1. In view of the Conformity Act and the law of Arkansas
respecting consolidation of causes,
held that the district
court did not abuse its discretion in permitting several allied
corporations to be joined as plaintiffs in an action prosecuted by
their receiver to recover triple damages under § 7 of the Sherman
Act for the destruction of their properties and business committed
in an alleged conspiracy to restrain interstate commerce. P.
259 U. S.
382.
Page 259 U. S. 345
2. Unincorporated labor unions, such as the United Mine Workers
of America, and its district and local branches, impleaded in this
case, recognized as distinct entities by numerous acts of Congress
as well as by the laws and decisions of many states, are suable as
such in the federal courts upon process served on their principal
officers, for the torts committed by them in strikes, and their
strike funds are subject to execution. P.
259 U. S.
385.
3. Such associations are included by § 7 of the Sherman Act,
permitting actions for damages resulting from conspiracies in
restraint of interstate commerce to be brought against
"corporations and associations existing under or authorized by the
laws of either the United States" or the laws of any territory,
state or foreign country. P.
259 U. S.
392.
4. Where the constitution of a general association of workmen,
organized for the declared purpose of improving their wages and
working conditions through strikes and other means and subdivided
into district and local unions, through which its treasury was
supplied, authorized the several district organizations to order
local strikes within their respective districts, but upon their own
responsibility and without financial support from the general body
unless sanctioned by its governing board, and a local strike in
which serious trespasses were committed was called by a district
without such sanction, but in accordance with its own constitution,
and conducted by it at its own expense,
held that the
general association was not responsible, upon principles of agency,
even though it had power to discipline the district and take over
the strike at its own expense, and that liability on its part and
that of its officers could not be sustained without substantial
evidence of their participation in or ratification of the torts
committed. P.
259 U. S.
393.
5. The overwhelming weight of evidence in this case establishes
that the defendant district union and its officers, with other
individual defendants, participated in a plot unlawfully to deprive
the plaintiffs of their employees by intimidation and violence, and
in its execution destroyed the plaintiffs' properties. P.
259 U. S.
396.
6. Where the constitution of a district organization of several
local labor unions authorizes the district officers to order a
local strike, the district is responsible for injuries unlawfully
inflicted in a strike so ordered, and its strike funds may be
subjected to a resulting judgment. P.
259 U. S.
403.
7. The mining of coal is not interstate commerce, and a
conspiracy to obstruct mining at particular mines, though it may
prevent coal
Page 259 U. S. 346
from going into interstate commerce, is not a conspiracy to
restrain that commerce within the Sherman Act unless an intention
to restrain it be proven or unless so direct and substantial an
effect upon it necessarily result from the obstruction to mining
that such intention must in reason be inferred. P.
259 U. S.
410.
8. Evidence that a union of coal miners belonged to a general
association which, as an incident of its object to promote wages,
etc., had a general policy to unionize coal mines by strikes, etc.,
and thus discourage competition of open shop against union in
interstate commerce,
held not sufficient to prove that a
conspiracy of the lesser organization and its members, accompanied
by a local strike, to prevent the employment of nonunion miners and
the mining of coal at particular mines, was a conspiracy to
restrain interstate commerce in violation of the Sherman Act, where
the strike and its lawless activities were the affair of the
conspirators, explained by local motives, and the normal output of
the mines was not enough to have a substantial effect on prices and
competition in interstate commerce from which a motive to assist
the general policy might be inferred. Pp.
259 U. S. 403,
259 U. S.
412.
258 F. 829 reversed.
This is a writ of error brought under § 241 of the Judicial Code
to review a judgment of the circuit court of appeals of the Eighth
Circuit. That court, on a writ of error, had affirmed the judgment
of the District Court for the Western District of Arkansas in favor
of the plaintiffs, with some modification, and that judgment thus
affirmed is here for review.
The plaintiffs in the district court were the receivers of the
Bache-Denman Coal Company, with eight other corporations, in each
of which the first-named company owned a controlling amount of
stock. They were closely interrelated in corporate organization and
in the physical location of their coal mines. These had been
operated for some years as a unit under one set of officers in the
Prairie Creek valley in Sebastian County, Arkansas. In July, 1914,
the District Court for the Western District of Arkansas appointed a
receiver for all of the nine companies by a single decree. The
receiver then appointed
Page 259 U. S. 347
was Franklin Bache, whose successors are as such defendants in
error here.
The defendants in the court below were the United Mine Workers
of America and its officers, District 21 of the United Mine Workers
of America and its officers, 27 local unions in District No. 21 and
their officers, and 65 individuals, mostly members of one union or
another, but including some persons not members, all of whom were
charged in the complaint with having entered into a conspiracy to
restrain and monopolize interstate commerce, in violation of the
first and second sections of the Anti-Trust Act, and with having,
in the course of that conspiracy, and for the purpose of
consummating it, destroyed the plaintiff's properties. Treble
damages for this and an attorney's fee were asked under the seventh
section of the act.
The original complaint was filed in September, 1914, about six
weeks after the destruction of the property. It was demurred to,
and the district court sustained the demurrer. This was carried to
the court of appeals on error, and the ruling of the district court
was reversed.
Dowd v. United Mine Workers, 235 F. 1. The
case then came to trial on the third amended complaint and answers
of the defendants. The trial resulted in a verdict of $200,000 for
the plaintiffs, which was trebled by the court, and to which was
added a counsel fee of $25,000, and interest to the amount of
$120,600, from July 17, 1914, the date of the destruction of the
property, to November 22, 1917, the date upon which judgment was
entered. The verdict did not separate the amount found between the
companies. On a writ of error from the court of appeals, the case
was reversed as to the interest, but in other respects the judgment
was affirmed. 258 F. 829. The defendants the International Union
and District No. 21 have given a supersedeas bond to meet the
judgment if it is affirmed as against both or either of them.
Page 259 U. S. 348
The third amended complaint avers that, of the nine companies,
of which the plaintiff was receiver and for which he was bringing
his suit, five were operating companies engaged in mining coal and
shipping it in interstate commerce, employing in all about 870 men,
and mining an annual product when working to their capacity valued
at $465,000, of which 75 percent was sold and shipped to customers
outside of the state. Of the five operating companies, one was
under contract to operate the properties of two of the others, and
four nonoperating companies were each financially interested in one
or more of the operating companies either by lease, by contract, or
by the ownership of all or a majority of their stock. The defendant
the United Mine Workers of America is alleged to be an
unincorporated association of mine workers, governed by a
constitution, with a membership exceeding 400,000, subdivided into
30 districts and numerous local unions. These subordinate districts
and unions are subject to the constitution and bylaws not only of
the International Union, but also to constitutions of their
own.
The complaint avers that the United Mine Workers divide all coal
mines into two classes, union or organized mines, operating under a
contract with the union to employ only union miners, and open shop
or nonunion mines, which refuse to make such a contract; that,
owing to the unreasonable restrictions and regulations imposed by
the union on organized mines, the cost of production of union coal
is unnecessarily enhanced so as to prevent its successful
competition in the markets of the country with nonunion coal; that
the object of the conspiracy of the United Mine Workers and the
union operators acting with them is the protection of the
union-mined coal by the prevention and restraint of all interstate
trade and competition in the products of nonunion mines. The
complaint enumerates twenty-three states in which coal
Page 259 U. S. 349
mining is conducted, and alleges that the coal mined in each
comes into competition in interstate commerce, directly or
indirectly, with that mined in Illinois, Kentucky, Alabama, New
Mexico, Colorado, Kansas, Oklahoma, and Arkansas, in the markets of
Louisiana, Texas, Oklahoma, Nebraska, Kansas, Missouri, Iowa, and
Minnesota, where, but for the defendants' unlawful interference,
plaintiffs would have been engaged in trade in 1914; that the
bituminous mines of the greater part of the above territory are
union mines, the principal exceptions being Alabama, West Virginia,
parts of Pennsylvania, and Colorado, which the defendant has thus
far been unable to organize.
