1. In a suit to enjoin a trade association under the Anti-Trust
Act in which the government adduced, as evidence of guilty purpose,
the history of earlier combinations which this one had superseded,
held that there was no evidence of any present agreement
or purpose to produce any effect on commerce other than that which
necessarily would flow from the activities of the present
association, and that the only question was whether that
association, as actually conducted, had a necessary tendency to
cause direct and undue restraint of competition condemned by the
Act. P.
268 U. S.
577.
2. Each case arising under the Sherman Act must be determined
upon the particular facts disclosed by the record, and opinions of
the Court in those cases must be read and applied in the light of
their facts, with clear recognition of essential differences in
that regard. P.
268 U. S.
579.
3. Trade associations or combinations of individuals or
corporations, which, as in this case, openly and fairly gather and
disseminate information as to the cost of their product, the actual
prices it has brought in past transactions, stocks on hand, and
approximate cost of transportation from the principal point of
shipment to points of consumption, and meet and discuss such
statistics without reaching or attempting to reach any agreement or
concerted action respecting prices, production, or the restraining
of competition, do not thereby engage in an unlawful restraint of
commerce. P.
268 U. S.
582.
4. In a suit under the Anti-Trust Act to dissolve a trade
association formed by numerous manufacturers of hardwood flooring,
the following activities were complained of: (1) computation and
distribution among the members of information as to the average
cost of their products, based (a) on cost of raw material as
ascertained and averaged by the association's secretary from
reports of actual sales of rough lumber by members in open market,
(b) on manufacturing costs ascertained through questionnaires sent
the members, and (c) on percentage of waste in milling, ascertained
through test runs made by selected members under direction of
Page 268 U. S. 564
the secretary; (2) compilation and distribution among them of
booklets showing freight rates from a basing point to numerous
points to which their products were shipped, enabling members to
quote delivered prices promptly; (3) gathering by periodical
reports from members of information as to the quantity and kind of
flooring sold by them, dates of sales and prices received, average
freight rates, commissions paid, amount and kinds of stock on hand,
and of unfilled orders, monthly production and new orders booked,
which information, embracing only past and closed transactions and
omitting names of purchasers, current prices, and many other
details, was transmitted in summarized form to the members by the
secretary of the association, without, however, revealing the
identity of members in connection with specific information
transmitted, and was given wide publicity through publication in
trade journals, communication to the Department of Commerce, etc.;
(4) monthly meetings at which problems of the industry were
discussed, without discussion or agreement upon prices.
Held that such activities did not constitute an unlawful
restraint on commerce.
Am. Column Lumber Co. v. United
States, 257 U. S. 377;
United States v. Am. Linseed Oil Co., 262 U.
S. 371, distinguished. P.
268 U. S.
568.
Reversed.
Appeal from a decree of the district court awarding an
injunction, in a suit brought by the government under the
Anti-Trust Act against a combination, in the form of a trade
association, of manufacturers of hardwood flooring lumber.
Page 268 U. S. 565
MR. JUSTICE STONE delivered the opinion of the Court.
By bill in equity filed March 5, 1923, the United States asked
an injunction restraining the defendants, who are appellants here,
from violating § 1 of the Act of Congress of July 2, 1890,
entitled, "An act to protect trade and commerce against unlawful
restraints and monopolies," 26 Stat. 209, commonly known as the
Sherman Act.
The defendants are the Maple Flooring Manufacturers'
Association, an unincorporated "trade association;" twenty-two
corporate defendants, members of the association, engaged in the
business of selling and shipping maple, beech, and birch flooring
in interstate commerce, all but two of them having their principal
places of business in Michigan, Minnesota, or Wisconsin (one
defendant being located in Illinois and one in New York); the
several individual representatives of the corporate members of the
association, and George W. Keehn, secretary of the association. Of
the corporate defendants, approximately one-half own timber lands
and sawmills and are producers of the rough lumber from which they
manufacture finished flooring, sold and shipped in interstate
commerce. The other defendants purchase rough flooring lumber in
the open market and manufacture it into finished flooring which is
sold and shipped in interstate commerce. In 1922, there were in the
States of Illinois, Michigan, Minnesota, and Wisconsin, seventeen
nonmember manufacturers of maple, beech, and birch flooring, and
there were fifty-eight nonmember manufacturers of maple, beech, and
birch flooring in the United States who reported to the government.
