l. The provisions of the Mineral Leasing Act of February 25,
1920, plainly indicate that Congress held in mind the distinction
between a positive mandate to the Secretary and permission to take
certain action in his discretion; also, the difference between
applicants for mere privileges and those persons who, because of
expenditures, or otherwise, deserved special consideration. P.
283 U. S.
418.
2. Section 13 of this Act, by which the Secretary is
"authorized" to grant prospecting permits looking to the discovery
and exploitation of oil deposits belonging to the United States, is
susceptible of the construction that it leaves the Secretary a
discretion to reject, or refuse to receive, all applications for
such permits, by a general order made in pursuance of a policy of
the President to conserve such deposits. P.
283 U. S.
419.
Page 283 U. S. 415
So
held in view of the words of the section; the
belief, widely accepted when the Act was passed, that decline of
petroleum production in the United States was imminent; the
enormous increase that actually occurred, and the present surplus;
the general powers of the Secretary over the public lands, and the
right of the President to withdraw them from private
appropriation.
3. Mandamus will issue only where the duty to be performed is
ministerial and the obligation to act peremptory, and plainly
defined. P.
283 U. S. 420.
46 F.2d 217, 224 affirmed.
Certiorari,
post, p. 811, to review judgments reversing
judgments for mandamus, in suits brought against the Secretary of
the Interior and the Commissioner of the General Land Office by
applicants for permits to prospect for oil and gas.
Page 283 U. S. 416
MR. JUSTICE McREYNOLDS delivered the opinion of the Court.
All these causes turn on the same point of law; the records
disclose facts not materially different; one opinion will
suffice.
The Act of Congress approved February 25, 1920, 41 Stat. 437,
intended to promote certain mining operations, contains
thirty-eight sections.
"Section 1. That deposits of coal, phosphate, sodium, oil, oil
shale, or gas, and lands containing such deposits owned by the
United States, . . . shall be subject to disposition in the form
and manner provided by this Act. . . ."
"Sec. 13. That the Secretary of the Interior is hereby
authorized, under such necessary and proper rules and regulations
as he may prescribe, to grant to any applicant qualified under this
Act a prospecting permit, which shall give the exclusive right, for
a period not exceeding two years, to prospect for oil or gas upon
not to exceed two thousand five hundred and sixty acres of land
wherein such deposits belong to the United States and are not
within any known geological structure of a producing oil or gas
field upon condition that the permittee shall begin drilling
operations within six months from the date of the permit, and
shall, within one year from and after the date of permit, drill one
or more wells for oil or gas to a depth of not less than five
hundred feet each, unless valuable deposits of oil or gas shall be
sooner discovered, and shall, within two years from date of the
permit, drill for oil or
Page 283 U. S. 417
gas to an aggregate depth of not less than two thousand feet
unless valuable deposits of oil or gas shall be sooner discovered.
. . ."
"Sec. 14. That, upon establishing to the satisfaction of the
Secretary of the Interior that valuable deposits of oil or gas have
been discovered within the limits of the land embraced in any
permit, the permittee shall be entitled to a lease for one-fourth
of the land embraced in the prospecting permit. . . ."
Section 9 authorizes the Secretary to lease lands containing
deposits of phosphates under such general regulation as he may
adopt. By § 17, unappropriated deposits of oil or gas situated
within the known geologic structure of a producing oil or gas field
"may be leased by the Secretary of the Interior to the highest
responsible bidder, . . ." such leases to be conditioned upon the
payment by the lessee of such bonus as may be accepted and of such
royalty as may be fixed in the lease, etc. Section 21 authorizes
the Secretary to lease deposits of oil shale under such regulations
as he may prescribe, for indefinite periods.
Section 2 declares that the Secretary
"is authorized to, and, upon the petition of any qualified
applicant, shall, divide any of the coal lands or the deposits of
coal, classified and unclassified, owned by the United States,
outside of the Territory of Alaska, into leasing tracts of forty
acres each, . . ."
and thereafter
"shall, in his discretion, upon the request of any qualified
applicant or on his own motion, from time to time, offer such lands
or deposits of coal for leasing, and shall award leases thereon by
competitive bidding or by such other methods as he may by general
regulations adopt, to any qualified applicant. . . ."
