A petition was presented by Tobias Watkins for a habeas corpus
for the purpose of inquiring into the legality of his confinement
in the jail of the County of Washington by virtue of a judgment of
the Circuit Court of the United States of the District of Columbia
rendered in a criminal prosecution instituted against him in that
court. The petitioner alleged that the indictments under which he
was convicted and sentenced to imprisonment charged no offense for
which the prisoner was punishable in that court or of which that
court could take cognizance, and consequently that the proceedings
were
coram non judice.
The Supreme Court has no jurisdiction in criminal cases which
could reverse or affirm a judgment rendered in the circuit court in
such a case where the record is brought up directly by writ of
error.
The power of this Court to award writs of habeas corpus is
conferred expressly on this Court by the fourteenth section of the
Judicial Act, and has been repeatedly exercised. No doubt exists
respecting the power.
No law of the United States prescribes the case in which this
great writ shall be issued nor the power of the Court over the
party brought up by it. The term used in the Constitution is one
which is well understood, and the Judicial Act authorizes the
Court, and all the courts of the United States and the judges
thereof, to issue the writ "for the purpose of inquiring into the
cause of commitment."
The nature and powers of the writ of habeas corpus.
A judgment in its nature concludes the subject on which it is
rendered, and pronounces the law of the case. The judgment of a
court of record whose jurisdiction is final is as conclusive on all
the world as the judgment of this Court would be. It is as
conclusive on this Court as on other courts. It puts an end to
inquiry concerning the fact by deciding it.
With what propriety can this Court look into an indictment found
in the circuit court and which has passed into judgment before that
court? We have no power to examine the proceedings on a writ of
error, and it would be strange if, under color of a writ to
liberate an individual from an unlawful imprisonment, the Court
could substantially reverse a judgment which the law has placed
beyond its control. An imprisonment under a judgment cannot be
unlawful unless that judgment be an absolute nullity, and it is not
a nullity if the court has general jurisdiction of the subject,
although it should be erroneous.
The Circuit Court for the District of Columbia is a court of
record having general jurisdiction over criminal cases. An offense
cognizable in any court is cognizable in that court.
If the offense be punishable by law, that court is competent to
inflict the punishment. The judgment of such a tribunal has all the
obligation which the judgment of any tribunal can have. To
determine whether the offense charged in the indictment be legally
punishable or not is among the most unquestionable of its powers
and duties. The decision of this question is the exercise of its
jurisdiction, whether its judgment be for or against the prisoner.
The judgment is equally binding in one case and in the other, and
must remain in
Page 28 U. S. 194
full force, unless reversed regularly by a superior court
capable of reversing it. If this judgment is obligatory, no court
can ever look behind it.
Had any offense against the laws of the United States been in
fact committed, the Circuit Court for the District of Columbia
could take cognizance of it. The question whether any offense was
committed or was not committed -- that is, whether the indictment
did or did not show that an offense had been committed -- was a
question which this Court was competent to decide. If its judgment
was erroneous -- a point which this Court does not determine --
still it is a judgment, and until reversed cannot be
disregarded.
It is universally understood that the judgments of the courts of
the United States, although their jurisdiction be not shown on the
pleadings, are yet binding on all the world, and that this apparent
want of jurisdiction can avail the party only on a writ of error.
The judgment of the circuit court in a criminal case is of itself
evidence of its own legality, and requires for its support no
inspection of the indictment on which it is founded. The law trusts
that court with the whole subject, and has not confided to this
Court the power of revising its decisions. This Court cannot usurp
that power by the instrumentality of a writ of habeas corpus. The
judgment informs us that the commitment is legal, and with that
information it is our duty to be satisfied.
The cases of
United States v.
Hamilton, 3 Dall. 17,
Ex
Parte Burford, 3 Cranch 447,
Ex parte
Bollman & Swartwout, 4 Cranch 75, and
Ex Parte
Kearney, 7 Wheat. 38, examined.
