1. The Eighteenth Amendment contemplates that the manufacture of
intoxicating liquor for beverage purposes may be denounced as a
criminal offense by both federal and state law; and that these laws
may not only coexist but be given full operation, each
independently of the other. P.
272 U. S.
314.
2. Where such manufacture is thus doubly denounced, one who
engages therein commits two distinct offenses, one against the
United States and one against the State, and may be subjected to
prosecution and punishment in the federal courts for one and in the
state courts for the other without any infraction of the
constitutional rule against double jeopardy, it being limited to
repeated prosecutions " for the same offense." P.
272 U. S.
314.
3. The provision of § 256, Jud. Code, giving the District Courts
exclusive jurisdiction of offenses, relates only to offenses under
the federal law, and does not affect the authority of a state court
over an offense against the state law, although the same act was an
offense against federal law as well. P.
272 U. S.
314.
4. The power of a State to declare criminal the manufacture of
intoxicating liquor for beverage purposes and to prosecute
offenders is not derived from the Eighteenth Amendment. P.
272 U. S.
314.
5. In the absence of objection by the United States, persons
under federal indictment and on bail awaiting trial for violations
of the federal prohibition law may be arrested and tried by the
state courts for the same acts constituting violations of the state
prohibition law. P.
272 U. S.
315.
6. A decision of a state supreme court construing state penal
statutes in such wise as to impose a heavier sentence than would be
valid under the construction advanced by the accused is not
reviewable here as a denial of due process of law, under the
Fourteenth Amendment. P.
272 U. S.
316.
7. The due process of law clause in the Fourteenth Amendment
does not take up the statutes of the several States and make them
the test of what it requires; nor does it enable this Court to
revise the decisions of the state courts on questions of state law.
What it does require is that state action, whether through one
agency or another, shall be consistent with the fundamental
Page 272 U. S. 313
principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of al
our civil and political institutions and not infrequently are
designated as " law of the land." Those principles are applicable
alike in all the States, and do not depend upon or vary with local
legislation. P.
272 U. S.
316.
158 La. 209 affirmed.
Error to a judgment of the Supreme Court of Louisiana affirming
a sentence for violation of the state law against manufacture of
intoxicating liquor for beverage purposes.
MR. JUSTICE VAN DEVANTER delivered the opinion of the Court.
The state of Louisiana, like the United States, has a statute
making it a criminal offense to manufacture intoxicating liquor for
beverage purposes. A judgment of the Supreme Court of the state,
affirming a conviction under this statute (158 La. 209, 103 So.
742), is presented for review by this writ of error. The writ was
sued out before the Act of February 13, 1925, c. 229, 43 Stat. 936,
and falls within the saving clause in the last section.
When the accusation was preferred in the state court, and when
the accused were arrested thereon, they already were under
indictment in the federal District Court for the same acts as an
offense against the federal statute, and were on bail awaiting
trial in that court. When taken before the state court, they
interposed a plea, first, that it was without authority to
entertain the accusation, because the acts charged constituted an
offense against the United States of which the federal District
Court was
Page 272 U. S. 314
given exclusive jurisdiction by section 256 of the federal
Judicial Code (Comp.St. § 1233); and, second, that, even if the
accusation could be entertained, their arrest under state process
while they were on bail awaiting trial in the federal District
Court was in derogation of the authority of the latter, and
therefore did not give jurisdiction of their persons. The plea was
overruled, and this is assigned as error.
We think the ruling was right. The Eighteenth Amendment to the
Constitution contemplates that the manufacture of intoxicating
liquor for beverage purposes may be denounced as a criminal offense
both by the federal law and by the state law, and that these laws
may not only coexist, but be given full operation, each
independently of the other. Where such manufacture is thus doubly
denounced, one who engages therein commits two distinct offenses,
one against the United States and one against the state, and may be
subjected to prosecution and punishment in the federal courts for
one, and in the state courts for the other, without any infraction
of the constitutional rule against double jeopardy, it being
limited to repeated prosecutions "for the same offense."
United
States v. Lanza, 260 U. S. 377.
The provision in section 256 of the federal Judicial Code has no
bearing on the authority of a state court to entertain an
accusation for an offense against the state law. That provision
relates to offenses "cognizable under the authority of the United
States." Only offenses against the laws of the United States are
cognizable under its authority. Those against state laws are
cognizable only under the authority of the state. And this is true
where the same act is an offense against both a law of the United
States and a law of the state.
