1. Where creditors have obtained and docketed judgments
constituting liens on the real estate of their debtor, and have
instituted a creditors' suit in a state court to marshal the liens
and enforce them by a sale of the real estate, the bankruptcy of
the debtor, occurring more than four months after the institution
of the creditors' suit, does not oust the state court of
jurisdiction, nor vest in the court of bankruptcy power to enjoin
further proceedings in the state court. Pp.
283 U. S. 320,
283 U. S.
323.
2. The state court proceeding described in the certificate in
this case, when examined with the West Virginia statutes upon which
it is based, is found to be a suit by a judgment creditor for the
enforcement of the lien of his judgment on the debtor's real
estate,
Page 283 U. S. 319
in which all liens of creditors on such real estate are
ascertained and marshalled and the realty sold for their
satisfaction. It is not of the class of proceedings under state
insolvency laws which are suspended by the federal Bankruptcy Law.
P.
283 U. S.
327.
Response to a question certified, upon an appeal to the court
below from an order of the district court, in bankruptcy. The order
enjoined commissioners of a West Virginia court from selling
certain real estate pursuant to its decree.
MR. JUSTICE ROBERTS delivered the opinion of the Court.
The District Court for Southern West Virginia entered an order
in the bankruptcy of the Fall Branch Coal Company enjoining
commissioners appointed by a West Virginia state court from
proceeding with the sale of certain real estate of the bankrupt
pursuant to a decree of that court. The petitioners were the
trustee in bankruptcy and two mortgagees.
The petition alleged that the commissioners were advertising for
sale only the property of the bankrupt in West Virginia, that it
would be advantageous to all parties to have this property sold
with property of the bankrupt situate in Kentucky, and that the
bankruptcy court had exclusive jurisdiction to make the sale. The
respondents in their answer denied the right of the district court
to enjoin the proceedings in the state court, and appealed from an
order awarding an injunction.
April 11, 1927, one Alley obtained judgment against the coal
company in the Circuit Court of Mingo County, West Virginia, which
was docketed May 5, 1927, and thus became
Page 283 U. S. 320
a lien on its estate in that county. February 20, 1928, Alley
filed in the same court a judgment creditors' suit against the coal
company, and made parties thereto all creditors having liens
against its real estate, including the two mortgagees who were
co-petitioners with the trustee in the bankruptcy court. In his
bill, he prayed that the liens and assets be marshalled and that
the company's real estate be sold and the proceeds distributed
among the lien claimants according to their respective rights. The
cause was duly matured, and, at April Term, 1928, was referred to a
commissioner in chancery to report the real estate owned by the
debtor and the liens thereon. At the July Term, 1928, the
commissioner presented his report, and thereupon the respondents
were appointed to make sale of the property. August 4, 1928,
sixteen months after rendition of Alley's judgment, and five and
one-half months after the filing of the creditors' bill, the coal
company filed its voluntary petition in bankruptcy, and on October
11, 1928, while the commissioners of the state court were
proceeding to carry out its order of sale, the petition was filed
to enjoin them from further proceeding.
Upon these facts, the question certified is:
Where creditors have obtained and docketed judgments
constituting liens on the real estate of defendant, and have
instituted a creditors' suit in a state court to marshal and
enforce the liens and sell the real estate subject thereto, does
the bankruptcy of defendant occurring more than four months after
the institution of the creditors' suit oust the state court of
jurisdiction, or vest in the court of bankruptcy power to enjoin
further proceedings in the state court?
The purpose of the Bankruptcy Act, passed pursuant to the power
of Congress to establish a uniform system of bankruptcy throughout
the United States, is to place the property of the bankrupt,
wherever found, under the control of the court, for equal
distribution among the
Page 283 U. S. 321
creditors. The filing of the petition is an assertion of
jurisdiction with a view to the determination of the status of the
bankrupt and a settlement and distribution of his estate. This
jurisdiction is exclusive within the field defined by the law, and
is so far
in rem that the estate is regarded as
in
custodia legis from the filing of the petition.
Acme
Harvester Co. v. Beekman Lumber Co., 222 U.
S. 300. It follows that liens cannot thereafter be
obtained nor proceedings be had in other courts to reach the
property, the district court having acquired the exclusive right to
administer all property in the bankrupt's possession.
Lazarus,
Michel & Lazarus v. Prentice, 234 U.
S. 263;
White v. Schloerb, 178 U.
S. 542;
Murphy v. John Hofman Co., 211 U.
