1. The function of a state legislature in prescribing the time,
place and manner of holding elections for representatives in
Congress under Constitution, Art. I, § 4, is a lawmaking function
in which the veto power of the state governor participates if,
under the state constitution, the governor has that power in the
making of state laws. P.
285 U. S.
365.
2. The rule giving weight to practical construction is
especially applicable in the case of a constitutional provision
which governs the exercise of political rights, and hence is
subject to constant and careful scrutiny. P.
285 U. S.
369.
Page 285 U. S. 356
3. Where the number of representatives in Congress to which a
state is entitled under the present apportionment pursuant to the
Act of June 18, 1929, is the same as the number under the last
previous apportionment (Act of August 8, 1911) and the election
districts are unchanged, elections of representatives may be
conducted in the same manner as before the reapportionment. P.
285 U. S.
374.
4. Where the number of representatives for a state has been
increased by the new apportionment, the additional representatives,
if no new districts are created, may be elected by the state at
large under the clause of the Constitution (Art. I, § 2) providing
that "The House of representatives shall be composed of Members
chosen every second year by the the several states."
Id.
5. Where the number of representatives has been decreased by the
new apportionment, all the representatives must be elected by the
state at large unless and until new districts are created.
Id.
6. The conclusions set forth in the last three paragraphs,
supra, are consistent with the general provisions (§§ 3-5,
inclusive) of the reapportionment Act of August 8, 1911, and it is
therefore unnecessary to decide whether those parts of the Act
remain in force since the new apportionment. P.
285 U. S.
373.
7. Inclusion of an earlier statutory provision in the United
States Code does not operate as a reenactment.
Id.
184 Minn. 228, 238 N.W. 494, reversed.
Certiorari, 284 U.S. 616, to review a judgment affirming the
dismissal of a suit to enjoin the Secretary of State of Minnesota
from acting under a measure of the legislature purporting to
redistrict the state for congressional elections. The bill sought
to have all filings for nomination declared illegal. There was
first an interlocutory appeal from an order sustaining a
demurrer.
Page 285 U. S. 361
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE HUGHES delivered the opinion of the Court.
Under the reapportionment following the fifteenth decennial
census, as provided by the Act of Congress of June 18, 1929 (c. 28,
§ 22, 46 Stat. 21, 26), Minnesota is entitled to nine
representatives in Congress, being one less than the number
previously allotted. In April, 1931, the bill known as House File
No. 1456 (Laws Minn.1931, p. 640), dividing the state into nine
congressional districts and specifying the counties of which they
should be composed, was passed by the House of representatives and
the Senate of the state, and was transmitted to the governor, who
returned it without his approval. Thereupon, without further action
upon the measure by the House of representatives and the Senate,
and in compliance with a resolution of the House of
representatives, House File No. 1456 was deposited with the
Secretary of State of Minnesota. This suit was brought by the
petitioner as a "citizen, elector and taxpayer" of the state to
obtain a judgment declaring invalid all fillings for nomination for
the office of representative in Congress, which should designate a
subdivision of the state as a congressional district, and to enjoin
the Secretary of State from giving notice of the holding of
elections for that office in such subdivisions.
Page 285 U. S. 362
The petition alleged that House File No. 1456 was a nullity in
that, after the governor's veto, it was not repassed by the
legislature as required by law, and also in that the proposed
congressional districts were not "compact," and did not "contain an
equal number of inhabitants as nearly as practicable" in accordance
with the Act of Congress of August 8, 1911. [
Footnote 1]
The respondent, Secretary of State, demurred to the petition
upon the ground that it did not state facts sufficient to
constitute a cause of action. He maintained the validity of House
File No. 1456 by virtue of the authority conferred upon the
legislature by article 1, § 4, of the Federal Constitution, and he
insisted that the Act of
Page 285 U. S. 363
Congress of August 8, 1911, was no longer in force, and that the
asserted inequalities in redistricting presented a political, and
not a judicial, question. The trial court sustained the demurrer,
and its order was affirmed by the supreme court of the state. 238
N.W. 494. The action was then dismissed upon the merits, and the
supreme court affirmed the judgment upon its previous opinion. 238
N.W. 792. This Court granted a writ of certiorari.
Article I, section 4, of the Constitution of the United States,
provides:
"The times, places, and manner of holding elections for senators
and representatives shall be prescribed in each state by the
legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by law make
or alter such regulations, except as to the places of choosing
senators."
