1. A state statute is a "public act" within the meaning of the
full faith and credit clause of the Federal Constitution. P.
286 U. S.
154.
2. A federal court is bound equally with courts of the state in
which it sits to observe the command of the full faith and credit
clause. P.
286 U. S.
155.
3. As regards the question whether a state is bound to recognize
in its courts an Act of another state which is obnoxious to its
public policy, different considerations may apply where the right
claimed
Page 286 U. S. 146
under the Act is the cause of action sued on, and where it is
set up merely as a defense to an asserted liability. P.
286 U.S. 160.
4. Through a contract made in Vermont, an employer domiciled and
having its principal place of business there, and its employee,
also a resident of that state, tacitly accepted the Vermont
Workmen's Compensation Act, which provides that injury or death of
an employee suffered in Vermont or elsewhere in the course of his
employment, shall be compensated for only as by the Act provided,
without recourse to actions based on tort, which it expressly
excludes. The employee died of an injury he received while casually
in New Hampshire about the employment, and left no New Hampshire
dependents.
Held:
(1) That the Vermont statutory agreement is a defense to the
employer against an action for death by wrongful act, brought in
New Hampshire, in the federal court, by the personal representative
of the deceased employee. P.
286 U. S.
153.
(2) Refusal to recognize such defense is a failure to give full
faith and credit to the Vermont statute, in violation of Art. IV,
1, of the Federal Constitution. P.
286 U. S.
154.
(3) To recognize as a defense in another state the statutory
relationship and obligations to which the parties to the employment
subjected themselves under the Vermont Act is not to give that Act
an extraterritorial application. P.
286 U. S.
155.
(4) The fact that the New Hampshire Compensation Act permits
employees to elect, after the injury, whether to sue for negligence
or to avail themselves of its compensation provisions does not
establish that it would be obnoxious to New Hampshire public policy
to give effect,
ut supra, to the Vermont statute in cases
involving only the rights of residents of that state. P.
286 U.S. 161.
5. Acceptance of the New Hampshire Workmen's Compensation Act by
a Vermont employer in order to save certain common law defenses if
sued by employees resident in the former state
held not an
abandonment of the employer's defense under the Vermont Act in
respect of an employee who resided in Vermont and was injured while
casually working in New Hampshire. P.
286 U. S.
162.
51 F.2d 992, 999, reversed.
Certiorari to review the affirmance of a recovery in an action
for death by wrongful act.
See 284 U.
S. 221.
Page 286 U. S. 150
MR. JUSTICE BRANDEIS delivered the opinion of the Court.
This action for damages was brought in a court of New Hampshire
under the employers' liability provisions of the Employers'
Liability and Workmen's Compensation Act of that state, N.H. Public
Laws 1926, c. 178, to recover for the death of Leon J. Clapper,
which the plaintiff claimed was due to his employer's negligence.
The case
Page 286 U. S. 151
was removed to the federal court on the ground of diversity of
citizenship; the defendant, Bradford Electric Light Co., Inc.,
being a citizen and resident of Vermont and the plaintiff, Jennie
M. Clapper, administratrix, being a citizen and resident of New
Hampshire. It appeared that the company had its principal place of
business in Vermont and lines extending into New Hampshire; that
Leon Clapper, a resident of Vermont, was employed by it there as a
lineman for emergency service in either state, and that, in the
course of his duties, he was sent to restore some burned-out fuses
at a substation in New Hampshire, and while doing so was killed.
The company, invoking the full faith and credit clause of the
Federal Constitution, set up as a special defense that the action
was barred by provisions of the Vermont Compensation Act; that the
contract of employment had been entered into in Vermont, where both
parties to it then, and at all times thereafter resided, and that
the Vermont act had been accepted by both employer and employee as
a term of the contract.
The District Court ruled that the action was properly brought
under the laws of the State of New Hampshire; that the action was
based on a tort occurring in that state, and that the Vermont
Workmen's Compensation Act had no extraterritorial effect.
