1. District attorneys in New York, though classed by statute as
local officers, are part of the judicial system of the State, and,
in enforcing
Page 295 U. S. 90
state laws of general application by criminal prosecution,
perform a state function within their respective counties, and are
officer of the State within the meaning of § 266, Jud.Code. P.
295 U. S.
92.
2. In the absence of a clear showing of necessity, a federal
court of equity will not restrain the institution of a criminal
prosecution in a state court upon the ground that the statute
defining the offense violates the Federal Constitution, but will
leave the party to set up the federal question in the state court
and to his right of review in this Court. P.
295 U. S.
95.
3. Allegations that enforcement of a state regulation of one's
business will cause irreparable damage and deprivation of "rights,
liberties, properties, and immunities" are in themselves
conclusions of law which will not sustain the jurisdiction of
equity to enjoin a criminal prosecution for violation of the
regulation. P.
295 U. S.
96.
The bill, to restrain prosecution under a state statute making
it a misdemeanor to violate a "Code of Fair Competition in the
Motor Vehicle Retailing Trade," alleged that the plaintiff had a
large business in buying and selling such vehicles, but did not
show that the single prosecution in contemplation would work
serious interference with the business.
Held
insufficient.
4. Decree dismissing a bill on the merits
affirmed on
the ground that the allegations failed to state a case within the
equity jurisdiction of the District Court. P.
295 U. S. 97.
8 F. Supp.
437 affirmed.
Appeal from a decree of the District Court of three judges
dismissing the bill in a suit to enjoin a criminal prosecution
under a state law.
Page 295 U. S. 91
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE HUGHES delivered the opinion of the Court.
Appellant, a retail dealer in automobiles in the City of New
York, brought this suit to restrain the District Attorney of New
York County from instituting a criminal prosecution for alleged
violation of the "Code of Fair Competition for the Motor Vehicle
Retailing Trade." Appellant alleged that he was threatened with
prosecution under Chapter 781 of the Laws of 1933 of the state of
New York, which made it a misdemeanor to violate any provision of a
code of fair competition as approved by the President of the United
States under Title 1 of the National Industrial Recovery Act. 48
Stat. 195. It appears that the charge of violation of the code
related to the provisions which limited the amount to be allowed
for an old car "traded in" as part payment for a new car and
required the maintenance of factory list prices, plus certain
charges, with a prohibition against discounts, gratuities, etc.,
for the purpose of inducing purchases. The state statute was
challenged as repugnant to the constitution of the state, by reason
of an improper delegation of legislative power, and also as
effecting a deprivation of liberty and property without due process
of law in contravention of the Fourteenth Amendment of the
Constitution of the United States.
Appellant's application for an interlocutory injunction was
heard in the District Court by three judges. Jud.Code, § 266, 28
U.S.C. § 380. There was also a motion by the defendant to dismiss
the bill of complaint upon the grounds, among others, that it
failed to allege facts constituting an equitable cause of action,
and that the District Court was without jurisdiction. Pursuant to
notice, the Attorney General of the state appeared in support of
the state act. Affidavits were submitted on both sides, and, on
hearing, the District Court sustained the
Page 295 U. S. 92
validity of the statute and, on that ground, denied the motion
for injunction and granted the motion to dismiss the bill. An order
to that effect was entered, and the case comes here on appeal.
Upon the argument at this bar, the questions were raised (1)
whether the district attorney was an officer of the state within
the meaning of § 266 of the Judicial Code and (2) whether the
complaint stated a cause of action within the equitable
jurisdiction of the District Court. The case was continued to
permit the parties to file briefs upon these questions, and the
briefs are now in.
First. If the district attorney of the County of New
York is to be deemed a local officer, performing a local function
in a matter of interest only to the particular county, § 266 of the
Judicial Code has no application, and we are without jurisdiction
of this direct appeal from the District Court.
Ex parte
Collins, 277 U. S. 565,
277 U. S. 568;
Ex parte Public National Bank, 278 U.
