Section 141(a) of the Revenue Act of 1928 gives groups of
affiliated corporations the privilege of making consolidated
returns, in lieu of separate ones, for 1929 and subsequent years
upon condition that all members consent to the regulations
prescribed prior to the return. Section 141(b) authorizes the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, with the approval of the
Secretary of the Treasury, to make regulations for determining the
tax liability of an affiliated group and of each member in such
manner as clearly to reflect the income and prevent avoidance of
tax liability.
Held:
1. The making of a consolidated return of income on the part of
affiliated corporations was a "consent" to the regulations
prescribed prior to the return. P.
292 U. S.
65.
2. Deduction of a loss, in an income tax return, is not
allowable unless the relevant act and regulations fairly may be
read to authorize it. P.
292 U. S.
66.
3. Where a parent company, during a consolidated return period,
caused the property of two affiliates, of which it held all the
stock, to be sold to outsiders, received a distribution of the net
proceeds after payment of their outside debts, and then dissolved
the affiliated corporations, the losses represented by the
difference between the amount of the distribution and what it had
lent the affiliates and paid for their stock in prior years were
losses upon a distribution within the consolidated return period
and arising from intercompany transactions, and not from a sale of
stock, within
Page 292 U. S. 63
the meaning of Regulation 75, adopted pursuant to the
above-cited Act, and, under those Regulations, they were not
deductible in the consolidated return. Pp. 66-67.
4. The Act and Regulations are not to be construed as permitting
double deduction of the same loses, first as subsidiary company
losses in consolidated returns for earlier years and again in
stating the eventual loss to the parent company from its investment
in the subsidiaries. P.
292 U. S.
68.
66 F.2d 236, 67
id. 236, affirmed.
Certiorari, 290 U.S. 624, to review the reversal of a judgment
awarded the plaintiff by the district court, sitting without a
jury, in an action on a claim of excessive payment of taxes.
MR. JUSTICE BUTLER delivered the opinion of the Court.
In 1917, petitioner purchased all the capital stock of the
Springer Trading Company for $40,000, and in 1920 all that of the
Roy Trading Company for $50,000. It held these shares until late in
1929, when both companies were dissolved. In that period, it
advanced the Springer Company sums amounting to $69,030.27, and the
Roy Company $9,782.22. Nothing having been paid it on account of
these advances, petitioner had an investment in the
Page 292 U. S. 64
former of $109,030.27 and in the latter of $59,782.22. It made
consolidated returns which took into account the gains and losses
of each subsidiary. Operations of the Springer Company resulted in
losses in all but two of the years, and those of the Roy Company in
all but four. The losses of the former exceeded its gains by
$118,510.53, and those of the latter by $57,127.85. In 1929, before
the end of November, the subsidiaries sold all their property to
outside interests. After paying debts to others, each had a balance
-- the Springer Company $22.914.22 and the Roy Company $15,106.16
-- which it paid petitioner on December 23. Both subsidiaries were
dissolved December 30 in that year.
Petitioner made a consolidated return for 1929 based on the
results of operation and the liquidation of each subsidiary, but
made no deduction of losses resulting to itself from the
liquidations. The return showed a tax of $20,836.20, which was duly
paid. In May, 1931, petitioner filed an amended return and claimed
a refund of $14,406.43. This return does not take into account
profits or losses of subsidiaries in that year, but deducts the
losses above shown to have resulted to petitioner from its
investments in them.
* The commissioner
rejected the claim. Petitioner brought this action in the Federal
district court for New Mexico against the collector to recover the
amount of its claim. A jury was waived, the court made special
findings of fact, stated its conclusions of law,
Page 292 U. S. 65
and gave petitioner judgment as prayed. The Circuit Court of
Appeals reversed. 67 F.2d 236.
The question is whether petitioner is entitled to deduct from
its 1929 income any part of the losses resulting from its
investments in the subsidiaries.
