1. The fundamental theory of liberty upon which all governments
of this Union rest excludes any general power of the State to
standardize its children by forcing them to accept instruction from
public teachers only. P.
268 U. S.
535.
2. The Oregon Compulsory Education Act (Oreg. Ls., § 5259)
which, with certain exemptions, requires every parent, guardian or
other person having control of a child between the ages of eight
and sixteen years to send him to the public school in the district
where he resides, for the period during which the school is held
for the current year, is an unreasonable interference with the
liberty of the parents and guardians to direct the upbringing of
the children, and in that respect violates the Fourteenth
Amendment. P.
268 U. S.
534.
3. In a proper sense, it is true that corporations cannot claim
for themselves the liberty guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment,
and, in general, no person in any business has such an interest in
possible customers as to enable him to restrain exercise of proper
power by the State upon the ground that he will be deprived of
patronage;
4. But where corporations owning and conducting schools are
threatened with destruction of their business and property through
the improper and unconstitutional compulsion exercised by this
statute upon parents and guardians, their interest is direct and
immediate, and entitles them to protection by injunction.
Truax
v. Raich, 239 U. S. 33. P.
268 U. S.
535.
5. The Act, being intended to have general application, cannot
be construed in its application to such corporations as an exercise
of power to amend their charters.
Berea College v.
Kentucky, 211 U. S. 45. P.
268 U. S.
535.
6. Where the injury threatened by an unconstitutional statute is
present and real before the statute is to be effective, and
will
Page 268 U. S. 511
become irreparable if relief be postponed to that time, a suit
to restrain future enforcement of the statute is not premature. P.
268 U. S. 536.
296 Fed. 928, affirmed.
APPEALS from decrees of the District Court granting preliminary
injunctions restraining the Governor, and other officials, of the
State of Oregon from threatening or attempting to enforce an
amendment to the school law -- an initiative measure adopted by the
people November 7, 1922, to become effective in 1926 -- requiring
parents and others having control of young children to send them to
the primary schools of the State. The plaintiffs were two Oregon
corporations owning and conducting schools.
Page 268 U. S. 529
MR. JUSTICE McREYNOLDS delivered the opinion of the Court.
These appeals are from decrees, based upon undenied allegations,
which granted preliminary orders restraining
Page 268 U. S. 530
appellants from threatening or attempting to enforce the
Compulsory Education Act
* adopted November
7, 1922, under the initiative provision of her Constitution by the
voters of Oregon. Jud.Code, § 266. They present the same points of
law; there are no controverted questions of fact. Rights said to be
guaranteed by the federal Constitution were specially set up, and
appropriate prayers asked for their protection.
The challenged Act, effective September 1, 1926, requires every
parent, guardian or other person having control or charge or
custody of a child between eight and sixteen years to send him "to
a public school for the period of time a public school shall be
held during the current year" in the district where the child
resides, and failure so to do is declared a misdemeanor. There
are
Page 268 U. S. 531
exemptions not specially important here -- for children who are
not normal, or who have completed he eighth grade, or who reside at
considerable distances from any public school, or whose parents or
guardians hold special permits from the County Superintendent. The
manifest purpose is to compel general attendance at public schools
by normal children, between eight and sixteen, who have not
completed the eighth grade. And without doubt enforcement of the
statute would seriously impair, perhaps destroy, the profitable
features of appellees' business and greatly diminish the value of
their property.
Appellee, the Society of Sisters, is an Oregon corporation,
organized in 1880, with power to care for orphans, educate and
instruct the youth, establish and maintain academies or schools,
and acquire necessary real and personal
Page 268 U. S. 532
property. It has long devoted its property and effort to the
secular and religious education and care of children, and has
acquired the valuable good will of many parents and guardians. It
conducts interdependent primary and high schools and junior
colleges, and maintains orphanages for the custody and control of
children between eight and sixteen. In its primary schools, many
children between those ages are taught the subjects usually pursued
in Oregon public schools during the first eight years. Systematic
religious instruction and moral training according to the tenets of
the Roman Catholic Church are also regularly provided. All courses
of study, both temporal and religious, contemplate continuity of
training under appellee's charge; the primary schools are essential
to the system and the most profitable. It owns valuable buildings,
especially constructed and equipped for school purposes. The
business is remunerative -- the annual income from primary schools
exceeds thirty thousand dollars -- and the successful conduct of
this requires long-time contracts with teachers and parents. The
Compulsory Education Act of 1922 has already caused the withdrawal
from its schools of children who would otherwise continue, and
their income has steadily declined. The appellants, public
officers, have proclaimed their purpose strictly to enforce the
statute.