S. 562;
United States Fidelity & G. Co. v.
Bray, 225 U. S. 205;
Hebert v. Crawford, 228 U. S. 204. It
may inquire into the validity of liens, marshal them, and control
their enforcement and liquidation.
Isaacs v. Hobbs Tie &
Timber Co., 282 U. S. 734, and
authorities cited;
Whitney v. Wenman, 198 U.
S. 539; Remington, Bankruptcy (3d ed.) § 2472.
Though a lien be not discharged by bankruptcy, its owner may
not, without the bankruptcy court's permission, institute
proceedings in a state court to enforce it, since his so doing
might interfere with the orderly administration of the estate.
Thus, a mortgagee will be restrained from instituting or proceeding
further in a foreclosure action, begun after the date of the
petition in bankruptcy. [
Footnote
1] And a creditor holding a valid judgment
Page 283 U. S. 322
more than four months old will be enjoined from enforcing its
lien by suit brought after the date of the petition. [
Footnote 2] And as the lien created by a
judgment entered within four months in avoided, the court of
bankruptcy has jurisdiction to administer the property regardless
of the lien, and will restrain the prosecution of an action to
enforce it. [
Footnote 3]
The bankruptcy law contains no express provision preserving
liens acquired by legal proceedings more than four months before
the petition is filed. But it is clearly implied that they shall be
saved from the operation of the law, for § 67(f) [
Footnote 4] voids only liens obtained by
legal proceedings within that period. It has consequently been held
that those acquired earlier, if valid under state law, are
preserved, and will be accorded priority by the bankruptcy court in
distribution of the estate, in accordance with applicable local
law. [
Footnote 5]
There is no dispute concerning these propositions. Appellants,
however, assert that the jurisdiction in bankruptcy to ascertain,
marshal, and enforce liens is not exclusive, but concurrent with
that of other courts competent to that end, if the liens in
question are not discharged but recognized as valid in bankruptcy,
and that the rule of comity is applicable that the court first
lawfully taking jurisdiction shall retain it.
Wabash R.
Co. v.
Page 283 U. S. 323
Adelbert College, 208 U. S. 38;
Harkin v. Brundage, 276 U. S. 36. They
contend that, when the petition was filed in this case, the state
court was proceeding in a suit within its jurisdiction and had
taken possession of the
res for the purpose of enforcing
such a lien.
The certificate states that the judgment of the plaintiff in the
creditors' suit constituted a lien on real estate from a date
sixteen months prior to the initiation of the bankruptcy
proceeding. It is obvious that it and any other judgments involved
in that suit, and the mortgage liens which were to be marshalled in
it, including those of the two mortgagees who joined in the
petition for injunction against further action by the state court,
were valid notwithstanding the bankruptcy, because the creditors'
suit was filed five and one-half months before the petition in
bankruptcy, and all such other judgments and liens must then have
been in existence and matured, or they would not have been proper
subjects for the state court's action.
If appellants are correct in their contention that the
creditors' suit was no more than a proceeding to enforce liens
saved from discharge by the subsequent bankruptcy of the debtor, it
follows, as they claim, that the district court sitting in
bankruptcy had no power to enjoin that action.
In
Metcalf v. Barker, 187 U. S. 165,
Lesser Brothers were adjudged bankrupts on their own petition, on
May 12, 1899. They had, on October 2, 1896, being insolvent,
transferred all their property, partnership and individual, to
certain favored creditors. On October 22, 1896, and October 29,
1896, Metcalf recovered judgments in the Supreme Court of the New
York against the Lessers, upon which executions were issued and
returned unsatisfied. On December 17, 1896, Metcalf commenced a
judgment creditors' action in the Supreme Court of New York, which
came to trial on December 17, 1897, as a result
Page 283 U. S. 324
whereof the transfers were adjudged fraudulent and void as to
plaintiff. 22 Misc.Rep. 664, 50 N.Y.S. 1060. The transfers had
involved both personal property and real estate. The judgment of
the court set aside the transfers of personal property and of the
real estate in favor of the plaintiff. Meantime, receivers had been
appointed for the Lessers, and the judgment of the Supreme Court
determined that the tangible property and its proceeds then in the
hands of the receivers, and certain claims by the receivers, were
to be administered by them for the benefit of the creditors of the
partnership, including Metcalf, while the real estate involved
became subject to the lien of the judgments of Metcalf as of
October 22 and 29, 1896.