In that year, thirty-eight nonmember manufacturers reported a
manufacturing capacity of 238,610,000 feet of flooring of the types
mentioned, and during the same year the manufacturing capacity of
the defendants was 158,400,000 feet. Estimates
Page 268 U. S. 566
submitted in behalf of the government indicate that, in the year
1922, the defendants produced 70 percent of the total production of
these types of flooring, the percentage having been gradually
diminished during the five years preceding, the average for the
five years being 74.2 percent. It is also in evidence that, aside
from nonmember manufacturers who reported to the government, there
are numerous other nonmember manufacturers of such flooring in the
United States and Canada. The defendants own only a small
proportion of the total stand, in the United States, of maple,
beech, and birch timber from which the various types of flooring
produced and sold by defendants is manufactured.
In March, 1922, the corporate defendants organized the
defendant, the Maple Flooring Manufacturers' Association, but for
many years prior to that time, and certainly since 1913, a
substantial number of the corporate defendants have participated
actively in maintaining numerous successive trade associations of
the same name which were predecessors of the present association.
The oral testimony and documentary evidence have covered a wide
range, and have reached a great volume which it will be impossible,
within the limits of an opinion, to review in detail. The
defendants have engaged in many activities to which no exception is
taken by the government and which are admittedly beneficial to the
industry and to consumers, such as cooperative advertising and the
standardization and improvement of its product. The activities,
however, of the present association of which the government
complains may be summarized as follows:
(1) The computation and distribution among the members of the
association of the average cost to association members of all
dimensions and grades of flooring.
(2) The compilation and distribution among members of a booklet
showing freight rates on flooring from Cadillac,
Page 268 U. S. 567
Michigan, to between 5,000 and 6,000 points of shipment in the
United States.
(3) The gathering of statistics which at frequent intervals are
supplied by each member of the association to the secretary of the
association given complete information as to the quantity and kind
of flooring sold and prices received by the reporting members, and
the amount of stock on hand, which information is summarized by the
secretary and transmitted to members, without, however, revealing
the identity of the members in connection with any specific
information thus transmitted.
(4) Meetings at which the representatives of members congregate
and discuss the industry and exchange views as to its problems.
Before considering these phases of the activities of the
association, it should be pointed out that it is neither alleged
nor proved that there was any agreement among the members of the
association either affecting production, fixing prices, or for
price maintenance. Both by the articles of association and in
actual practice, members have been left free to sell their product
at any price they choose, and to conduct their business as they
please. Although the bill alleges that the activities of the
defendants hereinbefore referred to resulted in the maintenance of
practical uniformity of net delivered prices as between the several
corporate defendants, the evidence fails to establish such
uniformity, and it was not seriously urged before this Court that
any substantial uniformity in price had in fact resulted from the
activities of the association, although it was conceded by
defendants that the dissemination of information as to cost of the
product and as to production and prices would tend to bring about
uniformity in prices through the operation of economic law. Nor was
there any direct proof that the activities of the association had
affected prices adversely to consumers. On the contrary, the
defendants offered a great volume of evidence tending to show that
the trend of
Page 268 U. S. 568
prices of the product of the defendants corresponded to the law
of supply and demand, and that it evidenced no abnormality when
compared with the price of commodities generally. There is
undisputed evidence that the prices of members were fair and
reasonable and that they were usually lower than the prices of
nonmembers, and there is no claim that defendants were guilty of
unfair or arbitrary trade practices.
The contention of the government is that there is a combination
among the defendants, which is admitted; that the effect of the
activities of the defendants carried on under the plan of the
association must necessarily be to bring about a concerted effort
on the part of members of the association to maintain prices at
levels having a close relation to the average cost of flooring
reported to members, and that consequently there is a necessary and
inevitable restraint of interstate commerce, and that therefore the
plan of the association itself is a violation of § 1 of the Sherman
Act, which should be enjoined regardless of its actual operation
and effect so far as price maintenance is concerned. The case must
turn, therefore, on the effect of the activity of the defendants in
the gathering and dissemination of information as to the cost of
flooring, since, without that, the other activities complained of
could have no material bearing on price levels in the industry, and
it was to this phase of the case that the oral argument was mainly
directed.
Having outlined the substantial issues in the case, it will now
be convenient to examine more in detail the several activities of
the defendants of which the government complains.
Computation and Distribution, Among the
Members,
of Information as to the Average Cost of Their
Product
There are three principal elements which enter into the
computation of the cost of finished flooring. They are
Page 268 U. S. 569
the cost of raw material, manufacturing cost, and the percentage
of waste in converting rough lumber into flooring. The information
as to the cost of rough lumber was procured by the secretary from
reports of actual sales of lumber by members in the open market.
From five to ten ascertained sales were taken as standard, and the
average was taken as the estimated cost of raw material.