Accordingly, that court rejected the special defense and denied a
motion to dismiss. The case was tried three times before a jury,
the third trial resulting in a verdict for the plaintiff in the sum
of $4,000. The judgment entered thereon was first reversed by the
circuit court of appeals. But, upon a rehearing, the judgment of
the trial court was affirmed, one judge dissenting. 51 F.2d 992,
999. The company filed in this Court both an appeal and a petition
for writ of certiorari. The appeal was denied, and certiorari
granted.
284 U. S. 221.
Page 286 U. S. 152
The Vermont Workmen's Compensation Act provides that a workman
hired within the state shall be entitled to compensation even
though the injury was received outside the state, Vermont General
Laws, c. 241, § 5770; that
"employers who hire workmen within this state to work outside of
the state, may agree with such workmen that the remedies under the
provisions of this chapter shall be exclusive as regards injuries
received outside this state by accident arising out of and in the
course of such employment, and all contracts of hiring in this
state shall be presumed to include such an agreement,"
§ 5774; that every contract of employment made within the state
shall be presumed to have been made subject to its provisions,
unless prior to the accident an express statement to the contrary
shall have been made, in writing, by one of the parties, § 5765,
and that acceptance of the Act is "a surrender by the parties . . .
of their rights to any other method, form or amount of compensation
or determination thereof," § 5763. Neither the company nor Leon
Clapper filed a statement declining to accept any provision of the
Vermont Act.
The New Hampshire Employers' Liability and Workmen's
Compensation Act provides that the employer shall become subject to
the workmen's compensation provisions of the Act only by filing a
declaration to that effect, N.H. Public Laws, c. 178, § 4, and
that, even if the declaration is filed, the employee may,
subsequent to the injury, still elect either to claim compensation,
§ 11, or to sue for damages at common law as modified by the
employers' liability provisions of the Act. Failure to file such a
declaration exposes the employer to a common law action of
negligence in which the defenses of assumption of risk and injury
by a fellow servant may not be interposed. Sections 2, 3. The
company filed in New Hampshire the declaration provided for by its
statute.
Page 286 U. S. 153
Thus, each state has a workmen's compensation law of the
elective type, but their provisions differ sharply. The New
Hampshire statute, unlike that of Vermont, permits the employee or
his representative to elect, after the injury, to sue for damages
as at common law, and it was as a result of such an election made
by the administratrix that the case at bar arose. The main question
for decision is whether the existence of a right of action for Leon
Clapper's death should be determined by the laws of Vermont, where
both parties to the contract of employment resided and where the
contract was made, or by the laws of New Hampshire, where the
employee was killed.
First. It clearly was the purpose of the Vermont Act to
preclude any recovery by proceedings brought in another state for
injuries received in the course of a Vermont employment. The
provisions of the Act leave no room for construction. [
Footnote 1] The statute declares in
terms that, when a workman is hired within the state, he shall be
entitled to compensation thereunder for injuries received outside,
as well as inside, the state unless one of the parties elects to
reject the provisions of the Act. And it declares further that, for
injuries wherever received, the remedy under the statute shall
exclude all other rights and remedies of the employee or his
personal representative. If the accident
Page 286 U. S. 154
had happened in Vermont, the statute plainly would have
precluded the bringing of an action for damages in New Hampshire
under its Employers' Liability Act. [
Footnote 2] For such action is predicated on a tort, and
in Vermont an injury resulting from the employer's negligence is
not a tort, if the provisions of the Compensation Act have been
accepted. The question is whether the fact that the injury occurred
in New Hampshire leaves its courts free to subject the employer to
liability as for a tort; that is, may the New Hampshire courts
disregard the relative rights of the parties as determined by the
laws of Vermont where they resided and made the contract of
employment; or must they give effect to the Vermont Act, and to the
agreement implied therefrom, that the only right of the employee
against the employer, in case of injury, shall be the claim for
compensation provided by the statute?
Second. If the conflict presented were between the laws
of a foreign country and those of New Hampshire, its courts would
be free, so far as the restrictions of federal law are concerned,
to attach legal consequences to acts done within the state, without
reference to the undertaking of the parties, entered into at their
common residence abroad, that such consequences should not be
enforced between them. But the conflict here is between the laws of
two states, and the company, in setting up as a defense a right
arising under the Vermont statute, invokes Art. IV, § 1, of the
Federal Constitution, which declares that "full Faith and Credit
shall be given in each state to the public Acts . . . of every
other state." That a statute
Page 286 U. S. 155
is a "public act" within the meaning of that clause is settled.
