Before allowance of a writ of error to review a judgment
directing issue of a writ of mandamus to compel the granting of a
building permit, the permit was issued, the building erected, and
the property transferred to persons not parties to the cause.
Held that, irrespective of the motive for granting the
permit, the cause was moot, and, for that reason, the judgment
below should be reversed, with directions for dismissal of the
petition for mandamus, without costs. P.
261 U. S.
217.
50 App.D.C. 279, 270 F. 1019, reversed.
Error to a judgment of the Court of Appeals of the District of
Columbia reversing a judgment of the Supreme Court of the District,
which dismissed a petition for the writ of mandamus, and directing
that the writ be issued.
MR. JUSTICE SUTHERLAND delivered the opinion of the Court.
The defendant in error, petitioner below, on June 9, 1920, filed
a petition in the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia,
praying for a writ of mandamus against respondents requiring them
to issue to her a permit to erect a building for business purposes
on a lot situated on a residence street in Washington. Prior to
filing the petition, she made preparations to erect the building
and applied to the building inspector for a permit, which he
Page 261 U. S. 217
declined to issue upon grounds not necessary to be stated
here.
The plaintiffs in error, respondents below, filed an answer to
the petition and return to the rule to show cause, and to the
answer a demurrer was interposed. On July 6, 1920, the demurrer was
overruled, the rule to show cause discharged, and petition
dismissed. Upon appeal to the Court of Appeals, this judgment was,
on February 7, 1921, reversed, and the cause remanded, with
directions to issue the writ as prayed. On March 19, 1921, an
application for a rehearing was overruled, and, on June 13th
following, this writ of error was allowed.
On March 14th, after the decision of the Court of Appeals, but
before the allowance of the writ of error, the permit demanded by
petitioner was issued by the building inspector, and thereupon the
building was constructed. It had been fully completed when the writ
of error was allowed. On June 2, 1921, petitioner conveyed all her
interest in the property to persons not parties to this cause.
It thus appears that there is now no actual controversy between
the parties -- no issue on the merits which this Court can properly
decide. The case has become moot for two reasons: (1) because the
permit, the issuance of which constituted the sole relief sought by
petitioner, has been issued and the building to which it related
has been completed, and (2) because, the first reason aside,
petitioner no longer has an interest in the building, and therefore
has no basis for maintaining the action.
This Court will not proceed to a determination when its judgment
would be wholly ineffectual for want of a subject matter on which
it could operate. An affirmance would ostensibly require something
to be done which had already taken place. A reversal would
ostensibly avoid an event which had already passed beyond recall.
One would be as vain as the other. To adjudicate a cause
Page 261 U. S. 218
which no longer exists is a proceeding which this Court
uniformly has declined to entertain.
See Mills v. Green,
159 U. S. 651;
Codlin v. Kohlhausen, 181 U. S. 151;
Little v. Bowers, 134 U. S. 547,
134 U. S. 556;
Singer Manufacturing Co. v. Wright, 141 U.
S. 696,
141 U. S. 699;
American Book Co. v. Kansas, 193 U. S.
49;
United States v. Hamburg-American Co.,
239 U. S. 466,
239 U. S. 475;
Berry v. Davis, 242 U. S. 468,
242 U. S. 470;
Board of Public Utility Comm'rs v. Compania General de Tabacos
de Filipinas, 249 U. S. 425;
Commercial Cable Co. v. Burleson, 250 U.
S. 360;
Heitmuller v. Stokes, 256 U.
S. 359.
It is urged that the permit was issued by the inspector of
buildings only because he believed it was incumbent upon him to
comply with the judgment of the Court of Appeals and avoid even the
appearance of disobeying it. The motive of the officer, so far as
this question is concerned, is quite immaterial. We are interested
only in the indisputable fact that his action, however induced, has
left nothing to litigate.
American Book Co. v. Kansas,
supra. The case being moot, further proceedings upon the
merits can neither be had here nor in the court of first instance.
To dismiss the writ of error would leave the judgment of the Court
of Appeals requiring the issuance of the mandamus in force -- at
least apparently so -- notwithstanding the basis therefor has
disappeared. Our action must, therefor,e dispose of the case, not
merely of the appellate proceeding which brought it here. The
practice now established by this Court, under similar conditions
and circumstances, is to reverse the judgment below and remand the
case with directions to dismiss the bill, complaint, or petition.
United States v. Hamburg-American Co., supra; Barry v. Davis,
supra; Board of Public Utility Comm'rs v. Compania General de
Tabacos de Filipinas, supra; Commercial Cable Co. v. Burleson,
supra; Heitmuller v. Stokes, supra.
Following these precedents, the judgment below should be
reversed, with directions to the Court of Appeals to
Page 261 U. S. 219
remand the cause to the Supreme Court, with instructions to
dismiss the petition, without costs, because the controversy
involved has become moot, and therefore is no longer a subject
appropriate for judicial action.
And it is so ordered.