Manufacturing costs were ascertained by questionnaires sent out to
members by which members were requested to give information as to
labor costs, cost of warehousing, insurance and taxes, interest at
6% on the value of the plant; selling expense, including
commissions and cost of advertising and depreciation of plant. From
the total thus ascertained, there was deducted the net profit from
wood and other byproducts. The net total cost thus ascertained of
all members reporting was then averaged.
The percentage of waste in converting the rough lumber into
flooring was ascertained by test runs made by selected members of
the association under the direction of the secretary of the
association, in the course of which a given amount of rough lumber
was converted into flooring of different sizes and the actual waste
in the process ascertained and stated in terms of percentage. By
combining the three elements of cost thus arrived at, the total
cost per thousand feet of the aggregate of the different types and
grades of flooring produced from a given amount of rough lumber was
estimated. To this cost there was at one time added an estimated 5%
for contingencies, which practice, however, was discontinued by
resolution of the association of July 19, 1923. For the element of
manufacturing and marketing cost, the first of these estimates
prepared in the manner described was based upon an average of such
cost for the first half of 1921. Other successive estimates were
prepared on a like basis during the first, third, and fourth
quarter of the year 1922.
Page 268 U. S. 570
In order to determine the cost of a given type or grade of
flooring, it was necessary to distribute the total cost of the
aggregate of the different types and grades of finished flooring
produced from a given amount of rough lumber among the several
types and grades thus produced. This distribution was made by the
officials of the association, and the estimated cost thus
determined was tabulated and distributed among the members of the
association. There is no substantial claim made on the part of the
government that the preparation of these estimates of cost were not
made with all practicable accuracy, or that they were in any
respect not what they purported to be, an estimate of the actual
cost of commercial grades of finished flooring fairly ascertained
from the actual experience of members of the association, except
that the point is made by the government that the distribution of
cost among the several types and grades of finished flooring
produced from a given amount of rough lumber was necessarily
arbitrary, and that it might be or become a cover for price-fixing.
Suffice it to say that neither the government nor the defendants
seem to have found it necessary to prove upon what principle of
cost accounting this distribution of cost was made, and there are
no data from which any inference can be drawn as to whether or not
it conformed to accepted practices of cost accounting applied to
the manufacture of a diversified product from a single type of raw
material.
The Compilation and Distribution Among
Members
of Information as to Freight Rates
Through the agency of the secretary of the association, a
booklet was compiled and distributed to members of the association
showing freight rates from Cadillac, Michigan, to numerous points
throughout the United States to which the finished flooring is
shipped by members of the
Page 268 U. S. 571
association. It appears from the evidence to have been the usual
practice in the maple flooring trade to quote flooring at a
delivered price, and that purchasers of flooring usually will not
buy on any other basis. The evidence, however, is undisputed that
the defendants quote and sell on an f.o.b. mill basis whenever a
purchaser so requests. It also appears that the mills of most of
the members of the association are located in small towns in
Michigan and Wisconsin, and that the average freight rates from
these principal producing points in Michigan and Wisconsin to the
principal centers of consumption in the United States are
approximately the same as the freight rate from Cadillac, Michigan,
to the same centers of consumption. There is abundant evidence that
there were delays in securing quotations of freight rates from the
local agents of carriers in towns in which the factories of
defendants are located, which seriously interfered with prompt
quotations of delivered prices to customers; that the actual
aggregate difference between local freight rates for most of
defendants' mills and the rate appearing in defendants' freight
rate book based on rates at Cadillac, Michigan, were so small as to
be only nominal, and that the freight rate book served a useful and
legitimate purpose in enabling members to quote promptly a
delivered price on their product by adding to their mill price a
previously calculated freight rate which approximated closely to
the actual rate from their own mill towns.
The government bases it criticism of the use of the freight rate
book upon the fact that antecedent associations, maintained by
defendants, incorporated in the freight rate book a delivered price
which was made up by adding the calculated freight rate from
Cadillac, Michigan, to a minimum price under the so-called "minimum
price plan" of previous associations, whereby the price was fixed
at cost plus 10% of profit. It is conceded
Page 268 U. S. 572
that the present association does not include a delivered price
in the freight rate book, but it is urged by the government that
the circulation of the tables of estimated cost of flooring,
together with a freight rate book, enables members of the
association to fix a delivered price by adding to the estimated
cost circulated among members the calculated freight rate published
in the freight rate book, and that the freight rate book, used in
conjunction with the published material as to estimated cost, is
merely a device whereby the defendants have continued the so-called
minimum price plan formerly maintained by predecessor associations,
which was a plan whereby the members cooperated in the maintenance
of a fixed minimum price. Defendants maintain that the minimum
price plan was never actually carried out by any predecessor
association, and that it was formally abandoned in February or
March, 1920, after the failure to secure the approval of the plan
by the Federal Trade Commission, and was never revived or
continued.