Modern Woodmen of America v. Mixer, 267 U.
S. 544,
267 U. S.
550-551;
Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Dunken,
266 U. S. 389,
266 U. S. 393.
See Tennessee Coal, Iron & R. Co. v. George,
233 U. S. 354,
233 U. S. 360;
Chicago & Alton R. Co. v. Wiggins Ferry Co.,
119 U. S. 615,
119 U. S. 622.
[
Footnote 3] A federal court
sitting in New Hampshire is bound equally with courts of the state
to observe the command of the full faith and credit clause, where
applicable. [
Footnote 4] The
precise question for decision is whether that clause is applicable
to the situation here presented.
Third. The administratrix contends that the full faith
and credit clause is not applicable. The argument is that to
recognize the Vermont Act as a defense to the New Hampshire Action
would be to give to that statute an
Page 286 U. S. 156
extraterritorial effect, whereas a state's power to legislate is
limited to its own territory. It is true that full faith and credit
is enjoined by the Constitution only in respect to those public
acts which are within the legislative jurisdiction of the enacting
state.
See National Mutual Bldg. & Loan Assn. v.
Brahan, 193 U. S. 635,
193 U. S. 647;
Olmsted v. Olmsted, 216 U. S. 386,
216 U. S. 395.
[
Footnote 5] But obviously the
power of Vermont to effect legal consequences by legislation is not
limited strictly to occurrences within its boundaries. It has
power, through its own tribunals, to grant compensation to local
employees, locally employed, for injuries received outside its
borders,
compare Quong Ham Wah Co. v. Industrial Accident
Comm'n, 255 U. S. 445,
dismissing writ of error, 184 Cal. 26, 192 P. 1021, and
likewise has power to exclude from its own courts proceedings for
any other form of relief for such injuries. [
Footnote 6]
Page 286 U. S. 157
The existence of this power is not denied. It is contended only
that the rights thus created need not be recognized in an action
brought in another state; that a provision which Vermont may
validly enforce in its own courts need not be given effect when the
same facts are presented for adjudication in New Hampshire.
The answer is that such recognition in New Hampshire of the
rights created by the Vermont Act cannot, in any proper sense, be
termed an extraterritorial application of that Act. [
Footnote 7] Workmen's compensation Acts
are
Page 286 U. S. 158
treated, almost universally, as creating a statutory relation
between the parties -- not, like employer's liability acts, as
substituting a statutory tort for a common law tort.
See Cudahy
Packing Co. v. Parramore, 263 U. S. 418,
263 U. S. 423;
Mulhall v. Nashua Mfg. Co., 80 N.H.194, 197, 115 A. 449;
Cameron v Ellis Construction Co., 252 N.Y. 394, 396, 169
N.E. 622;
Chandler v. Industrial Commission, 55 Utah 213,
217, 184 P. 1020;
Anderson v. Miller Scrap Iron Co., 169
Wis. 106, 113, 117, 118, 170 N.W. 275, 171 N.W. 935. The relation
between Leon Clapper and the company was created by the law of
Vermont, and as long as that relation persisted, its incidents were
properly subject to regulation there, for both Clapper and the
company were at all times residents of Vermont; the company's
principal place of business was located there; the contract of
employment was made there, and the employee's duties required him
to go into New Hampshire only for temporary and specific purposes,
in response to orders given him at the Vermont office. The mere
recognition by the courts of one state that parties by their
conduct have subjected themselves to certain obligations arising
under the law of another state is not to be deemed an
extraterritorial application of the law of the state creating the
obligation. [
Footnote 8]
Compare
Page 286 U. S. 159
Canada Southern Ry. Co. v. Gebhard, 109 U.
S. 527,
109 U. S.
536-537.
