1. A decision of a state court applying and enforcing a state
statute of general scope against a particular transaction as to
which there was a distinct and timely insistence that, if so
applied, the statute was void under the federal Constitution
necessarily affirms the validity of the statute as so applied, and
the judgment is therefore reviewable by writ of error under § 237
of the Judicial Code. P.
274 U. S.
385.
2. The inquiry then is whether the statute is constitutional as
applied and enforced in respect to the situation presented. P.
274 U. S.
385.
3. This Court will review the finding of facts by a state court
where a federal right has been denied as the result of a finding
shown by the record to be without evidence to support it; or where
a conclusion of law as to a federal right, and a finding of fact,
are so intermingled as to make it necessary, in order to pass upon
the federal question, to analyze the facts. P.
274 U. S.
385.
4. A Kansas statute defining "criminal syndicalism" as
"the doctrine which advocates crime, physical violence, arson,
destruction of property, sabotage, or other unlawful acts or
methods as a means of accomplishing or effecting industrial or
political ends, or as a
Page 274 U. S. 381
means of effecting industrial or political revolution, or for
profit . . ."
and punishing any person who "advocates, affirmatively suggests,
or teaches the duty, necessity, propriety or expediency of crime,
criminal syndicalism, or sabotage" was applied by the state court
as covering a case where it was charged and proved merely that the
defendant secured members in an organzation whose constitution
proclaimed
"[t]hat the working class and the employing class have nothing
in common, and that there can be no peace so long as hunger and
want are found among millions of working people and the few who
make up the employing class have all the good things of life.
Between these two classes, a struggle must go on until the workers
of the world organize as a class, take possession of the earth and
the machinery of production, and abolish the wage system. Instead
of the conservative motto, 'A fair day's wage for a fair day's
work,' we must inscribe on our banner the revolutionary watchword,
'Abolition of the wage system.' By organizing industrially, we are
forming the structure of the new society within the shell of the
old."
Held: that there being no charge or evidence that the
organization advocated any crime, violence, or other unlawful acts
or methods as a means of effecting industrial or political changes
or revolution, thus applied, the statute is a violation of the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. P.
274 U. S.
386.
117 Kan. 69 reversed.
Error to a judgment of the Supreme Court of Kansas which
affirmed a conviction of Fiske under the Kansas Criminal
Syndicalism Act.
MR. JUSTICE SANFORD delivered the opinion of the Court.
The plaintiff in error was tried and convicted in the District
Court of Rice County, Kansas, upon an information charging him with
violating the Criminal Syndicalism Act of that State. Laws
Spec.Sess. 1920, c. 37. The judgment was affirmed by the Supreme
Court of the
Page 274 U. S. 382
State, 117 Kan. 69, 230 P. 88; and this writ of error was
allowed by the Chief Justice of that court.
The only substantial Federal question presented to and decided
by the State court, and which may therefore be reexamined by this
Court, is whether the Syndicalism Act, as applied in this case, is
repugnant to the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
The relevant provisions of the Act are:
"Section 1. 'Criminal syndicalism' is hereby defined to be the
doctrine which advocates crime, physical violence, arson,
destruction of property, sabotage, or other unlawful acts or
methods, as a means of accomplishing or effecting industrial or
political ends, or as a means of effecting industrial or political
revolution, or for profit. . . ."
"
* * * *"
"Sec. 3. Any person who, by word of mouth, or writing,
advocates, affirmatively suggests or teaches the duty, necessity,
propriety or expediency of crime, criminal syndicalism, or sabotage
. . . is guilty of a felony. . . ."
The information charged that the defendant did
"by word of mouth and by publicly displaying and circulating
certain books and pamphlets and written and printed matter,
advocate, affirmatively suggest and teach the duty, necessity,
propriety and expediency of crime, criminal syndicalism, and
sabotage by . . . knowingly and feloniously persuading, inducing
and securing"
certain persons "to sign an application for membership in . . .
and by issuing to" them "membership cards" in a certain Workers'
Industrial Union,
"a branch of and component part of the Industrial Workers of the
World organization, said defendant then and there knowing that said
organization unlawfully teaches, advocates and affirmatively
suggests:"
"That the working class and the employing class have nothing in
common, and that there can be no peace so long as hunger and want
are found among millions of working people and the few who make up
the employing class have all the good things
Page 274 U. S. 383
of life."
"And that"
"Between these two classes a struggle must go on until the
workers of the World organize as a class, take possession of the
earth and the machinery of production and abolish the wage
system."
"And that:"
"Instead of the conservative motto, 'A fair day's wages for a
fair day's work,' we must inscribe on our banner the revolutionary
watchword, 'Abolition of the wage system.' By organizing
industrially we are forming the structure of the new society within
the shell of the old."
The defendant moved to quash the information as insufficient,
for the reason, among others, that it failed to specify the
character of the organization in which he was alleged to have
secured members. This was overruled.
On the trial, the State offered no evidence as to the doctrines
advocated, suggested or taught by the Industrial Workers of the
World organization other than a copy of the preamble to the
constitution of that organization containing the language set forth
and quoted in the information. The defendant, who testified in his
own behalf, stated that he was a member of that organization and
understood what it taught; that, while it taught the matters set
forth in this preamble, it did not teach or suggest that it would
obtain industrial control in any criminal way or unlawful manner,
but in a peaceful manner; that he did not believe in criminal
syndicalism or sabotage, and had not at any time advocated,
suggested or taught the duty, necessity, propriety and expediency
of crime, criminal syndicalism or sabotage, and did not know that
they were advocated, taught or suggested by the organization; and
that, in taking the applications for membership in the
organization, which contained the preamble to the Constitution, he
had explained the principles of the organization so far as he knew
them by letting the applicants read this preamble.