It cannot, we think, be questioned that data as to the average
cost of flooring circulated among the members of the association,
when combined with a calculated freight rate which is either
exactly or approximately the freight rate from the point of
shipment, plus an arbitrary percentage of profit, could be made the
basis for fixing prices or for an agreement for price maintenance
which, if found to exist, would, under the decisions of this Court,
constitute a violation of the Sherman Act. But, as we have already
said, the record is barren of evidence that the published list of
costs and the freight rate book have been so used by the present
association. Consequently, the question which this Court must
decide is whether the use of this material by members of the
association will necessarily have that effect, so as to produce
that unreasonable restraint of interstate commerce which is
condemned by the Sherman Act.
Page 268 U. S. 573
The Gathering and Distributing Among Members of Trade
Statistics
It is contended by the government that an analysis of the
reporting system adopted by the defendants shows that there is no
information withheld by one member from another, and that every
member is perfectly familiar not only with the summaries which show
the exact market condition generally, but also with the exact
condition of the business of each of his fellow members. An
examination of the record discloses that this is not an accurate
statement of the statistical information distributed among members
of the association, certainly not within any recent period of the
history of the successive associations. At the time of the filing
of the bill, members reported weekly to the secretary of the
association on forms showing dates of sales made by the reporting
member, the quantity, the thickness and face, the grade, the kind
of wood, the delivery, the prices at which sold, the average
freight rate to destination, and the rate of commission paid, if
any. Members also reported monthly the amount of flooring on hand
of each dimension and grade and the amount of unfilled orders.
Monthly reports were also required showing the amount of production
for each period and the new orders booked for each variety of
flooring. The association promptly reported back to the members
statistics compiled from the reports of members, including the
identifying numbers of the mills making the reports, and
information as to quantities, grades, prices, freight rates, etc.,
with respect to each sale. The names of purchasers were not
reported, and from and after July 19, 1923, the identifying number
of the mill making the report was omitted. All reports of sales and
prices dealt exclusively with past, and closed transactions. The
statistics gathered by the defendant association are given wide
publicity. They are published in trade journals
Page 268 U. S. 574
which are read by from 90 to 95% of the persons who purchase the
products of association members. They are sent to the Department of
Commerce, which publishes a monthly survey of current business.
They are forwarded to the Federal Reserve and other banks, and are
available to anyone at any time desiring to use them. It is to be
noted that the statistics gathered and disseminated do not include
current price quotations, information as to employment conditions;
geographical distribution of shipments, the names of customers or
distribution by classes of purchasers, the details with respect to
new orders booked, such as names of customers, geographical origin
of orders, or details with respect to unfilled orders such as names
of customers, their geographical location, the names of members
having surplus stocks on hand, the amount of rough lumber on hand,
or information as to cancellation of orders. Nor do they differ in
any essential respect from trade or business statistics which are
freely gathered and publicly disseminated in numerous branches of
industry producing a standardized product such as grain, cotton,
coal oil, and involving interstate commerce whose statistics
disclose volume and material elements affecting costs of
production, sales price, and stock on hand.
Association Meetings
The articles of the defendant association provide for regular
meetings for the transaction of business on the third Wednesday of
April, July, and October of each year, and that special meetings
may be called by the president or a majority of the board of
trustees. During the year in which the bill of complaint was filed,
meetings appear to have been held monthly. Minutes of meetings were
kept, although it is not contended that they constituted a complete
record of the proceedings. Trade conditions generally, as reflected
by the statistical information disseminated
Page 268 U. S. 575
among members, were discussed; the market prices of rough maple
flooring were also discussed, as were also manufacturing and market
conditions. Those members who did not produce rough flooring lumber
improved the occasion of the monthly meetings to secure purchases
of this commodity from other members. The testimony is explicit,
and not denied, that, following the decision in
United States
v. American Linseed Oil Co., 262 U. S. 371
(June, 1923), there was no discussion of prices in meetings. There
was no occasion to discuss past prices, as those were fully
detailed in the statistical reports, and the association was
advised by counsel that future prices were not a proper subject of
discussion. It was admitted by several witnesses, however, that,
upon occasion, the trend of prices and future prices became the
subject of discussion outside the meeting among individual
representatives of the defendants attending the meeting. The
government, however, does not charge, nor is it contended, that
there was any understanding or agreement, either express or
implied, at the meetings or elsewhere, with respect to prices.