"Sec. 22. That any
bona fide occupant or claimant of
oil or gas bearing lands in the Territory of Alaska, who, or whose
predecessors in interest, prior to withdrawal had
Page 283 U. S. 418
complied otherwise with the requirements of the mining laws, but
had made no discovery of oil or gas in wells and who prior to
withdrawal had made substantial improvements for the discovery of
oil or gas on or for each location or had prior to the passage of
this Act expended not less than $250 in improvements on or for each
location shall be entitled, upon relinquishment or surrender to the
United States within one year from the date of this Act, or within
six months after final denial or withdrawal of application for
patent, to a prospecting permit or permits, lease or leases, under
this Act covering such lands. . . ."
Section 23. That the Secretary
"is hereby authorized and directed, under such rules and
regulations as he may prescribe, to grant to any qualified
applicant a prospecting permit which shall give the exclusive right
to prospect for chlorides, sulphates, carbonates, borates,
silicates, or nitrates of sodium. . . ."
These provisions quite plainly indicate that Congress held in
mind the distinction between a positive mandate to the Secretary
and permission to take certain action in his discretion. Also, the
difference between applicants for mere privileges and those persons
who, because of expenditures, or otherwise, deserved special
consideration.
The petitioners, acting separately and as directed by the
general rules and regulations, either filed or sought to file
applications for permits to prospect for oil and gas under § 13. In
order to effectuate the conservation policy of the President, the
Secretary of the Interior, by a general order, either rejected or
refused to receive their applications. Thereupon these proceedings
were begun in the Supreme Court, District of Columbia. They seek
writs of mandamus to compel the Secretary to receive or reinstate
the applications and act upon each according to its merits.
Page 283 U. S. 419
Answering, the Secretary admitted issuance of the general order
and action thereunder. All this he claimed was done in pursuance of
the authority vested in him by law. The supreme court of the
district held against him, and ordered receipt or reinstatement of
petitioner's applications followed by definite action thereon. The
court of appeals reached a different conclusion, and reversed the
judgments.
The answers aver
"that under the Act [1920], the granting of a prospecting permit
for oil and gas is discretionary with the Secretary of the
Interior, and any application may be granted or denied, either in
part or in its entirety, as the facts may be deemed to
warrant."
Having examined the Act, we cannot say that, by any clear and
indisputable language, it refutes his position. Certainly there is
ground for a plausible, if not conclusive, argument that, so far as
it relates to the leasing of oil lands, it goes no further than to
empower the Secretary to execute leases which, exercising a
reasonable discretion, he may think would promote the public
welfare.
It is unnecessary now to declare the precise meaning of the
relevant provisions of the Act. It was passed when, according to a
widely accepted view, decline of petroleum production in the United
States was imminent. In fact, there has been an enormous increase,
and a consequent troublesome surplus. Looking only at its words,
one may interpret § 13 as the Secretary says he did. And this
conclusion is aided by consideration of his general powers over the
public lands as guardian of the people, § 441, R.S.;
United
States v. Grimaud, 220 U. S. 506;
Williams v. United States, 138 U.
S. 514;
Knight v. U.S. Land
Assn., 142 U. S. 161;
also the right of the President to withdraw public lands from
private appropriation,
United States v. Midwest Oil Co.,
236 U. S. 459;
Withdrawal Act, 1910, 36 Stat. 847.
Page 283 U. S. 420
Under the established rule, the writ of mandamus cannot be made
to serve the purpose of an ordinary suit. It will issue only where
the duty to be performed is ministerial and the obligation to act
peremptory and plainly defined. The law must not only authorize the
demanded action, but require it; the duty must be clear and
indisputable.
United States ex rel. International Contracting
Co. v. Lamont, 155 U. S. 303,
155 U. S. 308;
Louisiana v. McAdoo, 234 U. S. 627,
234 U. S. 633;
Work v. Rives, 267 U. S. 175.
The judgments under review must be
Affirmed.