S. 101,
278 U. S. 104;
School District No. 7 v. Hunnicut, 283 U.S. 810.
See
also Oklahoma Gas & Electric Co. v. Packing Co.,
292 U. S. 386,
292 U.S. 390.
The office of district attorney in the State of New York was
created in 1801. In each of the districts as then established,
which included several counties, he was charged with duties which
previously had devolved upon an Assistant Attorney General. In
1815, the County of New York was made a separate district and, in
1818, provision was made for the appointment of a district attorney
in each county. The power of appointment was vested in the governor
and the council of appointment until the Constitution of 1821, when
that power was given to the county courts. The Constitution of 1846
provided that district attorneys should be chosen by the electors
of the respective counties.
Despite this provision for local elections, the district
attorney in each county has been regarded as a state officer
performing a state function and taking the place, in
Page 295 U. S. 93
respect to his duties within the district or county, of the
Attorney General, upon whom at the outset these duties had been
laid. Lincoln's Constitutional History of New York, vol. 2, pp.
529, 530; vol. 4, pp. 722, 723. Under the state statutes prior to
1892, it appears that district attorneys were classified as
judicial officers. N.Y., Rev.Stat., Chap. V, Title 1. In
Fellows v. Mayor, etc., of City of New York, 8 Hun 484,
485, dealing with the status of an assistant district attorney, the
court said: "It is conceded that the district attorney is a state
officer. It could not well be questioned." And in
People ex
rel. Lyon v. Nicoll, 32 N.Y.S. 279, 280, the court referred to
the office of the district attorney as "a state office, classified
by the Revised Statutes as a judicial office."
In the Public Officers Law of 1892 (now Chapter 47 of the
Consolidated Laws of New York, Article I, § 2), a different
classification was made, and public officials were defined as
either "state officers" or "local officers," the latter embracing
officers chosen "by the electors of a portion only of the state."
District attorneys fall within this description of local officers.
Notwithstanding the change in classification, they are still to be
deemed a part of the judicial system of the state, each performing
within his county a distinctively state function. Lincoln's
Constitutional History of New York,
loc. cit. See
Opinions, Attorney General of New York, 1924, p. 120.
In this view, we cannot regard the local description, or the
method of selecting the officer, as decisive with respect to the
application of § 266 of the Judicial Code. That section relates to
suits in which an interlocutory injunction is sought to restrain,
on constitutional grounds, the enforcement
"of any statute of a State by restraining the action of any
officer of such State in the enforcement or execution of such
statute, or in the enforcement or execution of an order made by an
administrative board or commission acting under and pursuant to the
statutes
Page 295 U. S. 94
of such State."
To determine the application of this provision, we must have
regard both to the nature of the legislative action which is
assailed and to the function of the officer who is sought to be
restrained. We have said that the reference is not to every
legislative action, regardless of its nature and scope, but to a
statute "of general application" or an order of a state board or
commission. Thus, the section does not apply to suits to restrain
the enforcement of municipal ordinances or the orders of a city
board.
Ex parte Collins, supra. And, although the
constitutionality of a statute is challenged, the provision is
inapplicable where the defendants are local officers and the suit
"involves matters of interest only to the particular municipality
or district."
Id. Accordingly, a suit against local
officials to enjoin the collection of taxes assessed against shares
in a national banking association, in pursuance of a state law but
"by, and for the sole use of, the city," was found not to be within
the section.
Ex parte Public National Bank, supra. We
pointed out that the suit must not only seek to have a state
statute declared unconstitutional, or that in effect, but to
restrain the action "of an officer of the state." But the court was
careful to reserve the question whether so-called local officers
might not in fact represent the state or exercise "state functions
in the matters involved," so as to bring the suit to restrain their
action within the provision for three judges and direct appeal.