Upon this state of the record, the district court, from whose
decision this appeal was taken, held that the plan or system
operated by the defendant had a direct and necessary tendency to
destroy competition; that the methods employed by them had at all
times a controlling influence to impeding the economic laws of
supply and demand, and tending to increase prices and to stifle
competition; that the plan of the association was therefore
inherently illegal; that, in consequence, the actual results
flowing from such a plan and the execution of it are of secondary
importance. The court accordingly decreed the dissolution of the
defendants' association and enjoined them from engaging in
activities complained of by the government. In arriving at this
result, it was admitted that it was impossible to measure, either
accurately or
Page 268 U. S. 576
even approximately, the effect of the activities of the
defendants upon prices, production, and competition in the flooring
industry for the reason that there could be, in the nature of
things, no satisfactory standards of comparison. The court found no
agreement to fix prices, and that, in fact, lower prices have
usually been quoted by members than by nonmembers of the
association. In reaching its conclusion, the court relied
principally upon the necessary tendency or effect of the plan
actually in operation and upon the past history of the association
and its predecessors as indicating a probable purpose on the part
of the members of the association to use the plan as a medium for
effecting actual and undue restraint on interstate commerce, and it
is urged here that the history of the successive associations
organized by the members of the defendant association, or a
majority of them, establishes a systematic purpose on the part of
the corporate defendants to restrain interstate commerce.
It is pointed out that the articles of the association of
January 1, 1913, embodied the so-called "allotment plan," which
provided for an allotted percentage of the aggregate shipments of
all members within a given period to each member, with a provision
for payment of a bonus or allowance to each member which did not
make its full allotment or percentage of shipments. This plan was
abandoned in March, 1920. On July 1, 1916, the articles of
association of that date adopted a minimum price plan which it is
claimed continued in effect until about January 1, 1921. This plan
contemplated the establishment of a minimum price of maple, beech,
and birch flooring by members of the association, such prices to
consist of the average cost and expense of manufacturing and
selling the product, plus an average profit of ten percent. The
plan provided drastic penalties for the sale of flooring at less
than the minimum price so established. It is also charged that, on
January, 1921, the defendants, by agreement,
Page 268 U. S. 577
established a minimum price basis for the sale of flooring for
the ensuing year. Under this plan, the average net profit was
reduced from ten to five percent, and penalties for noncompliance
with the minimum price scale were abolished.
It is conceded, however, that each of these several plans was
abandoned, and that the present association, both by the terms of
its articles of association and in actual practice, has confined
itself to the activities which have already been described in some
detail.
We think it might be urged on the basis of this record that the
defendants, by their course of conduct, instead of evidencing the
purpose of persistent violators of law, had steadily indicated a
purpose to keep within the boundaries of legality as rapidly as
those boundaries were marked out by the decisions of courts
interpreting the Sherman Act. Whether, however, their general
purpose was to become law-abiding members of the community or law
breakers, it is not, we think, very material unless the court
either can infer from this course of conduct a specific and
continuing purpose or agreement or understanding on their part to
do acts tending to effect an actual restraint of commerce
(
United States v. United States Steel Corp'n, 251
U. S. 416), or unless, on the other hand, it is
established that the combination entered into by the defendants in
the organization of the defendant association and its activities as
now carried on must necessarily result in such restraint. As
already indicated, the record is barren of evidence tending to
establish that there is any agreement or purpose or intention on
the part of defendants to produce any effect upon commerce other
than which would necessarily flow from the activities of the
present association, and, in our view, the government must stand or
fall upon its ability to bring the facts of the present case within
the rule as laid down in
American Column
Co.
Page 268 U. S. 578
v. United States, 257 U. S. 377,
where it was said at p.
257 U. S.
400:
"It has been repeatedly held by this Court that the purpose of
the statute is to maintain free competition in interstate commerce,
and that any concerted action by any combination of men or
corporations to cause, or which in fact does cause, direct and
undue restraint of competition in such commerce falls within the
condemnation of the Act, and is unlawful,"
and within the rule laid down by the court in
United States
v. American Linseed Oil Co., 262 U. S. 371, at
262 U. S. 390:
"In the absence of a purpose to monopolize or the compulsion
that results from contract or agreement, the individual certainly
may exercise great freedom, but concerted action through
combination presents a wholly different problem, and is forbidden
when the necessary tendency is to destroy the kind of competition
to which the public has long looked for protection."