Under the Constitution of Minnesota, the "legislature" consists
"of the senate and house of representatives." Const.Minn. Art. 4, §
1. Before any bill passed by the Senate and House of
representatives "becomes a law," it must "be presented to the
governor of the state," and if he returns it within the time stated
without his approval, the bill may become a law provided it is
reconsidered and thereupon passed by each house by a two-thirds
vote.
Id., Art. 4, § 11. The state Constitution also
provides that, after each federal census, "the legislature shall
have the power to prescribe the bounds of congressional . . .
districts."
Id., art. 4, § 23. We do not understand that
the supreme court of the state has held that, under these
provisions, a measure redistricting the state for congressional
elections could be put in force by the legislature without
participation by the governor, as required in the case of
legislative bills, if such action were regarded as a performance of
the function of the legislature as a lawmaking body. No decision to
that effect has been cited. It appears that, "on seven occasions"
prior to the measure now under consideration, the Legislature of
Minnesota
Page 285 U. S. 364
had "made state and federal reapportionments in the form of a
bill for an act which was approved by the governor." [
Footnote 2] While, in the instant case, the
supreme court regarded that procedure as insufficient to support
the petitioner's contention as to practical construction, that
question was dismissed from consideration because of the
controlling effect which the court ascribed to the federal
provision. 184 Minn. 241, 238 N.W. p. 500. The court expressed the
opinion that "the various provisions of our state constitution
cited in the briefs are of little importance in relation to the
matter now in controversy;" that
"the power of the state legislature to prescribe congressional
districts rests exclusively and solely in the language of article
I, section 4, of the United States Constitution."
Id., 235; 497. Construing that provision, the court
reached the conclusion that the legislature, in redistricting the
state, was not acting strictly in the exercise of the lawmaking
power, but merely as an agency, discharging a particular duty in
the manner which the federal Constitution required. Upon this
point, the court said (
id., 235, 499):
"The legislature, in districting the state, is not strictly in
the discharge of legislative duties as a lawmaking body, acting in
its sovereign capacity, but is acting as representative of the
people of the state under the power granted by said Article I, § 4.
It merely gives expression as to district lines in aid of the
election of certain federal officials, prescribing one of the
essential details serving primarily the federal government, and
secondly the people of the state. The legislature is designated as
a mere agency to discharge the particular duty. The governor's veto
has no relation to such matters; that power pertains, under the
state Constitution, exclusively
Page 285 U. S. 365
to state affairs. The word 'legislature' has reference to the
well recognized branch of the state government, created by the
state as one of its three branches for a specific purpose, and when
the framers of the Federal Constitution employed this term, we
believe they made use of it in the ordinary sense with reference to
the official body invested with the functions of making laws, the
legislative body of the state, and that they did not intend to
include the state's chief executive as a part thereof. We would not
be justified in construing the term as being used in its enlarged
sense as meaning the state, or as meaning the lawmaking power of
the state."
The question then is whether the provision of the Federal
Constitution, thus regarded as determinative, invests the
legislature with a particular authority, and imposes upon it a
corresponding duty, the definition of which imports a function
different from that of lawgiver, and thus renders inapplicable the
conditions which attach to the making of state laws. Much that is
urged in argument with regard to the meaning of the term
"legislature" is beside the point. As this Court said in
Hawke
v. Smith, No. 1, 253 U. S. 221,
253 U. S. 227,
the term was not one
"of uncertain meaning when incorporated into the Constitution.
What it meant when adopted it still means for the purpose of
interpretation. A legislature was then the representative body
which made the laws of the people."
The question here is not with respect to the "body" as thus
described, but as to the function to be performed. The use in the
Federal Constitution of the same term in different relations does
not always imply the performance of the same function. The
legislature may act as an electoral body, as in the choice of
United States Senators under Article I, § 3, prior to the adoption
of the Seventeenth Amendment. It may act as a ratifying body, as in
the case of proposed amendments to the Constitution under Article
V.
Hawke v. Smith,
No.
Page 285 U. S. 366
1, supra; Hawke v. Smith, No. 2, 253 U.
S. 231;
Leser v. Garnett, 258 U.
S. 130,
258 U. S. 137.
It may act as a consenting body, as in relation to the acquisition
of lands by the United States under Article I, § 8, par. 17.