An argument is advanced to the effect that the state, in
denouncing the manufacture of intoxicating liquor for beverage
purposes as a criminal offense, and in taking proceedings to punish
the offenders, is exerting a power
Page 272 U. S. 315
derived from the Eighteenth Amendment, and therefore that all
that is done by the state in that regard must be taken as done
under the authority of the United States. The same argument was
advanced in
United States v. Lanza, supra, and was
rejected as unsound for reasons which we deem it well to repeat
here:
"To regard the amendment as the source of the power of the
states to adopt and enforce prohibition measures is to take a
partial and erroneous view of the matter. Save for some
restrictions arising out of the federal Constitution, chiefly the
commerce clause, each state possessed that power in full measure
prior to the amendment, and the probable purpose of declaring a
concurrent power to be in the states was to negative any possible
inference that, in vesting the national government with the power
of country-wide prohibition, state power would be excluded. In
effect, the second section of the Eighteenth Amendment put an end
to restrictions upon the state's power arising out of the federal
Constitution, and left her free to enact prohibition laws applying
to all transactions within her limits. To be sure, the first
section of the amendment took from the states all power to
authorize acts falling within its prohibition, but it did not cut
down or displace prior state laws not inconsistent with it. Such
laws derive their force, as do all new ones consistent with it, not
from this amendment, but from power originally belonging to the
states, preserved to them by the Tenth Amendment, and now relieved
from the restriction heretofore arising out of the federal
Constitution. This is the
ratio decidendi of our decision
in
Vigliotti v. Pennsylvania, 258 U. S.
403."
It, of course, was essential that the state court have
jurisdiction of the persons of the accused. In fact, they were
before it, and were accorded full opportunity to defend. In the
absence of any showing to the contrary, and there is none, it
properly may be assumed that the
Page 272 U. S. 316
United States acquiesced in their arrest and trial on the
accusation under the state law, notwithstanding they were then on
bail awaiting trial in the federal court on the indictment pending
there. Certainly, if the United States was not objecting, the fact
that the accused were thus on bail awaiting trial in the federal
court presented no obstacle to the arrest under the process of the
state court as a means of acquiring jurisdiction of their persons.
Ponzi v. Fessenden, 258 U. S. 254,
258 U. S. 260;
Beavers v. Haubert, 198 U. S. 77,
198 U. S. 85;
Peckham v. Henkel, 216 U. S. 483,
216 U. S.
486.
The accused also assign error on a ruling respecting the maximum
period of imprisonment admissible under the state law. Two statutes
were involved. The accused took the position that one was special,
and excluded the other. But the trial court rejected that view,
construed the statutes as intended to be taken together, and, as a
result, imposed a more burdensome sentence than was named in the
statute which the accused thought controlling. The Supreme Court
sustained that construction, and the accused contend here, as they
did in that court, that the construction was wrong, and, being
wrong, operated as a denial of due process of law in the sense of
the Fourteenth Amendment. The contention must be overruled. Whether
state statutes shall be construed one way or another is a state
question, the final decision of which rests with the courts of the
state. The due process of law clause in the Fourteenth Amendment
does not take up the statutes of the several states and make them
the test of what it requires, nor does it enable this Court to
revise the decisions of the state courts on questions of state law.
What it does require is that state action, whether through one
agency or another, shall be consistent with the fundamental
principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our
civil and political institutions and not infrequently are
designated as "law of the
Page 272 U. S. 317
land." Those principles are applicable alike in all the states,
and do not depend upon or vary with local legislation.
Castillo
v. McConnico, 168 U. S. 674,
168 U. S.
682-683;
West v. Louisiana, 194 U.
S. 258,
194 U. S. 261,
194 U. S. 263;
Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U. S. 454,
205 U. S. 459;
Pullman Co. v. Knott, 235 U. S. 23,
235 U. S. 25;
Enterprise Irrigation District v. Farmers' Mutual Canal
Co., 243 U. S. 157,
243 U. S. 166. The
Supreme Court of the state having held that the two statutes must
be taken together in determining the penalty intended, we must
accept that conclusion as if written into the statutes themselves.
Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas. Co., 220 U. S.
61,
220 U. S. 73.
All that would be open in this court under the due process clause
is whether the state had power to impose the penalty fixed by the
statutes as thus construed.
Rawlins v. Georgia,
201 U. S. 638,
201 U. S. 640.
That the state had such power is not questioned, but only that the
statutes rightly construed show that the power has been exercised.
On this question, as we have said, the decision of the Supreme
Court of the state is controlling.
Judgment affirmed.