It should be noted that the bill of complaint neither charges,
nor does the government urge, that there was any purpose on the
part of the defendants to monopolize commerce in maple, beech, and
birch flooring. It is not contended that there was the compulsion
of any agreement fixing prices, restraining production or
competition, or otherwise restraining interstate commerce. In our
view, therefore, the sole question presented by this record for our
consideration is whether the combination of the defendants in their
existing association as actually conducted by them has a necessary
tendency to cause direct and undue restraint of competition in
commerce falling within the condemnation of the Act. In urging that
such is the necessary effect, the government relies mainly upon the
decisions of this Court in
Eastern States Retail Lumber
Dealers' Association v. United States, 234 U.
S. 600;
American Column & Lumber Co. v. United
States, supra, and
United States v. American Linseed Oil
Company, supra.
Page 268 U. S. 579
It should be said at the outset that, in considering the
application of the rule of decision in these cases to the situation
presented by this record, it should be remembered that this Court
has often announced that each case arising under the Sherman Act
must be determined upon the particular facts disclosed by the
record, and that the opinions in those cases must be read in the
light of their facts and of a clear recognition of the essential
differences in the facts of those cases, and in the facts of any
new case to which the rule of earlier decisions is to be
applied.
In
Eastern States Retail Lumber Dealers' Association v.
United States, supra, the defendant members of the association
had entered into a combination and agreement whereby members were
required to report to the association the names of wholesale
dealers in lumber who sold their product directly to consumers. The
names of the offending wholesalers were placed upon a "black list"
which was circulated among the members of the association. The name
of a blacklisted wholesaler could be removed from the list only on
application to the secretary of the association and on assurance
that the offending wholesaler would no longer sell in competition
with retailers. It was conceded by the defendants, and the court
below found, that the circulation of this information would have a
natural tendency to cause retailers receiving these reports to
withhold patronage from listed concerns; that it therefore
necessarily tended to restrain wholesalers from selling to the
retail trade, which, in itself, was an undue and unreasonable
restraint of commerce. Moreover, the Court said at
234 U. S.
612:
"This record abounds in instances where the offending dealer was
thus reported, the hoped for effect, unless he discontinued the
offending practice, realized, and his trade directly and
appreciably impaired."
There was thus presented a case in which the court could not
only see that the combination would necessarily result
Page 268 U. S. 580
in a restraint on commerce which was unreasonable, but where in
fact such restraints had actually been effected by the concerted
action of the defendants.
In
American Column & Lumber Co. v. United States,
supra, the defendant association adopted a plan for the
gathering from its members daily, and disseminating among them
weekly, reports of all sales and shipments actually made, giving
prices, names and addresses of purchasers, the kind, grade, and
quantity of commodity sold and shipped. Its plan provided for a
monthly production report giving production of members during the
previous month, a monthly stock report showing stock on hand on the
first day of the month, current price lists, followed by prompt
information as to new price quotations as made. Monthly meetings
were held at which the extensive interchange of reports was
supplemented by further exchange of information as to production at
which active and concerted efforts were made to suppress
competition by the restriction of production. The secretary of the
association, in communications to members, actively urged
curtailment of production and increase of prices. The record
disclosed a systematic effort, participated in by the members of
the association and led and directed by the secretary of the
association, to cut down production and increase prices. The court
not only held that this concerted effort was, in itself, unlawful,
but that it resulted in an actual excessive increase of price to
which the court found the "united action of this large and
influential membership of dealers contributed greatly." The opinion
of the Court in that case rests squarely on the ground that there
was a combination on the part of the members to secure concerted
action in curtailment of production and increase of price, which
actually resulted in a restraint of commerce, producing increase of
price.
In
United States v. American Linseed Oil Co., supra,
defendants entered into an agreement, with provisions
Page 268 U. S. 581
for financial forfeitures in event of its violation, for the
organization and maintenance of an exchange or bureau whose
function it was to gather and distribute information, among the
members, as to all price lists covering the product of members.
Members agreed, under heavy penalties for violation, to furnish to
the bureau a
"schedule of prices and terms and adhere thereto, unless more
onerous ones were obtained, until prepared to give immediate notice
of departure therefrom for relay by the bureau to members."
Members were required by the agreement to report by telegraph
all variations of prices, the names of prospective buyers, the
point of shipment, the exact prices, terms, and discounts, whether
sales were made to jobber, or dealer or consumer, in what quantity,
and to report also by telegraph all orders received, to report
daily all carload sales of product, giving full details, all such
information being treated as confidential and concealed from the
buyers. All information received was made available to members
through the statistical surveys of the bureau. It was provided that
any subscriber who had offered his product to a prospective buyer
who did not purchase should have the right to advise the bureau of
the unsuccessful offer and to request the bureau to "bulletin" all
its subscribers asking specific information regarding any
quotations for sale to such prospective buyer, and to make to
subscribers a compilation report of the information secured by such
"bulletin." Members were required to give the desired information.