The complaint further avers that, early in 1914, the plaintiff
companies decided that the operating companies should go on a
nonunion or open shop basis. Two of them, the Prairie Creek Coal
Mining Company and the Mammoth Vein Coal Company, closed down and
discontinued as union mines, preparatory to reopening as open shop
mines in April. They were to be operated under a new contract by
the Mammoth Vein Coal Mining Company. Another of the companies, the
Hartford Coal Company, which had not been in operation, planned to
start as an open shop mine as soon as convenient in the summer of
1914. The fifth, the Coronado Coal Company, continued operating
with the union until April 18, 1914, when its employees struck
because of its unity of interest with the other mines of the
plaintiffs. The plaintiffs say that, in April, 1914, the defendants
and those acting in conjunction with them, in furtherance of the
general conspiracy, already described, to drive nonunion coal out
of interstate commerce, and thus to protect union operators from
nonunion competition, drove and frightened away with plaintiffs'
employees, including those directly engaged in shipping coal to
other states, prevented the plaintiffs from employing other men,
destroyed the structures and facilities for mining, loading, and
shipping coal, and the
Page 259 U. S. 350
cars of interstate carriers waiting to be loaded, as well as
those already loaded with coal in and for interstate shipment, and
prevented plaintiffs from engaging in or continuing to engage in
interstate commerce. The complaint alleges that the destruction to
the property and business amounted to the sum of $740,000, and asks
judgment for three times that amount, or $2,220,000. Certain of the
funds of the United Mine Workers in Arkansas were attached. The
defendants the United Mine Workers of America, District No. 21, and
each local union, and each individual defendant filed a separate
answer. The answers deny all the averments of the complaint. The
trial began on October 24, 1917, and a verdict and judgment were
entered on November 22 following. The evidence is very voluminous,
covering more than 3,000 printed pages.
Page 259 U. S. 351
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE TAFT, after stating the case, delivered the
opinion of the Court.
There are five principal questions pressed by the plaintiffs in
error here, the defendants below. The first is that there was a
misjoinder of parties plaintiff. The second is that the United Mine
Workers of America, District No. 21, United Mine Workers of
America, and the local unions made defendants, are unincorporated
associations, and not subject to suit, and therefore should have
been dismissed from the case on motions seasonably made. The third
is that there is no evidence to show any agency by the
Page 259 U. S. 382
United Mine Workers of America in the conspiracy charged, or in
the actual destruction of the property, and no liability therefor.
The fourth is that there is no evidence to show that the conspiracy
alleged against District No. 21 and the other defendants was a
conspiracy to restrain or monopolize interstate commerce. The fifth
is that the court erred in a supplemental charge to the jury, which
so stated the court's view of the evidence as to amount to a
mandatory direction coercing the jury into finding the verdict
which was recorded.
First. It does not seem to us that there was a misjoinder of
parties under the procedure as authorized in Arkansas. In that
state, the law provides that, when causes of action of a like
nature, or relative to the same question, are pending before any of
its circuit or chancery courts, the court may make such orders and
rules regulating proceedings therein as may be conformable to the
usages of courts for avoiding unnecessary costs or delay in the
administration of justice, and may consolidate said causes when it
appears reasonable to do so. In
Southern Anthracite Coal Co. v.
Bowen, 93 Ark. 140, the court consolidated, over objection by
defendant, two suits by two workmen who had been injured in the
same accident, and the Supreme Court approved of this action. In
Fidelity Insurance Co. v. Friedman, 117 Ark. 71, it was
held that actions by an injured person and by a mortgagee against
eight insurance companies on eight different fire insurance
policies could be consolidated against the objection by defendants,
and they were tried together. Of course, the application of this
rule of the Arkansas courts under the federal Conformity Act will
be qualified to prevent injury to any substantial right secured by
federal law in the trial. It is a case for the exercise of
reasonable discretion by the trial court. We cannot say that that
discretion was abused in this case. All the companies for which the
plaintiffs herein are receivers were united together in
interest
Page 259 U. S. 383
and were largely under the control of one of the companies. The
active manager of all of them for years was Franklin Bache. He was
the first receiver, and, as such, the plaintiff. There was no need
for a division in the verdict of damages found, because the union
of interest between the plaintiffs involved no difficulty in the
distribution among them of the amount found. The judgment is
res adjudicata as to all the plaintiffs, and we can find
no substantial reason for disturbing it on this ground. No
difficulty presented itself with respect to the challenge of jurors
by either side, and, so far as appears, there was no embarrassment
to the defendants growing out of the union of the plaintiffs. On
the contrary, an examination of the evidence shows that all the
witnesses for the defendants treated the plaintiffs as a unit. They
were so regarded in business and in the neighborhood where the
mines were.
Second. Were the unincorporated associations, the International
Union, District No. 21, and the local unions, suable in their
names? The United Mine Workers of America is a national
organization. Indeed, because it embraces Canada, it is called the
International Union. Under its constitution, it is intended to be
the union of all workmen employed in and around coal mines, coal
washers, and coke ovens on the American continent. Its declared
purpose is to increase wages and improve conditions of employment
of its members by legislation, conciliation, joint agreements, and
strikes. It demands not more than eight hours a day of labor. The
union is composed of workmen eligible to membership, and is divided
into districts, subdistricts, and local unions. The ultimate
authority is a general convention to which delegates selected by
the members in their local organizations are elected. The body
governing the union in the interval between conventions is the
International Board consisting of the principal officers, the
president, vice-president, and secretary-treasurer, together with a
member from
Page 259 U. S. 384
each district. The president has much power. He can remove or
suspend International officers, appoints the national organizers
and subordinates, and is to interpret authoritatively the
constitution, subject to reversal by the International Board. When
the Board is not in session, the individual members are to do what
he directs them to do. He may dispense with initiation fees for
admission of new locals and members. The machinery of the
organization is directed largely toward propaganda, conciliation of
labor disputes, the making of scale agreements with operators, the
discipline of officers, members, districts, and locals, and toward
strikes and the maintenance of funds for that purpose. It is
admirably framed for unit action under the direction of the
national officers. It has a weekly journal, whose editor is
appointed by the president, which publishes all official orders and
circulars, and all the union news. Each local union is required to
be a subscriber, and its official notices are to be brought by the
secretary to the attention of the members. The initiation fees and
dues collected from each member are divided between the national
treasury, the district treasury, and that of the local. Should a
local dissolve, the money is to be transmitted to the national
treasury.
The rules as to strikes are important here. Section 27 of
Article IX of the constitution is as follows:
"The Board shall have power between conventions, by a two-thirds
vote, to recommend the calling of a general strike, but under no
circumstances shall it call such strike until approved by a
referendum vote of the members."
Under article XVI, no district is permitted to engage in a
strike involving all or a major portion of its members without
sanction of the International Convention or Board.
Section 2 of that article provides that districts may order
local strikes within their respective districts "on
Page 259 U. S. 385
their own responsibility," but where local strikes are to be
financed by the International Union, they must be sanctioned by the
International Board.
Section 3 provides that in unorganized fields the Convention or
Board must sanction strikes, and no financial aid is to be given
until after the strike has lasted four weeks, unless otherwise
decided by the Board. The Board is to prescribe conditions in which
strikes are to be financed by the International Union and the
amount of strike relief to be furnished the striking members. In
such cases, the president appoints a financial agent to assume
responsibility for money to be expended from the International
funds, and he only can make binding contracts. There is a uniform
system of accounting as to the disbursements for strikes.
The membership of the union has reached 450,000. The dues
received from them for the national and district organizations make
a very large annual total, and the obligations assumed in traveling
expenses, holding of conventions, and general overhead cost, but
most of all in strikes, are so heavy that an extensive financial
business is carried on, money is borrowed, notes are given to
banks, and in every way the union acts as a business entity,
distinct from its members. No organized corporation has greater
unity of action, and in none is more power centered in the
governing executive bodies.
Undoubtedly, at common law, an unincorporated association of
persons was not recognized as having any other character than a
partnership in whatever was done, and it could only sue or be sued
in the names of its members, and their liability had to be enforced
against each member.
