purchase (in
accordance with one of the stipulations), the additional sums of
$400,000 in each of the years 1928, 1929, and 1930, and the further
sum of $450,000 in 1931. After the time when the Honolulu Company
had been fully reimbursed as provided in the agreement for all its
expenditures in the acquisition, development, and operation of the
properties, respondent was to receive monthly one-third of the net
profits resulting from the production and operation. After careful
stipulations with respect to such reimbursement and the computation
of net profits, the agreement provided:
"Anything in this agreement contained to the contrary
notwithstanding, it is the intention of the parties to this
agreement that the full ownership, possession, and control of all
the properties, the subject of this agreement, and of all of the
personal property acquired and/or used on and in connection with
the operation and development of the properties, the subject of
this agreement, shall be vested in Honolulu, and Elbe shall have no
interest in or to said properties or in or to any personal property
used on or in connection with the operation or development of the
said properties or in or to the salvage value of any thereof,
Page 303 U. S. 375
except as provided by paragraph 9 [relating to abandonment of
the purchase and reconveyance]."
The first payment of $350,000 was received by respondent in
1927, and, being greater than the cost of all the properties
transferred, respondent reported as taxable income the difference
between that cost basis and the amount received. In its income tax
returns for the years 1928 and 1929, respondent reported the
payments of $400,000 received in each of the years, and claimed 27
1/2 percent. thereof as an allowance for depletion. This is the
claim which has been sustained below.
We agree with the conclusion of the Board of Tax Appeals that
the contract between the respondent and the Honolulu Company
provided for an absolute sale of all the properties in question,
including all the oil and gas in place, and that respondent did not
retain any interest or investment therein. The aggregate sum of
$2,000,000 was paid as an agreed purchase price to which was to be
added the one-third of the net profits payable on the conditions
specified. We are unable to conclude that the provision for this
additional payment qualified in any way the effect of the
transaction as an absolute sale, or was other than a personal
covenant of the Honolulu Company.
See Helvering v. O'Donnell,
ante, p.
303 U. S. 370. In
this view, neither the cash payments nor the agreement for a share
of subsequent profits constituted an advance royalty, or a "bonus"
in the nature of an advance royalty, within the decisions
recognizing a right to the depletion allowance with respect to
payments of that sort. Such payments are made to the recipient as a
return upon his capital investment in the oil or gas in place.
See Burnet v. Harmel, 287 U. S. 103,
287 U. S.
111-112;
Murphy Oil Co. v. Burnet, 287 U.
S. 299,
287 U. S. 302.
Payments of the purchase price which are received upon a sale of
oil and gas properties are in a different category. The words
"gross income from the property," as used in the statute governing
the allowance for depletion, mean gross income
Page 303 U. S. 376
received from the operation of the oil and gas wells by one who
has a capital investment therein, not income from the sale of the
oil and gas properties themselves.
See Darby-Lynde Co. v.
Alexander, 51 F.2d 56, 59. We conclude that, as respondent
disposed of the properties, retaining no investment therein, it was
not entitled to make the deduction claimed for depletion.
Palmer v. Bender, 287 U. S. 551,
287 U. S. 557;
Helvering v. Twin Bell Syndicate, 293 U.
S. 312,
293 U. S. 321;
Thomas v. Perkins, 301 U. S. 655,
301 U. S. 661;
Helvering v. Bankline Oil Co., ante, p.
303 U. S. 362;
Helvering v. O'Donnell, supra.
The judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals is reversed, and
the cause is remanded for further proceedings in conformity with
this opinion.
Reversed.
MR. JUSTICE CARDOZO and MR. JUSTICE REED took no part in the
consideration and decision of this case.