From this judgment there were appeals, as a result of which the
decree in favor of Metcalf did not become final until March 12,
1900. On March 8, 1900, the trustee in bankruptcy procured from the
United States district court an order on Metcalf to show cause why
an injunction should not issue enjoining him from taking any
further proceedings under any judgment in the creditors' action.
Objection was made to the jurisdiction of the court, which was
overruled, and the injunction made permanent. Metcalf presented a
petition to revise to the circuit court of appeals, which certified
to this Court certain questions, amongst others, whether the
district court had jurisdiction to make the injunction order, and
whether Metcalf, by the commencement of the creditors' action,
acquired a lien on the property of the bankrupts superior to the
title of the trustee. This Court answered that the district court
had no jurisdiction, and that Metcalf did acquire such a lien.
The bill was a technical creditors' bill; its purpose was to
subject equitable assets to the lien of a judgment which the
judgment did not bind at law. This Court held that the lien when
established related back to the date of the filing of the bill,
which was much more than four months
Page 283 U. S. 325
before the initiation of the cause in bankruptcy. It was urged
that, at the date of bankruptcy, the claim was contingent and was
only an equitable lien, and that, in truth and in substance, the
judgment was recovered within four months of bankruptcy, and under
§ 67(f), must be declared null and void. This Court overruled the
contention, quoted § 67(f), and said (p.
187 U. S.
174):
"In our opinion, the conclusion to be drawn from this language
is that it is the lien created by a levy, or a judgment, or an an
attachment, or otherwise, that is invalidated, and that, where the
lien is obtained more than four months prior to the filing of the
petition, it is not only not to be deemed to be null and void on
adjudication, but its validity is recognized. . . . A judgment or
decree in enforcement of an otherwise valid preexisting lien is not
the judgment denounced by the statute, which is plainly confined to
judgments creating liens."
In
Clarke v. Larrenmore, 188 U.
S. 486, a judgment was recovered, but did not constitute
a lien on the debtor's personal property. Within four months prior
to the filing of a bankruptcy petition, the judgment creditor
issued execution under which levy was made on the debtor's goods.
It was held that the levy and the sale thereunder were avoided. The
Court said:
"The judgment in favor of petitioner against Kenney was not like
that in
Metcalf Bros. v. Barker, . . . one giving effect
to a lien theretofore existing, but one which, with the levy of an
execution issued thereon, created the lien. . . ."
In
Globe Bank & Trust Co. v. Martin, 236 U.
S. 288, the Court said:
"The difference, having the provisions of the act in view,
between the beginning of a proceeding to assert liens that existed
more than four months before the filing of the petition in
bankruptcy, and the attempt to create them by attachment and other
proceedings within four months, has been recognized in decisions of
this Court [citing
Metcalf v. Barker]. "
Page 283 U. S. 326
Following these cases, the federal courts have with practical
unanimity held that, where a judgment which constitutes a lien on
the debtor's real estate is recovered more than four months prior
to the filing of the petition, the bankruptcy court is without
jurisdiction to enjoin the prosecution of the creditor's action,
instituted prior to the filing of a petition in bankruptcy, to
bring about a judicial sale of the real estate. [
Footnote 6]
Page 283 U. S. 327
The trustee in bankruptcy may intervene in such suits of protect
the interests of the estate. [
Footnote 7]
It is clear that, if the action in the state court was merely in
the nature of an execution or proceeding to obtain the avails of
the judgment lien, it should not have been enjoined by the district
court.
The appellees, however, insist that the purpose and function of
the creditors' bill was a general disposition and distribution of
the debtor's property; that it was a winding up proceeding pursuant
to state law, and was therefore superseded by the bankruptcy. They
invoke the settled rule that state insolvency laws which are
tantamount to bankruptcy because they provide for an administration
of the debtor's assets and a winding up of his affairs similar to
that provided by the national act are suspended while the latter
remains in force, and proceedings under them are utterly null and
void, whether commenced within four months of the filing of a
petition in bankruptcy or before.
Sturges v.
Crowninshield, 4 Wheat. 122;
Mayer v.
Hellman, 91 U. S. 496;
Hanover Nat. Bank v. Moyses, 186 U.
S. 181;
Miller v. New Orleans Acid & Fertilizer
Co., 211 U. S. 496;
Stellwagen v. Clum, 245 U. S. 605;
International Shoe Co. v. Pinkus, 278 U.