By requiring that, under the circumstances here presented, full
faith and credit be given to the public act of Vermont, the Federal
Constitution prevents the employee or his representative from
asserting in New Hampshire rights which would be denied him in the
state of his residence and employment. A Vermont court could have
enjoined Leon Clapper from suing the company in New Hampshire, to
recover damages for an injury suffered there, just as it would have
denied him the right to recover such damages in Vermont.
Compare Cole v. Cunningham, 133 U.
S. 107;
Reynolds v. Adden, 136 U.
S. 348,
136 U. S. 353.
The rights created by the Vermont Act are entitled to like
protection when set up in New Hampshire by way of defense to the
action brought there. If this were not so, and the employee or his
representative were free to disregard the law of Vermont and his
contract, the effectiveness of the Vermont Act would be gravely
impaired. For the purpose of that Act, as of the workmen's
compensation laws of most other states, is to provide, in respect
to persons residing and businesses located in the state, not only
for employees a remedy which is both expeditious and independent of
proof of fault, but also for employers a liability which is limited
and determinate.
Compare New York Central R. Co. v. White,
243 U. S. 188;
Hawkins v. Bleakly, 243 U. S. 210;
Mountain Timber Co. v. Washington, 243 U.
S. 219.
Fourth. It is urged that the provision of the Vermont
statute which forbids resort to common law remedies for injuries
incurred in the course of employment is contrary to the public
policy of New Hampshire; that the full faith and credit clause does
not require New Hampshire to enforce an Act of another state which
is obnoxious to its public policy, and that a federal courts
sitting in that state may therefore decline to do so.
Compare
245 U. S. S.
160� Trust Co. v. Grosman,
245 U.
S. 412. It is true that the full faith and credit clause
does not require the enforcement of every right conferred by a
statute of another state. There is room for some play of
conflicting policies. Thus, a plaintiff suing in New Hampshire on a
statutory cause of action arising in Vermont might be denied relief
because the forum fails to provide a court with jurisdiction of the
controversy, see Chambers v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co.,
207 U. S. 142,
207 U. S.
148-149; compare Douglas v. New York, New Haven
& Hartford R. Co.,
279 U. S. 377; or
because it fails to provide procedure appropriate to its
determination, see Tennessee Coal, Iron & R. Co. v.
George,
233 U. S. 354,
233 U. S.
359; compare Slater v. Mexican National R. Co.,
194 U. S. 120,
194 U. S.
128-129; or because the enforcement of the right
conferred would be obnoxious to the public policy of the
forum, compare Bothwell v. Buckbee, Mears Co.,
275 U. S. 274,
275 U. S.
277-279; Union Trust Co. v. Grosman,
245 U. S.
412; Bond v. Hume,
243 U. S.
15, 243 U. S.
25; Converse v. Hamilton,
224 U.
S. 243, 224 U. S.
260-261; or because the liability imposed is deemed a
penal one, see Galveston, Harrisburg & San Antonio Ry. Co.
v. Wallace,
223 U. S. 481,
223 U. S.
490; compare Stewart v. Baltimore & Ohio R.
Co.,
168 U. S. 445,
168 U. S. 448.
But the company is in a position different from that of a plaintiff
who seeks to enforce a cause of action conferred by the laws of
another state. The right which it claims should be given effect is
set up by way of defense to an asserted liability, and to a defense
different considerations apply. Compare Home Insurance Co. v.
Dick,
281 U. S. 397,
281 U. S.
407-408. A state may, on occasion, decline to enforce a
foreign cause of action. In so doing, it merely denies a remedy,
leaving unimpaired the plaintiff's substantive right, so that he is
free to enforce it elsewhere. But to refuse to give effect to a
substantive defense under the applicable law of another state, as
under the circumstances here presented, subjects the defendant to
irremediable liability. This may not be done. Compare
267 U. S. S. 161�
of America v. Mixer, 267 U. S. 544,
267 U. S.
550-551;
Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Dunken,
266 U. S. 389;
Supreme Council of Royal Arcanum v. Green, 237 U.
S. 531;
see also Western Union Telegraph Co. v.
Brown, 234 U. S. 542;
Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Sowers,
213 U. S. 55,
213 U. S.
69.