Id., p,
278 U. S. 105.
Where a statute embodies a policy of statewide concern, an
officer, although chosen in a political subdivision and acting
within that limited territory, may be charged with the duty of
enforcing the statute in the interest of the state, and not simply
in the interest of the locality where he serves. This is especially
true in the case of a prosecuting officer who acts for the entire
state, as a part of its machinery of enforcement, in proceedings
against violators of the state statute. The function of
Page 295 U. S. 95
such an officer in enforcing a statute of general application is
of controlling importance in giving effect to the intent of the
Congress.
In the instant case, it is manifest that the statute under
attack attempted to establish a statewide policy, and not one
merely in the interest of the particular county. The defendant is
charged with the duty of enforcing the statute by prosecuting those
who disobey it, and, in performing that duty, he acts not merely in
the local interest, but in the name of the people of the state in
compelling observance of its laws. In that enforcement, he is
acting in a true sense as an officer of the state. Appellant sought
to restrain his action in that aspect, and hence we think that the
case fell within § 266 of the Judicial Code, and was properly heard
by three judges.
Second. We pass to the question whether the bill of
complaint stated a cause of action within the equitable
jurisdiction of the District Court.
The general rule is that equity will not interfere to prevent
the enforcement of a criminal statute even though unconstitutional.
Hygrade Provision Co. v. Sherman, 266 U.
S. 497,
266 U. S. 500.
See also In re Sawyer, 124 U. S. 200,
124 U. S.
209-211;
Davis & Farnum Manufacturing Co. v. Los
Angeles, 189 U. S. 207,
189 U. S. 217.
To justify such interference, there must be exceptional
circumstances and a clear showing that an injunction is necessary
in order to afford adequate protection of constitutional rights.
See Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U. S. 197,
263 U. S. 214;
Packard v. Banton, 264 U. S. 140,
264 U. S. 143;
Tyson & Bros. United Theater Ticket Offices v. Banton,
273 U. S. 418,
273 U. S. 428;
Cline v. Frink Dairy Co., 274 U.
S. 445,
274 U. S. 452;
Ex parte Young, 209 U. S. 123,
209 U. S.
161-162. We have said that it must appear that "the
danger of irreparable loss is both great and immediate;" otherwise,
the accused should first set up his defense in the state court,
even though the validity of a statute is challenged. There is ample
opportunity
Page 295 U. S. 96
for ultimate review by this Court of federal questions.
Fenner v. Boykin, 271 U. S. 240,
271 U. S.
243-244.
Appellant's bill of complaint failed to meet this test.
Appellant alleged that the district attorney had applied to a
magistrate of the City of New York for the issue of a summons
directing the appearance of the appellant, to the end that an
investigation should be made of a complaint against him for
violation of the provisions of the "Motor Vehicle Retailing Code,"
and that an information charging violation should be drawn. He
alleged that the district attorney intended, unless restrained, to
institute criminal proceedings. The state statute made any
violation of the provisions of the code a misdemeanor punishable by
a fine not exceeding $500 for each offense. The bill contained
general allegations of irreparable damage and deprivation of
"rights, liberties, properties, and immunities" without due process
of law if the statute were enforced. But the bill failed to state
facts sufficient to warrant such conclusions, which alone were not
enough. The bill alleged that appellant had a large business in
buying and selling motor vehicles, but the statute did not prohibit
the continuance of that business, and the bill gave no facts to
show that the particular requirements of the code which were in
question would create such a serious interference as to require
equitable relief. Aside from the statement of general and
unsupported conclusions, the case presented by the bill was the
ordinary one of a criminal prosecution which would afford
appropriate opportunity for the assertion of appellant's rights. So
far as the bill disclosed, nothing more than a single prosecution
was in contemplation -- a point which the district attorney
emphasized by his disclaimer, on the hearing below, of any
intention to institute any further prosecution against appellant
until his rights, constitutional or otherwise, had been adjudicated
in the pending criminal proceeding.
Page 295 U. S. 97
The bill should have been dismissed upon the ground that it
failed to state a case within the equitable jurisdiction of the
District Court. The decree is modified accordingly, and, as
modified, the decree is affirmed.
Decree modified, and, as modified, affirmed.