Each subscriber was required to furnish the bureau, upon request,
information pertaining to any buyer of the product, and might
request the bureau to secure like information from all other
subscribers "whenever it shall have an order or account with or
inquiry from the buyer." The plan as organized was actively carried
out by the defendants, and the Court held that the plan as operated
by the defendants was a violation of the Sherman Act in that "its
necessary
Page 268 U. S. 582
tendency was to suppress competition in interstate commerce." It
was held that the agreement for price maintenance, accompanied by
free exchange of information between competitors as to current
prices of the product offered for sale, full details as to
purchasers, actual and prospective, and the exchange of information
as to buyers and those to whom offerings were made by sellers and
of the terms of such offerings could necessarily have only one
purpose and effect -- namely to restrain competition among sellers.
The Court said at
262 U. S.
389:
"If, looking at the entire contract by which they are bound
together in the light of what has been done under it, the Court can
see that its necessary tendency is to suppress competition in trade
between the states, the combination must be declared unlawful. That
such is its tendency, we think, must be affirmed."
It is not, we think, open to question that the dissemination of
pertinent information concerning any trade or business tends to
stabilize that trade or business and to produce uniformity of price
and trade practice. Exchange of price quotations of market
commodities tends to produce uniformity of prices in the markets of
the world. Knowledge of the supplies of available merchandise tends
to prevent overproduction and to avoid the economic disturbances
produced by business crises resulting from overproduction. But the
natural effect of the acquisition of wider and more scientific
knowledge of business conditions, on the minds of the individuals
engaged in commerce and its consequent effect in stabilizing
production and price, can hardly be deemed a restraint of commerce,
or, if so, it cannot, we think, be said to be an unreasonable
restraint, or in any respect unlawful.
It is the consensus of opinion of economists and of many of the
most important agencies of government that the public interest is
served by the gathering and dissemination, in the widest possible
manner, of information with
Page 268 U. S. 583
respect to the production and distribution, cost and prices in
actual sales, of market commodities because the making available of
such information tends to stabilize trade and industry, to produce
fairer price levels, and to avoid the waste which inevitably
attends the unintelligent conduct of economic enterprise. "Free
competition" means a free and open market among both buyers and
sellers for the sale and distribution of commodities. Competition
does not become less free merely because the conduct of commercial
operations becomes more intelligent through the free distribution
of knowledge of all the essential factors entering into the
commercial transaction.
* General
knowledge that there is an accumulation of surplus of any market
commodity would undoubtedly tend to diminish production, but the
dissemination of that information cannot, in itself, be said to be
restraint upon commerce in any legal sense. The manufacturer is
free to produce, but prudence and business foresight based on that
knowledge influences free choice in favor of more limited
production. Restraint upon free competition begins when improper
use is made of that information through any concerted action which
operates to restrain the freedom of action of those who buy and
sell.
It was not the purpose or the intent of the Sherman Anti-Trust
Law to inhibit the intelligent conduct of business operations, nor
do we conceive that its purpose was to suppress such influences as
might affect the operations of interstate commerce through the
application to them of the individual intelligence of those engaged
in commerce, enlightened by accurate information as to the
essential elements of the economics of a trade or business,
however
Page 268 U. S. 584
gathered or disseminated. Persons who unite in gathering and
disseminating information in trade journals and statistical reports
on industry, who gather and publish statistics as to the amount of
production of commodities in interstate commerce, and who report
market prices are not engaged in unlawful conspiracies in restraint
of trade merely because the ultimate result of their efforts may be
to stabilize prices or limit production through a better
understanding of economic laws and a more general ability to
conform to them, for the simple reason that the Sherman Law neither
repeals economic laws nor prohibits the gathering and dissemination
of information. Sellers of any commodity who guide the daily
conduct of their business on the basis of market reports would
hardly be deemed to be conspirators engaged in restraint of
interstate commerce. They would not be any the more so merely
because they became stockholders in a corporation or joint owners
of a trade journal engaged in the business of compiling and
publishing such reports.