The Revenue Act of 1928 and Regulations 75 made under § 141(b)
govern. Section 141(a) gives to groups of affiliated corporations
the privilege of making consolidated returns, in lieu of separate
ones, for 1929 or in subsequent years upon condition that all
members consent to the regulations prescribed prior to the return.
And, in view of the many difficult problems arising in the
administration of earlier provisions authorizing consolidated
returns, the Congress deemed it desirable to delegate by § 141(b)
the power "to prescribe regulations legislative in character."
Senate Report No. 960, 70th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 15. That
subsection authorizes the commissioner, with the approval of the
Secretary, to make such regulations as he may deem necessary in
order that the tax liability of an affiliated group and of each
member
"may be determined, computed, assessed, collected, and adjusted
in such manner as clearly to reflect the income and to prevent
avoidance of tax liability."
The making of the consolidated return constituted acceptance by
petitioner and its subsidiaries of the regulations that had been
prescribed. No question as to validity is raised. The brief
substance of the regulations here involved follows:
Article 37(a) provides: Gains or losses shall not be recognized
upon a distribution
during a consolidated return period by
one member to another in cancellation or redemption of its stock,
"and any such distribution shall be considered an intercompany
transaction." And subdivision (b) requires that any such
distribution
after a
Page 292 U. S. 66
consolidated return period shall be treated as a sale, and
directs adjustments to be made in accordance with articles 34, 35,
and 36.
Article 34(a) prescribes the basis for determination of gain or
loss upon a sale by a member of stock issued by another member and
"during any part of the consolidated return period" held by the
seller. Subdivision (c) applies to sales which break affiliation
and which are made during the period that the selling corporation
is a member of the affiliated group.
Article 40(a) directs that intercompany accounts receivable or
other obligations which are the result of intercompany transactions
during a consolidated return period shall not "during a
consolidated return period" be deducted as bad debts. Subdivision
(c) governs deductions after the consolidated return period on
account of such transactions during the period.
1. In the absence of a provision in the Act or regulations that
fairly may be read to authorize it, the deduction claimed is not
allowable.
Brown v. Helvering, 291 U.
S. 193;
Burnet v. Houston, 283 U.
S. 223,
283 U. S. 227.
Cf. Wolford Realty Co. v. Rose, 286 U.
S. 319,
286 U. S. 326.
Petitioner contends that Articles 37(b) and 34(c) cover the case.
We are unable so to construe them. Article 37 relates to
dissolutions. Subdivision (b) deals with distributions made after a
consolidated return period. The record conclusively shows that each
subsidiary handed over the balance before the dissolution was
consummated and during the consolidated return period. Article 34
relates exclusively to the sale of stock. No sale of stock was
involved. The parent and subsidiary corporations were the only
parties. Neither subsidiary acquired stock of the other or that
issued by itself. The petitioner retained all the shares of each,
and, at the end, voted dissolutions that operated to cancel
them.
Page 292 U. S. 67
2. Respondent, relying on Articles 37(a) and 40(a), maintains
that the losses petitioner seeks to deduct arose from intercompany
transactions during the consolidated return period, and therefore
may not be allowed.
Article 37(a) forbids the recognition of losses upon
distribution during the consolidated return period, and declares
that such distributions shall be considered intercompany
transactions. Article 40(a) forbids during that period the
deduction as bad debts of obligations which are the result of
intercompany transactions. The payment of the liquidating dividends
was made during the return period, and was the last step leading up
to the action of directors and stockholders for the dissolution of
the subsidiaries. The amount handed over by the Springer Company
was less than petitioner's advances to it, but the amount paid by
the Roy Company was greater than the advances to it. Undoubtedly
the obligation of the subsidiaries in respect of the advances would
be held to be intercompany accounts receivable quite independently
of the regulations.
