1. The constitutionality of a state statute presenting very
important questions should not be decided unless the case before
the court so requires. P.
258 U. S.
184.
2. Whether the Kansas Industrial Relations Act (Laws 1920, c.
29), in providing in effect for compulsory arbitration of labor
controversies in certain industries before an administrative body
whose orders it makes reviewable and enforceable through the state
supreme court, violates the federal Constitution is not
determinable upon a review of a judgment of that court sustaining,
as a separable feature of the act, the power it gives the
administrative body to call witnesses to testify in a general
investigation of industrial
Page 258 U. S. 182
condition and the power of the state district court, of general
jurisdiction, to order their attendance and to enforce their
obedience through contempt proceedings. P.
258 U. S.
185.
3. An injunction issued by a court of general jurisdiction and
equity powers upon proper pleadings and served upon parties within
the jurisdiction must be obeyed, even if erroneous and based upon
an invalid statute, until set aside by orderly review. P.
258 U. S. 190.
4. Where a sentence imposed by the Kansas district court for
contempt in disobeying an injunction issued in a suit brought by
the state to prevent execution of a conspiracy to cause a general
strike and cessation of work in coal mines contrary to the state
laws, including the Industrial Relation Act,
supra, was
affirmed by the state supreme court independently of that act
(though its constitutionality was drawn in question) upon the
ground that the district court had general power to grant the
injunction and that the validity of the injunction could not be
questioned collaterally in the contempt proceeding,
held
that the judgment of affirmance, having a nonfederal basis, was not
reviewable by this Court. P.
258 U. S.
189.
Writs of error to review 107 Kans. 423, 109 Kans. 376,
dismissed
Writs of error to review two judgments of the Supreme Court of
Kansas affirming sentences to confinement for contempt.
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE TAFT delivered the opinion of the Court.
These are two writs of error to the Supreme Court of Kansas sued
out (§ 237, Judicial Code) with the hope and purpose of testing the
validity, under the federal Constitution,
Page 258 U. S. 183
of the Act of the Legislature of Kansas creating a Court of
Industrial Relations. C. 29, Special Session Laws of Kansas of
1920.
In No. 154, the plaintiffs in error were defendants in
proceedings taken in the District Court of Crawford County, Kansas,
to compel them to attend and give testimony under subpoena before
the Court of Industrial Relations. They had refused to appear.
After arrest and a hearing, they were sentenced to confinement in
jail until they should comply with the order.
State ex rel. v.
Howat, 107 Kan. 423.
In No. 491, the plaintiffs in error were sentenced to
imprisonment for a year as punishment for violation of an
injunction issued by the same district court forbidding them to
call or cause a strike among the employees in certain coal mines in
Crawford County.
State v. Howat, 109 Kan. 376.
We are of opinion that in neither case is the Kansas Industrial
Relations Act presented in such way as to permit us to pass upon
those features which are attacked by the plaintiffs in error as
violative of the Constitution of the United States.
The main purpose of the act is to create an administrative
tribunal to arbitrate controversies between employers and employees
in certain industrial, mining, and transportation businesses which
the act declares to be affected with such a public interest that
their continuity is essential to the public peace, the public
health, and the proper living conditions and general welfare of the
people. The board, miscalled a court, is given power to make
investigations on its own initiative or upon complaint of
interested persons to consider the wages, the return to capital,
and the conditions surrounding the workers in any such employment
and business, to summon all necessary parties in interest, to call
and examine witnesses, and, after hearing, to make its findings and
orders stating specifically
Page 258 U. S. 184
the terms and conditions, including wages, upon which such
industry or employment shall be carried on in the future. In case
the parties do not obey the orders, the board is given authority to
apply to the Supreme Court of Kansas to compel compliance, and the
Supreme Court is authorized to review the orders upon the evidence
already heard and such other new evidence as that court shall
permit, and enter and enforce a proper judgment. The board is also
authorized, with the consent of the governor, to make general
investigations into industrial and economic conditions to
familiarize itself with industrial problems as they may arise. In
effect, the act provides for compulsory arbitration between labor
and capital in certain industries and employment. It forbids an
injunction against a workman or employee to prevent his quitting
his employment. It is directed against strikes and lockouts and
their declared wasteful and destructive effect, and conspiracies,
picketing, and intimidation to induce them. Obviously we should not
pass upon the constitutional validity of an act presenting such
critical and important issues unless the case before us requires
it.
In No. 154, Howat and the other plaintiffs in error were
subpoenaed to appear before the so-called Court of Industrial
Relations to testify in an investigation into conditions existing
in the mining industry in Cherokee and Crawford Counties. They
failed to appear. The powers of the tribunal in such a case are set
forth in § 11 of the act, reading in part as follows:
"Said court . . . shall have the power and authority to issue
summons and subpoenas and compel the attendance of witnesses and
parties . . . and to make any and all investigations necessary to
ascertain the truth in regard to said controversy. In case any
person shall fail or refuse to obey any summons or subpoena issued
by said court after due service then, and in that event, said court
is hereby authorized or empowered to take proper
Page 258 U. S. 185
proceedings in any court of competent jurisdiction to compel
obedience to such summons or subpoena."