Moreover, there is no adequate basis for the lower court's
conclusion that to deny recovery would be obnoxious to the public
policy of New Hampshire. No decision of the state court has been
cited indicating that recognition of the Vermont statute would be
regarded in New Hampshire as prejudicial to the interests of its
citizens. [
Footnote 9] In
support of the contention that the provision of the Vermont Act is
contrary to the New Hampshire policy, it is urged that New
Hampshire's Compensation Law is unique among workmen's compensation
acts in that it permits the injured employee to elect, subsequent
to injury, whether to bring a suit based upon negligence or to
avail himself of the remedy provided by the Act, and that the
Legislature of New Hampshire has steadily refused to withdraw this
privilege. [
Footnote 10] But
the mere fact that the Vermont legislation does not conform to that
of New
Page 286 U. S. 162
Hampshire does not establish that it would be obnoxious to the
latter's public policy to give effect to the Vermont statute in
cases involving only the rights of residents of that state incident
to the relation of employer and employee created there.
Northern Pacific R. Co. v. Babcock, 154 U.
S. 190,
154 U. S. 198.
Nor does sufficient reason appear why it should be so regarded. The
interest of New Hampshire was only casual. Leon Clapper was not a
resident there. He was not continuously employed there. So far as
appears, he had no dependent there. It is difficult to see how the
state's interest would be subserved, under such circumstances, by
burdening its courts with this litigation.
Sixth. The administratrix urges that the company had in
fact accepted the provision of the New Hampshire Compensation Act,
which reserves to the employee the right to elect to sue for
damages as at common law. It was upon this ground, primarily, that
the Circuit Court of Appeals based, upon the rehearing, the
affirmance of the judgment of the District Court. The circumstances
under which the acceptance of the New Hampshire Act was filed show
that the company did not intend thereby to abandon its rights under
the Vermont law in respect to Leon Clapper or other employees
similarly situated. It had had occasion to hire in New Hampshire
residents of that state for employment there in connection with the
operation of its lines in that state. In case of injury of such
employees, failure to accept the New Hampshire Act would have made
the petitioner liable to an action for negligence in which it would
have been denied the defenses of assumption of risk and injury by a
fellow servant.
Jutras v. Amoskeag Mfg. Co., 84 N.H. 171,
173, 147 A. 753;
Levesque v. American Box & Lumber
Co., 84 N.H. 543, 153, A. 10. Its acceptance is to be
construed as referable only to such New Hampshire employees,
Page 286 U. S. 163
and not as bringing under the New Hampshire Act employees not
otherwise subject to it.
We are of opinion that the rights as between the company and
Leon Clapper or his representative are to be determined according
to the Vermont Act. The judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals
must accordingly be reversed. We have no occasion to consider
whether, if the injured employee had been a resident of New
Hampshire, or had been continuously employed there, or had left
dependents there, recovery might validly have been permitted under
New Hampshire law.
Reversed.
MR. JUSTICE CARDOZO took no part in the consideration or
decision of this case.
[
Footnote 1]
"
Right to Compensation Exclusive: The rights and
remedies granted by the provisions of this chapter to an employee
on account of a personal injury for which he is entitled to
compensation under the provisions of this chapter, shall exclude
all other rights and remedies of such employee, his personal
representatives, dependents or next of kin at common law or
otherwise on account of such injury. Employers who hire workmen
within this state to work outside of the state, may agree with such
workmen that the remedies under the provisions of this chapter
shall be exclusive as regards injuries received outside this state
by accident arising out of and in the course of such employment,
and all contracts of hiring in this state shall be presumed to
include such an agreement."
Vt.Gen.Laws [1917], c. 241, § 5774.
[
Footnote 2]
Compare Home Insurance Co. v. Dick, 281 U.
S. 397. No question is here raised of the character of
that considered in
Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. Co. v.
Sowers, 213 U. S. 55, and
Tennessee Coal, Iron & R. Co. v. George, 233 U.
S. 354, of the validity of an attempt to create a
statutory cause of action and confine it to the courts of the
enacting state.
[
Footnote 3]
See also Bothwell v. Buckbee, Mears Co., 275 U.