Wherever the term "legislature" is used in the Constitution, it is
necessary to consider the nature of the particular action in view.
The primary question now before the Court is whether the function
contemplated by Article I, § 4, is that of making laws.
Consideration of the subject matter and of the terms of the
provision requires affirmative answer. The subject matter is the
"times, places and manner of holding elections for senators and
representatives." It cannot be doubted that these comprehensive
words embrace authority to provide a complete code for
congressional elections, not only as to times and places, but in
relation to notices, registration, supervision of voting,
protection of voters, prevention of fraud and corrupt practices,
counting of votes, duties of inspectors and canvassers, and making
and publication of election returns -- in short, to enact the
numerous requirements as to procedure and safeguards which
experience shows are necessary in order to enforce the fundamental
right involved. And these requirements would be nugatory if they
did not have appropriate sanctions in the definition of offenses
and punishments. All this is comprised in the subject of "times,
places and manner of holding elections," and involves lawmaking in
its essential features and most important aspect.
This view is confirmed by the second clause of Article I, § 4,
which provides that "the Congress may at any time by law make or
alter such regulations," with the single exception stated. The
phrase "such regulations" plainly refers to regulations of the same
general character that the legislature of the state is authorized
to prescribe with respect to congressional elections. In exercising
this power, the Congress may supplement these state regulations
Page 285 U. S. 367
or may substitute its own. It may impose additional penalties
for the violation of the state laws or provide independent
sanctions. It "has a general supervisory power over the whole
subject."
Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.
S. 371,
100 U. S. 387;
Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U. S. 651,
110 U. S. 661;
Ex parte Clarke, 100 U. S. 399;
United States v. Mosley, 238 U. S. 383,
238 U. S. 386;
Newberry v. United States, 256 U.
S. 232,
256 U. S. 255.
But this broad authority is conferred by the constitutional
provision now under consideration, and is exercised by the Congress
in making "such regulations" -- that is, regulations of the sort
which, if there be no overruling action by the Congress, may be
provided by the legislature of the state upon the same subject.
The term, defining the method of action equally with the nature
of the subject matter, aptly points to the making of laws. The
state legislature is authorized to "prescribe" the times, places,
and manner of holding elections. Respondent urges that the fact
that the words "by law" are found in the clause relating to the
action of the Congress, and not in the clause giving authority to
the state legislature, supports the contention that the latter was
not to act in the exercise of the lawmaking power. We think that
the inference is strongly to the contrary. It is the nature of the
function that makes the phrase "by law" apposite. That is the same
whether it is performed by state or national legislature, and the
use of the phrase places the intent of the whole provision in a
strong light. Prescribing regulations to govern the conduct of the
citizen, under the first clause, and making and altering such rules
by law, under the second clause, involve action of the same
inherent character.
As the authority is conferred for the purpose of making laws for
the state, it follows, in the absence of an indication of a
contrary intent, that the exercise of the authority must be in
accordance with the method which the state has prescribed for
legislative enactments. We find
Page 285 U. S. 368
no suggestion in the federal constitutional provision of an
attempt to endow the legislature of the state with power to enact
laws in any manner other than that in which the constitution of the
state has provided that laws shall be enacted. Whether the governor
of the state, through the veto power, shall have a part in the
making of state laws is a matter of state polity. Article I, § 4,
of the Federal Constitution neither requires nor excludes such
participation. And provision for it as a check in the legislative
process cannot be regarded as repugnant to the grant of legislative
authority. At the time of the adoption of the Federal Constitution,
it appears that only two states had provided for a veto upon the
passage of legislative bills -- Massachusetts through the governor
and New York through a council of revision. [
Footnote 3] But the restriction which existed in
the case of these states was well known. That the state legislature
might be subject to such a limitation, either then or thereafter
imposed as the several states might think wise, was no more
incongruous with the grant of legislative authority to regulate
congressional elections than the fact that the Congress, in making
its regulations under the same provision, would be subject to the
veto power of the President, as provided in Article I, § 7.
Page 285 U. S. 369
The latter consequence was not expressed, but there is no
question that it was necessarily implied, as the Congress was to
act by law, and there is no intimation, either in the debates in
the federal convention or in contemporaneous exposition, of a
purpose to exclude a similar restriction imposed by state
constitutions upon state legislatures when exercising the lawmaking
power.