Pickett v. Walsh, 192 Mass. 572;
Karges Furniture Co. v. Amalgamated Woodworkers Local
Union, 165 Ind. 421;
Baskins v. United Mine Workers,
234 S.W. 464. But the growth and necessities of these great labor
organizations have brought affirmative legal recognition of
their
Page 259 U. S. 386
existence and usefulness and provisions for their protection
which their members have found necessary. Their right to maintain
strikes when they do not violate law or the rights of others has
been declared. The embezzlement of funds by their officers has been
especially denounced as a crime. The so-called union label, which
is a
quasi trademark to indicate the origin of
manufactured product in union labor, has been protected against
pirating and deceptive use by the statutes of most of the states,
and, in many states, authority to sue to enjoin its use has been
conferred on unions. They have been given distinct and separate
representation and the right to appear to represent union interests
in statutory arbitrations, and before official labor boards. We
insert in the margin an extended reference,
* furnished by the
industry of counsel, to
Page 259 U. S. 387
legislation of this kind. More than this, equitable procedure
adapting itself to modern needs has grown to recognize the need of
representation by one person of many, too numerous to sue or to be
sued (Story, Equity Pleadings, 8th ed., §§ 94, 97;
St. Germain
v. Bakery Union, 97 Wash. 282;
Branson v. Industrial
Workers of the World, 30 Nev. 270;
Barnes v. Chicago
Typographical Union, 232 Ill. 402), and this has had its
influence upon the law side of litigation, so that, out of the very
necessities of the existing conditions and the utter impossibility
of doing justice otherwise, the suable character of such an
organization as this has come to be recognized in some
jurisdictions, and many suits for and against labor unions are
reported in which no question has been raised as to the right to
treat them in their closely united
Page 259 U. S. 388
action and functions as artificial persons capable of suing and
being sued. It would be unfortunate if an organization with as
great power as this International Union has in the raising of large
funds and in directing the conduct of 400,000 members in carrying
on, in a wide territory, industrial controversies, and strikes out
of which so much unlawful injury to private rights is possible,
Page 259 U. S. 389
could assemble its assets to be used therein free from liability
for injuries by torts committed in course of such strikes. To
remand persons injured to a suit against each of the 400,000
members, to recover damages and to levy on his share of the strike
fund, would be to leave them remediless.
Page 259 U. S. 390
In the case of
Taff Vale Co. v. Amalgamated Society of
Railway Servants, [1901] A.C. 426, an English statute provided
for the registration of trades unions, authorized them to hold
property through trustees, to have agents, and provided for a
winding up and a rendering of accounts. A union was sued for
damages growing out of a strike. Mr. Justice Farwell, meeting the
objection that the union was not a corporation and could not be
sued as an artificial person, said:
"If the contention of the defendant society were well founded,
the legislature has authorized the creation of numerous bodies of
men capable of owning great wealth and of action by agents with
absolutely no responsibility for the wrongs that they may do to
other persons by the use of that wealth and the employment of those
agents."
He therefore gave judgment against the union. This was affirmed
by the House of Lords. The legislation in question in that case did
not create trade unions, but simply recognized their existence and
regulated them in certain ways, but neither conferred on them
general power to sue nor imposed liability to be sued.
See also
Hillenbrand v. Building Trade Council, 14 Ohio Dec.(N.P.) 628;
Holland Jurisprudence (12th ed.) 341; Pollock's First Book on
Jurisprudence (2d ed.) 125.
Though such a conclusion as to the suability of trades unions is
of primary importance in the working out of justice and in
protecting individuals and society from possibility of oppression
and injury in their lawful rights from the existence of such
powerful entities as trade unions, it is, after all, in essence and
principle, merely a procedural matter. As a matter of substantive
law, all the members of the union engaged in a combination doing
unlawful injury are liable to suit and recovery, and the only
question is whether, when they have voluntarily, and for the
purpose of acquiring concentrated strength and the faculty of quick
unit action and elasticity, created a self-acting
Page 259 U. S. 391
body with great funds to accomplish their purpose, they may not
be sued as this body, and the funds they have accumulated may not
be made to satisfy claims for injuries unlawfully caused in
carrying out their united purpose. Trade unions have been
recognized as lawful by the Clayton Act; they have been tendered
formal incorporation as national unions by the Act of Congress
approved June 29, 1886, c. 567, 24 Stat. 86. In the Act of Congress
approved August 23, 1912, c. 351, 37 Stat. 415, a commission on
industrial relations was created, providing that three of the
Commissioners should represent organized labor. Transportation Act
1920, §§ 302-307, 41 Stat. 469, recognizes labor unions in creation
of railroad boards of adjustment, and provides for action by the
Railroad Labor Board upon their application. The Act of Congress
approved August 5, 1909, c. 6, § 38, 36 Stat. 112, and the Act
approved October 3, 1913, c. 16, subd. G(a), 38 Stat. 172,
expressly exempt labor unions from excise taxes. Periodical
publications issued by or under the auspices of trades unions are
admitted into the mails as second-class mail matter. Acts
1911-1913, c. 389, 37 Stat. 550. The legality of labor unions of
postal employees is expressly recognized by Act of Congress
approved August 24, 1912, c. 389, § 6, 37 Stat. 539, 555. By Act of
Congress passed August 1, 1914, no money was to be used from funds
therein appropriated to prosecute unions under the Anti-Trust Act
(38 Stat. 609, 652).
In this state of federal legislation, we think that such
organizations are suable in the federal courts for their acts, and
that funds accumulated to be expended in conducting strikes are
subject to execution in suits for torts committed by such unions in
strikes. The fact that the Supreme Court of Arkansas has since
taken a different view in
Baskins v. United Mine Workers of
America, supra, cannot, under the Conformity Act, operate as a
limitation on the federal procedure in this regard.
Page 259 U. S. 392
Our conclusion as to the suability of the defendants is
confirmed in the case at bar by the words of §§ 7 and 8 of the
Anti-Trust Law. The persons who may be sued under § 8 include
"corporations and associations existing under or authorized by
the laws of either the United States, the laws of any of the
territories, the laws of any state, or the laws of any foreign
country."
This language is very broad, and the words given their natural
signification certainly include labor unions like these. They are,
as has been abundantly shown, associations existing under the laws
of the United States, of the territories thereof, and of the states
of the Union. Congress was passing drastic legislation to remedy a
threatening danger to the public welfare, and did not intend that
any persons or combinations of persons should escape its
application. Their thought was especially directed against business
associations and combinations that were unincorporated to do the
things forbidden by the act, but they used language broad enough to
include all associations which might violate its provisions
recognized by the statutes of the United States or the states or
the territories, or foreign countries as lawfully existing, and
this, of course, includes labor unions, as the legislation referred
to shows. Thus it was that, in the cases of
United States v.
Trans-Missouri Freight Association, 166 U.
S. 290,
United States v. Joint Traffic
Association, 171 U. S. 505,
Montague & Co. v. Lowry, 193 U. S.
38, and
Eastern states Lumber Association v. United
States, 234 U. S. 600,
unincorporated associations were made parties to suits in the
federal courts under the Anti-Trust Act without question by anyone
as to the correctness of the procedure.
For these reasons, we conclude that the International Union, the
District No. 21, and the 27 local unions were properly made parties
defendant here and properly served by process on their principal
officers.
Page 259 U. S. 393
Third. The next question is whether the International Union was
shown by any substantial evidence to have initiated, participated
in, or ratified the interference with plaintiffs' business which
began April 6, 1914, and continued at intervals until July 17, when
the matter culminated in a battle and the destruction of the
Bache-Denman properties. The strike was a local strike declared by
the president and officers of the District Organization No. 21,
embracing Arkansas, Kansas, Oklahoma, and Texas. By § 16 of the
International constitution, as we have seen, it could not thus
engage in a strike, if it involved all or a major part of its
district members, without sanction of the International Board.
There is nothing to show that the International Board ever
authorized it, took any part in preparation for it or in its
maintenance. Nor did they or their organization ratify it by paying
any of the expenses. It came exactly within the definition of a
local strike in the constitutions of both the national and the
district organizations. The district made the preparations and paid
the bills. It does appear that the president of the national body
was in Kansas City and heard of the trouble which had taken place
on April 6 at Prairie Creek, and that, at a meeting of the
International Board, he reported it as something he had learned on
his trip for their official information. He said that a man named
Bache had demanded in a suit an accounting of the funds of the
Southwestern Coal Operators' Association, that, when he secured the
information he
"went down to Arkansas and started to run his mine nonunion. The
boys simply marched in on him in a day down there, and kicked his
Colorado guards out of there, and broke their jaws, and put the
flag of the United Mine Workers on top of the tipple, and pulled
the fires out of the boilers, and that was all there was to it, and
the mines have been idle ever since. I do not say our boys did
this, but I mean the people from all through that country marched
in and
Page 259 U. S. 394
stopped the work, and, when the guards offered resistance,
several of them were roughly handled, but no lives were lost, as I
understand it."