S. 274,
275 U. S. 279;
Pennsylvania Fire Insurance Co. v. Gold Issue Mining &
Milling Co., 243 U. S. 93,
243 U. S. 96;
Western Life Indemnity Co. v. Rupp, 235 U.
S. 261,
235 U. S.
274-275;
Texas & New Orleans R. Co. v.
Miller, 221 U. S. 408,
221 U. S. 416;
Louisville & Nashville R. Co. v. Melton, 218 U. S.
36,
218 U. S. 50-52;
El Paso & Northwestern Ry. Co. v. Gutierrez,
215 U. S. 87,
215 U. S. 92-93;
Smithsonian Institute v. St. John, 214 U. S.
19,
214 U. S. 28;
Allen v. Alleghany Co., 196 U. S. 458,
196 U. S.
464-465;
Finney v. Guy, 189 U.
S. 335,
189 U. S. 340;
Johnson v. New York Life Insurance Co., 187 U.
S. 491,
187 U. S. 496;
Eastern Building & Loan Assn. v. Ebaugh, 185 U.
S. 114,
185 U. S. 121;
Bankolzer v. New York Life Ins. Co., 178 U.
S. 402,
178 U. S.
405-406;
Lloyd v. Matthews, 155 U.
S. 222,
155 U. S.
227-228;
Glenn v. Garth, 147 U.
S. 360,
147 U. S.
367-369.
Compare Supreme Council of Royal Arcanum v.
Green, 237 U. S. 531,
237 U. S.
544-545;
Converse v. Hamilton, 224 U.
S. 243,
224 U. S.
260-261;
Hancock National Bank v. Farnum,
176 U. S. 640;
Crapo v.
Kelly, 16 Wall. 610;
Green v.
Van Buskirk, 5 Wall. 307.
See 2 Farrand,
Records of the Federal Convention, pp. 188, 447, 577. Congress,
Acting under the authority of Article IV, § 1, has provided for the
authentication of "acts of the legislature of any state or
Territory, or of any country subject to the jurisdiction of the
United States." Act of May 26, 1790, c. 11, Act of March 27, 1804,
c. 56, § 2, R.S. § 905, U.S.Code, Tit. 28, § 687.
[
Footnote 4]
Compare 11 U. S.
Duryee, 7 Cranch 481; R.S. §§ 905, 906.
See also Minnesota
v. Northern Securities Co., 194 U. S. 48,
194 U. S. 72;
Cooper v. Newell, 173 U. S. 555,
173 U. S.
567.
[
Footnote 5]
See also New York Life Ins. Co. v. Head, 234 U.
S. 149,
234 U. S. 161;
Bonaparte v. Tax Court, 104 U. S. 592,
104 U. S. 597.
Compare Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. Co. v. Sowers,
213 U. S. 55,
213 U. S. 70;
Tennessee Coal, Iron & R. Co. v. George, 233 U.
S. 354,
233 U. S.
360.
[
Footnote 6]
For decisions construing state workmen's compensation acts as
applicable, under appropriate circumstances, to injuries received
outside the state, and upholding the validity of the acts as so
construed,
see Quong Ham Wah Co. v. Industrial Accident
Comm'n, 184 Cal. 26, 36, 192 P. 1021;
Industrial Comm'n v.
Aetna Life Ins. Co., 64 Colo. 480, 490, 174 P. 589;
Kennerson v. Thames Towboat Co., 89 Conn. 367, 375, 91 A.
372;
Metropolitan Casualty Ins. Co. v. Huhn, 165 Ga. 667,
670, 142 S.E. 121;
Beall Bros. Supply Co. v. Industrial
Comm'n, 341 Ill. 193, 199, 173 N.E. 64;
Pierce v. Bekins
Van & Storage Co., 185 Iowa, 1346, 1356, 172 N.W. 191;
Saunders' Case, 126 Me. 144, 146, 136 A. 722;
Pederzoli's Case, 269 Mass. 550, 553, 169 N.E. 427;
Crane v. Leonard, Crossette & Riley, 214 Mich, 218,
231, 183 N.W. 204;
State ex rel. Chambers v. District
Court, 139 Minn. 205, 208, 209, 166 N.W. 185;
State ex
rel. Loney v. Industrial Accident Board, 87 Mont.191, 195,
196, 286 P. 408;
McGuire v. Phelan-Shirley Co., 111 Neb.
