1. The fact that an exercise of the police power forbidding
certain forms of advertising by dentists will interfere with
existing contracts for display signs and press notices does not
touch the validity of the regulation. P.
294 U. S.
610.
2. A regulation of dentists is not invalid as to them because it
does not extend to other professional classes. P.
294 U. S.
610.
3. A regulation preventing dentists from advertising their
professional superiority and their prices; from use of certain
forms of advertising signs; from use of advertising solicitors or
publicity agents; from advertising free dental work, free
examinations, guaranteed work, and painless operations,
held valid under the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, without regard to the truthfulness of the
representations or the benefit of the services advertised. P.
294 U. S.
611.
4. It is within the authority of the State to estimate the
baleful effects of such advertising, and to protect the community
not only against deception, but against practices which, though
they may be free from deception in particular instances, tend
nevertheless to lower the standards of the profession and
demoralize it. P.
294 U. S.
612.
148 Ore. 50; 34 P.2d 311, affirmed.
Appeal from the affirmance of a judgment dismissing the
complaint in a suit to enjoin the enforcement of a statutory
regulation of dentists.
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE HUGHES delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents the question of the validity of a statute of
the state of Oregon, enacted in 1933, relating
Page 294 U. S. 609
to the conduct of dentists. Oregon Laws 1933, c. 166, p. 208.
Previous legislation had provided for the revocation of licenses
for unprofessional conduct, which, as then defined, included
advertising of an untruthful and misleading nature. The Act of 1933
amended the definition so as to provide the following additional
grounds for revocation:
"advertising professional superiority or the performance of
professional services in a superior manner; advertising prices for
professional service; advertising by means of large display,
glaring light signs, or containing as a part thereof the
representation of a tooth, teeth, bridge work or any portion of the
human head; employing or making use of advertising solicitors of
free publicity press agents; or advertising any free dental work,
or free examination; or advertising to guarantee any dental
service, or to perform any dental operation painlessly."
Plaintiff, a dentist practicing in Portland, Or., brought this
suit in the state court against the members of the State Board of
Dental Examiners to enjoin the enforcement of the statute, alleging
that it was repugnant to the due process and equal protection
clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, and impaired the obligation of
contracts in violation of ยง 10, cl. 1, Article I of the
Constitution of the United States. The circuit court, overruling
this contention, sustained a demurrer to the complaint and, upon
the refusal of plaintiff to plead further, the suit was dismissed.
On appeal, the Supreme Court of the state took the same view of the
federal question and affirmed the judgment. 34 P.2d 311. The case
comes here on appeal.
Plaintiff alleged in his complaint that he was licensed in 1918;
that he had continuously advertised his practice in newspapers and
periodicals, and by means of signs of the sort described in the
amended statute, and that he had employed advertising solicitors;
that in his advertisements
Page 294 U. S. 610
he had represented that he had a high degree of efficiency and
was able to perform his professional services in a superior manner;
that he had stated the prices he would charge, had offered
examinations of prospective patients without charge, and had also
represented that he guaranteed all his dental work and that his
dental operations were performed painlessly. He further alleged
that the statements in his advertisements were truthful and were
made in good faith; that, by these methods, he had developed a
large and lucrative practice; that, through long training and
experience, he had acquired ability superior to that of the great
majority of practicing dentists; that he had been able to
standardize office operations, to purchase supplies in large
quantities and at relatively low prices, and thus to establish a
uniform schedule of charges for the majority of operations; also,
that he had made contracts for display signs and for advertisements
in newspapers, and had entered into other engagements of which he
would be unable to take advantage if the legislation in question
were sustained, and, in that event, his business would be destroyed
or materially impaired.
Plaintiff is not entitled to complain of interference with the
contracts he describes, if the regulation of his conduct as a
dentist is not an unreasonable exercise of the protective power of
the state. His contracts were necessarily subject to that
authority.
Rast v. Van Deman & Lewis Co., 240 U.
S. 342,
240 U. S. 363;
Union Dry Goods Co. v. Georgia Public Service Comm'n,
248 U. S. 372,
248 U. S.
375-376;
Sproles v. Binford, 286 U.
S. 374,
286 U. S. 391;
Stephenson v. Binford, 287 U. S. 251,
287 U. S. 276.
Nor has plaintiff any ground for objection because the particular
regulation is limited to dentists, and is not extended to other
professional classes. The state was not bound to deal alike with
all these classes, or to strike at all evils at the same time or in
the same way. It could deal with the different professions
according to the needs of the public in relation to each.