The practical construction of Article I, § 4, is impressive.
General acquiescence cannot justify departure from the law, but
long and continuous interpretation in the course of official action
under the law may aid in removing doubts as to its meaning. This is
especially true in the case of constitutional provisions governing
the exercise of political rights, and hence subject to constant and
careful scrutiny. Certainly the terms of the constitutional
provision furnish no such clear and definite support for a contrary
construction as to justify disregard of the established practice in
the states.
McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U. S.
1,
146 U. S. 36;
Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. v. Kansas, 248 U.
S. 276,
248 U. S. 284;
Myers v. United States, 272 U. S. 52,
272 U. S. 119,
272 U. S. 136;
The Pocket Veto Case, 279 U. S. 655,
279 U. S.
688-690. That practice is eloquent of the conviction of
the people of the states, and of their representatives in state
legislatures and executive office, that, in providing for
congressional elections and for the districts in which they were to
be held, these legislatures were exercising the lawmaking power,
and thus subject, where the state constitution so provided, to the
veto of the governor as a part of the legislative process. The
early action in Massachusetts under this authority was by
"resolves," and these, under the Constitution of 1780, were
required to be submitted to the governor, and it appears that they
were so submitted and approved by him. [
Footnote 4] In New York,
Page 285 U. S. 370
from the outset, provision for congressional districts was made
by statute, [
Footnote 5] and
this method was followed until 1931. The argument based on the
disposition, during the early period, to curtail executive
authority in the states, and on the long time which elapsed in a
number of states before the veto power was granted to the governor,
is of slight weight in the light of the fact that this power was
given in four states shortly after the adoption of the Federal
Constitution, [
Footnote 6] that
the use of this check has gradually been extended, and that the
uniform practice (prior to the questions raised in relation to the
present reapportionment) has been to provide for congressional
districts by the enactment of statutes with the participation of
the governor wherever the state constitution provided for such
participation as part of the process of making laws.
See Moran
v. Bowley, 347 Ill. 148, 179 N.E. 526, 527;
Koening v.
Flynn, 258 N.Y. 292, 300, 179 N.E. 705;
Carroll v.
Becker, 45 S.W.2d 533;
State ex rel. Schrader v.
Polley, 26 S.D. 5, 7, 127 N.W. 848. The Attorney General of
Minnesota, in his argument in the instant case, states:
"It is conceded that, until 1931, whenever the State of
Minnesota was divided into districts for the purpose of
congressional elections, such action was taken by the legislature
in the form of a bill, and presented to and approved by the
governor. "
Page 285 U. S. 371
That the constitutional provision contemplates the exercise of
the lawmaking power was definitely recognized by the Congress in
the Act of August 8, 1911, [
Footnote 7] which expressly provided in § 4 for the
election of representatives in Congress, as stated,
"by the districts now prescribed by law until such state shall
be redistricted in the manner provided by the laws thereof, and in
accordance with the rules enumerated in § three of this Act."
The significance of the clause "in the manner provided by the
laws thereof" is manifest from its occasion and purpose. It was to
recognize the propriety of the referendum in establishing
congressional districts where the state had made it a part of the
legislative process. "It is clear," said this Court in
Davis v.
Hildebrant, 241 U. S. 565,
241 U. S.
568,
"that Congress, in 1911, in enacting the controlling law
concerning the duties of the states, through their legislative
authority, to deal with the subject of the creation of
congressional districts, expressly modified the phraseology of the
previous acts relating to that subject by inserting a clause
plainly intended to provide that, where, by the state Constitution
and laws, the referendum was treated as part of the legislative
power, the power as thus constituted should be held and treated to
be the state legislative power for the purpose of creating
congressional districts by law."
The case of
Davis v. Hildebrant, supra, arose under the
amendment of 1912 to the Constitution of Ohio reserving the right
"by way of referendum to approve or disapprove by popular vote any
law enacted by the general assembly."
Id., p.
241 U. S. 566.
The act passed by the General Assembly of Ohio in 1915,
redistricting the state for the purpose of congressional elections,
was disapproved under the referendum provision, and the validity of
that action was challenged under Article I, § 4, of the Federal
Page 285 U. S. 372
Constitution. The supreme court of the state, denying a mandamus
to enforce the disapproved act,
"held that the provisions as to referendum were a part of the
legislative power of the state, made so by the Constitution, and
that nothing in the Act of Congress of 1911, or in the
constitutional provision, operated to the contrary, and that
therefore the disapproved law had no existence."