609, 611, 612, 197 N.W. 615;
Rounsaville & Central R.
Co., 87 N.J.Law 371, 374, 94 A. 392;
Matter of Post v.
Burger & Gohlke, 216 N.Y. 544, 549, 111 N.E. 351
(
compare Smith v. Heine Safety Boiler Co., 224 N.Y. 9, 11,
12, 119 N.E. 878;
Matter of Cameron v. Ellis Construction
Co., 252 N.Y. 394, 397, 169 N.E. 622);
Grinnell v.
Wilkinson, 39 R.I. 447, 462, 463, 98 A. 103;
Smith v. Van
Noy Interstate Co., 150 Tenn. 25, 36, 262 S.W. 1048;
Texas
Employers' Ins. Assn. v. Volek, 44 S.W.2d 795, 798;
Pickering v. Industrial Comm'n, 59 Utah, 35, 38, 201 P.
1029;
Gooding v. Ott, 77 W.Va. 487, 492, 493, 87 S.E. 862;
Anderson v. Miller Scrap Iron Co., 169 Wis. 106, 114, 115,
170 N.W. 275, 171 N.W. 935. A contrary construction was reached in
Altman v. North Dakota Workmen's Compensation Bureau, 50
N.D. 215, 195 N.W. 287;
Sheehan Pipe Line Const. Co. v. State
Industrial Comm'n, 151 Okl. 272, 273,
3 P.2d
199. Early decisions to like effect, in California, Illinois,
and Massachusetts, have been superseded by statute.
See North
Alaska Salmon Co. v. Pillsbury, 174 Cal. 1, 162 P. 93;
Union Bridge & Construction Co. v. Industrial Comm'n,
287 Ill. 396, 398, 122 N.E. 609;
Gould's Case, 215 Mass.
480, 102 N.E. 693. The provisions of the state the state in respect
to injuries occurring outside the state are summarized in
Schneider, "The Law of Workmen's Compensation" (2d ed.1932) Vol. 1,
pp. 428-433.
[
Footnote 7]
The statute does not undertake to prohibit acts beyond the
borders of the state.
Compare Allegeyer v. Louisiana,
165 U. S. 578;
Nutting v. Massachusetts, 183 U.
S. 553,
183 U. S. 557.
It does not attempt to forbid or regulate subsequent modification
of the Vermont contract, or the formation of subsidiary contracts,
or new agreements, by the parties in other states.
Compare New
York Life Ins. Co. v. Head, 234 U. S. 149;
New York Life Ins. Co. v. Dodge, 246 U.
S. 357. It affects only the rights and liabilities of
parties who, by their conduct within the state, have subjected
themselves to its operation. As to those parties, its effect is not
to create a liability for acts without the state,
compare
Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Brown, 234 U.
S. 542, but to give rise to a defense in consequence of
acts within.
[
Footnote 8]
See Barnhart v. American Concrete Steel Co., 227 N.Y.
531, 535, 125 N.E. 675, denying recovery in a common law Action for
damages in the state of injury, on the ground that the employee's
remedy was for compensation under the law of the state of
employment.
Compare In re Spencer Kellogg & Sons, 52
F.2d 129, 134,
reversed on other grounds, 285 U. S. 285 U.S.
502. Compensation was similarly denied in
Hall v. Industrial
Comm'n, 77 Colo. 338, 339, 235 P. 1073;
Hopkins v.
Matchless Metal Polish Co., 99 Conn. 457, 464, 121 A. 828;
Proper v. Polley, 233 App.Div. 621, 253 N.Y.S. 530.
Compare Scott v. White Eagle Oil & Refining
Co., 47 F.2d
615, 616.
See also Darsch v. Thearle Duffield Fire Works
Display Co., 77 Ind.App. 357, 133 N.E. 525.