This case came before the Court on a petition for a habeas
corpus on the relation of Tobias Watkins, setting forth that at May
term, 1829, of the Circuit Court of the District of Columbia, in
the County of Washington, certain presentments were found against
him, upon three of which trials were had, and verdicts passed
against him; upon which judgments were pronounced, purporting to
condemn him to the payment of certain pecuniary fines and costs,
and certain terms of imprisonment for the supposed offenses
therein. For the nature and terms of the indictments, and of the
convictions and judgments thereon, the petition referred to the
same. Copies and exemplifications of the records of the proceedings
were annexed to the petition.
The petition proceeded to state that immediately on the
rendition of the judgments and in the pretended pursuance and
execution of the same, the petitioner was, on 14 August, 1829,
committed to the common gaol of Washington County, in which he has
since been confined under color and pretense of the authority,
force, and effect of the said indictments; that he is well advised
by counsel that the said convictions and judgments are illegal and
wholly void upon
Page 28 U. S. 195
their faces and give no valid authority or warrant whatever for
his commitment and imprisonment; that the indictments do not, nor
does any one of them, charge or import any offense at common law
whatever cognizable in the course of criminal judicature, and
especially no offense cognizable or punishable by the said circuit
court, and that his imprisonment is wholly unjust and without any
lawful ground, warrant, or authority whatever.
The petitioner prays the benefit of the writ of habeas corpus,
to be directed to the Marshal of the District of Columbia, in whose
custody, as keeper of the gaol of the district the petitioner is,
commanding him to bring the body of the petitioner before the court
with the cause of his commitment, and especially commanding him to
return with the writ the record of the proceedings upon the
indictments with the judgments thereupon, and to certify whether
the petitioner be not actually imprisoned by the supposed authority
and in virtue of the said judgment.
The first indictment referred to in the petition charged the
petitioner as Fourth Auditor of the Treasury of the United States,
and as such having assigned to him the keeping of the accounts of
the receipts and expenditures of the public moneys of the United
States in regard to the Navy Department; with having obtained for
his private use the sum of $750, the money of the United States, by
means of a draft for that sum on the navy agent of the United
States at New York, which draft was drawn by him in the City of
Washington in favor of C. S. Fowler, on the navy agent at New York,
and negotiated in the City of Washington on 16 January, 1828, the
said sum of money having been by him represented to the Secretary
of the Navy as required by the navy agent for the uses of the
United States, and so represented in a requisition made to the navy
agent for a warrant on the Treasury of the United States for the
amount of the draft, with other sums included in the
requisition.
The second indictment charged the petitioner with having
received from the navy agent of the United States at New York the
sum of $300, money of the United
Page 28 U. S. 196
states, by means of fraudulent misrepresentations made to the
navy agent, contained in a letter addressed to him on 8 October,
1827, in which it was falsely stated that the said sum of $300 was
required for the use of the United States, and that the same was so
obtained from the navy agent, by a draft on him in favor of C.J.
Fowler, by whom the money was paid to the petitioner, on his having
negotiated the draft.
The third indictment charged the petitioner with having procured
to be drawn from the Treasury of the United States the sum of
$2,000, by means of a requisition from the Secretary of the Navy, a
blank requisition left by that officer in his department having, on
the representation of the petitioner that the same was required for
the public service by the navy agent at Boston, been filled up for
this purpose, and for which he drew and negotiated drafts in the
City of Washington at different times in favor of C. J. Fowler, in
different sums amounting to $2,000, and appropriated the same to
his own use.
Messrs. Jones and Coxe moved for a rule on the United States, to
show cause why a habeas corpus should not issue, and proposed that
the argument should take place on the motion upon all the points
involved in the case. Mr. Berrien, Attorney General, objected to an
argument on the motion. He stated that he was prepared to go into
the argument on the return of the rule, but was not willing to do
so on the motion.