Under this section, the board made application to the district
court of Crawford County, the court of first instance of general
jurisdiction in that county, to issue an order directing the
plaintiffs in error to attend the board and testify. This order was
issued, duly served, and disobeyed. T he contemnors were then
brought into court by attachment. Their plea that the legislation
under which they were subpoenaed was void was held to be
insufficient, and they were committed to jail until they should
comply with the subpoena. The contemnors appealed to the supreme
court of the state, which affirmed the action of the district
court, holding that, without regard to the validity of the
particular provisions of the Industrial Relations Act of which they
complained, they were under legal obligation to obey the subpoena
and were in contempt for not doing so. The court invited attention
to § 28 of the act, which provides that:
"If any § or provision of this act shall be found invalid by any
court, it shall be conclusively presumed that this act would have
been passed by the legislature without such invalid section or
provision, and the act as a whole shall not be declared invalid by
reason of the fact that one or more sections or provisions may be
found to be invalid by any court."
and pointed out that, even if the compulsory features of the
act, to the constitutionality of which the plaintiff objected, were
invalid, there still remained in the act provision for
investigation and findings by the industrial relations court, in
respect to which the power of the legislature was indisputable and
in furtherance of which the machinery for compelling the attendance
and testimony of witnesses was appropriate. The court relied on the
decision of this Court in respect to a similar provision in the
Interstate Commerce Law in which the Interstate Commerce Commission
was authorized
Page 258 U. S. 186
to secure attendance of witnesses at any investigation by it,
through a proceeding before a circuit court of the United States.
Interstate Commerce Commission v. Brimson, 154 U.
S. 447,
154 U. S.
488-489. It would seem to be sustained also by the
decision of this Court in
Blair v. United States,
250 U. S. 273,
wherein it was held that a witness summoned to give testimony
before a grand jury in the district court of the United States was
not entitled to refuse to testify, when ordered by the court to do
so, upon the plea that the court and jury were without jurisdiction
over the supposed offense under investigation because the statute
denouncing the offense was unconstitutional.
But even if we did not agree with the state court on this point,
what we have said shows that the case was decided and disposed of
by that court without any consideration of the application of the
federal Constitution to the features of the Kansas statute of which
complaint is made. Even if those features are void, these contempt
proceedings the state court sustains of general law. We cannot,
therefore, consider for federal questions mooted and assigned for
error.
Southern Pacific Co. v. Schuyler, 227 U.
S. 601,
227 U. S. 610;
Leathe v. Thomas, 207 U. S. 93,
207 U. S. 98;
Giles v. Teasley, 193 U. S. 146,
193 U. S. 160;
Hopkins v. McLure, 133 U. S. 380,
133 U. S. 386;
Hale v. Akers, 132 U. S. 554,
132 U. S.
564.
In No. 491, the State of Kansas on the relation of its Attorney
General and the County Attorney of Crawford County, filed a
petition in the District Court of Crawford County, asking an
injunction against Howat and others, 150 in number, members of
local unions of the United Mine Workers of America, District No.
14. The petition averred that defendants were conspiring,
threatening, and about to direct the officers to call a general
strike in the coal mines of Crawford, Cherokee and Osage Counties,
Kansas, and cause a cessation of work in them, thereby endangering
the peace and order of the communities in which said mines were
located with intent
Page 258 U. S. 187
to violate the laws of Kansas and particularly the Court of
Industrial Relations Act; that, in pursuance thereof, they were
intimidating their coworkers and other employees of the operators
of the mines, that the purpose of the conspiracy was to stop the
operation of the railroads, and of the buildings, institutions, and
industries of the state in the conduct of its government affairs
and to cut off the supply of coal for household and other uses
throughout the state; that all of said acts would seriously affect
and injure the public welfare and the public health of the people;
that a similar conspiracy a year before had been carried out,
resulting in great suffering and loss to the people, and endangered
their lives and health to such a degree that the state authorities
were compelled to take possession of the mines and operate the
same, and that, in the light of this result, the present conspiracy
was being set on foot. The petition further averred that this
conspiracy was directed especially to a nullification of the
statute creating the Court of Industrial Relations and its
purposes. It was alleged that the plaintiff was without adequate
remedy at law, and that irreparable loss and injury to the state
and the people thereof would ensue unless the conspiracy of
defendants was enjoined. The defendants pleaded in answer to these
charges that:
"whatever cessation of work or intent to cease work there may
have been was solely and only in the exercise of their lawful
rights, for the purpose of improving their working conditions and
increasing their wages, and whatever effect their ceasing work may
have had upon the production of coal was incidental to and in the
exercise of their legal and constitutional rights, and the stoppage
in the operation of the production of coal, if any, was not the
primary purpose, but merely the incidental effect incident to the
exercise of their lawful rights."