But a word is necessary as to the subsidiaries' obligations to
the petitioner as stockholder. The record does not disclose whether
the latter obtained the stock directly from the issuing
corporations or purchased from others. Without regard to the manner
of acquisition, the amount paid constituted investment in the
subsidiaries. And, as it was the owner of all the shares of the
subsidiaries, petitioner will be deemed to have directed all their
activities in the unitary business and, as well, the steps taken
for their liquidation and dissolution. They were liable to it alone
for the balances remaining after payment of the amounts owed
others, and it was equally entitled whether claiming as lender or
shareholder. Under the circumstances, it reasonably may be held
that their obligation in respect of petitioner's stock ownership
resulted
Page 292 U. S. 68
from intercompany transactions within the meaning of Article
40(a). Petitioner rightly says, as does respondent, that the
amounts paid for the stock and the advances later made to the
subsidiaries stand on the same footing. But its contention that the
transactions out of which the claimed losses arose did not occur
during the consolidated return period cannot be sustained.
Petitioner is therefore not entitled to deduct them from its 1929
income.
3. The allowance claimed would permit petitioner twice to use
the subsidiaries' losses for the reduction of its taxable income.
By means of the consolidated returns in earlier years, it was
enabled to deduct them. And now it claims for 1929 deductions for
diminution of assets resulting from the same losses. If allowed,
this would be the practical equivalent of double deduction. In the
absence of a provision of the Act definitely requiring it, a
purpose so opposed to precedent and equality of treatment of
taxpayers will not be attributed to lawmakers.
Cf. Burnet v.
Aluminum Goods Co., 287 U. S. 544,
287 U. S. 551.
United States v. Ludey, 274 U. S. 295,
274 U. S. 301.
There is nothing in the Act that purports to authorize double
deduction of losses or in the regulations to suggest that the
commissioner construed any of its provisions to empower him to
prescribe a regulation that would permit consolidated returns to be
made on the basis now claimed by petitioner.
In
Remington Rand, Inc. v. Commissioner, 33 F.2d 77,
the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held a
subsidiary company's accumulated earnings on stock sold to a parent
company could not be added to the cost of the stock in determining
taxable gain arising on the latter's sale to outsiders. In
United Publishers' Corp. v. Anderson, 42 F.2d
781, a District Court in the same circuit, deeming the
Remington Rand case applicable, held that a parent
corporation filing consolidated returns showing losses of a
subsidiary during earlier years could nevertheless deduct loss on
the sale of the subsidiary's stock.
Page 292 U. S. 69
Petitioner insists that same principle governs both decisions,
and that therefore the deduction should be allowed. But the analogy
is not good. Where all the members gain, total taxable income is
the same on a consolidated return as upon separate ones. But where,
as in the case before us, the subsidiaries lose and the parent
gains, the losses of the former go in reduction of the taxable
income of the latter. Considerations that justify inclusion of the
profits made by all the members do not support the double deduction
claimed.
The weight of authority is against petitioner's contention.
Burnet v. Riggs Nat. Bank, 57 F.2d 980;
Commissioner
v. Apartment Corp., 67 F.2d 3;
Summerfield Co. v.
Commissioner, 29 B.T.A. 77;
National Casket Co. v.
Commissioner, 29 B.T.A. 139. No decision other than that of
the district court in
United Publishers' Corp. v. Anderson,
supra, gives any support to its claim.
Cf. Burnet v.
Imperial Elevator Co., 66 F.2d 643.
McLaughlin v. Pacific
Lumber Co., 66 F.2d 895.
Affirmed.
*
Operating losses claimed
and deducted prior to
Springer Co. Roy Co. Combined
1929 . . . . . . . . . $131,424.41 $59,007.25 $190,431.66
Investment loss claimed
for 1929 . . . . . . . 86,116.05 44,676.06 130,792.11
Total losses claimed. . . 217,540.46 103,683.31 321,223.77
Investment (stock plus
advances). . . . . . . 109,030.27 59,782.22 168,812.49