Later in May, he made a long speech at a special convention of
District No. 21 held at Ft. Smith for a purpose not connected with
this matter, in which he referred especially to the Colorado and
West Virginia strikes, in which the International Union was engaged
with all its might, but he made no specific allusion to the Prairie
Creek difficulty. It does appear that, in 1916, after Stewart, the
president of District 21, had been convicted of conspiracy to
defeat the injunction issued to protect the Prairie Creek mines in
this conflict, and had gone to the penitentiary and was pardoned,
White, the national president, wrote a letter thanking the
President for this, and that subsequently he appointed Stewart to a
position on a district committee. It would be going very far to
consider such acts of the president along a ratification by the
International Board, creating liability for a past tort. The
president had not authority to order or ratify a local strike. Only
the board could do this. White's report in an executive meeting of
the Board of the riot of April 6 shows sympathy with its purpose
and a lack of respect for law, but does not imply or prove on his
part any prior initiation or indicate a desire to ratify the
transaction as his work. The Board took no action on his report. He
did not request it.
Communications from outsiders and editorials, published in the
United Mine Workers journal, giving accounts of the occurrences at
Prairie Creek and representing that the troubles were due to the
aggression of the armed guards of the mine owners, and that the
action of the union men was justified because in defense of their
homes against night attacks, do not constitute such ratification by
the Board or the president, after the fact, as to make the
International Union liable for what had been done.
Page 259 U. S. 395
The argument of counsel for the plaintiffs is that, because the
national body had authority to discipline district organizations,
to make local strikes its own and to pay their cost, if it deemed
it wise, the duty was thrust on it, when it knew a local strike was
on, to superintend it and prevent its becoming lawless at its
peril. We do not conceive that such responsibility is imposed on
the national body. A corporation is responsible for the wrongs
committed by its agents in the course of its business, and this
principle is enforced against the contention that torts are
ultra vires the corporation. But it must be shown that it
is in the business of the corporation. Surely no stricter rule can
be enforced against an unincorporated organization like this. Here,
it is not a question of contract, or of holding out an appearance
of authority, on which some third person acts. It is a mere
question of actual agency, which the constitutions of the two
bodies settle conclusively. If the International body had
interfered, or if it had assumed liability by ratification,
different questions would have arisen.
Counsel cite § 2 of article XII of the constitution of District
No. 21 to show that questions of all strikes must be referred by
district officers to the national president for his decision, and
suggest that, in the absence of a showing, it is to be inferred
that they did so here, and the strike was approved by him. They
misconstrue the section. It applies only to a proposed strike which
would affect two districts and to which one district is opposed. It
does not apply to local strikes like this.
But it is said that the district was doing the work of the
International and carrying out its policies, and this circumstance
makes the former an agent. We cannot agree to this in the face of
the specific stipulation between them that, in such a case, unless
the International expressly assumed responsibility, the district
must meet it alone. The subsequent events, showing that the
District did meet
Page 259 U. S. 396
the responsibility with its own funds, confirm our reliance upon
the constitutions of the two bodies.
We conclude that the motions of the International Union, the
United Mine Workers of America, and of its president and its other
officers, that the jury be directed to return a verdict for them
should have been granted.
Fourth. The next question is two-fold: (a) whether the District
No. 21 and the individual defendants participated in a plot
unlawfully to deprive the plaintiffs of their employees by
intimidation and violence, and in the course of it destroyed their
properties, and (b) whether they did these things in pursuance of a
conspiracy to restrain and monopolize interstate commerce.
The case made for the plaintiff was as follows:
(a) In March of 1914, when the Prairie Creek No. 4 Mammoth Vein
coal mine and the Coronado mines were operating with union labor,
and under a District No. 21 contract and scale of wages and terms
which did not expire until July 1 following, Bache, the manager of
all the properties, determined to run his mines thereafter on a
nonunion or open basis. He had his superintendent prepare a letter
setting forth his reasons for the change, and forwarded it to his
principals in the East to justify the change of policy which he
insisted would result in a substantial reduction in the cost of
production. To avoid the charge of a breach of the union scale, he
had a contract made between the Mammoth Vein Coal Mining Company,
which he controlled, and the Prairie Creek Coal Company and the
Mammoth Vein Coal Company, by which the Mammoth Vein Coal Mining
Company, a corporation with $100 capital, agreed to run the mines.
As it had signed no scale, he considered it free from obligation to
the union. He then shut down the mines and prepared to open them on
a nonunion basis on April 6. He anticipated trouble. He employed
three guards from the Burns Detective Agency, and a number of
others to aid them. He bought
Page 259 U. S. 397
a number of Winchester rifles and ammunition. He surrounded his
principal mining plant at Prairie Creek No. 4 with a cable strung
on posts. He had notices prepared for his former employees, who
occupied the company's houses, to vacate. He had notices warning
trespassers from the premises posted at the entrance to the tract
that was enclosed within the cable. He sent out for nonunion men,
and had gathered some 30 or more at the mine by the day fixed for
the opening.
The mines of the plaintiffs lie in the County of Sebastian, on
the west border of Arkansas, next to Oklahoma, in a hilly country.
The whole country is full of coal mines. The annual coal-producing
capacity of Arkansas is about 2,000,000 tons. The product is a
smokeless coal, like the Pocohontas of West Virginia. All the
Arkansas mines, but one small one, were union. The towns in the
neighborhood, Hartford, Huntington, Midland, Frogtown, and others,
were peopled by union miners, and the business done in them was
dependent on union miners' patronage. Hartford, a town of 2,500,
was about 3 miles from Prairie Creek; Midland, less in size, lay
about the same distance away in another direction, and Huntington
was a mile or two further in still another direction. Frogtown was
a small village, about a mile and a half from Prairie Creek.
Stewart, the president of the District No. 21, and the other
officers, promptly declared a local strike against the Prairie
Creek and Mammoth Vein mine, and the union miners who had not been
discharged from the Coronado mine of the plaintiffs left. Through
the agency of the officers of District No. 21 and the local unions,
a public meeting was called at the schoolhouse, about a quarter of
a mile from the Prairie Creek mine. The influence of the union men
was exerted upon the shopkeepers of the towns above named to close
their stores and attend the meeting. It was given a picnic
character, and women and children attended. The meeting, after
listening to
Page 259 U. S. 398
speeches, appointed a committee to visit the superintendent in
charge of the mine. On this committee was one Slankard, a constable
of the Town of Hartford, and a union man, together with two other
union miners. They asked the superintendent that the nonunion men
be sent away and the mine resume operations with union men. The
committee was attended by a very large body of union miners. They
were met at the entrance to the enclosure by two guards with guns
carried behind them. The committee was admitted to see the
superintendent, and the crowd dealt with the guards. The guards had
been directed not to use their guns save to defend their own lives
or another's. The union miners assaulted the guards, took the guns
away, and so injured a number of the employees that four or five
had to be sent to a hospital. The crowd swarmed over the premises,
forced the pulling of the fires, and hurled stones at the fleeing
guards. The result was that all the employees deserted the mine,
and it was completely filled with water, which came in when the
pumps stopped. One of the crowd went up to the top of the coal
tipple and planted a flag on which was the legend, "This is a union
man's country."
Mr. Bache, after the riot and lawless violence of April 6,
secured from the federal district court an injunction against those
union miners and others whom his agents could identify as having
been present and having taken part. This included the president and
secretary-treasurer of the District No. 21 and others. Bache then
made preparations to resume mining. The mine was full of water, and
it required a considerable time to pump it out and get things into
proper condition. Because of further threats, the court was applied
to to send United States deputy marshals to guard the property, and
they were sent. Meantime the work of reparation progressed, and
Bache's agents were engaged in securing the coming of miners and
other employees from in and out of the state
Page 259 U. S. 399
to enlarge his force. The attitude of the union miners continued
hostile, and constant effort was made by them to intercept the
groups of men and women who were brought in by Bache from Tennessee
and elsewhere, and to turn them away, either by peaceable
inducement or by threats and physical intimidation. The vicinage
was so permeated with union feeling that the public officers did
not hesitate to manifest their emnity toward the nonunion men, and
made arrests of the guards and others who were in Bache's employ
upon frivolous charges. Rumors were spread abroad through the
county that the guards employed by Bache were insulting and making
indecent proposals to very young girls in and about Prairie Creek,
and P. R. Stewart, the president of District No. 21, in the
presence of some 10 persons on the public street of Midland, in the
latter part of May, denounced the guards for these insults and
proposals, and said that he would furnish the guns if the people
would take them. The evidence also disclosed that, through the
secretary-treasurer of District No. 21, some 40 or more Winchester
rifles were bought from the Remington Arms Company and secretly
sent to Hartford for the purpose intended by Stewart. They were
paid for by a check signed by Hull, the secretary-treasurer of
District No. 21, and countersigned by Stewart, the president.