Page 294 U. S. 611
We find no basis for the charge of an unconstitutional
discrimination.
Watson v. Maryland, 218 U.
S. 173,
218 U. S. 179;
Miller v. Wilson, 236 U. S. 373,
236 U. S. 384;
Missouri ex rel. Hurwitz v. North, 271 U. S.
40,
271 U. S. 43;
Dr. Bloom Dentist, Inc. v. Cruise, 288 U.S. 588.
The question is whether the challenged restrictions amount to an
arbitrary interference with liberty and property, and thus violate
the requirement of due process of law. That the state may regulate
the practice of dentistry, prescribing the qualifications that are
reasonably necessary, and to that end may require licenses and
establish supervision by an administrative board, is not open to
dispute.
Douglas v. Noble, 261 U.
S. 165;
Graves v. Minnesota, 272 U.
S. 425,
272 U. S. 427.
The state may thus afford protection against ignorance, incapacity
and imposition.
Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.
S. 114,
129 U. S. 122;
Graves v. Minnesota, supra. We have held that the state
may deny to corporations the right to practice, insisting upon the
personal obligations of individuals (
State Board of Dental
Examiners v. Miller, 90 Colo.193, 8 P.2d 699;
Miller v.
State Board of Dental Examiners, 287 U.S. 563), and that it
may prohibit advertising that tends to mislead the public in this
respect.
Dr. Bloom Dentist, Inc. v. Cruise, 259 N.Y. 358,
363, 182 N.E. 16; 288 U.S. 588.
Recognizing state power as to such matters, appellant insists
that the statute in question goes too far because it prohibits
advertising of the described character, although it may be
truthful. He contends that the superiority he advertises exists in
fact that, by his methods, he is able to offer low prices and to
render a beneficial public service contributing to the comfort and
happiness of a large number of persons.
The state court defined the policy of the statute. The court
said that while, in itself, there was nothing harmful in merely
advertising prices for dental work or in displaying glaring signs
illustrating teeth and bridge work, it could not be doubted that
practitioners who were not
Page 294 U. S. 612
willing to abide by the ethics of their profession often
resorted to such advertising methods "to lure the credulous and
ignorant members of the public to their offices for the purpose of
fleecing them." The legislature was aiming at "bait advertising."
"Inducing patronage," said the court, "by representations of
painless dentistry,' `professional superiority,' `free
examinations,' and `guaranteed' dental work" was, as a general
rule, "the practice of the charlatan and the quack to entice the
public."
We do not doubt the authority of the state to estimate the
baleful effects of such methods and to put a stop to them. The
legislature was not dealing with traders in commodities, but with
the vital interest of public health, and with a profession treating
bodily ills and demanding different standards of conduct from those
which are traditional in the competition of the market place. The
community is concerned with the maintenance of professional
standards which will insure not only competency in individual
practitioners, but protection against those who would prey upon a
public peculiarly susceptible to imposition through alluring
promises of physical relief. And the community is concerned in
providing safeguards not only against deception, but against
practices which would tend to demoralize the profession by forcing
its members into an unseemly rivalry which would enlarge the
opportunities of the least scrupulous. What is generally called the
"ethics" of the profession is but the consensus of expert opinion
as to the necessity of such standards.
It is no answer to say, as regards appellant's claim of right to
advertise his "professional superiority" or his "performance of
professional services in a superior manner," that he is telling the
truth. In framing its policy, the legislature was not bound to
provide for determinations of the relative proficiency of
particular practitioners.
Page 294 U. S. 613
The legislature was entitled to consider the general effects of
the practices which it described, and if these effects were
injurious in facilitating unwarranted and misleading claims, to
counteract them by a general rule even though, in particular
instances, there might be no actual deception or misstatement.
Booth v. Illinois, 184 U. S. 425,
184 U. S. 429;
Purity Extract & Tonic Co. v. Lynch, 226 U.
S. 192,
226 U. S. 201;
Hebe Co. v. Shaw, 248 U. S. 297,
248 U. S. 303;
Pierce Oil Corp. v. Hope, 248 U. S. 498,
248 U. S. 500;
Village of Euclid, Ohio v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.
S. 365,
272 U. S.
388-389.
The judgment is
Affirmed.