Id., p.
241 U. S. 567.
This Court affirmed the judgment of the state court. It is manifest
that the Congress had no power to alter Article I, § 4, and that
the Act of 1911, in its reference to state laws, could but operate
as a legislative recognition of the nature of the authority deemed
to have been conferred by the constitutional provision. And it was
because of the authority of the state to determine what should
constitute its legislative process that the validity of the
requirement of the state constitution of Ohio, in its application
to congressional elections, was sustained. This was explicitly
stated by this Court as the ground of the distinction which was
made in
Hawke v. Smith No. 1, supra, where, referring to
the
Davis case, the Court said:
"As shown in the opinion in that case, Congress had itself
recognized the referendum as part of the legislative authority of
the state for the purpose stated. It was held, affirming the
judgment of the Supreme Court of Ohio, that the referendum
provision of the state constitution, when applied to a law
redistricting the state with a view to representation in Congress,
was not unconstitutional. Article I, § 4, plainly gives authority
to the state to legislate within the limitations therein named.
Such legislative action is entirely different from the requirement
of the Constitution as to the expression of assent or dissent to a
proposed amendment to the Constitution. In such expression, no
legislative action is authorized or required."
It clearly follows that there is nothing in Article I, § 4,
which precludes a state from providing that
Page 285 U. S. 373
legislative action in districting the state for congressional
elections shall be subject to the veto power of the governor as in
other cases of the exercise of the lawmaking power. Accordingly, in
this instance, the validity of House File No. 1456 cannot be
sustained by virtue of any authority conferred by the Federal
Constitution upon the Legislature of Minnesota to create
congressional districts independently of the participation of the
governor as required by the state constitution with respect to the
enactment of laws.
The further question has been presented whether the Act of
Congress of August 8, 1911, is still in force. The state court held
that it was not, that it had been wholly replaced by the Act of
June 18, 1929. Sections 1 and 2 of the former Act, making specific
provision for the apportionment under the thirteenth census, are,
of course, superseded; the present question relates to the other
sections. These have not been expressly repealed. The Act of 1929
repeals "all other laws and parts of laws" that are inconsistent
with its provisions (§ 21). The petitioner urges that this Act
contains nothing inconsistent with §§ 3, 4, and 5 [
Footnote 8] of the Act of 1911, and the only
question is whether these sections, by their very terms, have
ceased to be effective. It is pointed out that the provisions of
the Act of 1911 were carried into the United States Code. U.S.C.
Tit. 2, §§ 2-5. Inclusion in the Code does not operate as a
reenactment; it establishes "
prima facie the laws of the
United States, general and permanent in their nature, in force on
the 7th day of December, 1925."
Act of June 30, 1926, c. 712, 44 Stat. 777. While §§ 3 and 4 of
the Act of 1911 expressly referred to "this apportionment" (the one
made by that Act), the argument is pressed that they contain
provisions setting forth a general policy which was intended to
apply
Page 285 U. S. 374
to the future creation of congressional districts, and the
election of representatives, until Congress should provide
otherwise.
There are three classes of states with respect to the number of
representatives under the present apportionment pursuant to the Act
of 1929, (1) where the number remains the same, (2) where it is
increased, and (3) where it is decreased. In states where the
number of representatives remains the same, and the districts are
unchanged, no question is presented; there is nothing inconsistent
with any of the requirements of the Congress in proceeding with the
election of representatives in such states in the same manner as
heretofore. Section 4 of the Act of 1911 provided that, in case of
an increase in the number of representatives in any state,
"such additional representative or representatives shall be
elected by the state at large and the other representatives by the
districts now prescribed by law"
until such state shall be redistricted. The Constitution itself
provides in Article I, § 2, that "The house of representatives
shall be composed of members chosen every second year by the people
of the several states," and we are of the opinion that, under this
provision, in the absence of the creation of new districts,
additional representatives allotted to a state under the present
reapportionment would appropriately be elected by the state at
large. Such a course, with the election of the other
representatives in the existing districts until a redistricting act
was passed, would present no inconsistency with any policy declared
in the Act of 1911.