The counsel for the petitioner observed, that in
Kearney's Case,
7 Wheat. 38, the argument took place on the motion, and, as in this
case the petition brought up the indictments and the judgments of
the circuit court, the whole matter was now fully before the
Court.
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE MARSHALL said that the counsel for the
petitioner and the attorney general might arrange among themselves
as they thought proper when the argument should come on, either on
the motion or the return. This not having been done, the rule was
warded returnable on the following motion day.
Page 28 U. S. 197
On the return of the rule, Mr. Coxe and Mr. Jones for the
petitioner contended that no offense was charged in the indictments
which was within the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court for the
County of Washington, and therefore all the proceedings of that
court were nullities and void.
1. All proceedings of a court beyond its jurisdiction are void.
Wise v.
Withers, 3 Cranch 331, 1 Pet.Condensed 552.
Rose v. Himely,
4 Cranch 241,
8 U. S. 268.
Doe v. Harden, 1 Paine's 55, 58-59.
2. In a case where a court acting beyond its jurisdiction has
committed a party to prison, a habeas corpus is the proper remedy,
and affords the means of trying the question.
7
U. S. 3 Cranch 448, 1 Pet.Condensed 594.
Bollman v.
Swartwout, 4 Cranch 75.
Kearney's
Case, 7 Wheat. 38.
3. The writ does not issue of course, but the party must show
that he is imprisoned by a court having no jurisdiction. 1 Chitty's
Crim.Law 124-125. A habeas corpus is a proper remedy for revising
the proceedings of a court in a criminal case. 1 Chitty's Crim.Law
180.
It was argued for the petitioner, that it has been decided in
many cases, that a writ of habeas corpus may issue so as to make
its action equivalent to that of a writ of error. 1 Chit.Crim.Law
180.
The circuit court is a court of general criminal jurisdiction in
cases within the local law and within the law of Maryland. What is
the effect of the clause of the act of Congress establishing this
Court? It is to give it cognizance of "all offenses," but this does
not mean that extraordinary powers are given to make new offenses
and to punish all acts deemed offenses. Offenses are the violations
of known and established local laws. The statute means offenses
against the laws of the United States in their sovereignty, and
against the local laws of the district.
For the purposes of this inquiry it is immaterial whether the
circuit court is or is not of limited jurisdiction. However
extended its jurisdiction may be, it has defined limits, and these
restrain it.
Suppose the court should entertain jurisdiction of cases
Page 28 U. S. 198
certainly not criminal, would not a decision in such a case be a
nullity? As if on the face of an indictment an act which is of a
civil nature should be made criminal. The court is limited to
offenses committed within its jurisdiction. Should it take
cognizance of an act done in England, would not this Court
interfere?
It is admitted that the judgment of a court of competent
jurisdiction is conclusive when the case is one properly submitted
to the operation of that jurisdiction. But it is not sufficient to
say that its jurisdiction is general; it should also appear it had
jurisdiction of the offense charged. Cited,
Rose v.
Himely, 5 Cranch 313.
Griffith v.
Frazier, 8 Cranch 9.
It is asked whether this Court will look into any criminal case
which has passed under the judgment of the circuit court. Suppose a
sentence imposed not authorized by law; would not this Court
interfere by its writ of habeas corpus?
It is not contended that every excess of jurisdiction is within
the principle claimed. There is a difference between a rule which
is reasonable, and that which goes into extravagance. It may not be
defined, but it can be felt, and this is a case where this rule can
apply. The position that the decision of an inferior court of the
United States in a criminal case cannot be inquired into unless
there is an appellate jurisdiction in such cases goes too far, and
runs into the
argumentum in absurdum.
In all the cases which have come before this Court in which a
writ of habeas corpus has been applied for, the decision has been
in favor of the jurisdiction. There has been enough shown here in
this preliminary question to authorize the writ, as the only
inquiry is whether the judgment of the circuit court is conclusive
upon all the matters before the court.