Conversations with Stewart, which Stewart did not take the stand to
deny, were sworn to in which he announced that he would not permit
the Prairie Creek men to run "nonunion," and intended to stop it.
McLachlin, who was a member of the executive board of District No.
21, in the first week of July gathered up some of the guns, exactly
how many does not appear, and shipped them 60 miles to McAlester,
Oklahoma, the headquarters of District No. 21. It appeared that
guns of like make and caliber were used by the assailants in the
attack on the Prairie Creek mine on July 17. The United States
marshals had been withdrawn
Page 259 U. S. 400
from the premises of Prairie Creek mine No. 4, before July 1,
though the guards were retained.
The evidence leaves no doubt that, during the month of June,
there was a plan and movement among the union miners to make an
attack upon Prairie Creek mine No. 4. By this time. the number of
men secured by Bache had increased to 70 or 80, and preparations
were rapidly going on for a resumption of mining. The tense feeling
in respect to the coming attack increased. On Sunday night, July
12, about midnight, there was a fusillade of shots into the village
of Frogtown, a small collection of houses, already mentioned, about
a mile and a half from Prairie Creek mine. A number of people, in
fright at the cry that "the scabs were surrounding the town," left
and went to Hartford, about 2 miles away, and thereafter guards
were put out at Hartford to defend that town against attack by the
guards at Prairie Creek. The ridiculous improbability that the
guards at Prairie Creek, who were engaged in protecting themselves
and the property and in constant fear of attack, should make this
unprovoked assault upon the town of Frogtown is manifest from the
slightest reading of the evidence, and there crept in through a
statement of one of the defendants, an active union man, to a
witness who testified to it, that this shooting had been done by
the Hartford constable, Slankard, and himself in order to arouse
the hostility of the neighborhood against the men at Prairie Creek.
On the night of the 16th, the union miners' families who lived in
Prairie Creek were warned by friends to leave that vicinity in
order to avoid danger, and at 4 o'clock the next morning the attack
was begun by a volley of many shots fired into the premises. A
large force with guns attacked the mining premises from all sides
later on in the day.
The first movement toward destruction of property was at mine
No. 3, a short distance from No. 4, where the coal washhouse was
set on fire. The occupants of the premises
Page 259 U. S. 401
were driven out, except a few who stayed and intrenched
themselves behind coal cars or other protection. Most of the
employees and their families fled to the ridges, behind which they
were able to escape danger from the flying bullets. The forces
surrounding the mine were so numerous that, by one o'clock, they
had driven out practically all of the defenders, and set fire to
the coal tipple of mine No. 4, and destroyed all the plant by the
use of dynamite and the match.
The assailants took some of Bache's employees prisoners as they
were escaping, and conducted them to a log cabin behind the
schoolhouse near the mine, to which reference has already been made
and where the first riot meeting was held. The four or five
prisoners were taken out of the cabin where they had been for a
short time confined, and two of them, one a former union man, were
deliberately murdered in the presence of their captors by a man
whose identity it was impossible to establish. The evidence in this
case clearly shows that Slankard, the constable of Hartford, was
present at the killing, and that the men who were killed were in
his custody, on the way, as he said, to the grand jury. He was
subsequently tried before a Sebastian County jury for murder, and
was acquitted on an alibi. Slankard, though a defendant and in
court, did not take the stand in this case. The overwhelming weight
of the evidence establishes that this was purely a union attack,
under the guidance of district officers.
The testimony offered by defendants to show that it was only an
uprising of the indignant citizens of the countryside really tended
to confirm the guilt of the District No. 21. Its palpably
artificial character showed that basis for it had been framed in
advance for the purpose of relieving the officers of District No.
21 and the union miners of that neighborhood from responsibility
for the contemplated execution of their destructive and criminal
purpose. It is a doubtful question whether this responsibility
Page 259 U. S. 402
was not so clearly established that, had that been the only
element needed to justify a verdict, the court properly might have
directed it. The president of District No. 21 and the union miners,
including Slankard, whose agency in and leadership of this attack
were fully proven, were present in the courtroom at the trial, but
did not take the stand to deny the facts established. Indeed, they
had been previously brought to trial for conspiracy to defeat the
federal administration of justice and for contempt because of these
very acts, had pleaded guilty to the charge made, and had been
sentenced to imprisonment, and their expenses as defendants in and
out of jail had been paid by the district out of the district
treasury, and the disbursements approved by the district in
convention.
It is contended on behalf of District No. 21 and the local
unions that only those members of these bodies whom the evidence
shows to have participated in the torts can be held civilly liable
for the damages. There was evidence to connect all these individual
defendants with the acts which were done, and, in view of our
finding that District No. 21 and the unions are suable, we cannot
yield to the argument that it would be necessary to show the guilt
of every member of District No. 21 and of each union in order to
hold the union and its strike funds to answer. District No. 21 and
the local unions were engaged in a work in which the strike was one
of the chief instrumentalities for accomplishing the purpose for
which their unions were organized. By § 1 of Article XII of the
constitution of District No. 21, it is provided that:
"When trouble of a legal character arises between the members of
local unions and their employer, the mine committee and officers
shall endeavor to effect an amicable adjustment, and failing, they
shall immediately notify the officers of the district, and said
district officers shall immediately investigate the cause of the
complaint,
Page 259 U. S. 403
and, failing to effect a peaceful settlement upon a basis that
would be equitable and just to the aggrieved members, finding that
a strike would best subserve the interests of the localities
affected, they may, with the consent and approval of the officers,
order a strike."
Thus, the authority is put by all the members of the District
No. 21 in their officers to order a strike, and if in the conduct
of that strike unlawful injuries are inflicted, the district
organization is responsible, and the fund accumulated for strike
purposes may be subjected to the payment of any judgment which is
recovered.
(b) It was necessary, however, in order to hold District No. 21
liable in this suit under the Anti-Trust Act, to establish that
this conspiracy to attack the Bache-Denman mines and stop the
nonunion employment there was with intent to restrain interstate
commerce and to monopolize the same, and to subject it to the
control of the union. The evidence upon which the plaintiffs relied
to establish this, and upon which the judgment of the trial court
and of the court of appeals went, consisted of a history of the
relations between the International Union and the union coal
operators of certain so-called competitive districts from 1898
until 1914. The miners of Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois, large
bituminous coal-producing states, were members of the union, and
the coal operators of those states, in spite of strikes and
lockouts from time to time, were properly classed as union
operators. They met yearly in conference with the union's
representatives to agree upon terms of employment from April 1st to
April 1st. In these conferences, the operators frequently
complained that the competition of many nonunion mines in Western
Pennsylvania and the whole of West Virginia was ruinous to their
business because of the low cost of production of coal in such
mines, due to the lower wages and less expensive conditions of
working than
Page 259 U. S. 404
in union mines, and urged that something must be done to stop
this, or that the union scale of wages be reduced. By § 8 of the
contract between the operators of the Central Competitive Coal
Field and the United Mine Workers of America, dated Chicago,
January 28, 1898, it was stipulated:
"That the United Mine Workers organization, a party to this
contract, do hereby further agree to afford all possible protection
to the trade and to other parties hereto against any unfair
competition resulting from a failure to maintain scale rates."
From this time on, in every annual conference until after the
controversy in the case before us in 1914, the subject recurred. It
does not appear when, if at any time, wages were reduced because of
this plea by the operators. Sometimes the contention of the
operators as to the effect of nonunion competition was conceded,
and greater activity in unionizing nonunion territory was promised.