S. 261.
It was pointed out in
Stellwagen v. Clum, supra, that
state laws which provide for sale and distribution of a debtor's
property may not amount to insolvency laws, and it was there held
that such laws, if not inconsistent with the administration of the
bankruptcy act, are available to litigants. Appellees must
therefore show that the
Page 283 U. S. 328
statutory action in the state court is in fact an insolvency
proceeding. The certificate states no facts which lead to such a
conclusion, nor does it so denominate the creditors' suit.
Reference to the statutes of West Virginia, of which we take
judicial notice, demonstrates that it is not in that category.
In that state, a judgment is a lien on the debtor's real estate
as against all except
bona fide purchasers for value
without notice, and as against the latter from the date of
docketing it in the county where the land lies. [
Footnote 8] The debtor's real estate cannot
be sold under execution.
In re McGraw, 254 F. 442. The
plaintiff must resort for enforcement of his judgment against real
estate to such a proceeding as is described in the certificate.
[
Footnote 9] He may do so
without exhausting his legal remedies, as against personal
property. [
Footnote 10] The
statute provides for a course of procedure such as is described in
the certificate -- namely, that the liens and the debtor's real
estate shall be determined by a commissioner appointed by the court
and, if
Page 283 U. S. 329
the claims which he reports be not paid, a decree shall be made
for a sale of the real estate subject to the liens so far as may be
necessary to pay them according to their priorities, if any. If a
lien-holder, after notice has been given of the proceeding as
required by the statute, does not appear and present his claims, he
is barred from participation except that, if a surplus remain after
the payment of claims presented, he may share in such surplus upon
proving his claim at any time before final decree. There is also a
provision for the presentation and participation of lien claims
where judgment has been recovered before final decree in the
creditors' action. This statute says nothing about a distribution
of assets amongst general creditors. It contains no provision that
lien claims presented which cannot be paid because the proceeds of
the sale are insufficient shall be wiped out as debts of the
defendant. It does not purport to discharge the debtor from his
indebtedness generally. It is merely a proceeding in equity to do
what would be done by a sheriff or marshal under an appropriate
writ for the sale of real estate in execution at law.
In re
McGraw, supra. Such officer, upon receiving the proceeds of a
judicial sale, would, under the supervision of the court, pay them
to those whose liens were discharged by the sale. He would marshal
the liens against the proceeds precisely as this statute directs
the chancellor to do. The act is in no sense an insolvency statute,
and a proceeding thereunder is not therefore avoided by the
adjudication of the debtor as a bankrupt. On the contrary, it is a
mere proceeding to enforce a valid lien or liens against the real
estate bound thereby, and falls within the rule announced in
Metcalf v. Barker, supra. [
Footnote 11] This is the view of the Supreme Court
Page 283 U. S. 330
of West Virginia, which has held that the action is merely one
to enforce liens, and that, where the bankruptcy of the debtor
occurred six months after its institution, it need not be stayed,
since the state court which had first acquired jurisdiction was
entitled to proceed to final decree.
Abney-Barnes Co. v.
Davy-Pocahontas Coal Co., 83 W.Va. 292, 98 S.E. 298.
It is suggested that the commissioners appointed by the state
court were in effect receivers, and it was stated in argument that
they did not qualify by giving bond until within four months of the
filing of the petition in bankruptcy, and that therefore the state
court action should be enjoined and the property taken into
possession of the bankruptcy court. But, as above said, the statute
of West Virginia merely substitutes these commissioners for the
usual judicial officer who makes a sale and reports the result
thereof to the court. [
Footnote
12]
Assuming them to be receivers, their function is not that of an
officer charged with winding up the affairs of the debtor, such as
would cause a conflict with the bankruptcy law. [
Footnote 13] Moreover, we find nothing in
the certificate to the effect that the commissioners had not
qualified more than four months prior to the filing of the petition
in the bankruptcy court.
The appellees rely upon
In re Watts, 190 U. S.
1. But that case does not support their contentions.
It is sufficient
Page 283 U. S. 331
to say that there, a state court made an order appointing a
general receiver for a corporation. He proceeded to inventory and
appraise the assets of the debtor, asked for orders requiring the
creditors to prove their claims, and was proceeding to a complete
winding up. Within a month and a half after the appointment, a
petition in bankruptcy was filed. This Court said:
"We do not understand it to be contended that the passage of the
bankruptcy act, in itself, suspended the statute of Indiana in
relation to the appointment of receivers, but only that, when the
proceedings for such appointment took the form, as they did here,
of winding up the affairs of the insolvent corporation, the
proceedings in bankruptcy displaced those in the state court and
terminated the jurisdiction of the latter."
