1. A negro, about to be tried for the murder of a white man, is
entitled to have the jurors asked on their
voir dire
whether they have any racial prejudice that would prevent a fair
and impartial verdict. P.
283 U. S. 311
et seq.
2. A request for such an inquiry at a trial in the District of
Columbia (where prospective jurors are examined by the Court)
held sufficient, although informal. P.
283 U. S.
310.
47 F.2d 407 reversed.
Certiorari, 282 U.S. 836, to review a judgment affirming a
sentence for murder.
Page 283 U. S. 309
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE HUGHES delivered the opinion of the Court.
The petitioner was convicted, in the Supreme Court of the
District of Columbia, of murder in the first degree, and was
sentenced to death. The conviction was affirmed by the court of
appeals. This Court granted a writ of certiorari, limited to the
question raised by the exception to the ruling of the trial court
on the examination on
voir dire of prospective jurors.
The petitioner is a negro, and the deceased was a white man, a
member of the police force of the District. The record shows the
following proceedings on the examination of jurors on the
voir
dire:
The court
"inquired if any of them knew the defendant, Alfred Scott
Aldridge, or his counsel, or any of the witnesses whose names have
been called. The court further inquired if any of the prospective
jurors knew any of the facts in the case or if any of them ever
remembered having read of it in the newspaper, or if they had any
prejudice or bias against circumstantial evidence, or if any of the
prospective jurors had any conscientious scruples against capital
punishment. The court further inquired if any prospective juror had
formed or exercised an opinion as to the guilt or innocence of the
defendant, and further inquired whether any prospective juror was
acquainted with any member of the Metropolitan Police Force of the
District of Columbia, or more particularly those attached to the
third precinct. "
Page 283 U. S. 310
"Whereupon, with the consent of the court, counsel for the
parties hereto approached the bench and, in a whispered tone, out
of the hearing of the prospective jurors, the following took
place:"
"Mr. Reilly. At the last trial of this case, I understand there
was one woman on the jury who was a southerner, and who said that
the fact that the defendant was a negro and the deceased a white
man perhaps somewhat influenced her. I don't like to ask that
question in public, but --"
"The Court. I don't think that would be a proper question, any
more than to ask whether they like an Irishman or a Scotchman."
"Mr. Reilly. But it was brought to our attention so prominently.
It is a racial question --"
"The Court. It was not this jury."
"Mr. Reilly. No. But it was a racial question, and the question
came up --"
"The Court. I don't think that is proper."
"Mr. Reilly. Might I, out of an abundance of caution, note an
exception."
"The Court. Note an exception."
"Counsel for the defendant requested the court to allow the
record to show that the question relative to racial prejudice be
propounded to each and every prospective juror, with the exception
heretofore noted on behalf of the defendant."
In accordance with the existing practice, the questions to the
prospective jurors were put by the court, and the court had a broad
discretion as to the questions to be asked. The exercise of this
discretion, and the restriction upon inquiries at the request of
counsel, were subject to the essential demands of fairness. We find
no reason to doubt the nature of the inquiry which the counsel for
the accused desired. It was admitted at the bar of this Court that
the members of the jury were white. In asking
Page 283 U. S. 311
that the question relative to "racial prejudice" be put to the
jurors, it is only reasonable to assume that counsel referred not
to immaterial matters, but to such a prejudice as would disqualify
a juror because precluding an impartial verdict. The reference to
what counsel had heard as to the attitude of a juror on the
previous trial, where the jury had disagreed, indicated the purpose
of the question, which was clear enough to invite appropriate
action by the court. If the court had permitted the question, it
doubtless would have been properly qualified. But the court,
interrupting counsel, disposed of the inquiry summarily. The court
failed to ask any question which could be deemed to cover the
subject. If the defendant was entitled to have the jurors asked
whether they had any racial prejudice, by reason of the fact that
the defendant was a negro and the deceased a white man, which would
prevent their giving a fair and impartial verdict, we cannot
properly disregard the court's refusal merely because of the form
in which the inquiry was presented.
The propriety of such an inquiry has been generally recognized.