Again pleas were made by the miners' representatives of the great
amount of money expended by the union, and in one or two instances
of the sacrifice of human lives, to effect this result. Again the
union leaders flatly refused to be further affected by the
argument, and charged that the nonunion competition of West
Virginia, which was always the principal factor, was only possible
because some of the most important union operators in Ohio and the
Central Competitive Field really were interested as nonunion
operators in West Virginia. There was considerable discussion as to
the nonunion competition of Kentucky fields as a basis for the
operators' complaints. At times there were suggestions from the
miners' side that the operators ought to contribute funds to enable
the campaign of unionizing to go on, but they never seem to have
met with favor.
In general convention of the union of 1904, a local union from
the Indian Territory in District No. 21 submitted a resolution
which was adopted in respect to the then Colorado strike:
Page 259 U. S. 405
"Resolved, that in strict compliance with our obligations and
teachings, we accord a hearty approval to our National Board on its
action in regard to District No. 15, now on, in Colorado, and
whatever action taken by the National that in their judgment is
necessary to the successful ending in the elevating of the craft in
District No. 15, meets our entire approval, for which we pledge out
unqualified support, as our knowledge of the southern field of
Southern Colorado in the event of an unsuccessful issue of the
trouble now pending would work almost unsurmountable and
incalculable damage to District No. 21, as it would be an unjust
competition in the same commercial field and could with little
effort undersell and supersede us in Oklahoma and Southwestern
Kansas markets."
In a joint conference between the union leaders and the coal
operators, in 1904, Mr. Mitchell, the president of the union, spoke
as follows:
"I believe the discussion of this matter should be carried on
with perfect frankness and candor on both sides. I don't think we
should disguise our position at all, and I want to state for our
side of the house just where we are, as I understand it. We don't
believe that a reduction in the mining rate will help you. We know
that it will do us incalculable injury. We don't believe that a
reduction in the mining rate will secure for you a larger amount of
trade than you now have. We don't believe that the industry will be
benefited by reducing wages. We know that, in the past, every
reduction in wages has been given to the large consumers of coal --
not to the domestic trade, not to those who can ill afford to pay
high rates for coal, but to the railroad companies and the great
manufacturers. We know that, when the mining rate is lowest, your
profits have been least."
"Now, gentlemen, it has required many years of work and effort
and sacrifice to make wages at the
Page 259 U. S. 406
mines compare favorably with wages in other industries. We are
not going back to the old conditions; we are not going to consent
to a reduction in wages. We believe the best thing to do is to
renew out present wage scale; to make such modifications of
internal questions as seem right, and then return and work out the
coming scale year as we have the past scale year. I think we may as
well understand now as at any other time that we are not going to
consent to a reduced mining rate."
At the convention in 1906, a resolution that Districts 13, 14,
21, 24, and 25 be admitted to the interstate joint conferences was
adopted. This was urged by President Mitchell of the Union, and the
secretary, W. B. Wilson. The latter said:
"If I understand the principle upon which this movement is
based, it is to bring into the joint conference those operators and
those miners of the Southwestern District whose competitive
business is closely related to each other, and in asking that the
operators of the Southwestern District be admitted to this
conference, we are simply carrying out that principle. The coal
mined in Western Pennsylvania comes in immediate competition and
direct competition with Ohio; that mined in Ohio, as well as that
in Pennsylvania, comes in competition with Indiana and Illinois;
that mined in Illinois comes in contact with Iowa; that mined in
Iowa comes in competition with Missouri and coal mined in Missouri
comes in competition with Kansas, Arkansas, and the Indian
Territory. They are all related to one another. They are all
competitors with one another, and it is but just and fair that each
of these fields should have a representation in the joint
conference that sets a base for the prices of the ensuing year.
This is the first conference that is held. Whatever wages are
agreed upon here, whether it is an increase in wages, a decrease in
wages, improved conditions or otherwise, it sets the pace for other
districts and those
Page 259 U. S. 407
other districts have no voice in saying what that price shall
be. In order to avoid that condition of affairs, in order to give
justice to the operators and miners in other fields not represented
here at the present time, we ask you as a matter of fairness and
justice to permit those whose operators and miners are represented
here to participate in this joint conference."
In 1910, Bache, as a union operator, took part for his mines in
fixing the scale of wages in District No. 21. Later on, at the time
of a conference, he made a separate scale with the District No. 21
more favorable, in some respects, than that subsequently agreed on
in the conference with the other operators, and he was for that
reason expelled from the operators' association. He was permitted
at a later time to rejoin it, but he had some litigation with it in
respect to their funds, the nature of which is not disclosed by the
record.
In 1913 and 1914, and in the years preceding, the International
Union had carried on two strikes of great extent covering the
Colorado fields and the Ohio and West Virginia fields in which very
large sums of money had been expended and there was much
lawlessness and violence. Its treasury had been drained, and it
borrowed $75,000 from District No. 21 during this period.
The foregoing will enable one to acquire a fair idea of the
national situation, shown by the record, in respect to the mining
and sale of coal so far as it bears upon this case and upon this
state of fact. The plaintiffs charge that there has been and is a
continuously operating conspiracy between union coal operators and
the International Union to restrain interstate commerce in coal and
to monopolize it, and that the work of District No. 21 at Prairie
Creek was a step in that conspiracy for which it can be held liable
under the Anti-Trust Act.
Coal mining is not interstate commerce, and the power of
Congress does not extend to its regulation as such. In
Page 259 U. S. 408
Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U. S. 251,
247 U. S. 272,
we said:
"The making of goods and the mining of coal are not commerce,
nor does the fact that these things are to be afterwards shipped or
used in interstate commerce make their production a part thereof.
Delaware, Lackawanna & Western R. Co. v. Yurkonis,
238 U. S.
439."
Obstruction to coal mining is not a direct obstruction to
interstate commerce in coal, although it, of course, may affect it
by reducing the amount of coal to be carried in that commerce. We
have had occasion to consider the principles governing the validity
of congressional restraint of such indirect obstructions to
interstate commerce in
Swift v. United States,
196 U. S. 375;
United States v. Patten, 226 U. S. 525;
United States v. Ferger, 250 U. S. 199;
Wisconsin R. Co. Commission v. C., B. & Q. R. Co.,
257 U. S. 563, and
Stafford v. Wallace, 258 U. S. 495. It
is clear from these cases that, if Congress deems certain recurring
practices though not really part of interstate commerce, likely to
obstruct, restrain or burden it, it has the power to subject them
to national supervision and restraint. Again, it has the power to
punish conspiracies in which such practices are part of the plan to
hinder, restrain, or monopolize interstate commerce. But, in the
latter case, the intent to injure, obstruct, or restrain interstate
commerce must appear as an obvious consequence of what is to be
done or be shown by direct evidence or other circumstance.
What really is shown by the evidence in the case at bar, drawn
from discussions and resolutions of conventions and conference, is
the stimulation of union leaders to press their unionization of
nonunion mines not only as a direct means of bettering the
conditions and wages of their workers, but also as a means of
lessening interstate competition for union operators, which in turn
would lessen the pressure of those operators for reduction of the
union scale or their resistance to an increase. The latter is a
Page 259 U. S. 409
secondary or ancillary motive, whose actuating force in a given
case necessarily is dependent on the particular circumstances to
which it is sought to make is applicable. If unlawful means had
here been used by the national body to unionize mines whose product
was important, actually or potentially, in affecting prices in
interstate commerce, the evidence in question would clearly tend to
show that that body was guilty of an actionable conspiracy under
the Anti-Trust Act. This principle is involved in the decision of
the case of
Hitchman Coal Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U.
S. 229, and is restated in
American Steel Foundries
v. Tri-City Central Trades Council, 257 U.
S. 184. But it is not a permissible interpretation of
the evidence in question that it tends to show that the motive
indicated thereby actuates every lawless strike of a local and
sporadic character, not initiated by the national body, but by one
of its subordinate subdivisions. The very fact that local strikes
are provided for in the union's constitution, and so may not engage
the energies or funds of the national body, confirms this view.
Such a local case of a lawless strike must stand on its own facts,
and, while these conventions and discussions may reveal a general
policy, the circumstances or direct evidence should supply the link
between them and the local situation to make an unlawful local
strike, not initiated or financed by the main organization, a step
in an actionable conspiracy to restrain the freedom of interstate
commerce which the Anti-Trust Act was intended to protect.