The counsel for the petitioner proceeded to argue at large upon
authorities that the offenses charged in the indictments were not
cognizable in the circuit court. As this point was not noticed in
the opinion of the Court, the argument is omitted. They cited
11 U. S. 7 Cranch
32; 1 Gall.
Page 28 U. S. 199
488; 2 East 814; 2 Maule & Selw. 378;
17 U. S. 4
Wheat. 405,
17 U. S. 424,
17 U. S. 430,
17 U. S. 410,
17 U. S. 416,
17 U. S. 427;
5 U. S. 1 Cranch
164.
The Attorney General denied that it was competent for this Court
to revise the proceedings of the circuit court in a criminal case,
or to award a habeas corpus to bring into revision such
proceedings.
No such case was to be found since the organization of the
court, and as writs of error and appeals are expressly limited to
cases which are not criminal, the issuing of such a writ, and for
such a purpose would be contrary to law.
He contended that the case of
Bollman v. Swartwout was
not an authority for the claim of the petitioner. That was a case
of bail, and not a case in which the judgment of a court had
passed. In
Kearney's Case, the writ of habeas corpus was
refused, the petitioner being in confinement for contempt, which
was considered equivalent to a sentence of the court.
It is now to be decided in the case before the court, whether
they will, through the means of a habeas corpus, revise the
sentence of an inferior court in a criminal case, so as to
determine whether it had jurisdiction of the offense charged in an
indictment found in that court.
The petition asserts
1. That no offense is charged in the indictment cognizable by
the law of Maryland.
2. That no offense is charged which is cognizable by the laws of
the United States.
As to the first, if it is competent to this Court to examine the
point, the whole case of the petition is open, as the circuit court
is said to have erred in deciding that the offense was cognizable
by it. The Circuit Court of the District of Columbia has
jurisdiction, such as is possessed by all other circuit courts of
the United States, and it has also general jurisdiction of offenses
committed in the district. In the legitimate exercise of this
jurisdiction to decide what is an offense, it is said to have
exceeded its jurisdiction. By what authority can this decision of a
court of general, final, criminal jurisdiction be reexamined here?
The court below has decided that the facts of the case amount to a
fraud on the
Page 28 U. S. 200
government, committed by false pretenses. It may be they have
erred in their judgment, but the error cannot be revised here. They
have jurisdiction to decide that the offense was committed in the
district, and they have so decided. The power of the court is 1. to
try the offender; 2. to determine what the offense is; 3. to punish
after conviction. These are exclusive and final powers.
There is no power or authority in this Court to reexamine a
decision of a circuit court as to its jurisdiction in a criminal
case. The proposition that the decisions of a court in a case
beyond its jurisdiction are void, although true in the abstract, is
practically false. Such decisions must stand unless there is power
in another court to reverse them. The truth of this is maintained
in civil as well as criminal cases.
It must appear that there is jurisdiction in a superior court to
award a writ of error, or a habeas corpus, which may bring up the
question, not alone that the judgment of the court was
erroneous.
If this Court possesses such powers, it must be derived from one
of three sources:
1. From the act of Congress appropriating and regulating the
powers of this Court. No powers are given by the act to revise the
proceedings of the circuit court in criminal cases.
2. From the powers of this Court as the Supreme Court to
exercise supervision over all inferior courts. In the case of
Bollman v. Swartwout, the court have said they have no
such powers.
3. Can those powers be derived from the power to issue writs of
habeas corpus, and by this to revise the judgments of inferior
judicatures exercising criminal jurisdiction?
Congress has carefully guarded against this; it has given
appellate powers in civil, admiralty, and maritime cases and has
refused them in criminal cases. It cannot be supposed that when
thus refused, they can be exerted under the writ of habeas corpus,
which this Court is authorized to issue. There are many cases for
the employment of this writ without claiming for it the rights
asserted to belong to it by the counsel for the petitioner.
Page 28 U. S. 201
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE MARSHALL delivered the opinion of the
Court.
