The National Motor Vehicle Theft Act, U.S. Title 18, § 408,
which punishes whoever transport, or causes to be transported, in
interstate or foreign commerce a motor vehicle knowing it to have
been stolen, and which defines "motor vehicle" as including "an
automobile, automobile truck, automobile wagon, motor cycle, or any
other self-propelled vehicle not designed for running on rails"
does not apply to aircraft. P.
283 U. S.
26.
43 F.2d 273 reversed.
Certiorari, 282 U.S. 835, to review a judgment affirming a
conviction under the Motor Vehicle Theft Act.
MR. JUSTICE HOLMES delivered the opinion of the Court.
The petitioner was convicted of transporting from Ottawa,
Illinois, to Guymon, Oklahoma, an airplane that he knew to have
been stolen, and was sentenced to serve three years' imprisonment
and to pay a fine of $2,000. The judgment was affirmed by the
Circuit Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. 43 F.2d 273. A writ
of certiorari was granted by this Court on the question whether the
National Motor Vehicle Theft Act applies to aircraft.
Page 283 U. S. 26
Act of October 29, 1919, c. 89, 41 Stat. 324, U.S.Code, Title
18, § 408. That Act provides:
"Sec. 2. That when used in this Act: (a) The term 'motor
vehicle' shall include an automobile, automobile truck, automobile
wagon, motor cycle, or any other self-propelled vehicle not
designed for running on rails."
"
* * * *"
"Sec. 3. That whoever shall transport or cause to be transported
in interstate or foreign commerce a motor vehicle, knowing the same
to have been stolen, shall be punished by a fine of not more than
$5,000, or by imprisonment of not more than five years, or
both."
Section 2 defines the motor vehicles of which the transportation
in interstate commerce is punished in Section 3. The question is
the meaning of the word "vehicle" in the phrase "any other
self-propelled vehicle not designed for running on rails." No doubt
etymologically it is possible to use the word to signify a
conveyance working on land, water or air, and sometimes legislation
extends the use in that direction --
e.g., land and air,
water being separately provided for, in the Tariff Act, September
21, 1922, c. 356, § 401(b), 42 Stat. 858, 948. But in everyday
speech, "vehicle" calls up the picture of a thing moving on land.
Thus, in Rev.Stats. § 4, intended, the Government suggests, rather
to enlarge than to restrict the definition, vehicle includes every
contrivance capable of being used "as a means of transportation on
land." And this is repeated, expressly excluding aircraft, in the
Tariff Act, June 17, 1930, c. 497, § 401(b), 46 Stat. 590, 708. So
here, the phrase under discussion calls up the popular picture.
For, after including automobile truck, automobile wagon, and motor
cycle, the words "any other self-propelled vehicle not designed for
running on rails" still indicate that a vehicle in the popular
sense -- that is, a vehicle running on land -- is the theme. It is
a vehicle that runs, not something, not commonly called a vehicle,
that flies. Airplanes were well known in 1919 when this statute was
passed, but it is admitted that they were not mentioned in the
reports or in the debates in Congress.
Page 283 U. S. 27
It is impossible to read words that so carefully enumerate the
different forms of motor vehicles and have no reference of any kind
to aircraft, as including airplanes under a term that usage more
and more precisely confines to a different class. The counsel for
the petitioner have shown that the phraseology of the statute as to
motor vehicles follows that of earlier statutes of Connecticut,
Delaware, Ohio, Michigan, and Missouri, not to mention the late
Regulations of Traffic for the District of Columbia, Title 6, c. 9,
§ 242, none of which can be supposed to leave the earth.
Although it is not likely that a criminal will carefully
consider the text of the law before he murders or steals, it is
reasonable that a fair warning should be given to the world, in
language that the common world will understand, of what the law
intends to do if a certain line is passed. To make the warning
fair, so far as possible, the line should be clear. When a rule of
conduct is laid down in words that evoke in the common mind only
the picture of vehicles moving on land, the statute should not be
extended to aircraft simply because it may seem to us that a
similar policy applies, or upon the speculation that, if the
legislature had thought of it, very likely broader words would have
been used.
United States v. Thind, 261 U.
S. 204,
261 U. S.
209.
Judgment reversed.