This case is very different from
Loewe v.Lawlor,
208 U. S. 274.
There, the gist of the charge held to be a violation of the
Anti-Trust Act was the effort of the defendants, members of a
trades union, by a boycott against a manufacturer of hats, to
destroy his interstate sales in hats. The direct object of attack
was interstate commerce.
So, too, it differs from
Eastern states Retail Lumber
Dealers' Association v. United States, 234 U.
S. 600, where
Page 259 U. S. 410
the interstate retail trade of wholesale lumber men with
consumers was restrained by a combination of retail dealers by an
agreement among the latter to blacklist or boycott any wholesaler
engaged in such retail trade. It was the commerce itself which was
the object of the conspiracy. In
United States v. Patten,
226 U. S. 525,
running a corner in cotton in New York City, by which the
defendants were conspiring to obtain control of the available
supply and to enhance the price to all buyers in every market of
the country, was held to be a conspiracy to restrain interstate
trade because cotton was the subject of interstate trade, and such
control would directly and materially impede and burden the due
course of trade among the states, and inflict upon the public the
injuries which the Anti-Trust Act was designed to prevent. Although
running the corner was not interstate commerce, the necessary
effect of the control of the available supply would be to obstruct
and restrain interstate commerce, and so the conspirators were
charged with the intent to restrain. The difference between the
Patten case and that of
Ware & Leland Co. v.
Mobile County, 209 U. S. 405,
illustrates a distinction to be drawn in cases which do not involve
interstate commerce intrinsically, but which may or may not be
regarded as affecting interstate commerce so directly as to be
within the federal regulatory power. In the
Ware &
Leland case, the question was whether a state could tax the
business of a broker dealing in contracts for the future delivery
of cotton where there was no obligation to ship from one state to
another. The tax was sustained, and dealing in cotton futures was
held not to be interstate commerce, and yet thereafter such
dealings in cotton futures as were alleged in the
Patten
case, where they were part of a conspiracy to bring the entire
cotton trade within its influence, were held to be in restraint of
interstate commerce. And so, in the case at bar, coal mining is not
interstate commerce, and obstruction
Page 259 U. S. 411
of coal mining, though it may prevent coal from going into
interstate commerce, is not a restraint of that commerce unless the
obstruction to mining is intended to restrain commerce in it, or
has necessarily such a direct, material, and substantial effect to
restrain it that the intent reasonably must be inferred.
In the case at bar, there is nothing in the circumstances or the
declarations of the parties to indicate that Stewart, the president
of District No. 21, or Hull, its secretary-treasurer, or any of
their accomplices, had in mind interference with interstate
commerce or competition when they entered upon their unlawful
combination to break up Bache's plan to carry on his mines with
nonunion men. The circumstances were ample to supply a full local
motive for the conspiracy. Stewart said: "We are not going to let
them dig coal -- the scabs." His attention and that of his men was
fastened on the presence of nonunion men in the mines in that local
community. The circumstance that a car loaded with coal and billed
to a town in Louisiana was burned by the conspirators has no
significance upon this head. The car had been used in the battle by
some of Bache's men for defense. It offered protection, and its
burning was only a part of the general destruction.
Bache's breach of his contract with the District No. 21, in
employing nonunion men three months before it expired, his attempt
to evade his obligation by a hugger-mugger of his numerous
corporations, his advertised anticipation of trespass and violence
by warning notices, by enclosing his mining premises with a cable
and stationing guards with guns to defend them, all these, in the
heart of a territory that had been completely unionized for years,
were calculated to arouse a bitterness of spirit entirely local
among the union miners against a policy that brought in strangers,
and excluded themselves or their union colleagues from the houses
they had occupied and
Page 259 U. S. 412
the wages they had enjoyed. In the letter which Bache dictated,
in favor of operating the mines on a nonunion basis, he said: "To
do this means a bitter fight, but in my opinion it can be
accomplished by proper organization." Bache also testified that he
was entering into a matter he knew was perilous and dangerous to
his companies, because in that section there was only one other
mine running on a nonunion basis. Nothing of this is recited to
justify in the slightest the lawlessness and outrages committed,
but only to point out that as it was a local strike within the
meaning of the International and district constitutions, so it was
in fact a local strike, local in its origin and motive, local in
its waging, and local in its felonious and murderous ending.
But it is said that these district officers and their
lieutenants among the miners must be charged with an intention to
do what would be the natural result of their own acts, that they
must have known that obstruction to mining coal in the Bache-Denman
mines would keep 75 percent of their output from being shipped out
of the state into interstate competition, and to that extent would
help union operators in their competition for business. In a
national production of from 10,000,000 to 15,000,000 tons a week,
or in a production in District No. 21 of 150,000 tons a week, 5,000
tons a week, which the Bache-Denman mines in most prosperous times
could not exceed, would have no appreciable effect upon the price
of coal or nonunion competition. The saving in the price per ton of
coal under nonunion conditions was said by plaintiff's witnesses to
be from 17 to 20 cents, but surely no one would say that such
saving on 5,000 tons would have a substantial effect on prices of
coal in interstate commerce. Nor could it be inferred that Bache
intended to cut the price of coal. His purpose was probably to
pocket the profit that such a reduction made possible. If it be
said that what District No. 21 feared
Page 259 U. S. 413
was that, if Bache were successful, the defection among union
operators would spread, and ultimately the whole district field of
District No. 21 in Arkansas, Oklahoma, and Texas would become
nonunion, and interstate commerce would then be substantially
affected, it may be answered that this is remote, and no statement
or circumstance appears in the record from which it can be inferred
that the participants in the local strike had such a possibility in
mind, or thought they were thus protecting union operators in a
control or monopoly of interstate commerce. The result of our
consideration of the entire record is that there was no evidence
submitted to the jury upon which they properly could find that the
outrages, felonies, and murders of District 21 and its companions
in crime were committed by them in a conspiracy to restrain or
monopolize interstate commerce. The motion to direct the jury to
return a verdict for the defendants should have been granted.
Fifth. These conclusions make it unnecessary to examine the
objection which the plaintiffs in error make to the supplemental
charge of the court.
The case has been prepared by counsel for the plaintiffs with
rare assiduity and ability. The circumstances are such as to awaken
regret that, in our view of the federal jurisdiction, we cannot
affirm the judgment. But it is of far higher importance that we
should preserve inviolate the fundamental limitations in respect to
the federal jurisdiction.
The judgment is reversed, and the case remanded to the
district court for further proceedings in conformity to this
opinion.
*
1. Legalization of labor unions and labor combinations:
The Clayton Act -- approved October 15, 1914, § 6, 38
Stat. 730, 731.
California -- Penal Code 1906, p. 581.
Colorado -- Rev.Stats.1908, § 3924.
Maryland --
Supp. Anno.Code 1913, Art. 27, § 40.
Massachusetts -- C.
778, Acts & Res. approved July 7, 1914.
Minnesota --
C. 493, approved April 21, 1917.
Nevada -- Rev.Laws 1912,
§ 6801.
New Jersey -- Comp.Stats.1910, § 128, p. 3051.
New York -- Consol.Laws 1909, c. 40, § 582.
North
Dakota -- Rev.Code 1905, § 8770.
Oklahoma -- Rev.Laws
1910. § 3764.
Pennsylvania -- Dig. Statute Law 1920, §
21247.
Texas -- Rev.Civ.Stats.1911, Arts. 5244-5246.
Utah -- C. 68, approved March 8, 1917; Laws 1917, c. 68, §
1.
West Virginia -- Acts 1907, c. 78, § 19.
2. Exemption from antitrust laws by statute or judicial
decisions:
California -- Acts 1909, c. 362, § 13.
Iowa-Rohlf
v. Kasemeier, 140 Iowa 182.
Louisiana -- Acts 1892,
Act No. 90, § 8; Rev.Laws 1897, p. 205.
Michigan --
Comp.Laws 1897, § 11382.
Montana -- Rev.Code 1907, § 8289;
Acts 1909, c. 97, § 2.
New Hampshire -- Laws 1917, c. 177,
§ 7.
Nebraska --
State v. Employers, 102 Neb.
768.
Wisconsin -- Stats.1913, § 1747h.
3. Right given to labor unions to sue to enjoin infringement of
registered union label or trademark:
Arkansas -- Acts 1905, Act 309, § 7.
Colorado
-- Mills' Supp. 1891-1905, § 2985; Rev.Stats.1908, § 6848.
Florida -- Gen.Laws 1906, § 3172.