This is a petition for a writ of habeas corpus to bring the body
of Tobias Watkins before this Court for the purpose of inquiring
into the legality of his confinement in gaol. The petition states
that he is detained in prison by virtue of a judgment of the
Circuit Court of the United States for the County of Washington in
the District of Columbia, rendered in a criminal prosecution
carried on against him in that court. A copy of the indictment and
judgment is annexed to the petition, and the motion is founded on
the allegation that the indictment charges no offense for which the
prisoner was punishable in that court, or of which that court could
take cognizance, and consequently that the proceedings are
coram non judice and totally void.
This application is made to a court which has no jurisdiction in
criminal cases (3 Cranch 169;) which could not revise this
judgment; could not reverse or affirm it, were the record brought
up directly by writ of error. The power, however, to award writs of
habeas corpus is conferred expressly on this Court by the
fourteenth section of the Judicial Act, and has been repeatedly
exercised. No doubt exists respecting the power; the question is
whether this be a case in which it ought to be exercised. The cause
of imprisonment is shown as fully by the petitioner as it could
appear on the return of the writ; consequently the writ ought not
to be awarded if the court is satisfied that the prisoner would be
remanded to prison.
No law of the United States prescribes the cases in which this
great writ shall be issued, nor the power of the court over the
party brought up by it. The term is used in the Constitution as one
which was well understood, and the Judicial Act authorizes this
Court and all the courts of the United States and the judges
thereof to issue the writ "for the purpose of inquiring into the
cause of commitment." This general reference to a power which we
are required to exercise, without any precise definition of that
power, imposes on us the necessity of making some inquiries into
its use,
Page 28 U. S. 202
according to that law which is in a considerable degree
incorporated into our own. The writ of habeas corpus is a high
prerogative writ, known to the common law, the great object of
which is the liberation of those who may be imprisoned without
sufficient cause. It is in the nature of a writ of error to examine
the legality of the commitment. The English judges, being
originally under the influence of the Crown, neglected to issue
this writ where the government entertained suspicions which could
not be sustained by evidence, and the writ when issued was
sometimes disregarded or evaded, and great individual oppression
was suffered in consequence of delays in bringing prisoners to
trial. To remedy this evil, the celebrated habeas corpus act of the
31st of Charles II was enacted, for the purpose of securing the
benefits for which the writ was given. This statute may be referred
to as describing the cases in which relief is, in England, afforded
by this writ to a person detained in custody. It enforces the
common law. This statute excepts from those who are entitled to its
benefit, persons committed for felony or treason plainly expressed
in the warrant, as well as persons convicted or in execution.
The exception of persons convicted applies particularly to the
application now under consideration. The petitioner is detained in
prison by virtue of the judgment of a court, which court possesses
general and final jurisdiction in criminal cases. Can this judgment
be reexamined upon a writ of habeas corpus?
This writ is, as has been said, in the nature of a writ of error
which brings up the body of the prisoner with the cause of
commitment. The court can undoubtedly inquire into the sufficiency
of that cause, but if it be the judgment of a court of competent
jurisdiction, especially a judgment withdrawn by law from the
revision of this Court, is not that judgment in itself sufficient
cause? Can the court, upon this writ, look beyond the judgment, and
re-examine the charges on which it was rendered. A judgment, in its
nature, concludes the subject on which it is rendered, and
pronounces the law of the case. The judgment of a court of record
whose jurisdiction is final is as conclusive on all
Page 28 U. S. 203
the world as the judgment of this Court would be. It is as
conclusive on this Court as it is on other courts. It puts an end
to inquiry concerning the fact by deciding it.