The jury was instructed that, before the defendant could be
convicted, they must be satisfied from the evidence, beyond a
reasonable doubt, that the Industrial Workers
Page 274 U. S. 384
of the World was an organization that taught criminal
syndicalism as defined by the Syndicalism Act.
The defendant moved in arrest of judgment upon the ground, among
others, that the evidence and the facts stated did not constitute a
public offense and substantiate the charges alleged in the
information. And he also moved for a new trial upon the grounds,
among others, that the verdict was contrary to the law and the
evidence and wholly unsupported by the evidence. Both of these
motions were overruled.
On the appeal to the Supreme Court of the State, among the
errors assigned were, generally, that the court erred in overruling
his motions to quash the information, his demurrer to the evidence
-- which does not appear in the record -- and his motions in arrest
of judgment and for a new trial; and specifically, that the
"court erred in refusing to quash the information, in overruling
the demurrer to the evidence, and in overruling the motion in
arrest of judgment, because the information and the cause of action
attempted to be proved were based upon"
the Kansas Syndicalism Act, "which, insofar as it sustains this
prosecution, is in violation . . . of the Constitution of the
United States, and especially of the Fourteenth Amendment,"
including the due process clause thereof.
The Supreme Court of the State, in its opinion, said: The
information
"does not in set phrase allege that the association known as the
Industrial Workers of the World advocates, affirmatively suggests
or teaches criminal syndicalism, but, when read as a whole, it
clearly signifies this, and also that the language quoted (which
the evidence shows to be taken from the preamble of the
constitution of that organization) was employed to express that
doctrine. . . . The language quoted from the I.W.W. preamble need
not -- in order to sustain the judgment -- be held necessarily and
as a matter of law, to advocate,
Page 274 U. S. 385
teach or even affirmatively suggest physical violence as a means
of accomplishing industrial or political ends. It is open to that
interpretation, and is capable of use to convey that meaning. . . .
The jury were not required to accept the defendant's testimony as a
candid and accurate statement. There was room for them to find, as
their verdict shows they did, that the equivocal language of the
preamble and of the defendant in explaining it to his prospects was
employed to convey and did convey the sinister meaning attributed
to it by the state. A final contention is that the statute . . . is
obnoxious to the due process of law clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Federal Constitution. Statutes penalizing the
advocacy of violence in bringing about governmental changes do not
violate constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech."
A decision of a State court applying and enforcing a State
statute of general scope against a particular transaction as to
which there was a distinct and timely insistence that, if so
applied, the statute was void under the Federal Constitution,
necessarily affirms the validity of the statute as so applied, and
the judgment is therefore reviewable by writ of error under section
237 of the Judicial Code.
Dahnke-Walker Co. v. Bondurant,
257 U. S. 282,
257 U. S. 288.
The inquiry then is whether the statute is constitutional as
applied and enforced in respect of the situation presented.
Ward & Gow v. Krinsky, 259 U.
S. 503,
259 U. S. 510;
Cudahy Co. v. Parramore, 263 U. S. 418,
263 U. S. 422.
And see St. Louis &c. Railway v. Wynne, 224 U.
S. 354,
224 U. S.
359.
And this Court will review the finding of facts by a State court
where a Federal right has been denied as the result of a finding
shown by the record to be without evidence to support it, or where
a conclusion of law as to a federal right and a finding of fact are
so intermingled as to make it necessary, in order to pass upon the
federal
Page 274 U. S. 386
question, to analyze the facts.
Northern Pacific Railway v.
North Dakota, 236 U. S. 585,
236 U. S. 593;
Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Dunken, 266 U.
S. 389,
266 U. S. 394,
and cases cited.
Here, the State court held the Syndicalism Act not to be
repugnant to the due process clause as applied in a case in which
the information in effect charged the defendant with violation of
the Act in that he had secured members in an organization which
taught, advocated and affirmatively suggested the doctrines set
forth in the extracts from the preamble to its constitution, and in
which there was no evidence that the organization, taught,
advocated or suggested any other doctrines. No substantial
inference can, in our judgment, be drawn from the language of this
preamble that the organization taught, advocated or suggested the
duty, necessity, propriety, or expediency of crime, criminal
syndicalism, sabotage, or other unlawful acts or methods. There is
no suggestion in the preamble that the industrial organization of
workers, as a class, for the purpose of getting possession of the
machinery of production and abolishing the wage system, was to be
accomplished by any other than lawful methods; nothing advocating
the overthrow of the existing industrial or political conditions by
force, violence or unlawful means. And, standing alone, as it did
in this case, there was nothing which warranted the court or jury
in ascribing to this language, either as an inference of law or
fact, "the sinister meaning attributed to it by the state." In this
respect, the language of the preamble is essentially different from
that of the manifesto involved in
Gitlow v. New York,
268 U. S. 652,
268 U. S. 665,
and lacks the essential elements which brought that document under
the condemnation of the law. And it is not as if the preamble were
shown to have been followed by further statements or declarations
indicating that it was intended to mean, and to be understood as
advocating, that the ends outlined therein would be accomplished or
brought about
Page 274 U. S. 387
by violence or other related unlawful acts or methods.
Compare Whitney v. California and
Burns v. United
States, ante, pp.
274 U. S. 357,
274 U. S. 328.
The result is that the Syndicalism Act has been applied in this
case to sustain the conviction of the defendant without any charge
or evidence that the organization in which he secured members
advocated any crime, violence or other unlawful acts or methods as
a means of effecting industrial or political changes or revolution.
Thus applied, the Act is an arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of
the police power of the State, unwarrantably infringing the liberty
of the defendant in violation of the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. The judgment is accordingly reversed, and the
case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this
opinion.
Reversed.