Idaho --
Rev.Code 1908, § 1453.
Illinois -- Rev.Stats. 1908, c.
140, § 4.
Iowa -- Code 1897, § 5050.
Kansas --
Gen.Stats.1915, § 11657.
Kentucky -- Stats.1903, c. 130, §
4750.
Louisiana -- Acts 1898, Act No. 49, § 5.
Maryland -- Supp. Anno.Code 1914, Art. 27, § 53.
Montana -- Rev.Code 1907, § 8455.
Nebraska --
Comp.Stats.1913, § 3570.
Nevada -- Rev.Laws 1912, § 4636.
New Hampshire -- Laws 1895, c. 42, § 4.
New York
-- Consol.Laws 1909, c. 31, § 16.
Oregon -- Bellinger
& Cotton's Anno.Stats.1902, § 1845.
Pennsylvania --
Acts 1901, Act No. 84, § 4; Dig.Statute Law 1920, § 21241.
Rhode Island -- Gen.Laws 1909, c.196, § 5.
South
Dakota -- Rev.Code 1903, § 3194.
Tennessee -- Acts
1905, c. 21, § 6.
Texas -- Civil St.1911, § 705.
Vermont -- Laws 1908, Act No. 121, § 5.
Virginia
-- Code 1904, § 1906d, par.(5).
Washington -- Rem. &
Bal.Code 1910, § 9496.
West Virginia -- Acts 1901, c. 5, §
5; Code 1913, § 3582.
Wisconsin -- Stats.1911, c. 84a, §
1747a5.
Wyoming -- Comp.Stats.1910, c. 218, § 3441.
4. Unauthorized use of registered union label or trademark made
an offense:
Alabama -- Code 1907, §§ 7322, 7323.
Arizona
-- Penal Code, §§ 355-358.
Arkansas -- Acts 1905, Act No.
309, § 8 (amended by c. 131, Acts 1909).
California --
Political Code 1906, §§ 3200-3201; Penal Code 1906, §§ 349a-351
(amended by chapter 181, Acts 1911).
Colorado -- Mills'
Supp. 1891-1905, §§ 2985l to 2985s; Rev.Stats.1908, § 6844.
Connecticut -- Gen.Stats.1902, §§ 4907-4912 (amended by c.
151, Acts 1907).
Delaware -- Acts 1899, c. 266.
Florida -- Gen Stats.1906, §§ 3169-3172.
Georgia
-- Civ.Code 1910, §§ 1989-1992.
Idaho -- Rev.Codes 1908,
§§ 1449-1455.
Illinois -- Rev.Stats.1908, c. 140, §§ 1-7.
Indiana -- Anno.Stats.1901, §§ 8693-8703; 3 Burns'
Anno.Stats.1908, §§ 10453-10463.
Iowa -- Code 1897, §§
5049-5051.
Kansas -- Gen.Stats.1909, §§ 9675-9680;
Gen.Stats.1915, §§ 11654-11659.
Kentucky -- Stats.1903, §§
4749-4755.
Louisiana -- Acts 1898, Act No. 49.
Maine -- Rev.Stats.1903, c. 40, §§ 30-36.
Maryland -- Pub.Laws 1904, Art. 27, §§ 43-48.
Massachusetts -- Pub.Laws 1902, c. 72, §§ 7-14.
Michigan -- Comp.Laws 1897, §§ 11681-11686 (amended by c.
279, Acts 1913).
Minnesota -- Rev.Laws 1905, §§ 5072-5076.
Missouri -- Rev.Stats.1909, §§ 11789-11796. Montana-Penal
Code 1907, §§ 8452-8457.
Nebraska -- Comp.Stats.1911, §§
4169-4173.
Nevada -- Rev.Laws 1912, §§ 4635-4637.
New
Hampshire -- Acts 1895, c. 42.
New Jersey --
Comp.Stats.1910, p. 1802, § 196, pp. 5643-5648.
New York
-- Consol.Laws 1909, c. 31, §§ 15, 16.
Ohio -- Gen.Code
1910, §§ 6219-6227, 13102, 13103, 13153-13155; Acts 1911, p. 420.
Oklahoma -- Rev.Laws 1910, §§ 8211-8217.
Oregon
-- Anno.Codes and Stats.1902, §§ 1841-1848.
Pennsylvania
-- Dig. Statute Law 1920, §§ 21236-21243.
Rhode Island --
Gen.Laws 1909, c.196.
South Dakota -- Political Code 1903,
§§ 3190-3195.
Tennessee -- Acts 1905, c. 21.
Texas -- Rev.Civ.Stats.1911, Arts. 705, 706; Rev.Pen.Code,
Arts. 1395, 1396.
Utah -- Comp.Laws 1907, §§ 2720-2723,
4482, 4483.
Vermont -- Pub.Stats.1906, §§ 4962-4967; Acts
1908, No. 121.
Virginia -- Code 1904, § 1906d.
Washington -- Rem. & Bal.Code 1910, §§ 9492-9500.
West Virginia -- Acts 1901, c. 5; Hogg's Code, §§
3578-3585; Code W.Va. §§ 3583, 3584.
Wisconsin --
Stats.1911, § 1747a.
Wyoming -- Comp.Stats.1910, §§
3439-3444.
5. Unauthorized use of union card, badge, or insignia made an
offense:
California -- Acts 1909, c. 331.
Connecticut
-- Acts 1907, c. 113, § 2.
Massachusetts -- Acts 1909, c.
514, § 32.
Minnesota -- Rev.Laws 1905, § 5053, par. 4.
Montana -- Rev.Code 1907, § 8866.
New York --
Consol.Laws 1909, c. 40, § 1278.
Ohio -- Gen.Code 1910, §
13163.
Oregon -- Acts 1911, c. 73, §§ 1, 3.
Pennsylvania -- Dig.Statute Law 1920, § 1050.
Texas -- Rev.Pen.Code 1911, Art. 425.
Virginia --
Acts 1908, c. 54, § 1.
6. Right to participate in selection of membership of boards of
arbitration in labor controversies:
Alabama -- Acts 1911, p. 320, § 6.
Alaska --
Acts 1913, c. 70, § 2.
Iowa -- Acts 1913, c. 292, §§ 1, 2.
Indiana -- Anno. Stats, 1901, § 7050, e, f.
Idaho
-- Rev.Code 1908, §§ 1430, 1431.
Louisiana -- Rev.Stats.
1897, p. 20, Act. No. 139; Acts of 1894, § 1.
Minnesota --
Rev.Laws 1905, § 1828.
Nevada -- Rev.Laws 1912, § 1930.
Nebraska -- Rev.Stats.1913, § 3638.
Texas --
Rev.Civ.Stats.1911, Art. 71.
7. Right to have member of union on board of arbitrators:
Connecticut -- Gen.Stats.1902, § 4708.
Illinois -- Hurd's Rev.Stats.1905, c. 10, § 19.
Indiana -- Anno.Stats.1901, § 7050b.
Idaho --
Rev.Code 1908, § 1427.
Massachusetts -- Acts 1909, c. 514,
§ 10.
Maine -- Acts 1909, c. 229, § 2.
Missouri
-- Rev.Stats.1909, § 7802.
Montana -- Rev.Code 1907, §§
1670, 1671.
Nebraska -- Rev.Stats.1913, § 3633.
New
Hampshire -- Acts 1911, c.198, § 3, as amended by c. 186, Acts
1913.
South Carolina -- Acts 1916, Act No. 545, § 8.
Utah -- Comp.Laws 1907, § 1324.
Vermont -- Acts
1912, Act No.190, § 1.
8. Embezzlement of funds of labor union made a special
offense:
Nebraska -- Rev.Stats.1913, § 8659.
New
Hampshire -- Pub.Stats. 1891, c. 273, § 17, as amended by Acts
1905, c. 1.
Pennsylvania -- Dig.Statute Law 1920, §
21252.
9. Bribery of union representative made an offense:
Nevada -- Rev.Laws 1912, § 6794.
New Jersey --
Acts 1911, c. 94, § 1.
New York -- Consol.Laws 1909, c.
40, § 380.
10. All public printing to bear union label:
Maryland -- Pub.Civ.Laws 1911, Art. 78, § 9.
Montana -- Rev.Code 1907, § 254.
Nevada --
Rev.Laws 1912, § 4309.