The counsel for the prisoner admit the application of these
principles to a case in which the indictment alleges a crime
cognizable in the court by which the judgment was pronounced; but
they deny their application to a case in which the indictment
charges an offense not punishable criminally according to the law
of the land. But with what propriety can this Court look into the
indictment? We have no power to examine the proceedings on a writ
of error, and it would be strange, if, under color of a writ to
liberate an individual from unlawful imprisonment, we could
substantially reverse a judgment which the law has placed beyond
our control. An imprisonment under a judgment cannot be unlawful
unless that judgment be an absolute nullity, and it is not a
nullity if the court has general jurisdiction of the subject,
although it should be erroneous. The Circuit Court for the District
of Columbia is a court of record having general jurisdiction over
criminal cases. An offense cognizable in any court is cognizable in
that court. If the offense be punishable by law, that court is
competent to inflict the punishment. The judgment of such a
tribunal has all the obligation which the judgment of any tribunal
can have. To determine whether the offense charged in the
indictment be legally punishable or not is among the most
unquestionable of its powers and duties. The decision of this
question is the exercise of jurisdiction, whether the judgment be
for or against the prisoner. The judgment is equally binding in the
one case and in the other, and must remain in full force unless
reversed regularly by a superior court capable of reversing it.
If this judgment be obligatory, no court can look behind it. If
it be a nullity, the officer who obeys it is guilty of false
imprisonment. Would the counsel for the prisoner attempt to
maintain this position?
Questions which we think analogous to this have been frequently
decided in this Court.
Kemp's Lessee v.
Kennedy, 5 Cranch 173, was a writ of error to a
judgment in
Page 28 U. S. 204
ejectment, rendered against her in the Circuit Court of the
United States for the District of New Jersey. An inquisition taken
under the confiscating acts of New Jersey had been found against
her on which a judgment of condemnation had been rendered by the
inferior Court of Common Pleas for the County of Hunterdon. The
land had been sold under this judgment of condemnation, and this
ejectment was brought against the purchaser. The title of the
plaintiff being resisted under those proceedings, his counsel
prayed the court to instruct the jury that they ought to find a
verdict for him. The court refused the prayer, and did instruct the
jury to find for the defendants. An exception was taken to this
direction, and the cause brought before this Court by writ of
error. On the argument the counsel for the plaintiff made two
points. 1. That the proceedings were erroneous. 2. That the
judgment was an absolute nullity. He contended that the individual
against whom the inquest was found, was not comprehended within the
confiscating acts of New Jersey. Consequently, the justice who took
the inquisition had no jurisdiction as regarded her. He contended
also that the inquisition was entirely insufficient to show that
Grace Kemp, whose land had been condemned, was an offender under
those acts. He then insisted that the tribunal erected to execute
these laws, was an inferior tribunal, proceeding by force of
particular statutes out of the course of the common law; it was a
jurisdiction limited by the statute, both as to the nature of the
offense, and the description of persons over whom it should have
cognizance. Everything ought to have been stated in the proceedings
which was necessary to give the court jurisdiction, and to justify
the judgment of forfeiture. If the jurisdiction does not appear
upon the face of the proceedings, the presumption of law is that
the court had not jurisdiction, and the cause was
coram non
judice, in which case no valid judgment could be rendered.
The court said that however clear it might be in favor of the
plaintiff on the first point, it would avail him nothing unless he
succeeded on the second.
The court admitted the law respecting the proceedings
Page 28 U. S. 205
of inferior courts in the sense in which that term was used in
the English books, and asked
"Was the court in which this judgment was rendered an inferior
court in that sense of the term?"
"All courts from which an appeal lies are inferior courts in
relation to the appellate courts, before which their judgment may
be carried, but they are not therefore inferior courts in the
technical sense of those words. They apply to courts of special and
limited jurisdiction, which are erected on such principles that
their judgments taken alone are entirely disregarded, and the
proceedings must show their jurisdiction. The courts of the United
States are all of limited jurisdiction, and their proceedings are
erroneous if the jurisdiction be not shown upon them. Judgments
rendered in such cases may certainly be reversed, but this court is
not prepared to say that they are absolute nullities, which may be
totally disregarded."