This was merely a statement of the well settled principle that a
general winding up receivership is tantamount to an insolvency
proceeding which will be superseded by bankruptcy, and,
a
fortiori, if, as in that case, the petition is filed within
four months of the appointment of the receiver. The language quoted
from that case by appellees respecting the paramount and exclusive
jurisdiction of the court of bankruptcy must be read in connection
with the facts on which it was predicated.
Most of the cases cited by the appellees to the effect that the
initiation of bankruptcy proceedings confers on the district court
jurisdiction to enjoin pending suits in state courts deal with the
situation where a lien was acquired within four months of the
filing of the petition, or where, after the filing of the petition,
an action was begun to enforce a lien valid in bankruptcy. As
heretofore noted, there are a few cases which have held that the
bankruptcy court may enjoin proceedings, brought prior to the
filing of the petition, to enforce valid liens which are more than
four months old at the date of bankruptcy; [
Footnote 14] but
Page 283 U. S. 332
these cases are contrary to the decisions of this Court and to
the great weight of federal authority.
The question is answered, "No."
[
Footnote 1]
Isaacs v. Hobbs Tie & Timber Co., supra; In re
Pittelikow, 92 F. 901;
In re Ball, 118 F. 672;
In
re Jersey Island Packing Co., 138 F. 625;
In re
Zehner, 193 F. 787;
In re Hasie, 206 F. 789;
George B. Matthews & Sons v. Webre Co., 213 F. 396,
aff'd sub. nom. Pugh v. Loisel, 219 F. 417,
cert.
denied, 238 U.S. 631;
McLoughlin v. Knop, 214 F. 260;
Cohen v. Nixon & Wright, 236 F. 407;
In re
Larkin, 252 F. 885;
In re North Star Ice & Coal
Co., 252 F. 301;
In re U.S. Chrysotile Asbestos Co.,
253 F. 294;
In re Oswegatchie Products Corp., 279 F. 547;
Brown Shoe Co. v. Wynne, 281 F. 807;
First Trust Co.
v. Baylor, 1 F.2d 24;
In re Dyer, 8 F.2d 376;
Allebach v. Thomas, 16 F.2d 853;
In re Holstein
Harvey, Inc., 26 F.2d 798.
[
Footnote 2]
In re L'Hommedieu, 146 F. 708;
In re Arden,
188 F. 475;
In re Schow, 213 F. 514.
[
Footnote 3]
Clarke v. Larremore, 188 U. S. 486;
In re Albright, 18 F.2d 591; Remington, Bankruptcy (3d
ed.) § 1905.
[
Footnote 4]
U.S.C. Tit. 11, § 107(f).
[
Footnote 5]
In re Wood, 95 F. 946;
In re L'Hommedieu, 146
F. 708;
In re Koslowski, 153 F. 823;
In re
Torchia, 185 F. 576;
In re Randolph, 187 F. 186;
In re Zeis, 245 F. 737;
In re Fraser, 261 F.
558.
[
Footnote 6]
White v. Thompson, 119 F. 868;
In re
Koslowski, 153 F. 823;
In re Pilcher & Son, 228
F. 13;
In re Brinn, 262 F. 527;
In re Maddox, 280
F. 227;
In re Thompson, 288 F. 385;
In re
Berlowe, 7 F.2d 898;
Wilkinson v. Goree, 18 F.2d 455;
In re Van Blokland, 20 F.2d 1016;
In re Conservative
Mtg. & Guaranty Co., 24 F.2d 38;
Whitney v.
Barrett, 28 F.2d 760.
Compare Blair v. Brailey, 221
F. 1;
Brown Shoe Co. v. Wynne, 281 F. 807.
See also
Hillyer v. LeRoy, 179 N.Y. 369, 72 N.E. 237.
Contra: In re
Baughman, 138 F. 742. It is also well settled that, where an
attachment is levied more than four months prior to bankruptcy, the
prosecution of the claim to judgment and sale within the four
months will not be enjoined or the sale set aside.
In re
Blair, 108 F. 529;
In re Beaver Coal Co., 110 F. 630;
In re Snell, 125 F. 154;
In re Kane, 152 F. 587;
In re Crafts-Riordon Shoe Co., 185 F. 931;
In re
Shinn, 185 F. 990;
Yumet & Co. v. Delgado, 243 F.