They further alleged that the Industrial Court Act was void
because in violation of the federal Constitution and the
Page 258 U. S. 188
rights of defendants thereunder, and so the court was without
power to issue an injunction as prayed.
The case came on for hearing, the state introduced evidence, and
the defendants demurred to the evidence. The demurrer was
overruled. The defendants declined to introduce evidence, and
rested. The court found the averments of the petition true, and
made permanent the temporary injunction already awarded. By this,
the defendants were enjoined
"from directing, ordering, or in any manner bringing about the
hindering, delaying, interference with, or suspension of the
operation, of any coal mines in the Counties of Crawford, Cherokee,
or Osage, in the State of Kansas, and of the mining of coal at any
of said mines, and from causing the miners and members of said
labor union to quit their work at said mines for the purpose or
purposes of hindering, delaying, interfering with, or suspending
the operation of any coal mines in said counties, and from
intimidating by threats, abuse, or in any other manner any person
or persons with intent to induce such person or persons from
accepting employment or remaining in employment at said mines, and
from in any way whatsoever carrying out any conspiracy for the
execution of any of said purposes."
In other clauses of the injunction, defendants are enjoined from
maintaining and carrying on a conspiracy with the intent to evade
the provisions of the Industrial Court Act, and to prevent persons
from appearing before it by picketing or otherwise. The order
expressly excluded from its purpose and effect the enjoining of any
person against quitting his employment. Thereafter, the Attorney
General filed an affidavit charging that the defendants had
violated the injunction by combining to order and compel a strike
at two mines in Crawford County. At a hearing at which defendants
were represented by counsel, the court found reasonable ground for
believing that those of defendants who are plaintiffs in error here
had violated
Page 258 U. S. 189
the injunction. They were arrested and brought before the court,
whereupon the court directed the filing of a formal accusation of
contempt against them. The defendants answered attacking the
validity of the Industrial Court Act and of the permanent
injunction, averring that they had not done anything unlawful, and
denying that the accusation stated facts sufficient to constitute a
violation of the injunction. The court found that the averments of
the accusation were sustained, that defendants had directed the
strike at the mines in question, that a cessation of work ensued,
that it was done willfully, in disobedience to the injunction, and
sentenced each of them to imprisonment for a year and to payment of
the costs and confinement till the costs were paid.
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Kansas held that the district
court, a constitutional court of general jurisdiction (Constitution
of Kansas, § 6, Art. III; General Statutes of Kansas 1915, § 2957),
had general power to issue injunctions in equity, and that, even if
its exercise of the power was erroneous, that the injunction was
not void, and the defendants were precluded from attacking it in
this collateral proceeding, that, aside from the Industrial Court
Act, the district court had power in this case to issue the
injunction on principles identical with those applied in abatement
of public nuisances. The court relied on the case of
In re
Debs, 158 U. S. 564. It
held that, if the injunction was erroneous, jurisdiction was not
thereby forfeited, that the error was subject to correction only by
the ordinary method of appeal, and disobedience to the order
constituted contempt, citing
State v. Pierce, 51 Kan. 241.
An injunction duly issuing out of a court of general jurisdiction
with equity powers, upon pleadings properly invoking its action,
and served upon persons. made parties therein and within the
jurisdiction, must be obeyed by them, however erroneous the action
of the
Page 258 U. S. 190
court may be, even if the error be in the assumption of the
validity of a seeming but void law going to the merits of the case.
It is for the court of first instance to determine the question of
the validity of the law, and until its decision is reversed for
error by orderly review, either by itself or by a higher court, its
orders based on its decision are to be respected, and disobedience
of them is contempt of its lawful authority, to be punished.
Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.
S. 418,
221 U. S. 450;
Toy Toy v. Hopkins, 212 U. S. 542,
212 U. S. 548.
See also United States v. Shipp, 203 U.
S. 563,
203 U. S.
573.
It is to be observed, moreover, that the injunction suit in the
district court was not the enforcement of the Industrial Relations
Court Act. It was a proceeding wholly independent of that act, and
the district court, in entertaining it, did not depend on the
constitutionality of that act for its jurisdiction or the
justification of its order. The state supreme court, it is true,
did go into an extended discussion of the constitutional principles
upon which the Industrial Court Act could in its opinion validly
rest, but, as the court itself had before intimated, the discussion
was not necessary to the conclusion which it had reached in
sustaining the sentence for contempt.
As the matter was disposed of in the state courts on principles
of general, and not federal, law, we have no choice but to dismiss
the writ of error as in No. 154.
Writs of error dismissed.