Where, as in the case of Minnesota, the number of
representatives has been decreased, there is a different situation,
as existing districts are not at all adapted to the new
apportionment. It follows that, in such a case, unless and until
new districts are created, all representatives allotted to the
state must be elected by the state at
Page 285 U. S. 375
large. That would be required, in the absence of a redistricting
act, in order to afford the representation to which the state is
constitutionally entitled, and the general provisions of the Act of
1911 cannot be regarded as intended to have a different import.
This conclusion disposes of all the questions properly before
the Court. Questions in relation to the application of the
standards defined in § 3 of the Act of 1911 to a redistricting
statute, if such a statute should hereafter be enacted, are wholly
abstract. The judgment is reversed, and the cause is remanded for
further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
Reversed.
MR. JUSTICE CARDOZO took no part in the consideration and
decision of this case.
[
Footnote 1]
The Act of August 8, 1911, c. 5, 37 Stat. 13, provided for the
apportionment of representatives in Congress among the several
states under the thirteenth census. After fixing the total number
of representatives and their apportionment in §§ 1 and 2, the Act
provided as follows:
"Sec. 3. That, in each state entitled under this apportionment
to more than one representative, the representatives to the
Sixty-third and each subsequent Congress shall be elected by
districts composed of a contiguous and compact territory, and
containing as nearly as practicable an equal number of inhabitants.
The said districts shall be equal to the number of representatives
to which such state may be entitled in Congress, no district
electing more than one representative."
"Sec. 4. That, in case of an increase in the number of
representatives in any state under this apportionment, such
additional representative or representatives shall be elected by
the state at large and the other representatives by the districts
now prescribed by law until such state shall be redistricted in the
manner provided by the laws thereof and in accordance with the
rules enumerated in § three of this Act, and if there be no charge
in the number of representatives from a state, the representatives
thereof shall be elected from the districts now prescribed by law
until such state shall be redistricted as herein prescribed."
"Sec. 5. That candidates for representative or representatives
to be elected at large in any state shall be nominated in the same
manner as candidates for governor, unless otherwise provided by the
laws of such state."
[
Footnote 2]
See Laws of Minnesota 1858, c. 83; 1872, c. 21; 1881,
c. 128; 1891, c. 3; 1901, c. 92; 1913, c. 513; 1929, c. 64.
[
Footnote 3]
The Constitution of Massachusetts of 1780 provided for the
governor's veto of "bills" or "resolves." Part Second, Chap. I, §
1, Art. II; 3 Thorpe, American Charters, Constitutions and Organic
Laws, 1893, 1894. The council of revision in New York, which had
the veto power under the first Constitution of 1777 (Art. III), was
composed of the governor, the chancellor, and the judges of the
supreme court, "or any two of them, together with the governor."
The veto power was given to the governor alone by the Constitution
of 1821. Article I, § 12, 3 Thorpe,
op. cit. 2628, 2641,
2642. In South Carolina, the veto power had been given by the
Constitution of 1776 to the "president" (Art. VII), but, under the
Constitution of 1778, the governor had no veto power;
see
Art. XIV, 6 Thorpe,
op. cit., 3244, 3252.
[
Footnote 4]
Const. Mass. 1780; 3 Thorpe,
op. cit. 1893, 1894, Mass.
Resolves, Oct.Nov., 1788, c. XLIX, p. 52; May-June, 1792, c. LXIX,
p. 23.
[
Footnote 5]
New York, Laws of 1789, c. 11; 1797, c. 62; 1802, c. 72.
See
Koenig v. Flynn, 258 N.Y. 292.
[
Footnote 6]
Georgia, Const. 1789, art. 2, § 10, 2 Thorpe,
op. cit.
788; Pennsylvania, Const. 1790, Art. I, § 22, 5 Thorpe,
op.
cit., 3094; New Hampshire, Const. 1792; Part Second, § 44, 4
Thorpe,
op. cit., 2482; Kentucky, Const. 1792, Art. I, §
28, 3 Thorpe,
op. cit., 1267. In Vermont, the Constitution
of 1793 (chapter 2, § 16) gave the governor and council a power of
suspension similar to that for which provision had been made in the
Constitution of 1786 (Chap. II, § 14) before the admission of
Vermont to the Union.
See also Constitution of 1777 (Chap.
II, § 14), 6 Thorpe,
op. cit., 3744, 3757, 3767.
[
Footnote 7]
See note 1
[
Footnote 8]
See note 1