The Court then proceeded to review the powers of the courts of
common pleas in New Jersey. They were courts of record, possessing
general jurisdiction in civil cases, with the exception of suits
for real property. In treason, their jurisdiction was over all who
could commit the offense.
After reviewing the several acts of confiscation, the Court said
that they could not be fairly construed to convert the courts of
common pleas into courts of limited jurisdiction. They remained the
only courts capable of trying the offenses described by the
laws.
In the particular case of Grace Kemp, the Court said, that
"The court of common pleas was constituted according to law, and
if an offense had been in fact committed, the accused was amenable
to its jurisdiction, so far as respected her property in the State
of New Jersey. The question whether this offense was or was not
committed, that is whether the inquest, which is substituted for a
verdict on an indictment, did or did not show that the offense had
been committed, was a question which the court was competent to
decide. The judgment it gave was erroneous, but it is a judgment,
and, until reversed, cannot be disregarded. "
Page 28 U. S. 206
This case has been cited at some length, because it is thought
to be decisive of that that now under consideration.
Had any offense against the laws of the United States been in
fact committed, the circuit court for the District of Columbia
could take cognizance of it. The question whether any offense was,
or was not committed, that is whether the indictment did or did not
show that an offense had been committed, was a question which that
court was competent to decide. If its judgment was erroneous, a
point which this Court does not determine, still it is a judgment,
and, until reversed, cannot be disregarded.
In
Skillern's Executors v. May's
Executors, 6 Cranch 267, a decree pronounced by the
Circuit Court for the District of Kentucky had been reversed, and
the cause was remanded to that court, that an equal partition of
the land in controversy might be made between the parties. When the
cause again came on before the court below, it was discovered that
it was not within the jurisdiction of the court, whereupon the
judges were divided in opinion, whether they ought to execute the
mandate, and their division was certified to this Court. This Court
certified, that the circuit court is bound to execute its mandate,
"although the jurisdiction of the court be not alleged in the
pleadings." The decree having been pronounced, although in a case
in which it was erroneous for want of the averment of jurisdiction,
was nevertheless obligatory as a decree.
The case
Williams v.
Armroyd, 7 Cranch 423, was an appeal from a
sentence of the Circuit Court for the District of Pennsylvania,
dismissing a libel which had been filed for certain goods which had
been captured and condemned under the Milan decree. They were sold
by order of the governor of the island into which the prize had
been carried, and the present possessor claimed under the
purchaser. It was contended that the Milan decree was in violation
of the law of nations, and that a condemnation professedly under
that decree could not change the right of property. This Court
affirmed the sentence of the circuit court restoring the property
to the claimant and said
"That
Page 28 U. S. 207
the sentence is avowedly made under a decree subversive of the
law of nations, will not help the appellant's case in a court which
cannot revise, correct, or even examine that sentence. If an
erroneous judgment binds the property on which it acts, it will not
bind that property the less, because its error is apparent. Of that
error, advantage can be taken only in a court which is capable of
correcting it."
The Court felt the less difficulty in declaring the edict under
which the condemnation had been made to be "a direct and flagrant
violation of national law," because the declaration had already
been made by the legislature of the union. But the sentence of a
court under it was submitted to as being of complete
obligation.
The cases are numerous, which decide that the judgments of a
court of record having general jurisdiction of the subject,
although erroneous, are binding until reversed. It is universally
understood that the judgments of the courts of the United States,
although their jurisdiction be not shown in the pleadings, are yet
binding on all the world, and that this apparent want of
jurisdiction can avail the party only on a writ of error. This
acknowledged principle seems to us to settle the question now
before the Court. The judgment of the circuit court in a criminal
case is of itself evidence of its own legality, and requires for
its support no inspection of the indictments on which it is
founded. The law trusts that court with the whole subject, and has
not confided to this Court the power of revising its decisions. We
cannot usurp that power by the instrumentality of the writ of
habeas corpus. The judgment informs us that the commitment is
legal, and with that information it is our duty to be
satisfied.