519;
Griffin v. Lenhart, 266 F. 671;
In re
Norris, 283 F. 860;
In re Houtman, 287 F. 251;
In
re Thompson, 288 F. 385;
Gatell v. Millian, 2 F.2d
365.
Contra: In re U.S. Graphite Co., 161 F. 583. On
similar grounds, the bankruptcy courts refuse to enjoin the
prosecution of foreclosure proceedings under a mortgage, the lien
of which is preserved in bankruptcy, if initiated prior to the date
of the petition.
Eyster v. Gaff, 91 U. S.
521;
In re Gerdes, 102 F. 318;
Carling v.
Seymour Lumber Co., 113 F. 483;
In re McKane, 152 F.
733;
Sample v. Beasley, 158 F. 607;
In re
Pennell, 159 F. 500;
In re Rohrer, 177 F. 381;
In
re Wagner's Estate, 206 F. 364;
In re Schmidt, 224 F.
814;
American Trust & Sav. Bank v. Ruppe, 237 F. 581;
Duncan v. Girand, 276 F. 554;
Louisville Realty Co. v.
Johnson, 290 F. 176;
In re Iroquois Utilities, Inc.,
297 F. 397;
Ft. Dearborn Trust & Sav. Bank v. Smalley,
298 F. 45;
In re Smith, 3 F.2d 40;
In re Gillette Realty Co., 15 F.2d 193;
In re
Hurlock, 23 F.2d
500;
In re Simpson, 31 F.2d 317;
Bushong v.
Theard, 37 F.2d 690,
cert. denied, 281 U.S. 763;
In re Marts, 38 F.2d 283.
Contra: In re Dana, 167
F. 529;
In re Kaplan, 144 F. 159;
First Savings Bank
v. Butler, 282 F. 866.
[
Footnote 7]
Section 11(b), U.S.C. Tit. 11, § 29;
In re Porter, 109
F. 111;
In re New England Breeders' Club, 175 F. 501;
In re Kearney Bros., 184 F. 190.
[
Footnote 8]
Code 1849, c. 186, § 6; Code 1860, c. 186, § 6; Code 1868, c.
139, § 5; 1882, c. 126, § 5; Code 1923, c. 139, § 5; Code 1931, §
38-3-6;
In re McGraw, 254 F. 442. And execution is not
needed to make the judgment such a lien.
Maxwell v.
Leeson, 50 W.Va. 361, 40 S.E. 420.
[
Footnote 9]
"The lien of a judgment may be enforced in a court of equity
after an execution or
fieri facias thereon has been duly
returned to the office of the court or to the justice from which it
issued showing by the return thereon that no property could be
found from which such execution could be made:
Provided,
That such lien may be enforced in equity without such return when
an execution or
fieri facias has not issued within two
years from the date of the judgment."
Code 1849 c. 186, § 9; Code 1860, c. 186, § 9; Code 1868, c.
139, § 8; 1872, c. 30; 1882, c. 126, § 7; 1891, c. 95, § 7; Code
1923, c. 139, § 7; Code 1931, § 38-3-9.
[
Footnote 10]
Price v. Thrash, 30 Grat. 515. (The statutory provision
of West Virginia is taken from that of Virginia: Code 1849, p. 709,
c. 186, § 9.)
[
Footnote 11]
The bill in
Metcalf v. Barker was a true creditors'
bill, seeking to make available to a judgment creditor assets which
could not be reached by an execution at law.
Jones v.
Green, 1 Wall. 330;
Dunphy v.
Kleinschmidt, 11 Wall. 610,
78 U. S. 614;
Taylor v. Bowker, 111 U. S. 110,
111 U. S. 116;
National Tube Works Co. v. Ballou, 146 U.
S. 517. The bill in this case assumes the existence of
the lien on the property and is a mere measure to enforce it.
[
Footnote 12]
Code 1860, c. 178; Acts 1882, c. 142; 1899, c. 49; 1903, c. 15;
1915, c. 76.Code 1923, c. 132; Code 1931, § 55-12-1.
See In re
McGraw, supra.
[
Footnote 13]
See In re Smith, 92 F. 135;
In re Lengert Wagon
Co., 110 F. 927;
In re Storck Lumber Co., 114 F. 360;
In re F. A. Hall Co., 121 F. 992;
In re Salmon &
Salmon, 143 F. 395;
In re Weedman Stave Co., 199 F.
948.
[
Footnote 14]
See Note 6
supra.