In
Pinder v. state, 27 Fla. 370, 8 So. 837, 838, the
counsel for the accused sought to have the jurors asked on their
voir dire:
"Could you give the defendant, who is a negro, as fair and
impartial a trial as you could a white man, and give him the same
advantage and protection as you would a white man upon the same
evidence?"
The Supreme Court of Florida held that the refusal of the court
to allow the question was error, and reversed the conviction.
[
Footnote 1] In
Hill v.
State, 112 Miss. 260, 72 So. 1003, the
Page 283 U. S. 312
Supreme Court of Mississippi held that it was fatal error to
refuse to permit a negro on trial for murder to put to prospective
jurors on their
voir dire the following question:
"Have you got any prejudice against the negro, as a negro, that
would induce you to return a verdict on less or slighter evidence
than you would return a verdict of guilty against a white man under
the same circumstances?"
The Supreme Court of North Carolina reversed the conviction of a
negro because of the refusal of the trial judge to permit a juror
to be asked if "he believed he could, as a juror, do equal and
impartial justice between the state and a colored man."
State
v. McAfee, 64 N.C. 339. [
Footnote 2]
See also
Page 283 U. S. 313
Fendrick v. State, 39 Tex.Cr.R. 147, 45 S.W. 589;
State v. Sanders, 103 S.C. 216, 88 S.E. 10.
The right to examine jurors on the
voir dire as to the
existence of a disqualifying state of mind has been upheld with
respect to other races than the black race, and in relation to
religious and other prejudices of a serious character.
Potter
v. State, 86 Tex.Cr.R. 380, 384, 216 S.W. 886;
People v.
Reyes, 5 Cal. 347, 349;
Watson v. Whitney, 23 Cal.
375, 379;
People v. Car Soy, 57 Cal. 102;
Horst v.
Silverman, 20 Wash. 233, 234, 55 P. 52. In
People v.
Reyes, supra, Mexicans were charged with assault with intent
to commit murder, and conviction was reversed because of the
refusal to allow questions to determine whether a prospective juror
was a member of the Know Nothing party, and whether he had taken
any oath or obligation which resulted in prejudice, or whether,
independent of such an oath, he entertained a prejudice which would
prevent him from giving the accused a fair trial. [
Footnote 3]
Page 283 U. S. 314
We do not overlook the reference of the court of appeals, in
support of the ruling of the trial court, to conditions in the
District of Columbia
"where the colored race is accorded all the privileges and
rights under the law that are afforded the white race, and
especially the right to practice in the courts, serve on the
jury,"
etc. But the question is not as to the civil privileges of the
negro, or as to the dominant sentiment of the community and the
general absence of any disqualifying prejudice, but as to the bias
of the particular jurors who are to try the accused. If in fact,
sharing the general sentiment, they were found to be impartial, no
harm would be done in permitting the question, but if any one of
them was shown to entertain a prejudice which would preclude his
rendering a fair verdict, a gross injustice would be perpetrated in
allowing him to sit. Despite the privileges accorded to the negro,
we do not think that it can be said that the possibility of such
prejudice is so remote [
Footnote
4] as to justify the risk in forbidding the inquiry. And this
risk becomes most grave when the issue is of life or death.
The argument is advanced on behalf of the government that it
would be detrimental to the administration of the
Page 283 U. S. 315
law in the courts of the United States to allow questions to
jurors as to racial or religious prejudices. We think that it would
be far more injurious to permit it to be thought that persons
entertaining a disqualifying prejudice were allowed to serve as
jurors and that inquiries designed to elicit the fact of
disqualification were barred. No surer way could be devised to
bring the processes of justice into disrepute.
We are of the opinion that the ruling of the trial court on the
voir dire was erroneous, and the judgment of conviction
must for this reason be reversed.
Judgment reversed.