Compare Wiley
v. Grand Trunk Ry. of Canada, 227 F. 127, 130;
Mexican
Nat. R. Co. v. Jackson, 118 F. 549, 552.
[
Footnote 9]
Compare Saloshin v. Houle, 85 N.H. 126, 155 A. 47, an
action of negligence by the widow of a New York resident killed in
New Hampshire while working for a New York firm, brought against a
third person residing in New Hampshire. The Supreme Court of New
Hampshire held that the widow's right of action was barred by her
acceptance of compensation under the New York Act, and that the
acceptance, in accordance with the provisions of that Act, operated
as an assignment to the compensation insurer of her rights against
the defendant.
[
Footnote 10]
Attention is called to the following rejected compensation bills
abolishing the right of election after accident: 1915 Session,
House Bills No. 206, 302, Journal, pp. 720, 1021; 1917 Session,
House Bills No. 319, 485, Journal, pp. 567, 568; 1919 Session,
House Bill No. 134, Journal, p. 437; 1927 Session, House Bill No.
212, Journal, p. 752; 1929 Session, House Bill No. 292, Journal, p.
752. In 1923, the statute was amended to increase the compensation,
N.H.Laws, 1923, c. 91, and in 1925, as amended, it was reenacted
without change, N.H. Public Laws, c. 178.
MR. JUSTICE STONE, concurring.
I agree that, in the circumstances of the present case, the
courts of New Hampshire, in giving effect to the public policy of
that state, would be at liberty to apply the Vermont statute and
thus, by comity, make it the applicable law of New Hampshire. In
the absence of any controlling decision of the New Hampshire
courts, I assume, as does the opinion of the court, that they would
do so, and that what they would do we should do. Hence, it seems
unnecessary to decide whether that result could be compelled,
against the will of New Hampshire, by the superior force of the
full faith and credit clause.
If decision of that question could not be avoided, I should
hesitate to say that the Constitution projects the authority of the
Vermont statute across state lines into New Hampshire, so that the
New Hampshire courts, in fixing the liability of the employer for a
tortious act committed within the state, are compelled to apply
Vermont law instead of their own. The full faith and credit
clause
Page 286 U. S. 164
has not hitherto been though to do more than compel recognition,
outside the state, of the operation and effect of its laws upon
persons and events within it.
Bonaparte v. Tax Court,
104 U. S. 592;
Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. Co. v. Sowers, 213 U. S.
55, 29;
Olmsted v. Olmsted, 216 U.
S. 386;
Tennessee Coal, Iron & R. Co. v.
George, 233 U. S. 354;
Hood v. McGehee, 237 U. S. 611;
see Union Trust Co. v. Grosman, 245 U.
S. 412,
245 U. S.
415-416;
Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Brown,
234 U. S. 542,
234 U. S.
547.
It is true that, in this case, the status of employer and
employee, terminable at will, was created by Vermont laws operating
upon them while they were within that state. I assume that the fact
of its creation there must be recognized elsewhere, whenever
material. But I am not prepared to say that that status,
voluntarily continued by employer and employee, and given a locus
in New Hampshire by their presence within the state, may not be
regulated there according to New Hampshire law, or that the legal
consequences of acts of the employer or employee there, which grow
out of or affect the status in New Hampshire, must, by mandate of
the Constitution, be either defined or controlled, in the New
Hampshire courts, by the laws of Vermont, rather than of New
Hampshire.
The interest which New Hampshire has, in exercising that
control, derived from the presence of employer and employee within
its borders and the commission of the tortious act there, is at
least as valid as that of Vermont, derived from the fact that the
status is that of its citizens, and originated when they were in
Vermont, before going to New Hampshire. I can find nothing in the
history of the full faith and credit clause, or the decisions under
it, which lends support to the view that it compels any state to
subordinate its domestic policy, with respect to persons and their
acts within its borders, to the laws of any other. On the contrary,
I think it should be interpreted as leaving the courts of New
Hampshire free, in
Page 286 U. S. 165
the circumstances now presented, either to apply or refuse to
apply the law of Vermont, in accordance with their own
interpretation of New Hampshire policy and law.