After setting out the above facts, the Society's bill alleges
that the enactment conflicts with the right of parents to choose
schools where their children will receive appropriate mental and
religious training, the right of the child to influence the
parents' choice of a school, the right of schools and teachers
therein to engage in a useful business or profession, and is
accordingly repugnant to the Constitution and void. And, further,
that, unless enforcement of the measure is enjoined the
corporation's business and property will suffer irreparable
injury.
Appellee, Hill Military Academy, is a private corporation
organized in 1908 under the laws of Oregon, engaged
Page 268 U. S. 533
in owning, operating and conducting for profit an elementary,
college preparatory and military training school for boys between
the ages of five and twenty-one years. The average attendance is
one hundred, and the annual fees received for each student amount
to some eight hundred dollars. The elementary department is divided
into eight grades, as in the public schools; the college
preparatory department has four grades, similar to those of the
public high schools; the courses of study conform to the
requirements of the State Board of Education. Military instruction
and training are also given, under the supervision of an Army
officer. It owns considerable real and personal property, some
useful only for school purposes. The business and incident good
will are very valuable. In order to conduct its affairs, long time
contracts must be made for supplies, equipment, teachers and
pupils. Appellants, law officers of the State and County, have
publicly announced that the Act of November 7, 1922, is valid, and
have declared their intention to enforce it. By reason of the
statute and threat of enforcement, appellee's business is being
destroyed and its property depreciated; parents and guardians are
refusing to make contracts for the future instruction of their
sons, and some are being withdrawn.
The Academy's bill states the foregoing facts and then alleges
that the challenged Act contravenes the corporation's rights
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment and that, unless appellants
are restrained from proclaiming its validity and threatening to
enforce it, irreparable injury will result. The prayer is for an
appropriate injunction.
No answer was interposed in either cause, and, after proper
notices, they were heard by three judges (Jud.Code § 266) on
motions for preliminary injunctions upon the specifically alleged
facts. The court ruled that the Fourteenth Amendment guaranteed
appellees against the
Page 268 U. S. 534
deprivation of their property without due process of law
consequent upon the unlawful interference by appellants with the
free choice of patrons, present and prospective. It declared the
right to conduct schools was property, and that parents and
guardians, as a part of their liberty, might direct the education
of children by selecting reputable teachers and places. Also, that
these schools were not unfit or harmful to the public, and that
enforcement of the challenged statute would unlawfully deprive them
of patronage, and thereby destroy their owners' business and
property. Finally, that the threats to enforce the Act would
continue to cause irreparable injury, and the suits were not
premature.
No question is raised concerning the power of the State
reasonably to regulate all schools, to inspect, supervise and
examine them, their teachers and pupils; to require that all
children of proper age attend some school, that teachers shall be
of good moral character and patriotic disposition, that certain
studies plainly essential to good citizenship must be taught, and
that nothing be taught which is manifestly inimical to the public
welfare.
The inevitable practical result of enforcing the Act under
consideration would be destruction of appellees' primary schools,
and perhaps all other private primary schools for normal children
within the State of Oregon. These parties are engaged in a kind of
undertaking not inherently harmful, but long regarded as useful and
meritorious. Certainly there is nothing in the present records to
indicate that they have failed to discharge their obligations to
patrons, students or the State. And there are no peculiar
circumstances or present emergencies which demand extraordinary
measures relative to primary education.
Under the doctrine of
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.
S. 390, we think it entirely plain that the Act of 1922
unreasonably interferes with the liberty of parents and guardians
to direct the upbringing and education of children
Page 268 U. S. 535
under their control: as often heretofore pointed out, rights
guaranteed by the Constitution may not be abridged by legislation
which has no reasonable relation to some purpose within the
competency of the State. The fundamental theory of liberty upon
which all governments in this Union repose excludes any general
power of the State to standardize its children by forcing them to
accept instruction from public teachers only. The child is not the
mere creature of the State; those who nurture him and direct his
destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize
and prepare him for additional obligations.
Appellees are corporations, and therefore, it is said, they
cannot claim for themselves the liberty which the Fourteenth
Amendment guarantees. Accepted in the proper sense, this is true.