We do not conceive that the members of trade associations become
such conspirators merely because they gather and disseminate
information, such as is here complained of, bearing on the business
in which they are engaged and make use of it in the management and
control of their individual businesses; nor do we think that the
proper application of the principles of decision of
Eastern
States Retail Lumber Association v. United States or
American Column & Lumber Co. v. United States or
United States v. American Linseed Oil Company leads to any
such result. The Court held that the defendants in those cases were
engaged in conspiracies against interstate trade and commerce
because it was found that the character of the information which
had been gathered and the use which was made of it led irresistibly
to the conclusion that they had resulted, or would necessarily
result, in a concerted effort of the defendants to curtail
production or raise
Page 268 U. S. 585
prices of commodities shipped in interstate commerce. The
unlawfulness of the combination arose not from the fact that the
defendants had effected a combination to gather and disseminate
information, but from the fact that the Court inferred from the
peculiar circumstances of each case that concerted action had
resulted or would necessarily result in tending arbitrarily to
lessen production or increase prices.
Viewed in this light, can it be said in the present case that
the character of the information gathered by the defendants, or the
use which is being made of it, leads to any necessary inference
that the defendants either have made or will make any different or
other use of it than would normally be made if life statistics were
published in a trade journal or were published by the Department of
Commerce, to which all the gathered statistics are made available.
The cost of production, prompt information as to the cost of
transportation, are legitimate subjects of inquiry and knowledge in
any industry. So likewise is the production of the commodity in
that industry, the aggregate surplus stock, and the prices at which
the commodity has actually been sold in the usual course of
business.
We realize that such information, gathered and disseminated
among the members of a trade or business, may be the basis of
agreement or concerted action to lessen production arbitrarily or
to raise prices beyond the levels of production and price which
would prevail if no such agreement or concerted action ensued, and
those engaged in commerce were left free to base individual
initiative on full information of the essential elements of their
business. Such concerted action constitutes a restraint of
commerce, and is illegal and may be enjoined, as may any other
combination or activity necessarily resulting in such concerted
action as was the subject of consideration in
American Column
& Lumber Co. v. United States, supra, and
United
Page 268 U. S. 586
States v. American Linseed Oil Co., supra. But, in the
absence of proof of such agreement or concerted action having been
actually reached or actually attempted under the present plan of
operation of defendants, we can find no basis in the gathering and
dissemination of such information by them or in their activities
under their present organization for the inference that such
concerted action will necessarily result within the rule laid down
in those cases.
We decide only that trade associations or combinations of
persons or corporations which openly and fairly gather and
disseminate information as to the cost of their product, the volume
of production, the actual price which the product has brought in
past transactions, stocks of merchandise on hand, approximate cost
of transportation from the principal point of shipment to the
points of consumption as did these defendants and who, as they did,
meet and discuss such information and statistics without, however,
reaching or attempting to reach any agreement or any concerted
action with respect to prices or production or restraining
competition, do not thereby engage in unlawful restraint of
commerce.
The decree of the district court is reversed.
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE TAFT and MR. JUSTICE SANFORD dissent from the
opinions of the majority of the Court in these two cases (the
present case and the one next following) on the ground that, in
their judgment, the evidence in each case brings it substantially
within the rules stated in the
American Column Co. and
American Linseed Oil Co. cases, the authority of which, as
they understand, is not questioned in the opinion of the majority
of the Court.
*
See a suggestive analysis of the Competitive System
by various economists collected and commented on in Marshall's
Readings on Industrial Society, 294, 419, 479, 498, 935.
See Hobson, The Evolution of Modern Capitalism, 403, 5;
Elementary Principles of Economics, Irving Fisher, 427
et
seq.
The separate opinion of MR. JUSTICE McREYNOLDS.
These causes (the present case and the one next following)
disclose carefully developed plans to cut down normal competition
in interstate trade and commerce. Long impelled by this purpose,
appellants have adopted various expedients through which they
evidently hoped to defeat the policy of the law without subjecting
themselves to punishment.
They are parties to definite and unusual combinations and
agreements whereby each is obligated to reveal to confederates the
intimate details of his business and is restricted in his freedom
of action. It seems to me that ordinary knowledge of human nature
and of the impelling force of greed ought to permit no serious
doubt concerning the ultimate outcome of the arrangements. We may
confidently expect the destruction of that kind of competition long
relied upon by the public for establishment of fair prices, and to
preserve which the Anti-trust Act was passed.
United States v. American Linseed Oil Co., 262 U.
S. 371, states the doctrine which I think should be
rigorously applied. Pious protestations and smug preambles but
intensify distrust when men are found busy with schemes to enrich
themselves through circumventions. And the government ought not to
be required supinely to await the final destruction of competitive
conditions before demanding relief through the courts. The statute
supplies means for prevention. Artificial gestures should not
hinder their application.
I think the courts below reached right conclusions, and their
decrees should be affirmed.