The counsel for the petitioner contend that writs of habeas
corpus have been awarded and prisoners liberated in cases similar
to this.
In
United States v.
Hamilton, 3 Dall. 17, the prisoner was committed
upon the warrant of the District Judge of Pennsylvania, charging
him with high treason. He was, after much deliberation, admitted to
bail. This was a proceeding contemplated by the thirty-third
section of the Judicial Act, which declares that in cases where the
punishment
Page 28 U. S. 208
may be death, bail shall not be admitted but by the Supreme or a
circuit court, or by a justice of the Supreme Court, or a judge of
the district court.
In the case
Ex Parte
Burford, 3 Cranch 447, the prisoner was committed
originally by the warrant of several justices of the peace for the
County of Alexandria. He was brought by a writ of habeas corpus
before the circuit court, by which court he was remanded to gaol,
there to remain until he should enter into recognizance for his
good behavior for one year. He was again brought before the Supreme
Court on a writ of habeas corpus. The judges were unanimously of
opinion that the warrant of commitment was illegal for want of
stating some good cause certain supported by oath. The court added
that
"if the circuit court had proceeded,
de novo, perhaps
it might have made a difference; but this Court is of opinion that
that court has gone only on the proceedings before the justices. It
has gone so far as to correct two of the errors committed, but the
rest remain."
The prisoner was discharged.
In the case of
Bollman v. Swartwout, the prisoners were
committed by order of the circuit court on the charge of treason.
The habeas corpus was awarded in this case on the same principle on
which it was awarded in the case of
3
U. S. 3 Dall. 17. The prisoners were discharged because
the charge of treason did not appear to have been committed. In no
one of these cases was the prisoner confined under the judgment of
a court.
The case
Ex Parte
Kearney, 7 Wheat. 38, was a commitment by order of
the Supreme Court for the District of Columbia, for a contempt. The
prisoner was remanded to prison. The Court, after noticing its want
of power to revise the judgment of the circuit court in any case
where a party had been convicted of a public offense, asked
"if then this Court cannot directly revise a judgment of the
circuit court in a criminal case, what reason is there to suppose
that it was intended to vest it with the authority to do it
indirectly."
The case
Ex Parte Kearney bears a near resemblance to
that under consideration.
The counsel for the prisoner rely mainly on the case
Page 28 U. S. 209
of
Wise v.
Withers, 3 Cranch 330. This was an action of
trespass
vi et armis for entering the plaintiff's house
and taking away his goods. The defendant justified as collector of
the militia fines. The plaintiff replied that he was not subject to
militia duty, and on demurrer this replication was held ill. This
Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court, because a court
martial had no jurisdiction over a person not belonging to the
militia, and its sentence in such a case being
coram non
judice, furnishes no protection to the officer who executes
it.
This decision proves only that a court martial was considered as
one of those inferior courts of limited jurisdiction, whose
judgments may be questioned collaterally. They are not placed on
the same high ground with the judgments of a court of record. The
declaration, that this judgment against a person to whom the
jurisdiction of the court could not extend, is a nullity; is no
authority for inquiring into the judgments of a court of general
criminal jurisdiction, and regarding them as nullities, if in our
opinion the court has misconstrued the law, and has pronounced an
offense to be punishable criminally, which, as we may think, is not
so.
Without looking into the indictments under which the prosecution
against the petitioner was conducted, we are unanimously of opinion
that the judgment of a court of general criminal jurisdiction
justifies his imprisonment, and that the writ of habeas corpus
ought not to be awarded.
On consideration of the rule granted in this case on a prior
day of this term, to-wit, on Tuesday, 26 January of the present
term of this Court, and of the arguments thereupon had; it is
considered, ordered, and adjudged by this Court that the said rule
be and the same is hereby discharged and that the prayer of the
petitioner for a writ of habeas corpus be and the same is hereby
refused.