Northwestern Life Ins. Co. v. Riggs, 203 U.
S. 243,
203 U. S. 255;
Western Turf Association v. Greenberg, 204 U.
S. 359,
204 U. S. 363.
But they have business and property for which they claim
protection. These are threatened with destruction through the
unwarranted compulsion which appellants are exercising over present
and prospective patrons of their schools. And this court has gone
very far to protect against loss threatened by such action.
Truax v. Raich, 239 U. S. 33;
Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U. S. 312;
Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U. S. 197.
The courts of the State have not construed the Act, and we must
determine its meaning for ourselves. Evidently it was expected to
have general application, and cannot be construed as though merely
intended to amend the charters of certain private corporations, as
in
Berea College v. Kentucky, 211 U. S.
45. No argument in favor of such view has been
advanced.
Generally it is entirely true, as urged by counsel, that no
person in any business has such an interest in possible customers
as to enable him to restrain exercise of proper power of the State
upon the ground that he will be deprived
Page 268 U. S. 536
of patronage. But the injunctions here sought are not against
the exercise of any proper power. Plaintiffs asked protection
against arbitrary, unreasonable and unlawful interference with
their patrons and the consequent destruction of their business and
property. Their interest is clear and immediate, within the rule
approved in
Truax v. Raich, Truax v. Corrigan and
Terrace v. Thompson, supra, and many other cases where
injunctions have issued to protect business enterprises against
interference with the freedom of patrons or customers.
Hitchman
Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U.
S. 229;
Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering,
254 U. S. 443;
American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Central Trades
Council, 257 U. S. 184;
Nebraska District v. McKelvie, 262 U.
S. 404;
Truax v. Corrigan, supra, and cases
there cited.
The suits were not premature. The injury to appellees was
present and very real, not a mere possibility in the remote future.
If no relief had been possible prior to the effective date of the
Act, the injury would have become irreparable. Prevention of
impending injury by unlawful action is a well recognized function
of courts of equity. The decrees below are
Affirmed.
*
"
Be it Enacted by the People of the State of
Oregon:"
"Section 1. That Section 5259, Oregon Laws, be and the same is
hereby amended so as to read as follows:"
"Sec. 5259.
Children Between the Ages of Eight and Sixteen
Years -- Any parent, guardian or other person in the State of
Oregon, having control or charge or custody of a child under the
age of sixteen years and of the age of eight years or over at the
commencement of a term of public school of the district in which
said child resides, who shall fail or neglect or refuse to send
such child to a public school for the period of time a public
school shall be held during the current year in said district,
shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and each day's failure to send
such child to a public school shall constitute a separate offense;
provided, that, in the following cases, children shall not be
required to attend public schools:"
"(a)
Children Physically Unable -- Any child who is
abnormal, subnormal or physically unable to attend school."
"(b)
Children Who Have Completed the Eighth Grade --
Any child who has completed the eighth grade, in accordance with
the provisions of the state course of study."
"(c)
Distance from school -- Children between the ages
of eight and ten years, inclusive, whose place of residence is more
than one and one-half miles, and children over ten years of age
whose place of residence is more than three miles, by the nearest
traveled road, from public school; provided, however, that, if
transportation to and from school is furnished by the school
district, this exemption shall not apply."
"(d)
Private Instruction -- Any child who is being
taught for a like period of time by the parent or private teacher
such subjects as are usually taught in the first eight years in the
public school; but before such child can be taught by a parent or a
private teacher, such parent or private teacher must receive
written permission from the county superintendent, and such
permission shall not extend longer than the end of the current
school year. Such child must report to the county school
superintendent or some person designated by him at least once every
three months and take an examination in the work covered. If, after
such examination, the county superintendent shall determine that
such child is not being properly taught, then the county
superintendent shall order the parent, guardian or other person, to
send such child to the public school the remainder of the school
year."
"If any parent, guardian or other person having control or
charge or custody of any child between the ages of eight and
sixteen years shall fail to comply with any provision of this
section, he shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and shall, on
conviction thereof, be subject to a fine of not less than $5, nor
more than $100, or to imprisonment in the county jail not less than
two nor more than thirty days, or by both such fine and
imprisonment in the discretion of the court."
"This Act shall take effect and be and remain in force from and
after the first day of September, 1926."