[
Footnote 1]
In the
Pinder case,
supra, the court said:
"Though the question is not in express terms provided for in the
statute above cited [McClellan's Digest, § 10, p. 446], yet it was
a pertinent, and, as we think, proper, question to test fully the
existence of bias or prejudice in the minds of the jurors. It
sought to elicit a fact that was of the most vital import to the
defendant, and a fact, too, that, if existent, was locked up
entirely within the breasts of the jurors to whom the question was
propounded, a knowledge of the existence of which could only be
acquired by interrogating the juror himself. The answer to it, if
in the affirmative, could have worked no harm to the juror or to
anyone else, but would have done credit to the humanity and
intelligence of the juror, and would have satisfactorily exhibited
to the court and to the defendant his entire competency, so far as
the element of bias or prejudice was involved. But, if the answer
to it from the jurors had been in the negative, then we have no
hesitancy in saying that it would have shown them to be wholly
unfit and incompetent to sit upon the trial of a man of the negro
race, whose right to a trial by a fair and impartial jury is as
fully guarantied to him under our Constitution and laws as to the
whitest man in Christendom. And such incompetency asserts itself
with superadded force in such a case as this, where the life or
death of the defendant was the issue to tip the scale in the jury's
hands for adjustment."
[
Footnote 2]
In that case, the court said (at p. 340):
"It is essential to the purity of trial by jury that every juror
shall be free from bias. If his mind has been poisoned by prejudice
of any kind, whether resulting from reason or passion, he is unfit
to sit on a jury. Here, his Honor refused to allow a proper
question to be put to the juror in order to test his
qualifications. Suppose the question had been allowed, and the
juror had answered that the state of his feelings towards the
colored race was such that he could not show equal and impartial
justice between the state and the prisoner, especially in charges
of this character, it is at once seen that he would have been
grossly unfit to sit in the jury box."
The practice of permitting questions as to racial prejudice is
not confined to any section of the country, and this fact attests
the widespread sentiment that fairness demands that such inquiries
be allowed. Thus, in New York, on the trial of a negro for the
murder of his wife, who was white, a talesman, who had testified to
a disqualifying prejudice, was excluded by the court on its own
motion, and the court of appeals held that the exclusion was not
error, although in the absence of a challenge to the talesman by
either party.
People v. Decker, 157 N.Y. 186, 190, 51 N.E.
1018.
See also State v. Brown, 188 Mo. 451, 459, 460, 87
S.W. 519.
[
Footnote 3]
The court in that case said (at p. 349):
"As the juror best knows the condition of his own mind, no
satisfactory conclusion can be arrived at without resort to
himself. Applying this test, then, how is it possible to ascertain
whether he is prejudiced or not unless questions similar to the
foregoing are propounded to him? . . ."
"Prejudice being a state of mind more frequently founded in
passion than in reason, may exist with or without cause, and to ask
a person whether he is prejudiced or not against a party, and (if
the answer is affirmative) whether that prejudice is of such a
character as would lead him to deny the party a fair trial, is not
only the simplest method of ascertaining the state of his mind, but
is probably the only sure method of fathoming his thoughts and
feelings. If the person called had not taken an obligation which
would prejudice him against foreigners in such a manner as to
imperil their rights in a court of law, he could say so, and the
question and answer would be harmless. If, upon the other hand, he
had taken oaths, and was under obligations which influenced his
mind and feelings in such a manner as to deny to a foreigner an
impartial trial, he is grossly unfit to sit as a juror, and such
facts should be known."
[
Footnote 4]
For an illustration of a case where the suggestion of bias was
held to be too remote,
e.g., as to political affiliations,
see Connors v. United States, 158 U.
S. 408.
MR. JUSTICE McREYNOLDS, dissenting.
Our jurisdiction over this case is limited by § 391, Title 28,
U.S. Code, which provides:
"All United States courts shall have power to grant new trials,
in cases where there has been a trial by jury, for reasons for
which new trials have usually been granted in the courts of law. On
the hearing of any appeal, certiorari, writ of error, or motion for
a new trial, in any case, civil or criminal, the court shall give
judgment after an examination of the entire record before the
court, without regard to technical errors, defects, or exceptions
which do not affect the substantial rights of the parties."
