The Federal Constitution forbids that a state should close its
courts to transitory causes of action against foreign corporations
arising in other states under federal law (Federal Employers'
Liability Act) while opening them to the litigation of all like
transitory cause arising in other states under state law. P.
292 U. S.
232.
227 Ala. 349; 149 So. 822, reversed.
Certiorari, 290 U.S. 621, to review the affirmance of a judgment
for the railway company in an action for damages.
MR. JUSTICE BRANDEIS delivered the opinion of the Court.
This action was brought under the Federal Employers' Liability
Act in the circuit court of Jefferson County, Alabama, to recover
damages for an injury suffered in Tennessee. The plaintiff,
McKnett, is a resident of Tennessee. The defendant, St. Louis &
San Francisco Railway Company, is a foreign corporation doing
business in Alabama. It pleaded in abatement that the court lacked
jurisdiction, since the cause of action had arisen wholly
Page 292 U. S. 231
in Tennessee, and did not arise by the common law or statute of
that state. The plea rested upon the limiting words of the Act of
1907, now embodied in ยง 5681, Code 1923, which declares:
"Whenever, either by common law or the statutes of another
state, a cause of action, either upon contract, or in tort, has
arisen in such other state against any person or corporation, such
cause of action shall be enforceable in the courts of this state,
in any county in which jurisdiction of the defendant can be legally
obtained in the same manner in which jurisdiction could have been
obtained if the cause of action had arisen in this state."
A demurrer to the plea was overruled, and the judgment entered
thereon for the defendant was affirmed by the highest court of the
state. 227 Ala. 349, 149 So. 822. This Court granted
certiorari.
The courts of Alabama have at all times taken jurisdiction of
suits between natural persons on transitory causes of action
arising in another state, even if both of the parties were
nonresidents of Alabama. [
Footnote
1] But, prior to the Act of 1907, it had been consistently
held, under the rule established by
Central Railroad &
Banking Co. v. Carr, 76 Ala. 388, that no Alabama court had
jurisdiction of any suit against a foreign corporation unless the
cause of action had arisen within the state. [
Footnote 2] In the case at bar, the court held
that, despite the 1907 Act, lack of
Page 292 U. S. 232
jurisdiction still existed in respect to causes of action
arising in another state under the federal law because, since the
statute was in plain terms limited to suits arising under the law
of the other state, it could not be extended by construction to
include causes of action arising in such other state under a
federal law.
The plaintiff contends that, by refusing to entertain
jurisdiction, the state court has denied him a right expressly
conferred by Congress and guaranteed by the Federal Constitution.
The defendant insists that the statute as construed is consistent
with the Federal Constitution, since a state may determine the
limits of the jurisdiction of its courts, the character of the
controversies which shall be heard in them,
Anglo-American
Provision Co. v. Davis Provision Co., No. 1, 191 U.
S. 373;
Chambers v. Baltimore & Ohio R.
Co., 207 U. S. 142,
207 U. S.
148-149, and the extent to which its courts shall become
a forum for the trial of transitory causes of action arising in
other states,
Missouri Pacific R. Co. v. Clarendon Boat Oar
Co., 257 U. S. 533;
Douglas v. New York, N.H. & H. R. Co., 279 U.
S. 377.
Alabama has granted to its circuit courts general jurisdiction
of the class of actions to which that here brought belongs in cases
between litigants situated like those in the case at bar. [
Footnote 3] The court would have had
jurisdiction of the cause between these parties if the accident had
occurred in Alabama. It would have had jurisdiction although the
accident occurred in Tennessee, if the defendant had been a
domestic corporation. It would have had jurisdiction, although the
defendant was a foreign corporation, the plaintiff a nonresident,
and the accident
Page 292 U. S. 233
occurred in Tennessee, if the suit had been brought for an
injury suffered while engaged in intrastate commerce. Thus, the
ordinary jurisdiction of the Alabama circuit court is appropriate
to enforce the right against this defendant conferred upon the
plaintiff by the Federal Employers' Liability Act. And its
jurisdiction was invoked according to the rules of procedure
prevailing in that court.
The power of a state to determine the limits of the jurisdiction
of its courts and the character of the controversies which shall be
heard in them is, of course, subject to the restrictions imposed by
the Federal Constitution. The privileges and immunities clause
requires a state to accord to citizens of other states
substantially the same right of access to its courts as it accords
to its own citizens.
Corfield v. Coryell, 4 Wash.C.C. 371,
381.
Compare Canadian Northern Ry. Co. v. Eggen,
252 U. S. 553. The
full faith and credit clause requires a state court to take
jurisdiction of an action to enforce a judgment recovered in
another state, although it might have refused to entertain a suit
on the original cause of action as obnoxious to its public policy.
Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U. S. 230;
Kenney v. Supreme Lodge, 252 U. S. 411,
252 U. S. 415;
Loughran v. Loughran, ante, p.
292 U. S. 216. By
Mondou v. New York, N.H. & H. R. Co., 223 U. S.
1, an action in a Connecticut court against a domestic
corporation, it was settled that a state court whose ordinary
jurisdiction as prescribed by local laws is appropriate for the
occasion may not refuse to entertain suits under the Federal
Employers' Liability Act.
While Congress has not attempted to compel states to provide
courts for the enforcement of the Federal Employers' Liability Act,
Douglas v. New York, N.H. & H. R. Co., 279 U.
S. 377,
279 U. S. 387,
the Federal Constitution prohibits state courts of general
jurisdiction from refusing to do so solely because the suit is
brought under a federal
Page 292 U. S. 234
law. The denial of jurisdiction by the Alabama court is based
solely upon the source of law sought to be enforced. The plaintiff
is cast out because he is suing to enforce a federal act. A state
may not discriminate against rights arising under federal laws.
Reversed.
[
Footnote 1]
Steen v. Swadley, 126 Ala. 616, 621, 28 So. 620;
Lee v. Baird, 139 Ala. 526, 36 So. 720.
Compare Smith
v. Gibson, 83 Ala. 284, 3 So. 321.
[
Footnote 2]
The conclusion seems to have been reached largely as a matter of
statutory construction.
Pullman Palace Car Co. v.
Harrison, 122 Ala. 149, 153-155, 25 So. 697;
Steen v.
Swadley, 126 Ala. 616, 622, 28 So. 620;
compare Lee v.
Baird, 139 Ala. 526, 529, 36 So. 720. Apparently the rule was
applied whether the plaintiff was a resident or a nonresident.
See Louisville & Nashville R. Co. v. Dooley, 78 Ala.
524;
compare Iron Age Publishing Co. v. Western Union Telegraph
Co., 83 Ala. 498, 505, 506, 3 So. 449.
[
Footnote 3]
Compare Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Pleasants, 46
Ala. 641;
Equitable Life Assurance Society v. Vogel's
Executrix, 76 Ala. 441;
Southern Ry. Co. v. Jordan,
192 Ala. 528, 529, 68 So. 418;
National Council v. Hill,
208 Ala. 63, 93 So. 812;
Jefferson Island Salt Co. v. E. J.
Longyear Co., 210 Ala. 352, 355, 98 So. 119.