The petitioner, a negro, killed a white policeman in the
District of Columbia. He was indicted, tried, and found guilty by a
jury. He moved for a new trial upon the ground, among others,
"that this Court committed error in refusing to examine the jury
on their
voir dire as to whether any juror may entertain
racial prejudice in a matter of homicide where the defendant is a
negro and the deceased a white policeman."
This was overruled, and sentence of death followed.
Upon appeal to the Court of Appeals for the District, the
following error, among others, was assigned:
"The
Page 283 U. S. 316
court's action in refusing the request of the defendant to
propound to the jury during the court's examination of the jury on
its
voir dire as to whether any juror may entertain racial
prejudice in the matter of a homicide where the defendant is a
negro and the deceased a white policeman."
Replying to this that court said:
"Counsel for defendant assigns as error the refusal of the court
to allow him to inquire of the prospective jurors on their
voir
dire whether they entertained racial prejudice in a case
wherein the defendant is a negro and the deceased a white man. We
had occasion to consider this same question in the case of
Crawford v. United States, 59 App.D.C. 356, 41 F.2d 979.
We have given the matter further careful consideration in this
case, and find no reason to recede from our former decision. In a
jurisdiction like the District of Columbia, where the colored race
is accorded all the privileges and rights under the law that are
afforded the white race, and especially the right to practice in
the courts, serve on the jury, etc., we are of the opinion that
there was no abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in
refusing to permit the question to be answered by the jurors."
This Court granted a certiorari to bring up the judgment of
affirmance, but limited review to the point raised by the quoted
assignment of error.
It appears that, while the trial judge was examining prospective
jurors on their
voir dire, counsel for the accused said to
him:
"At the last trial of this case. I understand there was one
woman on the jury who was a southerner, and who said that the fact
that the defendant was a negro and the deceased a white man perhaps
somewhat influenced her. I don't like to ask that question in
public."
The precise nature of "that question" is unknown to us. The
judge thought "that question" (whatever it was) improper, and
refused to ask it. Whereupon counsel noted an exception and
"requested the court to allow the
Page 283 U. S. 317
record to show that the question relative to racial prejudice be
propounded to each and every prospective juror, with the exception
heretofore noted on behalf of the defendant."
Solely because of the refusal of the trial judge to propound an
undisclosed question "relative to racial prejudice" (whatever that
may be), we are asked to upset a judgment approved by the judges of
both local courts who, it is fair to presume, understand conditions
in the District better than we do.
Nothing is revealed by the record which tends to show that any
juror entertained prejudice which might have impaired his ability
fairly to pass upon the issues. It is not even argued that,
considering the evidence presented, there was room for reasonable
doubt of guilt.
It does appear that counsel said he understood at a former trial
a female juror, a Southerner (whatever that may mean), declared
"the fact the defendant was a negro and the deceased a white man
perhaps somewhat influenced her." And that is the sum of the
information to be gathered from the record in respect of any "race
prejudice" which might have so distorted some juror's judgment as
to prevent honest and fair consideration.
How this unidentified woman juror voted, whether she was white
or black, whether her prepossessions were right or wrong or
materially different from those generally entertained by men of one
color towards those of another we cannot know. But "perhaps she was
somewhat influenced" by the fact that the dead man and the
defendant were of different color. Must we therefore decide that
"perhaps" and accordingly some member of the second jury failed to
act fairly, intelligently, and without due regard to his oath,
Two local courts could not conclude that there was adequate
reason for holding the accused man had suffered deprivation of any
substantial right through refusal by
Page 283 U. S. 318
the trial judge to ask prospective jurors something relative to
racial prejudice. And certainly I am unable to affirm that they
were wrong.
Section 391 of the U.S.Code, I think, was intended to prevent
escape of culprits from prompt deserved punishment in cases like
this. Congress had clear right to put the limitation on courts of
review and the enactment should be given effect according to its
purpose.
Unhappily, the enforcement of our criminal laws is scandalously
ineffective. Crimes of violence multiply; punishment walks lamely.
Courts ought not to increase the difficulties by magnifying
theoretical possibilities. It is their province to deal with
matters actual and material; to promote order and not to hinder it
by excessive theorizing of or by magnifying what in practice is not
really important.
I think the judgment below should be affirmed.